

RATHA WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

(1680 A.D.-1707 A.D.)

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A Thesis

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By



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Map of India - 1680 - 1707 A.D.

Map of Maharashtra - 1680 - 1707 A.D.

PREFACE

In the following pages a systematic attempt has been made to study the political history of the Marathas and a part of Aurangzeb's reign roughly beginning from 1681 A.D. and ending with 1707 A.D. which is generally termed as Maratha War of Independence. This study is based on unpublished original Persian and Marathi records as well as all types of published source material. The writer of the thesis is confident that his studies have thrown new and unexpected light on this period of Maratha History.

The writer is grateful to the authorities of the General Records Office, Bikaner and the Bharata Itihāsa Samshodhaka Mandala, Poona for allowing free use of unpublished material in their custodies. He is also grateful to the authorities of Fergusson College, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute and the Deccan College, Poona, for permitting to make liberal use of their libraries. He is equally indebted to Professor G.N.Khare of the University of Poona for his enlightened guidance, allowing access to original source material, illuminating discussions, immensely valuable suggestions and going through the thesis.

However, the writer alone is responsible for the views expressed in developing his thesis as well as for any errors which might have remained uncorrected.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY AND VALUATION OF SOURCES

Original contemporary Primary Source Material.

### A. Unpublished

#### Akhbārāt-i-Darbār-i-Mu'allā (Persian)

In the Rajasthan State Archives in Bikaner there are about 4000 Akhbars or Daily Court Bulletins issued from the Court of Aurangzeb out of which those belonging to Aurangzeb's regnal years 23 to 51 have been extracted and the extracts have been given in Appendix 'A' of this thesis. These extracts have been prepared by Prof. G.H.Khare, Miss Inder Kaur, Shri D.V.Chauhan and myself on behalf of Dhārat Itihās Samshodhak Mandala, Poona.

#### Appendix 'A' (2) - Sāwant Nādi Papers (Persian)

These have been acquired by Prof. G.H.Khare in 1961 from S.A.Chitnis of Sāwant Nādi through the present Sāwant Nādi Chief Shivrām Rāje Phosale. They are about 45 in number, out of which a few have been used in the thesis and the text has been given in the Appendix 'A' (2).

#### Appendix 'A' (3) Neralikar Papers (Persian)

These have been acquired by Prof. G.H.Khare in 1959 from Shri A.S.Neralikar of Nerali (Belgaum). They

are 146 in number out of which some have been used and their text has been given in Appendix A (3).

All these records are contemporary ones and are in the form of Court News Bulletins or Orders issued by superior government officers of the Mughals or Ādil Shāhī Sultans to their subordinate officers and as such are quite invaluable for evidence. They are of the first grade importance. They shed a flood of light on many a point of historical importance which otherwise would have remained in darkness.

#### B. Published

A few of the above mentioned Akhbārs, I was unable to have in the original though they have been used by Sir J. N. Sarkar in his history of Aurangzeb. I have relied for them on Sir J.N.Sarkar's above book.

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April 1922 and Vol. IX, 1928.

The records contained in the above publications are generally original ones, most of which bear seals, signets and different endorsements which prove beyond doubt that they are as authentic as Persian ones mentioned above. And as such they are of immense value as contemporary evidence.

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For The conversion of the dates from Hijra and Julius years, I have generally used G.S.Share's Ephemery and very occasionally Kanna Swami Pillai's 'An Indian Ephemeris, Vol. VI, A.D. 1600 to A.D. 1799'.

ABBREVIATIONS

ADR	Age of Democratic Revolution
APV	Aitihāsik Patravvyavahār
APYV	Aitihāsik Patre Yādi Vagaire
Bayle	Dictionarie, P. Bayle
BISMQ	Bhārat Itihās Samshodhak Mandala Quarterly
BS	Bombay and the Sidis
BUS	Basatin-us-Salātin
Epi.Indo.Mos	Epigraphia Indo Moslemica
GPS	Gadādhār Pralhād Shakāvali
Hadith	A Manual of Hadith
HA	History of Aurangzib
HD	History of Dharma Sāstra
HF	Historical Fragments
HS	House of Shivaji
HGR	A History of Gingee and Its Rulers
JS	Jedhe Shakāvali
KIS	Kāvya Itihās Sangrah Patre Yādya, etc.
KK	Muntakhab-ul-Lubāb-i-Muhammad Shāhī
KGIS	Karvir Chatrapati Charānyachya Itihāsāchī Sādhane
MA	Māthir-i-Ālamgirī
MD	Martin's Diary
ML	Muntakhab-ul-lubāb-i-Muhammad Shāhī
MM	Marāthe Āni Mogal

MSIH	Miscellaneous Sources of Indian History
PM	Portuguese and Marathas
PIHC	Proceedings of Indian History Congress
PIHRC	Proceedings of Indian Historical Records Commission
PSIH	Persian Sources of Indian History
Qurān	The Holy Qurān
Rajwade	Marāthyānchya Itihāsāchī Sādhane
RMP	Rise of Maratha Power and Other Essays
RPME	Religious Policy of Mughal Emperors
SBPM	The Struggle Between the Portuguese and the Marathas on the Goa Border (1659-1763).
SCP	Shiv Charitra Pradip
SCS	Shiv Charitra Sāhitya
SDA	Selected Documents of Aurangzeb's Reign
SHT	Shivaji And His Times
SKPS	Samthajikālin Patra Sārsangrah
SPSS	Shivkālin Patra Sārsangrah
SL	Sanads and Letters
SW	Sawant Wadi
SSK	Sri Sampradayāchi Kāgadpatra
VA	Vakil Reports
WPLI	War and Peace in the Law of Islam



TRANSLITERATION OF PERSIAN ALPHABETS

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## I N T R O D U C T I O N

### INVASION OF THE DECCAN -- INTENTIONS OF AURANGZEB

The history of the Mughal Empire is eloquent about the fact that right from Akbar, the great, till the emperor Aurangzeb, every emperor had the great ambition of subduing the Deccan and bringing it under single banner of the Mughals. On every occasion, during the course of history, it is seen that each of these emperors found some excuse to march their armies into the Deccan plateau. And in each campaign of these Mughal emperors, till Aurangzeb we find that the rulers of the Deccan whether they were Muslims or Hindus did resist such an unwarranted march of the Mughal armies. They gave fights which were commendable. They stood firm in opposing the mighty Muslims. In fact the history of Deccan bears witness to the fact that from Chānd Bibi of Ahmadnagar to Sikandar Adil Shāh of Bijāpur and Sambhaji of Maharashtra, fought the aggressors with their backs to the wall. The resistance was more than formidable.

The Mughal armies had to save their face by seeking an alliance or a truce with the rulers of the Deccan. But rarely the Mughal emperors gave up the idea of conquering

the Deccan. And rarely an instance is found when the Deccani rulers gave up themselves in a way which would have brought dishonour and disrepute for them. Such was the characteristic of the aggressor and equally well was the firmness and resolve of the men who played a most memorable role in the history in defending their liberty, religion and honour.

The cession of the Deccani kingdoms was not accomplished by the predecessors of Aurangzeb. They tried but succeeded only partially. Therefore it was in the fitness of historical events that the Emperor Aurangzeb should have embarked upon this incomplete mission of his predecessors. His was the dream of one empire, one rule and one religion for the entire territory of the Hindustān and the empire had to be of the Mughals, the banner of the Mughal and the religion of Islām. And Aurangzeb was determined to fulfil this dream. The wishes of people whom he was going to rule was not a matter of any serious consideration for him. In fact in the history of mankind, no dictator, more so when he is dominated by a particular type of fanaticism has ever respected the wishes of people. His primary aim would be to impose himself on the people, irrespective of any factual consequences. Aurangzeb, it appears has followed the same policy. Never did he show any respect for the people of the Deccan, nor did he have any reverence

for their religion or freedom. The hardships of thousands of innocent families caused by his devastating campaigns was no eye opener to him. The unhindered flow of blood shed of the poor and the innocent could hardly rouse any feeling of sympathy in him. He refused to recognise the feeling of humanity in the people. What he desired was to become an unquestionable master of India and a missionary of first order of Islam.

What made Aurangzeb to embark upon such a plan which in the final analysis brought him utter disappointment and devastation? The plan cost him more than his most precious life, leaving aside the innumerable hardships caused to thousands of people and many more thousands who lay dead and wounded from his side also. Surely to probe deep into this, it is essential to understand certain facts and factors which profoundly and predominantly influenced the course of his life. His character, his mental and psychological set up, his religious bias and convictions, and the then existing political and social conditions in India would greatly speak about it.

Aurangzeb had a rare gift of superb intellect. It is a noted fact that he was a great scholar of Persian and Arabic. Besides this he also had mastery over Turkish and Hindi languages. Multitude of correspondence, official and nonofficial, of this period will speak about

his diction, his choice of words and mastery over the presentation of matter. Equally well he was familiar with Islamic theology and jurisprudence.

He was a brave and fearless person and had cool and calculating disposition of mind even in the greatest hour of crisis. And he retained the same qualities even at the age of 87, when he conducted the seige of Wāgingerā in person. He defied the death freely. In private life he was a man with simple habits with puritan outlook. But his ways of life were not simple. In politics, cunning and deceit had the uppermost of him. The code of conduct was often modified to suit his conveniences. No hesitation was shown by him in adopting treacherous means or a liberal use of bribes in attaining his political aims. Above all he was a superbly ambitious man and this ambition was backed by his religious fanaticism and iron will. He had the ambition of conquering the throne, he had the ambition of creating the Muslim State in India, he had the ambition of putting Sunni religion on the highest citadel of all religions. And this was the root cause which created imbalance of mind in him. This furnishes us with an explanation of the discrepancies and contradictions in his behaviour and action. In the realisation of his ambition he was most ruthless and cruel. His fights for the throne and the treatment given to Dārā, his brother, his heartless

treatment to Shāh Jahān, his father, and murder of Murād are some of the outstanding examples which throw sufficient light on the mental and psychological build up of this ruler of a contraversial character. "For throne the attainment of which he was purblind to the injunctions of his religion and for which he, like his contemporary Cromwell made a science of fratricidal murder."<sup>1</sup> To him bloodshed and human agony was not a matter of any deserving importance, if only it served his purpose.

Religious leaders must be violent minded. It is a necessary evil. "These turbulent zealots who produce a thousand disorders in a state through their eagerness to exercise dominion over the masses, and who are not sorry to get themselves persecuted, in order that the populace through its sympathy with them in their punishment may be led to revolt and so to complete what the zealots intrigues have begun."<sup>2</sup> How aptly the description is applicable to Aurangzeb, his extreme zeal for religion and to the down trodden condition of the Hindu population. Aurangzeb in imposing the Islamic law and religion fulfilled the role of a violent minded religious leader and the masses in turn fulfilled their part of opposing him.

"Religious controversialists must be unfair minded. Extreme zealots are apt to become credulous and suspicious against people who are suspects in their eyes."<sup>3</sup> Aurangzeb's

biography bears ample witness to his behaviour, which certainly showed the violent animosity he had borne for the Hindus, leaving apart the injustice done to them and their religion.

In his zeal for spread of Islam Aurangzeb even did not care for real Qurānic message and teachings." "There is no compulsion in religion."<sup>4</sup> But in practice Aurangzeb with all the possible means and strength exhibited 'Compel them to come in'. Similarly "fight with them (unbelievers), until there is no persecution and all religions are only for Allah."<sup>5</sup> The existence of other religions was least tolerated by him. On numerous occasions in his reign he introduced such regulations against the Hindus so that they felt humiliated and humbled. There was no justification for his behaviour contrary to the religious code.

"Islām's greatest jihād is, not by means of the sword but by means of the holy Qurān i.e. a missionary effort to establish Islām."<sup>6</sup> The sword could never be used to force Islām on others, compulsion in religion being forbidden in clear words.<sup>7</sup> Fighting was undoubtedly allowed but it was expressly allowed only as a defensive measure against those who were bent upon annihilating Islām by the sword and not to compel people to accept Islām.<sup>8</sup>

Did Hindus in the 17th century raise their armies to

fight the Muslim religion as an aggressive measure? Not only in the 17th Century but the history of previous four centuries shows that the Hindus were under Muslim domination. In the 17th century they united under Shivaji only to throw away the yoke of foreign rule and religion. The life of Shivaji clearly shows that never did he introduce any measure which provoked an attack on Islām. The wars in the Deccan of Aurangzeb's time originated in his bigotedness and the ambition for expansion of Islām. Hindus if they had fought, was only in the defence of their mother land and religion. If Aurangzeb was a puritan and devotee of Qurān and Allah, then how did he violate the Qurānic injunctions? Qurān in advocating peace goes a step further and says that after a war is waged, even in the midst of the war if the enemy wants peace war is to be discontinued.<sup>9</sup> In this context, it is interesting to note an event which took place in November-December 1684, which would enable us to draw correct conclusions about Aurangzeb. During this time Sambhaji sent his vakil along with a vakil of Muhammad Akbar to Aurangzeb through Gāzi-ud-din khan soliciting peace in the midst of war. Aurangzeb did not care to see the petition, on the contrary he declared "Peace with this kāfar bachaḥ (Sambhaji) will be with sword."<sup>10</sup> Therefore it convinces us that never did Aurangzeb follow this injunction of Qurān. He pursued the war till he was victorious. Therefore the defence of Aurangzeb's actions becomes weak.



The Muslims always considered worshipping of idols by the Hindus as detestable. Whenever an opportunity came in way they readily exploited it and thus exhibited least tolerance towards Hindu religion. In 1495, a certain Muslim saint Chāngal came to India from Mecca and destroyed many idols of the Hindus.<sup>11</sup> In another instance we find the Muslims destroyed 27 temples of the Hindus on which the Hindus had spent twenty lac Delhi-vala (a coin) in order to construct Quwat-ul-Islām mosque of Delhi.<sup>12</sup> In Maharashtra, in 1498, a certain Muhammad Zaman constructed a mosque at Chodegaon (then called Kharābābād), on the stone inscription, it is mentioned with pride that the mosque was constructed after the destruction of 33 temples of the Hindus.<sup>13</sup> though the Holy Qurān has forbidden its followers from committing any such acts. Yet the zealot of Muslim religion carried out the job with perfect enthusiasm. It is these types of practices in the name of religion that basically brought the clash between Hindus and Muslims. The peak was reached in the reign of Aurangzeb. Therefore it is in the very cycle of historic process that there has to be an anti-thesis and hence the opposition became firm and determined. The above incidents clearly indicate the Muslim religion was being spread in India with the destructive activities of its followers and therefore it challenged the very soundness and universality and the principles of that religion. Such practices are certainly in contravention to the laws of humanity and therefore deserve condemnation, irrespective

of any religion.

## RELIGIOUS BIAS

### ISLĀM AND HINDUISM -- THE FORCES IN CONFLICT

It is said and generally believed that every religion of world is instrumental to man's moral and spiritual uplift. It is a means to achieve solace and salvation, a means to reach nearer God and thus helps in restoring worldly harmony among the mankind. Every religion speaks about love for neighbours, universal brotherhood and respect for the Natural Rights of man. No religion of the world, whether it is Christianity, Hinduism or Buddhism, propagates amongst mankind hatred for the men holding the religious belief contrary to their own. No religion of the world preaches killing of other human beings in order to carry out its own expansion. The principles of all religions recognise natural law and basic freedom of man to worship God in some form. But such is not the case with Islāmic religion or a religion preached and followed by Muslims. Certain of its principles are contrary to the accepted beliefs of mankind and civilization for centuries together. Islām preaches to wage a war in order to carry out the religious expansion. According to the Qurānic conceptions of Islām a war which has an ultimate religious purpose, that is to enforce God's law according to Islām or to check

transgression against it, it is a just war. No other form of fighting is permitted within or without the Muslim brotherhood. Thus waging war in order to impose its own will on the people of other religions, Islām makes such wars as legitimate ones. And the Hadith supports the view firmly as the prophet Muhammad is reported to have declared. "I am ordered to fight polytheists until they say 'there is no God but Allah'".<sup>14</sup> In order to impose the Islāmic religion on the non-believers Qurān permits the followers of Islām the methods of coercion and use of force or otherwise. The entire philosophy of such action is summarised by Muslim theologists in one sentence 'The Jihād is the peak of religion' and continue to add that 'Had thy lord pleased, he would have made mankind one nation, but those only to whom thy Lord hath granted, His mercy will cease to differ.'<sup>15</sup>

The necessity of understanding the Muslim religion as compared and contrasted with the Hindu and other religions, is two fold. Firstly, what these religions stand for, and their intrinsic value to the mankind. Secondly, these were the forces in conflict in seventeenth century in India, which brought out the Maratha War of Independence in the last quarter of the century.

The crux of philosophy of Islāmic religion with regard

to the non-believers can be understood in the philosophy of 'Jihād'. It distinctively brings out the difference and outstanding views of Islām with a view to enforcing it on all non-believers.

According to Islāmic law, the world was divided into the Dār-al-Islām (abode or territory of Islām) and the Dār-al-harb (abode or territory of war), in other words, Islām does not recognise the world beyond the territory of its own. And all those who do not belong to this territory, Islām should be perpetually at war, according to Qurān's injunctions. The territory of Islām corresponded to the territory under Muslim rule. Its inhabitants were Muslims by birth or by conversion. The Dār-al-harb consisted of all the states and communities outside the world of Islām. The members of this territory were commonly referred to as non-believers or infidels.

The Muslims, thus having set two different camps of mankind, proceeded on further assumption that the ultimate aim of Islām was world wide and all pervasive. In the early history of Islām we find that the Muslims were required to preach Islām by persuasion. The members of other religions had option to embrace Islām as an alternative for paying Jizyā and Islāmic State did not recognise any authority beyond its own. The failure of the other communities in respect of payment of all taxes to the

Muslim State made it necessary to declare a Jihād on the recalcitrant individuals and communities. Thus the Jihād reflecting the normal war relations existing between Muslims and Non-Muslims was the states instrument for transferring the Dār-al-harb into the Dār-al-Islām. It was thus, the product of war like people who had embarked on large scale movement of religious expansion.

What is this doctrine of Jihād? According to Muslim legal theory association of other gods with Allah cannot exist in Islāmic world. The preacher of Islām or Imām always propogated that the abode of Non-believers is hell only and evil is their destination. The Jihād was considered as a measure against polytheism and must be suffered by all who reject Islām, or in case of other communities who refuse to pay the poll tax. In addition to this they accepted the existance of certain classes of people or communities preaching different religion as tolerated religions, provided they pay Jizyā (Poll Tax) to the Islāmic rulers. And thus enjoyed only partial or limited rights as compared to the Muslim subjects.

Jihād is also a form of punishment to be inflicted upon Islām's enemies and the renegades from the faith. Thus in Islām, the Jihād is the 'bellum iustum'.<sup>16</sup> When once Jihād is accepted as a just means to carry out religious propaganda, it is permitted to make use of sword also. In

the early Makkan revelations the emphasis was in the main on persuasion. Muhammad warned people against idolology and invited them to worship Allah. This is evidenced by the verse "He who exerts himself (Jahādā) exerts only for his soul"<sup>17</sup> which expresses Jihād in terms of salvation of soul, rather than a struggle for proselytization. But from the history of subsequent years, this main emphasis on persuasion and salvation was forgotten and the religious wars were carried out on mainly for proselytization a purpose which was not at all originally intended by Qurān. This change in emphasis took place not because the Qurānic contents were changed but the outlook of religious leaders was mainly responsible to bring forth such a deviation. The main principle on which Jihād is based is the spread of Islām. Jihād may be regarded as Islām's instrument for carrying out its ultimate objective by turning all people into believers. It follows that the existence of a Dār-al-harb is ultimately outlawed under the Islāmic jural order, that the dār-al-Islām is permanently under Jihād obligation until Dār-al-harb is reduced to no-existence and that any community which prefers to remain non-Islāmic in the status of a tolerated religious community accepting certain disabilities must submit to Islāmic rule and reside in the dār-al-Islām or be bound as clients to the Muslim community.<sup>18</sup> In order to achieve no-existence of non-believers Jihād was made as one of the five articles of

faith and declared as 'farḍ'ayn' like prayer or fasting. But none of the jurists of the latter period made jihād as collective obligation of the Muslim community and an extremely pacifist sect known as the Waḥyariyya dropped both the jihād against polytheists and fasting from the articles of faith.

The principle of jihād was made applicable to both individuals as well as community and it became the duty of every able bodied Muslim to contribute to the spread of Islām. It started creating a divine monocratic state on an imperialistic basis. Muslim religion combined in itself religion and politics the dualism of an universal religion and an universal state. It resorted to peaceful as well as violent means for achieving the ultimate objective. The universality of Islām provided a unifying element for all believers, within the world of Islām and its defensive-offensive character produces the state of warfare permanently declared against the outside world, the (non-Islāmic world)  
19  
world of war.

Thus in short to conclude the importance of jihād in Islāmic religion and state, it was considered as an instrument deployed to turn dār-al-harb into dār-al-Islām. "The Islāmic state, whose principal function was to put God's law into practice sought to establish Islām as the dominant reigning ideology over the entire world. It refused to

recognise the co-existence of non-Muslim communities, except perhaps as subordinate entities, because by its very nature a universal state tolerates the existence of no other state than itself."<sup>20</sup>

Jihād was a most predominant instrument in carrying out the spread of Islām. In addition to it, the Islāmic state, which has been always considered a Military State, made it obligatory for its king or emperor as their commander to march its soldiers, i.e. followers of Islām against infidels. The King is usually referred to as the Silhouette of God (Zill-i-Jubhāni). The followers are told not to question his leadership. The basic principle of Islāmic Government made it clear that the tolerated religions, unless they convert, as an alternative, to pay poll tax they were considered not to have any rights of citizenship and any say in functioning of the Government. The one aim of the Muslim Governments was to universalise their religion and thus uproot the dār-al-harb from the map of the world. Thus, the Qurānic law proved to be the very life source of all the objects of the kings for the territorial aggrandizement. The Qurānic law has legalized plundering and slaying of the non-believers. This constituted a perpetual state of war between Muslims and the non-Muslims till the latter were completely subdued. This practice disputes the claim of some of Muslim furors that the Islāmic State was a nation or universal monarchy and that the appeal of Muhammad



was not only to the Arabs alone but to the world at large. According to them "the legal prerequisites for a universal State were already recognised in the Qurān, such as equality of all races before God and the common allegiance of all believers to one head of the state"<sup>21</sup>. If this claim is considered to be true and legally sound, both in theory and practice it means that the Qurān recognises the equality of other races before God, irrespective of their beliefs. All men, irrespective of the fact, the faith or religious belief they hold, or whichever race they might belong to were considered by the God Almighty as human beings only. Thus the Muslim furors, advance a claim in respect of Qurānic law which was poles asunder in practice. In the entire history of Islāmic States, such examples are very rarely found where the head of the Muslim State or the religion showed tolerance towards the non-Muslims. If such was the intention of Qurānic Law, then there would not have been any aggression against the non-Muslims. The very fact that the Muslim law made two distinctive camps of mankind, dār-al-Islām and dār-al-harb, made it obligatory for the followers of Islamic religion to wage war against the non-Muslims, till the latter was converted into the camp of believers, shows beyond doubt that the Islamic religion refused any toleration, particularly in respect of the religious faiths of other communities. And evidently so, the practice of all the Muslim Kings who supported their claim of religious

expansions relentlessly and faithfully carried out their wars, caused destruction to mankind and proved to be far away from recognising the existence of other religions, this only goes against its ardent advocates that Muslim religion recognised equality of other races before God. Islām could not tolerate the existence of another God or another religion. "If there were two gods the universe would be ruined."<sup>22</sup> This is the Qurānic injunction and the religious zealots have followed it to its extremity. But certain advocates of Muslim religion maintain that in theory the coexistence of a second universal state is not possible, though Islam tolerated Christianity and Juddism as religions. The claim is too superficial to be accepted, as every keen student of history knows, crusades continued between these religions for centuries. If even we have to accept the statement, we will have to accept it with greater caution and limitation, as the Muslims, if ever they tolerated any other religion it was merely an outcome of chance and necessity as the followers of other religion were either more powerful or superior in number to them. Similar has been the case in respect of Islām and Hinduism. The wars lasted for centuries together, for domination of Islām over the Hinduism. And if even in the history of religious expansion of Muslims in India, they showed any tolerance, it was merely a temporary arrangement, as either they lacked in force or numerical strength to overthrow

the latter or the conditions were so adversary that nothing could have been achieved by them, if they were to fight. Therefore one is forced to draw the conclusion that Islām showed least tolerance of any other faith other than its own and accept this conclusion glibly.

Though the ultimate aim of Islāmic State was to convert all non-Muslims to Islām, yet in practice, this was quite difficult. It is seen from history that the Islamic states had to fight with the other communities and they were not necessarily successful on every occasion. Therefore it seemed quite essential to find out a certain law which would govern the relations of Islāmic States with the rest of the communities. But this type of Muslim law in contrast to almost all other systems was designed to be a temporary institution -- until the people, except perhaps those of the tolerated religions would become Muslim. The modern law of nations presupposes the existence of a family of nations composed of states enjoying full sovereign rights and equality of status. The Muslim law recognises no other nation than its own, since the ultimate goal of Islām was the subordination of whole world to one system of law and religion, to be enforced by the supreme authority of the Qurān. Therefore, every Muslim King had to run in consonance with the aim of the Muslim State which has been defined as proselytization of the entire human beings. And

for similar reason, the law did not recognise equal status of any other community or religion, particularly with whom they were daggers drawn. Thus it lacked the real moral standing or respect based upon reciprocatory feeling and hence proved to be a weaker force, though Muslims, always ascertained that their principles of morality and religion are superior to others.

Such was the religion of which Aurangzeb was not only an ardent follower but a most active agent, whose mission of life was to make India as an abode of Islām and convert all non-Muslims i.e., Hindus into Muslims. He was an emperor and was backed with adequate resources both in manpower and material to put his dream into practice. He considered himself to be the chosen representative of God, who was entrusted to spread the law of God among the non-Muslims. He was an ardent devotee of Qurān and followed its teaching to its all extremities. He enforced Jizyā on Hindu population, demolished their places of worship, imposed new taxes and introduced many humiliating regulations against them. It will be worthwhile to study in details the measures he adopted against the Hindus during his reign in order to understand the subsequent opposition he had to face by Hindu and Rajput rulers and the populace of Maharashtra. It is also intended here to see, the extent of the Islāmic law as preached in Qurān, how it differed in practice from the original, as understood and

implemented by Aurangzeb.

### IMPOSITION OF JIZYĀ AND LAND TAX

In the early days of Islām, Jizyā and land tax were imposed in the form of a collective tribute consisting of a fixed sum of money and a fixed amount of agricultural product. The Qurān refers to Kharāj (land tax) as an income tax favoured by God,<sup>23</sup> and as far as poll tax the term in use was "Jizyā on the head" of every non-Muslim. If a Dhimmī or non-Muslim peasant became a Muslim he was freed of the Jizyā. The Dhimmī was constantly reminded that conversion would free him of the discriminatory poll tax for unbelief. The proceeds of these taxes were to constitute a permanent source of expenditure for the maintenance of the believers<sup>24</sup> engaged in fighting against non-Muslims. But the refusal of payment of Jizyā according to the Hanafi School, is not a breach of obligation, because of their status of having been admitted as Dhimmīs in dār-al-Islām. Those were to be treated gently and put in prison but not beaten, till the payment was made."<sup>25</sup>

Such was the origin and practice allowed by law of Islām in respect of imposition of Jizyā. Aurangzeb who was a puritan, did not appreciate much the policy of toleration showed by Akbar and other rulers, imposed Jizyā on all non-Muslims, or Kāfirs as he liked to call all the Hindu

population. "About the middle of his reign he decided to levy Jizyā tax on the Hindus, as ordained by the Sharā and it was enforced throughout his empire; and a rare piece of good work (HasNāt-i-gharib) had not been done in the past and the Hindus had not been degraded to such a degree in any other period."<sup>26</sup> He was a living person during Aurangzeb's time and has been considered as an official biographer of Aurangzeb, therefore there is no necessity of finding out any additional testimony in order to establish the intentions of Aurangzeb in imposing Jizyā. It was essentially meant to degrade and humiliate the Hindus. According to some "It is well to remember, however, that the Jizyā was levied by Aurangzeb at a time when toleration was an exception rather than the rule in the state craft of the world. It was not necessarily the outcome of any feeling of dislike that Aurangzeb entertained towards the Hindus or their faith."<sup>27</sup>

The words of Aurangzeb's biographer are a sufficient pointer to contradict the conclusions drawn by the above historians. It is worthwhile to study Aurangzeb's system of imposition of Jizyā which would lead us to a certain extent to find out how poor people were squeezed and oppressed more. There were three grades of assessment -- Those possessing property worth 200 dirhams (Rs. 52 i.e. silver weighing 51 tolas, 10 masha and 7 1/3 grains, paid 12 dirhams (Rs. three annas two) as the Jizyā. It was a

capital levy capable of wiping out the whole capital in about twenty years. A transaction dated 10th February 1704 states the rate of interest 4 percent. This would mean in case of poors i.e. the owners of real property worth rupees fifty two, the entire income from that property was taken away as the Jizyā. The second class consisted of those whose income was from rupees fifty two to rupees two thousand five hundred roughly, and were required to pay 6 1/4 percent Jizyā. And those whose property was worth more than 10,000 dirhams, were to pay 48 dirhams. According to other evidence it appears that men belonging to the poor class of the society were to pay Rs. three and annas five as Jizyā. In fact Jizyā at the same rate was collected from the citizens of Nevase in Ahmednagar district, during 1684-85."<sup>28</sup>

On 10th March 1679, Aurangzeb issued a general order for levying Jizyā and its collection from the Hindus. Many mullahs and maulavis were employed on the job of collection."<sup>29</sup>

By 1679 Aurangzeb had advanced so far on the path of bigotedness that it was possible for him to order the levy of the Jizyā on non-Muslims on the representation of Inayat Khan Diwan-i-khalsa.<sup>30</sup> A certain Rayāji Singh (Rayā Jai Singh) gave an undertaking to pay 4 lakhs of rupees Jizyā to Aurangzeb. In turn he got four imperial mahāls.<sup>32</sup>

In 1695 we come across a list of a number of villages in Poona and Junnar districts from where Jizyā was collected.<sup>31</sup> Khafi khān states that Inayat Khan the Biwan of Deccan had granted certain remissions in respect of Jizyā, which considerably roused the wrath of Aurangzeb. And Inayat khan was informed not to repeat this, as Aurangzeb had succeeded in reimposing Jizyā after many difficulties.<sup>33</sup>

#### DESTRUCTION OF TEMPLES

"Generally speaking, the Law (Islāmic) provides that Muslim authorities must guarantee the security of lives, property, churches, crosses, and other religious rites and practices of dhimmis, provided they do not build new churches or display their crosses and pray or ring their church bells loudly."<sup>34</sup> Such was the Qurānic injunction, but in practice, Aurangzeb disregarded this utmost. "Large numbers of the places of the worship of infidels and great temples of these wicked people have been thrown down and isolated. Men who can see only the outside of the things are filled with wonder at the successful accomplishment of such a seemingly difficult task. And on the sites of the temples lofty mosques have been built."<sup>35</sup> What was the crime of the innocent people who erected temples and against whom such destructive measures were launched? Was it that they belonged to a different faith, and observed a different religion than their ruler. Was this a sufficient cause



for such type of destructive measures. There were not many men, who defied Islāmic rule or Mughal law, few did raise their head, but they were crushed ruthlessly. For the fault of a few or none, to destroy all the places of religious worship of the Hindus was in itself criminal. "It is more reasonable to suppose, therefore, that the reason officially advanced in the chronicles was only an occasion if not the excuse (that certain men violated Muslim law), for Aurangzeb's embarkation of a militant policy of destruction of temples."<sup>36</sup> In the first half of the year 1672 government agents were sent to all parganas with orders to carry out destruction of all Hindu temples.

In 1669, Aurangzeb issued orders to destroy the temples of the Hindus, particularly those at Banāras and their places of learnings."<sup>37</sup> On 3rd August 1669, news of destruction of the temple of Rāśī Viśvanāth was received.<sup>38</sup> In 1670, i.e., in the 13th year of his reign, Aurangzeb ordered destruction of Keshe Raya's temple in Mathurā and construction of a mosque in its place."<sup>39</sup>

In October-November 1678, Dārāb Khan took leave of Aurangzeb in order to destroy the temples of Rajputs in Khandel. He reached Khandel on 8th March 1679. He killed many Rajputs and destroyed their temples."<sup>40</sup> On 25th May 1679 Khan-i-JahānBahadur after destroying the temples at Jodhpur brought the idols from these temples to Aurangzeb

at Delhi. He was rewarded and was ordered to place these idols in open space as well as under the steps of Jumma Masjid so that they would be always trampled under Muslim feet.<sup>41</sup> These instances are more than enough to depict the deep seated hatred in Aurangzeb's mind for the Hindus and their religion.

On January 5th 1680 Mubullah Khan and Yakkātāj Khan who were in Udaipur went to destroy a temple over there. About twenty Rajputs bravely resisted them. But the fight was in vain. At last the idols of the Hindus were destroyed."<sup>42</sup> On 13th January 1681 Aurangzeb went to see the tank named Udaya Sagar and ordered three temples there to be destroyed.<sup>43</sup> On 20th April 1680 a temple at Meerut was ordered to be destroyed.<sup>44</sup> On 18th January 1681 Husain Alikhan petitioned Aurangzeb that a temple in front of the palace of the Rana (Udaipur) and 172 other temples in Udaipur district were destroyed by him.<sup>45</sup> In appreciation of his work he was awarded the title of Bahādur Alangir Shāh. On 10th February 1681 Aurangzeb went to see Chitod and there he destroyed 63 temples of the Hindus.<sup>46</sup> On 28th May 1681 temple at Islamabad was destroyed. In June Amir-ul-Umra of Bengal was ordered to destroy temple of Jagannāth.<sup>47</sup> On 30th July 1681 a certain Abut Rao who had gone to Amber destroyed 66 temples there. No resistance of any kind was offered. On 1st February 1683, Prince Muhammad Aazam was ordered to destroy temple of Mahādeo

near Sātārā.<sup>48</sup>

Aurangzeb made an appointment of a special officer to supervise the destruction of Hindu temples in Maharashtra.<sup>49</sup>

In October 1689, he issued orders to destroy all the temples of the Hindus in Karnāṭaka. On receiving the news the local ruler made arrangements to keep more army in readiness in order to fight the approaching aggression.<sup>50</sup>

In November 1693, Sankar, a messenger, was sent to demolish a temple near Sheogaon, he came back after putting it down.<sup>51</sup>

In April of the following year, idol worship was prevented in Jaisingpura near Aurangabad. The priests of the temple were arrested but soon rescued by the Rajputs.<sup>51</sup>

In 1700, January orders were issued to desecrate and demolish temple at Purandhar. The temple in Wāgingera fort was demolished in March 1700. These are the few instances where dates and details are available in the chronicles. But there are hundreds of instances of Aurangzeb's reign where the dates are not available. In short Aurangzeb launched an unprovoked attack on the temples of the Hindus, demolished them and erected mosques in their places,<sup>52</sup> contrary to the law of Islām, as those who paid Jizyā were to be exempted from the destruction of places of worship. Finally, there was no answer for these acts of Muslim ruler. No reaction is seen in the form of opposition except by a few Hindus.

#### FORCED CONVERSIONS

As an ardent devotee of Islāmic religion, Aurangzeb

believed in converting non-Muslims into Islāmic faith, the dār-al-harb into dār-al-Islām. And in achieving this end he did not leave a single stone unturned. The most conspicuous method which was adopted by him in carrying out the spread of Islām was forced conversions. The official machinery was engaged in executing the scheme. The instances of such conversions are numerous. The writer duly intends giving some of them in order to high light the emphasis that was laid by Aurangzeb over this aspect of spread of Islām.

In the tenth year of Aurangzeb's reign Kondāji uncle of Netaji was converted. Netaji was also converted. On 17th November 1661 Raja Rup Singh's daughter who was converted to Islām was married to prince Muhammad A'zam.<sup>53</sup> In 1676 Bai Bhupad, the daughter of Raja of Kistāwar was married to Muhammad Sultan by Shaikh Nizam.<sup>54</sup> On 14th August 1680 Darbar khān was ordered to keep under his watch the women and children of Yāvāl village and 35 men were handed over to I'ktahām khan in order to convert them and teach them prayer.<sup>55</sup> On 6th September 1680 Gharibdas and Bai Singh sent by Mān Singh became Musalman. They were rewarded two thousand rupees each.<sup>56</sup> On 9th June 1681 Rao Jagat Singh Manoharpuri's sister Kalyān guar was converted and renamed Jāni-ul-Nisā Begum and was given 200 rupees per month.<sup>57</sup> On 14th December 1682 Kārtalab

khan who had captured 45 men of Sambhaji was ordered to let go those who converted to Islām. Accordingly 32 men were converted and 13 men were killed as they refused the same.<sup>58</sup> On 31st July 1683 Bahāri and others of Mahdi tribe were converted.<sup>59</sup> On 7th April 1685 Aurangzeb stopped the practice of paying rupees four to a male and rupees two to a female as a price for their conversion to Islām.<sup>60</sup> In 1686 a certain Gangadhar Rangnath Kulkarni, who was forcibly converted and had stayed in the Mughal service requested Maratha King Sambhāji to take him back into his own religion. Accordingly, Sambhaji issued the orders.<sup>61</sup> On 21st April 1686, at midnight, Khwaja Abdul Rahim Khan, brought the two sons of Lanchal, the brother of Pam Rai, who was the munshi of Fazil Khan. Both of them were converted and named Saādat-ullah and Shād-ullah.<sup>62</sup> In 1693, Bala Patil, Venkata Agri and Dharmaji Panvelkar were re-converted to Hinduism.<sup>63</sup> In 1700 two Maratha Sardars, Khanderao and Jagjivan rao Gujar were made prisoners and later on converted. Several converts are mentioned in the News Letters of the period. On 28th February 1702 we find a certain Hindu whose converted name Ghulam Mahamad is only known, on 9th March, Balla; on 12th June Narayan, on 17th November, a Maratha Desmukh and a Hindu Chaudhri and in November a certain Din Dar were converted.<sup>64</sup> Maratha prisoners occasionally provided the material for conversion. After the death of Sambhaji, his daughter who was in

Aurangzeb's captivity was forcibly converted and was married to Faqir Muhammad. Similarly, daughter of Raja Ram was married to Shamsheer Beg. Orphans were all converted to Islām. Thus there were individual and mass conversions throughout Aurangzeb's reign.

#### OTHER REPREHENSIBLE MEASURES AGAINST HINDUS

"Political reason is a computing principle, adding, subtracting, multiplying and dividing true moral denomination .... the true law giver ought to have an heart full of sensibility. He ought to love and respect his kind and to fear himself. Political arrangement is only to be wrought by Social fears. Their mind must conspire with his mind." Such have been the views of Burke, and most of us looking at the history of our civilization will agree with it. A ruler ought to know the mind of people whom he governs. He ought to have a heart full of kindness. But Aurangzeb, stood in contrast with these accepted qualities of a law giver. The reprehensible measures which he introduced against the Hindus, speak more eloquently of his qualities as a ruler and law giver than any explanations of his biographers.

The pilgrim tax on Hindus was reintroduced in April 1667.<sup>65</sup> In 1704, 200 soldiers were placed at the disposal of the censor for the purpose of preventing the celebration

of Holi.<sup>66</sup> Fire works of all kinds were prohibited. According to Fatwa-i-Alamgiri, Hindus were not supposed to look like Muslims. No Hindu person was<sup>allowed</sup> to ride a Iraqi or Turāni horse or an elephant nor was he permitted to make use of palanquin. Imperial orders were enforced against him on the detection of violation.<sup>67</sup> By an order Muslim engravers were forbidden to engrave on the seals of rings of Hindus the names of their gods and goddesses.<sup>68</sup> In 1693-94 Hindus were prohibited from carrying any arms in public. Laws making discrimination between the Hindus and Muslims were passed. The Hindus paid tax on garden produce at the rate of 20 percent, whereas recovery was made from Muslims at 16.6 percent.<sup>69</sup> In the year 1669-70 the Muslims used to pay 2 1/2 percent on the price of their cattle and the Hindus 5 percent.<sup>70</sup> The charges also differed and were fixed in 1682 at 2 1/2 percent for the Hindus.<sup>71</sup> Property tax at the rate of Rs. 42 from the Hindus and Rs. 41 from Muslims was collected.

Thus in short "Like the English puritans Aurangzeb drew his inspiration from the old law of relentless punishment and vengeance and forgot that mercy is an attribute of the Supreme Judge of the universe."

MARATHA OPPOSITIONTHE MEANING OF DHARMA, MANAV DHARMA AND MAHARASHTRA DHARMA

Now here an attempt is being made to explain the meaning of dharma, as it forms the philosophy of Hindu way of life since times immemorial. As is the case with Muslim religion, that Islāmic law governs the life and day to day practices of Muslims or those who believe in Islāmic faith and thus ultimately stands as a highest expression of their life. In a similar way, for Hindus Dharma stands as a highest expression of their life. The Muslim law derives its origin from the Qurān and the hadith. Later on with the passage of time certain usages and practices also became part and parcel of it. These were commonly referred to as religious practices and were understood and interpreted in consonance with the law of Islām. Certain parts of Muslim law and certain religious practices added to the bigotedness of the Muslim rulers brought a clash of two communities namely Muslim and Hindu in the 17th century in India and Maharashtra in particular.

It would be in the fitness of the events to understand this dharma or Hindu religion, which not only stands for religious rites and certain fixed principles or rules of conduct, but also certain concepts, peculiar to the inhabitants of Maharashtra, were added to it, which were commonly referred



to as Maharashtra dharma. A comparative study is necessary in order to understand and conclude the principles of each religion, whether they are justifiable in the larger interests and welfare of humanity.

Justice M.C.Ranade, in his famous book, 'Rise of Maratha Power and Other Essays' has made an attempt to explain the origin and development of the Maharashtra dharma, but it lacks factual evidence. Mr. Bhat in his book 'Maharashtra Dharma' has brought out all the aspects of it and explained the same in a very lucid style. Mr. Sardesai in his book on Bajaram and elsewhere has made only passing reference to such an important phenomena in the life and history of Marathas. The same is conspicuously absent in all the writings about Marathas, by Sir Jadunath Sarkar.

The necessity of dharma was felt by the people of early ages, in order to regulate the Aryan society in securing for the members of that society happiness in this world as well as the next. Therefore the primary purpose of dharma was to regulate life and create harmony in the society.

The meaning of dharma as stated in Vedās, is not only religious rites, but it also included 'fixed principles or rules of conduct'. On some occasions, it appears that it was used to signify merit acquired by the performance of religious rites. <sup>72</sup> In the Chandogya-Upaniṣad (2.23) there

is an important passage bearing on the meaning of the word dharma. There are three branches of dharma, one (is constituted by) sacrifice, study and charity (i.e. the stage of householder); the second (is constituted by) austerities (i.e. the stage of being a hermit); the third is brāhmacārin all these attain to the worlds of meritoriousness, and one who abides firmly in brāhmacārin attains immortality. <sup>73</sup>

In other words dharma here means the various stages that a man has to pass in his life and how best he should dwell upon it in order to achieve the prosperity, peace and finally salvation of the soul. Therefore Brāhmins have been considered in high position as they are supposed to be the symbols of sacredness, and purity of life. The rest of the Hindu society were advised to follow them. It is an expression used to indicate people's fidelity, sacredness and respect for purity in life, rather than in any orthodox and limited sense of the word confining only to a particular caste.

Later on with the passage of time the dharma became prominent in signifying the principles, duties and obligations of a man, his standard of conduct as a member of the Aryan <sup>74</sup> community, as a person in a particular stage of life.

It is in this sense that the word seems to have been used in the well-known exhortation to the pupil contained in the Taittiriya-Upaniṣad (I.II) "speak the truth, practice your

own dharma". It is in the same sense that the Bhagavadgita uses the word dharma in the expression 'Svadharna nidhanam sreyah'.  
75

In the same sense the word dharma is used in Manusmṛti (1-2), the Yājñavalkya smṛti ( ) and Tantra Vartika Medatithi commenting on Manu says that the expounders of smṛtis explain dharma as five fold e.g. varna dharma, āśrama dharma, varnāśrama dharma, naimittika dharma and gunadharna (the duty of crowned king whether Kshatriya or not to protect the subjects). It is by virtue of this gunadharna that the Hindu kings took upon themselves the sacred duty to protect their subjects as well as to defend the dharma.

The Vaiśeṣikasūtra defines dharma as "that from which results happiness and final beatitude."  
76

The authors of Dharma śāstrās laid great emphasis on the duties of every man as a member of a particular class, and very little emphasis on his privileges. Thus it helped greatly in creating solidarity and cohesion among the several classes of the society in India, inspite of their conflicting Hindu ways of living and enabled Hindu Society to hold its own against foreign aggression. These principles which were imbibed deep on the hearts of the Hindus and left an indelible impression on generations to come, helped greatly

to preserve Hindu culture and literature in the midst of alien cultures and inspite of bioted foreign domination.

With the progress of time the ācāra dharma changed. The meaning attached to it in practice and in day to day life certainly put narrow limits on the meaning of dharma, the colour given by the passage of time to certain principles of dharma did amount to making this dharma appear orthodox. But the fundamental question remains unanswered and whether the basic principles of dharma did undergo a change and did they at any stage run counter to the laws of humanity? The foregoing discussion will show that the dharma as preached to and practiced by the Hindus did not propagate an assault on the people holding religious beliefs contrary to their own. It does not speak about any war to be waged with the others or conversion of the people of different faith to their own. This is in very much contrast to the Muslim religion. It gives full freedom for men to lead their life in peace. It gives internal harmony and peace to society and attainment of the immortality of soul by doing such deeds which have the sanctity of purpose and purity of action to the individuals.

The people have the freedom to worship god in any form. The existence of other religions is tolerated. Nowhere it preaches to unsheath a sword against the people of a different faith. It is the sacred duty of the King in

accordance with gunadharmā, to protect his people and to defend their religion. People enjoyed the natural rights of man and there is no restriction of any type.

Such was the Nucleus of Hindu religion which came down to the people in the 17th century in India. Our main question will be completely answered if, we can conclude that the laws of Hindu religion are compatible with the Manavadharma, or the laws of humanity. And also to what extent the law of Islām accommodated itself with these laws of humanity or denied the same. By Manavadharma, or the laws of humanity, we mean that there are certain self evident rights of man since times immemorial, the foremost amongst it is that the God created all men equal and therefore they have the right to lead the life freely, in order to seek happiness in this world. That they are bound to each other in such a way as to promote the internal harmony of the society and thus be engaged in the pursuit of happiness. In order to achieve this end, one of the most dignified principle that was accepted was that, no human being has the right to kill the other except in self-defence. Therefore, bloodshed and massacre was prohibited totally for promoting the interests of the society.

Secondly, the laws of humanity recognised from very early days the man's right to worship God in any form. In other words there was no compulsion in religion. A man

should not be forced to follow principles of any particular sect or religion. In religion, a man is allowed to follow the dictates of conscience only. Thus the freedom to worship God and follow any religion became acceptable to all and became a spiritual force, rather than a cause of any material conflict. Any such coercion, contrary to dictates of the conscience of a man was to be met firmly, religious zealots are warned strongly against any such tendencies and acts on their parts. It was made clear to all that "a Resort to Force is apt to provoke a resistance which may recoil upon the aggressor". Religious persecution is sinful because no man has a right to stand between another human soul and God". In the words of Lock "nobody ought to be compelled in matter of religion either by law or force".

Religion can not be inculcated by force, there is no such thing as belief that is <sup>not</sup> held voluntarily. Again to quote Lock, "All the life and power of true religion consists in the inward and full persuasion of the mind; and the faith is not faith without believing and such is the nature of understanding that it cannot be compelled the belief of any thing by outward force. Nobody is a born member of church..... but every one joins himself voluntarily to that society in which he believes he has found that profession and worship which is truly acceptable to

God..... No religion which I believe not to be true  
can be either true or profitable to me ....."

Why should there be toleration? "Each sect attributes  
to the other the teaching of horrible impieties and blas-  
phemies and pushes its animosity to the farthest limits,  
yet, according to all the laws of decency, doctrines of  
this kind are precisely those in which people ought to be  
the most ready to practice a mutual toleration. Intolerance  
would be pardonable<sup>in</sup> a party that could give a clear demon-  
stration of the truth of its opinions and could make  
clean cut, categorical, and convincing answers to the diffi-  
culties. But when people are obliged to say that they  
have no better solution to offer than (that these are)  
secrets which are impenetrable to the human intelligence  
and which are hidden in the infinite treasure houses of  
the incomprehensible immensity of God, it seems quite in-  
excusable that people who find themselves in this intellec-  
tual predicament should take a high line, should hurl the  
thunder bolt of anathema, and should banish and hang their  
opponents."

Why are there religious wars? The devastating effects  
of wars of religion are well known everywhere and in all  
ages. Its zeal for opinion that hath filled our hemisphere  
with smoke and darkness and by a dear experience we know  
the fury of these flames <sup>78</sup> hath kindled." Therefore,

"rulers ought to employ a page to repeat to them every morning," see that you do not torment any one on account of his religious opinions, and that you do not extend the power of the sword to touch the conscience." <sup>79</sup> The wars of religion mostly took place because one particular religion thought that the people of other religion must accept their faith i.e. their principles. There was no middle way but to perish if they failed to accept that particular religion. Thus public peace came in danger. The religious leaders of such communities always looked upon themselves of fulfilling the mission irrespective of the damage to humanity. Such conduct is detestable beyond words. They never cared for the consequences of their assault on the established customs of other religions. This naturally would involve resentment from the members of other communities and religions and thus the first spark of war of religion is kindled, in order to create large flames to consume many innocent human beings.

In India the first major battle of this type took place when Prithvi Raj went down in the battle of Tiraori (1193) leaving aside the clashes of Muhammad Ghaznavi and Muhammad bin Qasim with the Indians in earlier period. Since then for next five centuries India became a scene of such aggressive wars by alien rulers. The Muslim domination was being made firm in each successive century. The Hindu population was being crushed slowly and gradually in the



Deccan. Climax was reached in 1565, when at Talikota the last singular force of Vijaynagar opposing the Muslim aggression practically sunk into the oblivion. Thus the grip of foreign domination over the majority of the population became so firm, that even the slightest opposition which was there was finally strangled and disappeared. In all these battles, the dormant principle was spread of Islam. Every war was coloured as a religious war and every soldier who died on the battle field, according to Islāmic law became a martyr as he fell while fighting the cause of religion and non-believers.

And for next century or so the entire land of the Deccan meekly submitted itself to these devastating conditions both religiously and politically." Every generation that had passed away in this state had actually made the rise of a Hindu to sovereignty more and more difficult. Indeed, the very tradition of Hindu independence and Hindu maintenance of a complete and self-contained kingdom seemed to have faded into a dim, distant and almost forgotten memory. Thus, when in 1659-60, a poor friendless middle class youth of thirty two set himself at once to face the might of the Mughal empire (then in noon-day splendour) and the nearer hostility of Bijapur .... he seemed to be the maddest of all mad men."<sup>80</sup>

And this brave person to oppose single handed was

none else but Shivaji the founder of Swarājya and defender of Hindu dharma and faith. Why there was such an opposition? The Mahomedans, according to their principle of faith, are under an obligation to use violence for the purpose of bringing other religion to ruin,...."<sup>81</sup> More than this the Muslim rulers created such compelling conditions that the majority of the people come to gather.

The sufferings of the Hindus were more than lamentable. Therefore, it appears true that "If men enter into seditious conspiracies it is not religion inspires them to it in their meetings, their sufferings and oppressions that make them willing to ease themselves. Just as moderate governments are everywhere quiet, everywhere safe, but oppression raises ferments and makes men struggle to cast of an uneasy and tyrannical yoke ..... There is only one thing which gathers people into seditious commotions and it is oppression..... "Further men gather in opposition not because of any diversity of opinions, a matter which certainly cannot be avoided, but the refusal of toleration to those that are of different opinion or faith. Many such instances can be cited from the history of India and from the history of Muslim rulers, when they showed complete intolerance towards others. After the successive Muslim rulers having practised the same principle of spreading Muslim domination and faith, Aurangzeb's reign was a fitting

climax to these historical developments. On many an occasion the men were executed due to religious persecution and thus an element of fear was created among people. It cannot be denied that the fear of death penalty has a great effect in silencing people who might have doubts to put forward against the dominant religion and also great effects in maintaining an ecclesiastical unity in externals, but any dogma that sanctions this practice will be condemning itself to what happens with bombs, mines and other infernal machines employed in war. The people who are the first to <sup>use</sup> these gain great advantages from them and so long as they have the upper hand they are in clover, but, when they lose the ascendancy, they are hoist with their own petrad." <sup>82</sup>

It is only necessary for us to apply this to the Muslim rulers and practices in India, and then we know how truly they (Muslim rulers) are hoist with their own petrad. Prof. G.H.Khare has rightly pointed out that by 1318 A.D. the kingdom of Yadavas and their allied kingdoms in Maharashtra were destroyed by the alien Muslim rulers. In earlier times also there were Muslim aggressions of Saks, Huns, etc. on India and many of them settled down in India. Due to their nature and habits they merged their identity with the Indians, so much so that their separate existence was not at all felt. But those alien Muslim rulers who attacked India and later on settled down

in India had a definite notion that their own religion, culture and language were superior and they owed their existence to it. They considered the destruction of others as their primary duty. During the process of establishment of their rule, they destroyed many temples (of Hindus). They not only destroyed the temples, but converted them into mosques. The (Hindu) hermitages were transformed into Muslim places of worship and many Hindu schools of learning were converted into Muslim schools. The names of villages and towns of Hindus were reconstructed on Muslim theme. The local saints and men of learning were driven out of their places, as against this (Muslim) saints in Iran were honoured and encouraged. Bahamani kings gave protection to the Muslim saints, poets, etc. and many of them came from outside India. Baba Kamal, Gesu Darāz, Maulana Pir Muhammad, Shah Tāhir, Shāh Niamatullah, Junaidi Azafi Nazir, Firishta etc. Many Muslim places of worships outside India also received royal patronage. The languages like Marathi and Sanskrit (of the majority of the people) were neglected and in its place Persian and Arabic received paramount importance. Many people were converted forcibly. In short the rightful owners of this land became beggars.

Why did Hindu rulers and population oppose Aurangzeb? Hindu opposition to Aurangzeb was quite strong and determined. The correspondence of contemporary rulers like Shivaji,

Sambhaji and Rajput princes throws sufficient light on this fact. Some of these letters written by Prince Akbar, son of Aurangzeb speak eloquently about the aggressive imposition of Muslim rule by Aurangzeb and subsequent opposition by the Hindus. In a letter he says "From the beginning of his (Aurangzeb's) reign it was the intention of Alamgir to utterly ruin all the Hindus alike. On the death of Shahrajah Jaswant Singh this intention became revealed to all. His war with the Rana (Raja Singh of Udaipur) was also the outcome of this design..... As all men are the creation of God and he is the protector of them all, it is not proper for us as Emperors of India to try to uproot the race of land owners for whom is India. Emperor Alamgir had carried matters beyond their limits."<sup>83</sup>

In another letter prince Akbar has rightly brought out the condition of the Hindus to which they were reduced owing to the treatment accorded by Aurangzeb. "Aurangzeb's treatment of the Hindus has become manifest. .... As for instance in the affair of Kutar Kishan Singh, though it happened owing to his youthfulness, yet it too was a sign of bigotry of Alamgir which he displayed to that community in every way."<sup>84</sup>

The Hindus and Muslims were poles apart in their outlook towards life. Muslim rulers predominantly wanted to spread their religion by all means. Hereas the task

of the Hindus was to survive against such an onslaught. Therefore Hindus could not fully trust the Muslims. During Shivaji's time we find the cause of Hindu opposition in the following assertion: "Muslim is disloyal. After the business is over he will ruin you with one excuse or the other. This is Maharashtra Rajya. All should gather courageously with their armed might and serve the master (Shivaji) loyally." <sup>85</sup>

Raja Ram Singh wrote to Sambhaji about the conditions prevailing against the Hindus in India and expressed a wish to fight the aggressive Muslim rule. He showed willingness to work along with other Hindu ruler like Sambhaji for the cause of the Hindu religion. Sambhaji in a spirited reply wrote to him "If such is indeed your real intention then you yourself ought to take the lead in this affair. The present wicked Emperor believes that we Hindus have all become effeminate and that we have lost all regard for our religion. Such an attitude on the part of the Emperor we can not any longer endure. We cannot put up with anything derogatory to our character as (Kshatriyās). The ..... injunctions of religion..... which we can not allow to be trampled under feet, nor can we neglect our duty as Kings to our subjects. We are prepared to sacrifice everything, our treasure, our land, our forts, in waging war against this satanic Emperor.... We have killed many a brave captain of the Emperor, imprisoned several, released

some after exacting ransom and some out of compassion; several effected their escape by offering bribes.... The moment has now arrived when the Emperor himself can be captured and made prisoner with the result that we can rebuild our temples and restore our religious practices we strongly assure you that we have resolved to execute all this in the near future."

This one letter of Sambhaji makes sufficiently clear the purposes of the struggle, the strong opposition to Muslim rule and fierce determination to carry out the same. And indeed the happenings in Maharashtra since 1680 till 1707 were the bold consequence of the fierce determination of the Maratha rulers for creating the Hindu state, protecting the Hindu religion and to show to their opponents that the Hindus had really not become effeminate. There can not be a better analysis of the cause of determined Hindu opposition to Muslim rule in general and Aurangzeb in particular than Sambhaji's own reading of the then existing political situation expressed in the above letter.

#### THE UNIFYING FORCE

The Muslim rulers of Delhi from time to time invaded Deccan in order to establish their rule. "..... a new danger threatened the country in the attempts made by the Delhi Emperors from Akbar to Aurangzeb to extend the

Mahomedan power again to the south of the Narmadā and the Tāpthi rivers..... The first shock of the Mahomedan invasion had been borne and surmounted, and the country had during the last three hundred years shown considerable rallying power. The old system of playing the waiting game and allowing the Mahomedan rulers to dissolve themselves in luxury would not have served the purpose. The new danger required new tactics, but above all tactics, what was wanted was a new spirit, a common feeling of interest, a common patriotism born of a liberal religious fervour. The scattered power of the Marāthā chiefs had to be united in a confederacy, animated by a common purpose, and sanctified by common devotion to the country."<sup>87</sup>

Such an unifying force was provided by the development of Maharashtra dharma. The works of Maratha poet-saints for over four centuries prior to the actual collision, provided the necessary background. Saints like Mukundrāj, prominently contributed to the development of the language and was uniting force in pre-Dnyāneshwar period. Subsequently Dnyāneshwar, Nāndev and Eknāth imbibed on the people the glorious principles of the dharma and toleration towards the others. In later period, Tukarām through lucid and simple composition of Abhanga touched upon all the stratas of the society in expressing and practising the dharma. Rāmdās and his Pāsboḍh are well known in Maharashtra,



through this book, he preached the Maharashtra dharma and imbibed on the minds of the people its eternal values to the mankind.

The impact of Maharashtra dharma in the 17th century in the Deccan was very great particularly in respect of political situation. It was a great factor in uniting the people. It was considered to be symbolic of the dharma in progressive form. Majority of the people followed it and therefore their loyalty to Maharashtra Rājya was astounding and unflinching.

Maharashtra dharma was a great unifying force in the entire struggle of the Marathas. Elsewhere in the introduction I have already explained meaning of the Maharashtra dharma its symbolic representation of the Hindu dharma, here, with the help of contemporary records I would like to bring home the significance and importance of Maharashtra dharma and Maharashtra Rājya.

In a letter, Rājārām the Maratha king, while organising the people wrote "you have expressed a wish to serve this country of God and Brāhmanās and thus bring prosperity to yourself. This has been conveyed through Shāmji Chintāmani. I am very much pleased. There could not have been a better object than this. This kingdom is the kingdom of you people ..... you should join with your armed contingent and thus help in carrying out the mission."

Rājārām in this letter has made king a subordinate entity. Emphasis is laid on the fact that the kingdom belongs to the people. And therefore the people must strive for its existence. The crying need of the hour was armed men to fight Aurangzeb.

Again recruitment is not done on any hired or payment basis. The very sentiment and the feelings of the Marathas are roused. Thus they are being asked to take up arms in order to protect their sacred kingdom, a kingdom symbolic of gods, purity and fidelity.

In another letter Rājārām wrote "your intentions of protecting the Maharashtra dharma have been fully conveyed. Therefore the Chhatrapati is pleased to grant six lakh <sup>89</sup> honas to you and Krishnāji Chorpade....." for accomplishing a special mission, and it was nothing but capture of the most prominent places including Delhi under Mughal rule.

Thus the people were being enthused to unite. Maharashtra dharma proved to be a magnetic force attracting all the people in Maharashtra under one banner and for the singular cause of the Maharashtra Rājya.

The contemporary records speak most eloquently about this strong and underlying unifying force. There are a series of such correspondence but to quote a few, from Rājārām to Sakādāji Saurāj

” हे राज्य म्हणजे देवाब्राम्हणाचे आहे धर्मस्थापना विशेषा  
कारे चालविणे हे स्वामीस अत्य ” 90

(This kingdom is the kingdom of God and Brāhmanās. To establish the dharma is the foremost duty of the king).

In another letter Rājārām wrote to Bāvāji Gosāvi

स्वामीचे राज्य म्हणजे देवाब्राम्हणाचे त्या राज्यात देवस्व  
दिवाणात जमा केले ते काही कल्याणदायक नव्हे 91

(This kingdom is the kingdom of God and Brāhmanās. You have set aside the fidelity, it is not proper).

In other letter from Rājārām to Triambak Krishnā we find श्री सत्पुस

पाचे देवस्थान बहुत थोर व हे महाराष्ट्र राज्य म्हणजे देवाब्राम्हणाचे  
(It is the sacred place of saint, and this Mahārāshtra आहे 92

Rājya, means the kingdom of God and Brāhmanās.

Similar contents are found in some of the letters written by Anachandrapant Asāṭya, the noted minister of Rājārām. He wrote to Bhānaji Gopāl .....

सत्पुस पाचे देवस्थान बहुत थोर आणि हे महाराष्ट्र राज्य म्हणजे देवा  
ब्राम्हणाचे आहे 93

In a letter written by Rājārām to Annāji Janārdhan, the same contents are repeated and emphasised.

हे महाराष्ट्र राज्य म्हणजे देवाब्राम्हणाचे आहे 94

Another minister of Rājārām Shankarāji Nārāyan also expressed the same feelings towards the kingdom of Marathas, when he wrote to Annāji Janārdhan " देवस्थान परम थोर व स्वामी

सत्पुस बहुत थोर हे राज्य देवाब्राम्हणाचे आसिर्वादाचे आहे 95

Similarly one of the Maratha officers writing to Algodā

Desai in Karantak also expressed the same feelings, when he wrote " हे महान्हाष्ट्र राज्य जे आहे ते तुम्हा लोकांचे आहे तुम्ही लोकां ह्यात राज्याची अनुकूलता आंतःकरण पुरस्कर करावी येणेच म्हण तुम्हा लोकांचे अंतर्गत अर्चित आहे. तुम्ही हे गोष्टी करीतच आहा १६

(This Maharashtra Rajya is the kingdom of you people. You must always strive for this kingdom. In that way only you will prosper. You are already acting upon it.....")

#### ACHIEVEMENTS OF SHIVAJI -- AN INSPIRING FORCE TO THE MARATHAS

After the decline and fall of Vijayanagar Empire, there was no independent Hindu kingdom as such in entire India. Everywhere there were Muslim rulers, whether it was Delhi, Golkonda, Bijapur or Ahmadnagar. The Hindus were apparently subdued. Their religion was suppressed. Their culture was in a dilapidated condition. The people had become disheartened and there was not even a distant hope of their rise or protection of their religion. Every face that was seen was far from blossoming. Every village was littered with the wreckage of the invading armies and wore a look of destruction. The masses had become down trodden. They were patiently bearing the inhuman treatment meted to them by their rulers.

To those down trodden and oppressed masses Shivaji brought the message of freedom and the faith in religion.

He gave them the cause to unite, <sup>o</sup>enabled the cause of freedom and religion. He with his relentless efforts imbibed on the people that if they unite in fighting for Swarājya, they can become once again a free people. This was a great Idea-force. It was some thing like Mazzini's 'Roseregimento' i.e. Idea-force of one Italy. It mobilized the public. He enlivened their hopes. He discarded their fear and once again reaffirmed faith in their capacity to challenge the alien rule.

The idea of Swarājya was brought to them like kindled fire. The fire was most sacred, all pervasive and consuming everything. The flames of this fire ultimately consumed the great armies of Muslim rulers and thus established the Hindu rule.<sup>97</sup>

The entire Maharashtra was reduced to non-entity, slavery and ridicule by the Muslim rulers.<sup>98</sup> People violently expressed the need for breaking the chains of slavery and alien domination. The depth of the feeling can be well imagined. The humiliating conditions one had to face under the domination of Muslims, needed relief. The great Shivaji appropriately felt the depths of feelings of the people and took upon himself to challenge the Muslim rule.

Shivaji's attack on Durgals at Junnar on 30th April 1656, brought the first collision between him and alien

Muslim rule. It was like a thunder bolt heavily charged, suspending in the atmosphere, to fall upon any moment and crush everything beneath. It was for the first time in the history of the Deccan that a small chieftain threw a serious challenge to a such well established rule of the Mughals and other Muslim rulers. In May 1661, Shāistā Khān came as a Mughal viceroy to the Deccan. In April 1663, Shivaji displayed a most conspicuous feat of daring and bravery in launching a night attack on Shāistā Khān.

As was the attack unexpected, so also the success Shivaji got and far reaching were its repercussions. Here in for the first time a serious friction started between the Mughals and the new leader of the Marathas. Elated by his success, on 6th January 1664, Shivaji made a daring attack on Surat and thus made it known to all about his strength to humble the most powerful rule.

Such was the humble but firm beginning of the new Maratha nation which Shivaji created. Shivaji was the first to challenge Bijapur and Delhi and then teach his countrymen that it was possible for them to be independent leaders in war. Then he founded a state and taught his people that they were capable of administering a kingdom in all its departments. He has proved by his example that the Hindu race can build a nation found a state, defeat enemies. They can maintain navies and ocean trading fleets

of their own and conduct naval battles on equal terms with foreigners. He fought the modern Hindus to rise to the full stature of their growth..... His splendid success fired the imagination of his contemporaries and his name became a spell calling the Maratha race to a new life ..... The imperishable achievement of his life was raising of the Marathas into an independent self-reliant people, conscious of their oneness and high destiny and his most precious legacy was the spirit that he breathed into his race."<sup>99</sup> Aurangzeb once said "He was a great captain and the only one who has had the magnanimity to raise a new kingdom, whilest, I have been endeavouring to destroy the ancient sovereignties of India; my armies have been employed against him for nineteen years, and nevertheless, his state has been always increasing."<sup>100</sup> There cannot be a greater tribute than this to the magnanimous achievements of Shivaji paid by the sworn enemy of Shivaji.

Thus the entire struggle was a national struggle, a struggle for independence, a struggle for freedom of religion. The majority of the people united in arms for this cause. The same was continued with equal zeal, enthusiasm, national spirit and feeling of patriotism by the successors of Shivaji. The resistance of the Maratha power was not mere accident due to any chance combination, but was a genuine effort on the part of a Hindu nationality,

not merely to assert its independence but to achieve what had not been attempted before the formation of a confederacy of states animated by a common patriotism.

The Marathas continued fighting even after the death of Shivaji. There was no going back from the ideal of independence. Sambhaji, Rajaram and a majority of their contemporary Maratha Sardars united themselves, with least resources, but with a common aim of protecting the Maharashtra Rājya and Maharashtra dharma. The struggling Marathas "not only outlived opposition but derived greater strength from the reverses it sustained from time to time, rising phoenix-like in greater splendour from the very ashes of its apparent ruin."<sup>101</sup>

Their secret of success was deep in the broad foundation of strong feeling for Maharashtra Rājya and Maharashtra dharma, in the hearts of the people. Though it is true that some of them did betray yet in the course of history, it should be borne in mind that such human weakness has prevailed in all periods, in all countries at all times. Therefore it should neither come as a shock nor a matter of disappointment. What was seen out of this War of Independence was that the people were "strongly bound together by common affinities of language, race, religion and literature and seeking further solidarity by a common independent political existence."



The War of Independence was a conflict between incompatible conceptions of two communities, and it carried out with violence a conflict that had already come into being. There is no reason to suppose that one side in this conflict was moribund, the other abounding with vigour. It is sufficiently enlightening to see it as a conflict in which one would prevail at the expense of the other. It is hoped that readers, whichever side their own sympathies may go, will at least agree that there existed a real conflict of two principles.

Lastly "Every nation or group of nations has its own tale to tell. Knowledge of the trials and struggles is necessary to all who would comprehend the problems, perils, challenges, and opportunities which confront us today."<sup>102</sup> It is not intended to stir a new and unending controversy. Nor is this work done with any feeling of animosity against any religion or creed. But it is written with the intentions of a dispassionate study of certain historical events, the trial and tribulations which the past generations of the Marathas had to confront in defending Religion, Liberty and Honour.

FOOTNOTES

1. PIRC 1940, pp. 271-73.
2. Bayle 4926 s.r. Leda.
3. Bayle ii 1089 t.s.r. Episcapius.
4. Qurān 2:256.
5. Qurān 8:61-62.
6. Hadith pp. 252-53.
7. Qurān V-4.
8. Qurān XI 5, 6.
9. Qurān V.8.
10. Appendix A No. 177.
11. Epi. Indo. Mos. 1909-10. Quoted by Prof. G.H.Khare in PSIH Vol. I, p. 2.
12. Epi. Indo. Mos. 1911-12. Quoted by Prof. G.H.Khare in PSIH Vol. I, p. 13.
13. PSIH Vol. I, pp. 93-96.  
 Though Qurān makes this point clear further, by stating that the dhimmis or non-believers have no right to raise new pagodas or crosses. Their old buildings and pagodas will not be destroyed provided they pay the necessary taxes. But it may be pointed out that these restrictions are imposed on those non-believers who are already in Dar-ul-Islam.
14. WFLI p. 75. Bukhārī, Kitāb-al-Jāmi al-ṣaḥīḥ, ed. Krenl. (Leiden, 1864), Vol. II, p. 236; and Abū Daūd, Sunan (Cairo, 1935), Vol. III, p. 44.

15. Qurān AI, 118, 119.
16. WPLI, p. 57.
17. Qurān, AAIX, 5, 6.
18. WPLI, p. 64.
19. WPLI, pp. 63-64.
20. WPLI, p. 51.
21. WPLI, p. 17.
22. Qurān, XXI, 22, 23.
23. Qurān, XXIII, 74, as quoted in WPLI, p. 190.
24. WPLI, pp. 125-26.
25. WPLI, pp. 195-96.
26. AA, p. 529.
27. RPMB, p. 159.
28. SCS, Vol. IV, No. 694.
29. AA, p. 174.
30. RPMB, p. 153.
31. MSIN, Vol. I, p. 137, No. 139.
32. Appendix A, No. 174.
33. AA, pp. 377-78.

The only exception we come across about the exemption of jizyā was in August 1685 in respect of people of Fardāpur, who deserted the village on account of jizyā. On a request of Nawāb Bāi, Aurangzeb exempted collection of jizyā in Fardāpur. (Appendix A No. 179).

34. WPLI, p. 195.
35. MAP, 528.

36. RPME p. 140.
37. MA p. 81.
38. MA p. 88.
39. MA p. 95.
40. MA p. 173.
41. MA p. 175.
42. MA p. 186.
43. MA pp. 188-89.
44. Appendix A No. 173-a.
45. MA p. 189.
46. MA p. 189.
47. Appendix A No. 173 b and c.
48. Appendix A No. 173-d.
49. RPME p. 148.
50. MD Oct. 1689 as quoted by J. Sarkar in HS p. 235.
51. RPME p. 147.
52. The only exceptions we learn are about Chinchwad and  
Māhur two places, in respect of which Aurangzeb continued old  
sanads.
53. MA p. 37.
54. MA p. 148.
55. Appendix A No. 175-a.
56. Appendix A No. 175-b.
57. Appendix A No. 175-c.
58. Appendix A No. 175-d.
59. Appendix A No. 175-e.
60. Appendix A No. 175-f.

61. SKPS No 189 P 65
62. MA pp. 273-74.
63. SOS Vol. IX, No. 83, p. 86.
64. RPMB, p. 182.
65. Appendix A No. 175-g.
66. RPMB, p. 149.
67. RPMB, p. 150.
68. RPMB, p. 130.
69. RPMB, p. 151.
70. RPMB, p. 151.
71. RPMB, p. 151.
72. HD, Vol. I, p. 2.
73. HD, Vol. I, p. 2.
74. HD, Vol. I, p. 2.
75. HD, Vol. I, p. 2.
76. HD, Vol. I, p. 3.
77. Bayle, p. III, 2596-b Synergistes.
78. Bayle, Glanvill, J., the Vanity of Dogmatizing (London).  
1661 Eversden, pp. 229-31.
79. Bayle, III, 1845 a and b, S.V. Macon.
80. HS, pp. 103-04.
81. Bayle, p. iii, 1859 S.V. Mahomat.
82. Bayle, p. i, 5436 S.V. Leze.
83. HS, p. 201.
84. HS, pp. 204-5.
85. SGP, Jedhekarinā, Kānhoji Jedhe.

- 86. HS, p. 206.
- 87. RMP, pp. 19-20.
- 88. SCS, Vol. IV, No. 726, pp. 78-79.

It is not known to whom Rajaram has addressed this letter. Nor any definite data is available. This letter was found in the records of Ghorpade family. Therefore, probably it might have been addressed to some Ghorpade.

- 89. SCS, Vol. V, No. 767, pp. 10-11.
- 90. SSK, No. 88, pp. 141-42.
- 91. SCS, Vol. V, No. 827, p. 66.
- 92. SSK, No. 82, p. 133.
- 93. SSK, No. 86, p. 139.
- 94. SSK, No. 80, p. 130.
- 95. SSK, No. 84, p. 136.
- 96. SCS, Vol. XII, No. 75, p. 42.
- 97. Shiv Dhārat, Introduction, p. 195.
- 98. Shiv Dhārat, Chapter 5:44.
- 99. SHT, p. 388.
- 100. Historical Fragments, Section I, p. 120.
- 101. RMP, p. 2.
- 102. A History of the English Speaking People, Vol. I, p. xvii.

CHAPTER I : PHASE I : SAMBHAJI (1627 TO 1689)

MARATHAS AND THE MUGHALSPHASE I : SAMBHAJI (1680 TO 1689)A. THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN  
MAHARASHTRA AT THE TIME OF SHIVAJI'S DEATH

3rd April, 1680 was a most significant day in the history of Maharashtra. It marked the end of a great man and demarkated an equally great rule from the past and future. The day was significant for the death of a man who rose from comparative obscurity to the great heights of kingship, who imparted courage and confidence, new vision and new values to the people of his age and a man who established faith in their religion and gave them freedom to follow their own religion and thus reinstated man's lost faith in civilization, culture and progress. The event was of still greater significance to the Maratha people. Its immediate repercussions as well as its future consequences were of great importance not only to the Marathi speaking people, but to the whole population of India. The history of India of the subsequent years was being formulated and shaped here. In the setting of the sun the day saw passing away of the most glorious person, the Indian history ever produced, the great Shivaji, the founder of a new kingdom, and reviver of



The old faith and religion in an improved form. On this day, the soul of this ardent fighter for freedom departed from this earthly world casting a spell of gloom and melancholy over a 4 million people.

The new state of Maharashtra was in its infant stage. The roots of Svarajya had not become firm in the soil of Maharashtra and suddenly the sappling was cut off from its very life force, as the death struck its founder, Shivaji the Great. Behind him were left many knotty problems still unsolved. A big vacuum was to be filled up in the form of succession to the throne, as the great ruler named two heirs. The potential contestants were his two sons, Sambhaji and Rajaram, from his two different wives. The country apparently looked to be divided on the issue of succession. And this naturally brought dissensions amongst the ablest and most trustworthy followers of Shivaji.

Besides this there were many problems, problems of greater dimensions, the problems which could ill afford delay in attending to them. Most important amongst them was an impending danger of external aggression. The strongest enemy of the new state was Aurangzeb, the greatest of the Mughal emperors, the most orthodox amongst the Sunnis, whose mission of life was to exterminate non-Muslims and non-believers of his own faith. It was his

cherished desire to crush the new state of Maharashtra with all his might and strength. He was on the look out of an opportunity and in the death of Shivaji, he readily found one. He was not one to let it go waste. The crying need of the hour for the people and the king of Maharashtra was to organise proper defence forces in order to meet the eventual attack by the Muslim ruler. The able statesmen and worthy ministers trained in state craft and left behind by Shivaji were quick enough to grasp this haunting problem of protection of the state. Equally well, the generals of his army, who had mastered the technique of warfare from their master Shivaji, could ill afford to neglect the strategy of future war with surrounding Muslim states of Bijapur and Hyderabad as well as the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb. The people were to be awakened about this impending danger, any neglect of it meant slavery and serfdom for many years to come, if not total annihilation.

Another problem constantly faced was about religion. For in the past many a century, people were forcibly converted to Islam. With the rise of Shivaji and with the creation of a new state the Hindu religion was re-established. The roots were yet to go firm, when its deliverer passed away. There was all possibility of the past being reviewed in respect of religious practice.

Therefore the foremost problem was preservance of Hindu religion. Besides this there were enemies at sea. The Portuguese, the Dutch, the English and the Sidis, were out to pick up troubles.

At the time of Shivaji's death Sambhaji was at Panhālā. The whole situation has been described by English Factors in their letter of 19th April, 1680.

"Nothing more worthy your Honours notice, except to advise your Honour etc. of the death of Shivaji, whose death we fear will cause a great deal of trouble in these parts, for most of the merchants are ready to run away, and certainly should any lashkar, come near the place, they would embark. Sambhaji Rajah has taken up his quarters at Panhālā where goes daily to him abundance of soldiers, he hath sent down and stopped all the corn that is in town and ordered it sent upto him -- we likewise do expect that the place would suddenly be secured by Sambhaji Rajah's party, and what we shall do in that condition, we leave to your Honour etc. to judge." <sup>1</sup> From the above letter intentions of Sambhaji are made very clear. In general the public opinion was bound to be also in favour of Sambhaji's succession to the throne. A Marathi letter of the same period speaks in similar way. It speaks, before this date (19th April, 1680). "Sambhaji was at Panhala. The army joined him. Sambhaji enforced economic

blockade. Ordered all the grain to be carried to Pannhālā. There was a general fear that Sambhaji's men may attack Karwar."<sup>2</sup> From it appears that Sambhaji took over the kingdom and his immediate plan was a likely attack on Karwar.

We find by 27th April, 1680 Sambhaji assumed complete control of his kingdom. Rajapur Factors state "Sambhaji has taken upon him to govern and title of king. He has sent for all persons that were in command as Subahdars, Havildars, etc. Some he imprisoned and some he discharges of their employs, we have lately come here new subahdar sent by him."<sup>3</sup>

On 12th July, 1680 the Bombay Factors informed "Sambhaji is publically declared Rajah, "the country begins to be well settled ..... report speaks of him as very diligent and careful."<sup>4</sup>

Thus we see that there was a favourable reaction to Sambhaji's accession to the throne among the subjects. The formal coronation of Sambhaji took place only in February 1681. He had assumed full powers of a king and became the leader of the Marathas before that date. On gaining the throne the first fight he gave and that which is on record is against the Muhammadans and is dated 21st July 1680. The letter of the above date states

"Shiv Chatrapati's son Sambhaji was ruling this territory of Chick-Balapur. At that time, Balaji Krishna was in charge of the Fort of Jagdeva. On the orders of Raghunath Pandit, he took charge of the fort Nandi. The Muhammedans had come with large forces to capture this fort, but they were defeated.<sup>5</sup> From the letter it is not evident who were these Muslims. It can be guessed that these might be a part of Bijapur forces. But there is no conclusive evidence to say so.

From a letter of 20th August, 1680 written by Chopra Factors to Surat, it appears that Sambhaji had an intention of giving a battle in open field to Khan-i-Jahan Bahadurkhan, the Subahdar of the Deccan appointed by Aurangzeb.<sup>6</sup> But we do not come across any such battle between the two. After Dasara festival of 1680 was over, we again find some movements of Sambhaji's troops. Sambhaji's army in three divisions including horse and foot was to march in three different directions namely Surat, Burhanpur and Aurangabad. With the news of the raid, Khan-i-Jahan Bahadurkhan moved towards Khandesh, and the Marathas withdrew.<sup>7</sup> Meanwhile during January, 1681 a false rumour gained currency that Sambhaji was killed by his sardars and Shivaji's younger son (Rajaram) was made Rajah and also Raghunath Pandit was put in chains. But, this, of course, was totally false.

After becoming king, Sambhaji had real relief at least for sometime to come from the aggressive sword of the Mughals. The Mughal armies were busy fighting war with the Rajputs.

#### B. BURHANPUR PLUNDERED

The significant event nearing the end of 1680 was the plunder of Burhanpur by the Maratha forces headed by Himbir Rao, the famous general of Shivaji. This event took place in the month of October-November 1680.

More details of this event are given by Khafi Khan and Bhimsen. He writes, at that time the Subahdar of Burhanpur was Khan-i-Jahan Bahadur Khan and his deputy Kakkar Khan was away on the job of collecting jizya tax. Sambhaji was ravaging the territory of Khandesh with twenty thousand men. Passing further about 70 miles this army fell on the Suburbs of Burhanpur. The people over there had least expected any such attack; they were, therefore, ill prepared for the defence. The garrison of Burhanpur consisted of 250 men. Kakkar Khan on his return did not have enough courage to give open fight. Therefore he chose to withdraw within the fort. The Marathas burnt various parts of the city and carried away the loot worth lakhs of rupees, in addition to gold, ornaments, precious stones, foodgrains, glass wares, etc. Khan-i-Jahan, on

receipt of this information made a speedy dash from Aurangabad and reached the ghats of Fardāpur, a place 32 miles northwards of Aurangabad and rested there for some-time because of continuous march.

Meanwhile the Maratha forces received intelligence of Khan-i-Jahān's arrival. The nearest resort of safety for them was the fort of Salher which was in the territory of Bāglāna. They took up the road via Chopda and reached Salher after four-five days march.

Khan-i-Jahān did not proceed further; instead he turned towards Bābulgaon, a place 32 miles from Aurangabad and encamped there. There he learnt that another Maratha force was coming up by way of Ahmadnagar and Mungipathan to raid Aurangabad. The Maratha force had assembled at Bālpurā Suburb and Satara village. Though Anup Singh Rathod was there, he had a scanty force at his disposal. Khan-i-Jahān, therefore, rushed there. But the Marathas<sup>10</sup> fled away without fighting.

#### C. SAMBHAJI AND MUHAMMAD AKBAR

In the history of Mughal dynasty succession to the throne has always remained a problem. And it is a strange fact, a student of history comes across that from Akbar the Great, till the death of Aurangzeb, the sons of every

ruling emperor have rebelled in their own life time and tried to establish their right of succession to the throne. Whether it was Jahāngir, Shah Jahān, or Aurangzeb each one in its own turn repeated the history.

Therefore the course of event was not unexpected when prince Muhammed Akbar, the fourth son of Aurangzeb declared himself emperor of India. The event took place on 1st January, 1681.

Akbar with his Rajput army and followers marched on Ajmer, to defeat and capture Aurangzeb but he was disappointed in his design. And he had to take to flight. He crossed Narmada near Akbarpur on 4th May, 1681 accompanied by Durgādās Rathod.

Where was he to go? The only place where he could seek shelter was Maharashtra, and the only king in the Deccan who could give him assylum was Sambhaji, in the face of mighty opposition of Aurangzeb.

As was expected Sambhaji extended his hospitality to the son of his sworn enemy. The prince Akbar entered Konkan, escaping the chasing armies of Khan-i-Jahān, Mir Nurullah, Quildar of Thalner, Raja Devi Singh Bundela<sup>11</sup> faujdar of Baglan and near Trimbak (Nasik) he was welcomed by Sambhaji's officers and was conducted with honour to Pali (in Konkan). This happened on 1st June, 1681.



Akbar was accompanied by 400 cavalry and a small body of infantry and fifty camels for transport. 300 Maratha foot soldiers formed his body guard. A fortnight after his arrival Hiroji Farzand brought a letter and presents for him from Sambhaji.

Thus the inevitable had happened. In giving shelter to Akbar, Sambhaji hastened up what is usually referred to as 'his doom'. This we shall discuss in the next few paras after analysing the intentions of Aurangzeb in coming to Deccan.

According to Bhimsen, Aurangzeb left Ajmer for the Deccan in order to suppress his rebel son Akbar. Khāfi Khān, attributes one more reason in addition to the above. The Emperor (Aurangzeb) started for the Deccan in order to<sup>12</sup> punish the infidels and chase his rebel son. He started on 8th September, 1681 and entered Burhānpur on 13th November, 1681. From there he started for Aurangābād and reached it on 22nd March, 1681. And from now onwards we see the beginning of a real struggle between the Marathas on the one hand and Aurangzeb on the other.

From the records it is seen that Akbar was in Maharashtra for some years and he did stay here. What was his mission in coming over to this Maratha King? And to what extent it was fulfilled? If we go through the events

of this period and study the relationship between the two parallel personalities, we shall be able to draw conclusions about these questions.

Akbar came to the Deccan with the expectation and hope that Maratha king Sambhaji would help him with military and economic aid in order to carry out his designs i.e. making a grand march to the North in order to defeat and depose his father Aurangzeb, their common enemy. He wanted to execute this plan without loss of any time. During this period Aurangzeb was busy with fighting Rajputs, his defence therefore would have been less effective as he would have to fight on two fronts. Thus he would be weakened and he would easily secure the throne for himself. What terms did he offer to Sambhaji in turn for this help? We are still in darkness about it.

But the trend of events did not move according to the expectations of Akbar. For some time after his arrival at Pali, Sambhaji could neither go and see him nor grant an interview. He was much occupied with his internal affairs. Thus much of the precious time was lost. By June 1681 Maharana made peace with Aurangzeb. And on 31st July Mughal armies set out under the banner of prince Azam to the Deccan. Aurangzeb himself took this challenge seriously and we find by the middle of November all the

military strength of the empire was being directed to the Deccan. The best generals of the Mughal army, three sons of Aurangzeb and he himself directed and supervised the operations in the Deccan for next twenty five years.

On 22nd March, 1682 Aurangzeb was at Aurangābād. He secured all the frontiers with strong garrisons.

During this period Akbar did not remain inactive. Day by day he was collecting, more and more men. His preparations for executing the plan were on. "Akbar's force increases daily. He hath now about 1,500 horse and at Trimbak (there) awaits him 5 or 6 thousand horse more. Sambhaji is daily expected to wait on him and it is said will with 2000 horse conduct him to Burhanpur, where all the Hindu Rajahs will meet him and some umaras that are his friends. From thence they intend to march for Delhi."<sup>13</sup>

Earlier than 8th September, 1681 Sambhaji informed Akbar that he was prepared with 30,000 soldiers to attack Burhanpur.<sup>14</sup> This indicates that the preparations for march to the North were afoot. Apparently it looks Sambhaji had approved the plan of Akbar and accordingly he was keeping Akbar informed about it. On 12th October, 1681 we find Sambhaji at Rahiri (Raigadh). Here he enquired about the conspiracy of poisoning and preparations for an

<sup>15</sup>  
 attack on Burhanpur, therefore it appears that till  
 this date he was firm in the plan of campaign. The news  
 of this large-scale preparation is further confirmed by  
 Bombay Council to Surat Factors in their letter dated  
 27th October 1681. It says "Sambhaji Rajah is making ready  
 great forces both horse and foot to assist Sultan Akbar.  
 It is said, in a month more they may march out of these  
 parts and that intend to march straight away for Burhanpur  
 -- God help you and the Hon'ble company's concerns from them.  
 Ram Rajah's mother (Boyarabai) is dead, by report poisoned  
 by Sambhaji Raja's contrivance."<sup>16</sup> And then on 13th  
 November a meeting took place between him and Akbar at  
 Patschauri. What transpired in this meeting we do not  
 know, as no account of this meeting are available to us.  
 But one thing appears to be certain from the subsequent  
 events that this proposed march on Burhanpur did not take  
 place. In March 1682, Sambhaji was busy fighting his  
 enemies on sea, particularly the Sidis at Janjira and the  
 Portuguese.

It is not surprising to know with the trend of events  
 and failure of Sambhaji's army accompanying Akbar for the  
 campaign of the North, that Akbar must have had a large  
 share of disappointment.

This state of affairs continued till December, 1684.  
 When again we find from a letter written by Akbar to

Sambhaji that a desire has been expressed by the former<sup>18</sup> to meet the latter. At this time Akbar is at Malkapur. There he talks about accomplishment of some business. The same subject has been dealt with in another of his letter though undated and addressed to Kavi Kalasha.

Records are silent about subsequent events. It is not known whether the meeting actually took place or not. But very clear is conclusion that no substantial results came out of it. A month after i.e. on 18th January 1685 Akbar writes to Sambhaji. "It is certain that by this time the Mughals have gone away (or otherwise) you have marched with your army as you had written to me, towards Khelna. If you write I too shall go and join you in the campaign."<sup>19</sup>

This is the last letter of Akbar available indicating his activities. From other sources we gather that he did take active part along with Sambhaji's troops fighting against the Portuguese. He was also connected in conducting the peace negotiations along with Kavi Kalasha with Prince Aazam, the Dutch officers and the Portuguese.

In February - March 1687 Akbar sailed for Iran. Akbar left both Maharashtra and India in sadness, grief and disappointment. It had dawned upon him finally in 1687 that his ambition and mission of launching a massive

attack on the Mughal divisions at Ahmadnagar, Aurangābād, Junnar and Burhanpur, thus make way for the campaign of the North and ultimately secure the throne had failed. He looked upon his host Sambhaji for aid in this hour of necessity. But he failed to respond. According to Akbar Sambhaji's war with the Portuguese, the Dutch and the Bidis was wasting away men and material.

It is rather difficult to read what transpired in the mind of Sambhaji, but with ease we can see the existing political situation, the problems arising out of it, and the priority each one received by the ruler.

The historians of Sambhaji have always questioned the political wisdom of Sambhaji, in handling Prince Akbar's stay in Maharashtra. In the opinion of some of them, Sambhaji should have appreciated and valued greatly the marvellous opportunity he got in the form of prince Akbar, the most beloved son of Aurangzeb, exploited it to the best for political advantage. He could have even if he wished so, easily dictated his own terms to Aurangzeb and saved Maharashtra from the future blood shed and ravages in the country. As no such indications are shown from records of that period, could not Sambhaji have followed a bold policy urged by prince Akbar, of an attack on the Mughal divisions at Ahmadnagar, Aurangābād, Junnar or Burhanpur and made way for the invasion of the North.

No. He did not do that. Though from records we find that there were military preparations to launch a grand scale attack. But nothing seems to have materialised. According to J. Sarkar, "Sambhaji's interest did not exactly coincide with Akbar's. Why should he go out of the safety of the Deccan hills and jungles into the broad plains of North India, where his troops would lose their natural advantage? Why should he denude his country of its defenders by accompanying Akbar in the wild project of invading Hindustan, give Aurangzib an opportunity of conquering Maharashtra in his absence and cutting off his return home from North India, where a defeat would mean annihilation for the Maratha army? His work lay at home." <sup>20</sup>

I do not agree with the views expressed by J. Sarkar. Firstly, in the beginning Sambhaji very well knew the extent of risk involved in giving shelter to the son of his sworn enemy. His ablest generals also knew well in advance the consequences that they and their country would be required to face for running such a risk. The political conditions were very clear. Aurangzeb would not have remained a silent and passive spectator of the situation. He was sure to march to the Deccan, with all his strength. He had never pardoned Shivaji for raising a new kingdom, when he was destroying others. In fact, he was on the look out of an excuse. And shelter given to

prince Akbar by Sambhaji readily provided one. The matter was only of time, as he was occupied with a war in Rajputana. Therefore in the proper context of political perspective, the political wisdom demanded that Sambhaji should have exploited this ready opportunity to serve the best of his political interests, if necessary even by using Akbar as a hostage. In anticipation of a prolonged war with Aurangzeb, it was necessary for him to prepare his armies and equip his soldiers for the necessary battles whether in plains or in the hills. He had inherited well trained armies. The soldiers had partaken in many operations, the army generals were of high calibre and had fought severest battles in the time of Shivaji. They were both physically and psychologically prepared for such an eventuality. What was required was a capable leader to march them in the battle field. Therefore it sounds more logical that any attack by Sambhaji's forces before Aurangzeb's army had settled down in the Deccan, would certainly have caused an alarm to Aurangzeb's designs and would have impeded free and unopposed march of Mughal armies in Maharashtra. To say that, by launching such an invasion he was risking the safety of the state, appears to be incorrect. Because the first principle of any war is to launch an offensive in enemy's territory. And the party which does it first has fifty percent victory to its credit. This blow certainly serves a deterrent and acts as a demo-



moralising force on the enemy. Thus Sambhaji could have well adopted this course of launching the offensive.

From the activities of Sambhaji during this period it appears that he chose the role of a defender instead of an aggressor, which in itself has got certain inherent defects, and from the happenings of subsequent years we can well imagine the consequences of his activities. It may be that he thought of giving priority in dealing with the enemies at sea first. It may be that he was doubtful about the leadership and support of Akbar. But then there is no evidence for such thinking. In all probability had Sambhaji achieved success against Aurangzeb, in the face of greater odds, it would have been but inevitable for Aurangzeb to pay the same tribute to this valliant son, as he paid to his great father on the latters death. Did not Shivaji run the same risk in all the battles he fought, whether against Bijapur armies or Mughals?

D. SAMBHAJI AND THE MUGHAL ACTIVITIES IN MAHARASHTRA  
(MAY, 1680 TO APRIL 1684)

From May 1680 to April 1684, is a period marked for the brisk activity of Mughal generals, who were pouring in Maharashtra one after the other. There appears to be a general mobilization of troops of Aurangzeb from North to the Deccan in order to destroy the Deccani kingdom.

By about 7th July 1680 Ranmast Khan with 400 men went to Hanvantgadh [Hanumantgadh] in order to lay siege to it. This was under Maratha possession. Khan-i-Jahān Bahādur went towards Dhrupgadh.<sup>21</sup> A Maratha force was busy repairing a small fort near Mulher. Debi Singh,<sup>22</sup> the Mughal Qāledar clashed with it and drove it away.

In August 1680 the Marathas looted 25 guns of Mughals near Sholapur. They were being carried away on the orders of Khan-i-Jahān Bahādur. As a result of it Ali Āgā Rūmi, Jagat Singh Hādā and Raja Jaswant Singh Bundelā who were supposed to carry these guns lost their mansab and had to make the loss good.<sup>23</sup> By December Sambhaji was near Sholapur. Ranmast Khan and other Mughal officers gave a battle to him.<sup>24</sup> Many men were killed on both sides.

In March-April 1681, Kalandar Khan the Mughal Qāledār of Naldurg gave a fight to the men of Sambhaji, who had gone there to plunder that territory. Khan-i-Jahān Bahādur appointed Ranmast Khan and others to chastise the Marathas.<sup>25</sup> A battle took place and the Mughals claimed the victory.

By about April-May the Maratha forces were in the vicinity of Aurangābād, ravaging the Mughal territory. Ranmast Khan, Musfar Khan, Dāud Khan and other imperial soldiers gave fight to the Marathas. Fifteen hundred Marathas were killed and many were injured. They carried

away the booty that they plundered.<sup>26</sup>

Sambhaji's men were active near Indore.<sup>27</sup> Khan-i-Jahan Bahadur sent his son Muzfar along with the imperial men to chase them away. They chased them about 50 miles, then the battle took place on the plains of Dharampur.<sup>28</sup> Many Marathas were killed with no conclusive results.

On 31st July 1681 prince Azam got the title of Shah<sup>29</sup> and was appointed to the Deccan expedition. He reached Aurangabad on 11th November 1681.

The Marathas were active near Sangamner in August 1682. Two hundred cavalry men and 500 foot soldiers of the Marathas alighted about 2 miles from Sivner and carried away 1600 cattles. Naroji the Mughal thanedar of Sangamner did not give fight as he was scared of the large number<sup>30</sup> of the Marathas.

Seeing the plight of his army and the forts under their possession, an order was issued by Aurangzeb to Ikhlas Khan that he should inspect various Mughal forts, if necessary get them repaired and make arrangements of other provisions for these forts. He was asked to follow the route of Ahmadnagar and Pedgaon and return by way of Sangamner and Newasa. A similar order was issued to Atish Khan, the Mughal officer in charge of the artillery<sup>31</sup> in the Deccan.

On 27th October 1681<sup>32</sup> Tulich Khan was sent on the Deccan Expedition and was presented a special robe. On 1st March 1682, Aurangzeb set on his march from Burhanpur to Aurangabad,<sup>33</sup> and reached Aurangabad on 23rd March 1682.

In September 1682, there was a rumour that the Marathas were coming to Antor. Immediately, Abdul Aziz Qiledar of Junnar and Shah Muhammad Thanedar of Akola were asked to go for his help. But Shah Muhammad delayed and as a result of it he lost his mansab.<sup>34</sup>

As the Marathas were active in all parts of the country, their king Sambhaji was also equally occupied with the same problem, and particularly, stopping the Mughal forces entering the Talkonkan. He issued orders to his various officers and men to keep a watch on the roads of Talkonkan and close them to the Mughals.<sup>35</sup> He called all his officers on various posts in Talkonkan and put them on alert and made them aware of the danger. By October all the roads to Konkan were strictly closed<sup>36</sup> and no Mughal soldier was allowed to pass by these roads.

On 19th September 1682, prince Muiz-ud-din came to Aurangzeb.<sup>37</sup>

The Marathas were active in September 1682 near Khima river on the imperial borders. Prince Azam was in that

territory. He appointed men to chase away the Marathas.<sup>38</sup>  
 On 28th September, Bahādur and others were asked to go <sup>39</sup> in  
 the valley of Talkonkan.

The Marathas appeared in the vicinity of Antor.  
 About 10 to 12 thousand cavalry and infantry men ravaged  
 that territory. The Mughal Thanedār begged for help.  
 Immediately, Shihabud-din Khan was ordered to go for his  
 rescue.<sup>40</sup> But it seems that he did not reach there, as  
 on 3rd October 1682, he was asked to proceed to Ahmadnagar.<sup>41</sup>

On 22nd October 1682, prince Aazam encamped at  
 Tembhurni, while Gulich Khan and Sarafrāz Khan with 13  
 thousand men crossed the Bhima in order to chastise the  
 Marathas.<sup>42</sup> On 5th October, Bahādurji, brother of Hindurao  
 was given a robe of honour and was appointed to the army  
 of prince Muiz-ud-din.<sup>43</sup>

On 5th October Māmūr Khan was asked to go to Bāglāna  
 as the Marathas appeared there.<sup>44</sup>

By about 14th October 1682, Maratha force appeared  
 in the vicinity of Nāsik, where the Mughals had stronghold,  
 plundered and burnt a few villages and went away.<sup>45</sup> Wise  
 after the event, Aurangzeb issued strict orders to Rājā  
 Manohar Dās Gor Qiledār of Lāmsej, Rājā Rān Singh Thanedār  
 of Nāsik and Shāh Muhammad Thanedār of Akolā that they  
 should remain alert about the enemy.<sup>46</sup>

By 18th October 1682, Sambhaji's men went to Khandan<sup>47</sup> fort in order to lay siege to it. The Mughal Qiledar Allah Yar Khan chased them and captured their 10 men.<sup>48</sup> On 19th October Khan-i-Jahan Bahadur was asked to go to Varghat from Ramsej and Bahadur Khan to Talkonkan. Similarly Shihab-ud-din Khan to go to Chakan, where the<sup>49</sup> Marathas were quite active.

The Maratha activities about collection of chauth and ravaging the Mughal territory had become quite alarming. As a consequence of it Aurangzeb issued orders to Mukkaram Khan, Shihab-ud-din Khan, Bahroz Khan and other commanders of the Mughal army as well as the Mughal thanedars that they should not permit the Marathas to collect chauth and should either arrest or chase them away. And in case the strength of the enemy was more then with cooperation of each others, they should chastise the enemy. Finally he warned them that, if inspite of this the enemy enters into anybody's territory then he would be stripped off his<sup>50</sup> position. It is interesting to see that this order of Aurangzeb hardly created the desired effect. The events to follow amply show us that the Marathas continued their activities as in the past. They appeared everywhere and collected the chauth.

On 1st November 1682 the Marathas attacked Shaikh Budha a servant of Dilerkhan along with 300 persons, who was carrying cash and other goods to Kamal-ud-din. It was

a night attack. Some men of the Shaikh Budha were killed<sup>51</sup> and the Marathas carried away the cash. Dilerkhan hastened for the help, but it was too late.

Thus we see from the events that in all parts of Maharashtra, the Marathas were harrying the Mughal forces, may be in small numbers, but they were certainly resisting everywhere. In the latter half of October and before 3rd November, it appears from the records that a major battle took place between these two forces, 40 miles from the Bhima in the Maratha territory. The Maratha army was led by its commander-in-chief Hambir Rao and Vithoji (Chavan) along with twenty thousand cavalry and foot soldiers. From the Mughal side were Gulich Khan, Sarafrāz Khan, Yalbarāsh Khan, Kamāl-ud-din Khan and Kisher Singh Hādā accompanied by 7 thousand cavalrymen. About 3 to 4 hundred Marathas were killed and many were wounded. In all probability the Marathas appeared to be victorious.<sup>52</sup>

On 5th November, prince Muiz-ud-din was ordered to proceed to Pedgāon with a warning that no person of the enemy was to be allowed to come there.<sup>53</sup>

Aurangzeb seeing the effective resistance of the Marathas and unfamiliarity of his men with the terrain of the Deccan, ordered a detailed geographical survey about it, particularly about valleys or the hilly passages in existence for entering into the Deccan. Soon he received

the information that there were 360 valleys, out of which, sixty five were such that the elephants and camels could pass and the rest were very difficult and the roads were very narrow.<sup>54</sup>

The Mughal soldiers were not familiar to such a jungle life. In the valleys of the Deccan they were finding it extremely difficult to survive. Bahādur Khan arrived at Bālāghāt, with 9 thousand men. Saifullah was guarding it. Along with him was Kānhoji Dakhani who was familiar with that region, accompanied by his 2 thousand men. The condition of the Mughal army had become bad. There was scarcity of the grain. The grain was sold at 5 seers a rupee and there was no money with the men to buy it.<sup>55</sup>

Shihab-ud-din Khan was carrying out the mission of destroying the villages unhindered. By about the first week of November, he entered Talkonkan/<sup>and</sup> with the help of a certain Isā, a zamindar of Talkonkan, he ravaged some villages, killed 4000 men, and carried away 1000 men and 4000 cattles.<sup>56</sup> Then he arrived at Junnar, ravaged and burnt 20 villages in that region, and killed many men.<sup>64</sup> On 22nd November, 1662, Abdun Nabi Beg was given the title of Rozwihān Khan and was given charge of the artillery of the Deccan.<sup>58</sup>



In November the Marathas crossed the Māngangā river and appeared in Gāndāpur with 1500 men. The Mughal faujdar asked for help. And Tirandāz Khan came to his rescue.<sup>59</sup>

On 28th November 1682, the Maratha force consisting of 6 to 7 thousand men came to Sanganner for collection of chauth. Nāroji, the Mughal thānedār of Sanganner rode the horse. Muḡfar Khan and Rāo Muhakam Singh etc. who were going towards Aundhāpattā, were asked to block the roads. Nāroji encircled the Marathas near Bhojpurā. A battle took place. Many Marathas were killed, prominent amongst them was Lakhmoji, a Maratha commander. His head was cut off and sent to Aurangzeb. An equal number of the Mughals were also killed.<sup>60</sup>

Then there was news about the Maratha's attack on Thālner. Therefore Shihāb-ud-din Khan was asked to remain alert.<sup>61</sup> On 28th November 1682, Aurangzeb received the news that 2 thousand cavalrymen of the Marathas came to village Mehandali for ravaging. Mukkaram Khan rode the horse. On 20th November, at Uran, a village 30 miles away from Mehandali a fight took place. Many men were killed on both sides. About 50 men of the Marathas were taken away as prisoners.<sup>62</sup>

A Maratha force under Nāro Trimal appeared in the vicinity of Shikārpur. Mankoji, the Mughal Thanedār

of Shikārpur gave a fight and defeated the Maratha force.<sup>63</sup>  
 The Maratha forces frequently appeared near Tembhurni.  
 Bahādur Khan who had just gone there from Talkonkan chased  
 them away. He built a small fortress there and united  
 the Zamindars of that district.<sup>64</sup> In December a Maratha  
 force appeared near Bidar for collection of chauth. It  
 ravaged some villages and carried away men and cattles.  
 From there it went to Berar.<sup>65</sup> The Mughal officer  
 Mukkaram Khan did not have the courage to resist. Imme-  
 diately Khan-i-Jahān Bahādur was ordered to proceed there  
 and chastise the Mughals.<sup>66</sup> Mughal/<sup>Khan</sup> was given cavalry men  
 and was asked to proceed to Purandhar. He was warned to  
 guard that territory. By about 27th December he reached  
 Purandhar, looted and burnt 27 villages in the vicinity  
 and killed and wounded many men. The Marathas under  
 Mānkoji put up a brave defence. He was assisted by  
<sup>67</sup>  
Thākur Banjārā.

Shihāb-ud-din Khan went to Lohgadh from Chākan, as  
 a Maratha force appeared there. On 14th December, a fight  
 took place. Sixty Marathas were killed. From there he  
 went to Visāpur, where the Marathas were collecting the  
 chauth. He rode a horse for about 60 miles and drove them  
 away. From there he went to Kasur, and gave a battle.  
 About 150 men of the Marathas were killed. Though he got  
 the victory yet all his men were killed.<sup>68</sup> Therefore

the victory does not appear to be real. From there he destroyed 18 villages. And for these brave activities, he received a sword and an imperial farman as a reward.

On 21st December, a warning was issued to Munwar Khan, Subahdār of Burhānpur to remain alert as the Marathas were active in Bāglāna.<sup>69</sup> Khan-i-Jahān Bahādūr was asked to remain at Nasik and Aurangzeb desired to send Ruhullah Khan to Berar.

In December, Hambir Rao, the Maratha general accompanied by 5000 cavalry and 15000 foot soldiers planned an attack on prince Aazam's camp, from the rear. But the prince got the news in advance. He appointed Firūz Khan, Rāo Anup Singh and others as rear guards. Culich Khan, Hasan Ali Khan, Anirudh Singh Nādā and Sarafrāz Khan on his left and right flank and on the front guard. A severe battle took place, apparently with the defeat of the Marathas. Firūz Khan was wounded as well as Culich Khan also received bullet wounds. Eight hundred were killed and 700 men of the Marathas were captured. Most of the Mughals were also killed.<sup>70</sup>

In the same month, the Marathas were active, near Hanumantgadh, Āvlā Jāvlā and four other forts collecting the chauth. The Mughal Ciledar of Dhrupgadh, Nekhām Khan sent his men to resist them. About 15 men of the Marathas

were killed and injured. Similarly, most of the Mughal soldiers were killed and wounded.<sup>71</sup>

In January the Marathas were active in the vicinity of Kolhāpur. Qāsim Khan and Iraj Khan gave a fight to the Maratha force.<sup>72</sup> A little later, in the same month, prince Aazam who was in the territory of Bijapur marched into the territory of Kolhāpur but was driven away beyond Bhima by the Maratha general Hambir Rao.<sup>73</sup> In the beginning of January Shihāb-ud-din Khan attacked the Maratha forces, near Rājgadh, Purandhar and Shivāpur. He was strongly resisted by the Maratha forces. Many men were killed on either sides. He was victorious. He recovered 16 swords, 40 dhups, a kettle drum and palanquin.<sup>74</sup> By the end of this month, Mānko Ballal, a Maratha Commander of Sambhaji, along with 5000 men attacked Maldurg. Qāsim Khan rode horse and gave battle. Mir Abid, the diwan of Qāsim Khan's army and many others were killed.<sup>75</sup>

On 18th February, Vithoji (Chavān) along with 4000 cavalry and foot soldiers arrived and closed the roads. Padam Singh was appointed vanguard and other men as rear guard by Izzat Khan, the Mughal officer. A battle took place. Nearly 400 men of the Marathas were killed and wounded, with an apparent victory to the Mughals.<sup>76</sup>

On the same date 5000 musketeers of Salābat Khan and Atish Khan were ordered to join prince Aazam's army.<sup>77</sup>

On 23rd February the Marathas appeared in the vicinity of Ahmadnagar. Tirandāz Khan was ordered to resist them. <sup>78</sup>

The Marathas were so active and their resistance was so powerful during this period that the Mughal commanders when ordered to face them, were trying to avoid it with one excuse or the other. An interesting example of this is that on 23rd February, Kasim Khan was ordered to go to Talkonkan for the help of Bahadur Khan, who was already facing the Marathas there. But he put an excuse that he was not familiar with that region. Finally, Aurangzeb asked Muḥallāh Khan to accompany him to Talkonkan. On 25th February Khan-i-Jahān Bahādūr was asked to go to Maldurg as the Marathas were very active there. <sup>79</sup> During the last week of February a Maratha force consisting of 7 thousand men was active near Jālnā <sup>80</sup> collecting chauth. Munawwar Khan was ordered to chastise the Marathas. The Marathas carried away 10 elephants of Shah Alam and destroyed the camels. <sup>81</sup>

On 3rd March Khan-i-Jahān Bahādūr was asked to go to Lerar from Maldurg as the Marathas became very active there. <sup>82</sup> By 12th March the Marathas were in Bālāpur district for collection of chauth. The Mughal faujdar of Bālāpur, Muḥammad Husain rode horse and chased them away. <sup>83</sup> He captured 5 men of the Marathas. By now the Lerar territory appears to have become the main centre

of the Maratha activity. High ranking generals of the Mughal army were being sent here one after the other. By 1st week of March Bahādur Khan also arrived there. He joined Īraj Khan in chasing away the Maratha force. On 19th March Aurangzeb got the news that Nek Rāi and four other commanders of Saebhajī's army with large number of men were ravaging the territory of Berar under Mughal possession and were carrying away men and catties. The subjects of those villages migrated to Kākan gaon. The Mughal officer Jaif ullaḥ rode horse and fought a battle near Makhan. About 300 men of the Marathas were killed and wounded. He recovered 4000 catties and men, 70 horses and mares, but lost most of the imperial men. Khan-i-Jahān Bahādur and Īraj Khan gave a fight to the Marathas near Talgaon. The Marathas went away by way of Chanda towards Hyderabad. Then there was news of the Marathas appearing near Ellichpur. Īraj Khan hastened there. From there Īraj Khan was attached to prince Muiz-ud-din's army in Bidar. But Khan-i-Jahān Bahādur continued the chase upto Malkhandan near the border of Hyderabad.<sup>84</sup>

Early March prince Azam had sent Dilāvar Khan and Munawwar Khan to protect the Pedgaon region. By about 25th March they received the intelligence of Maratha force having alighted 35 kos away from Pedgaon. They hastened

to chase the Marathas away. A battle took place. Many men of the Marathas were killed. The Mughals were victors, though all their men were also killed in the action.<sup>87</sup>

Sometime before 28th March, Nāroji, an army commander of Sambhaji along with his men landed up in Dhārur. The Mughal Qiledār of Dhārur, Qiledār Khan fought the battle. Nāroji alone with 100 others was killed. Their heads were cut off and a tower was erected. Many men on either side were wounded. Thirteen persons of the Marathas were captured, many horses, spears and other weapons were recovered. Most of the Mughal soldiers were killed.<sup>88</sup> The Mughals lost the forte<sup>89</sup> as we see that in May Prince Aazam recovered the same.

On 5th August Aurangzeb visited prince Aazam's artillery at Aurangābād fort.<sup>90</sup>

In September-October Aurangzeb himself arrived at Ahmadnagar from Aurangābād.

On 12th October Aurangzeb encamped at Karanpur (?).<sup>91</sup> Prince Aazam who was entrusted the job of invading Bijapur, was transferred along with Bidār Bakhat to Gulshanābād (Nasik). On 19th November, Sarbulund Khan and Khwājā Yākūb went to Bahādurpād to punish the Marathas. Within a month the news of Marathas becoming strong at Nirā

and Asti came. Ruhullah Khan and Baharamand Khan, who were already in Ahmadnagar left at mid-night on 18th December towards Mirā and Asti respectively against the enemy.<sup>92</sup> In the same month <sup>93</sup> Sāmūrkhan gained victory probably over the Marathas in Poona district. At the end of the year 1683, it appears from Marathi records that a fight took place between Aurangzeb and Sambhaji near Almaj.<sup>93</sup> Sambhaji became victorious. Many men belonging to Aurangzeb's side were killed. This is probably the only evidence of battle, where Sambhaji and Aurangzeb's forces clashed directly.

On 3rd January 1684 Shihab-ud-din Khan accompanied by Rankoji was in the vicinity of Bāheri. He ravaged Nizāmpur under Maratha possession, carried away 2000 men and 6000 cattles. Then he reached Purandhar. Sarbuland Khan from Pednason was ordered to join Shihab-ud-din Khan and was asked to remain alert in the absence of Shihab-ud-din Khan.<sup>94</sup>

On 4th January 1684 a Maratha force appeared near Udgir. Muzfar Khan, son of Khan-i-Jahān Bahādur was sent to drive them away.<sup>95</sup> On 7th January, a Maratha force appeared near Lohgad. The Mughal Thanedār of Tokāh Umrā, Fakkar-ud-din rode a horse and gave the fight.<sup>96</sup> From Udgir Muzfar Khan went to Barangpur, as a Maratha force appeared there. A severe battle took place. About 700



Marathas and 300 Mughal soldiers were killed. Muzfar Khan launched a night attack on the non-combatants and recovered goods, horses and weapons.<sup>97</sup> From there in his pursuit of the Marathas, he reached Songāon. Then he travelled another 20 kos and reached village Pur (?). A battle took place there. From Maratha side Jādhav (Dhana?) and Śākoji received the wounds. Then he chased them for another ten miles. He was specially rewarded by Aurangzeb<sup>98</sup> for his gallant pursuit, with 1000 rupees and an elephant.

In January 1681, Baharāmand Khan who was in Asti since December, marched towards Mungi-Paithan to disperse the Marathas. On 13th February prince Aazam who was at Nasik was sent to Bahādurgadh probably to assist Garbulund Khan who was already there.

In February, Maratha Sardar Timāji along with his men attacked Azam's camp and the surrounding territory. Kishor Singh Kādā hastened to fight. The Marathas lost<sup>99</sup> the battle and Timāji was made a prisoner. A small band of Marathas appeared near Pātoda for collection of<sup>100</sup> chauth. On 31st March Gāzi-ud-din Khan left for Poona and Kāde Nimone lying in Ahmadnagar district.

Such have been the series of movements from May 1680 to April 1681 of the Mughal forces in various parts of Maharashtra. The ablest generals and most renowned

Sardars and sons of Aurangzeb were moving from one place to another with great army and with the aim of punishing the rebels or dispersing the enemy i.e. Marathas. Above has been the diary of events as recorded by trustworthy men of Aurangzeb who mostly accompanied him during this campaign. From these movements of troops, it is quite evident the Marathas were quite dominating in respect of military strength in a number of parts of Maharashtra, to name a few, Nasik, Ahmadnagar, Mira, Asti, Mungi-Paithan, Bahadurgadh (in Pedgaon), Kolhapur, Aurangabad, the territory below the Western Ghats and the Poona district. Though there are no Marathi records to corroborate all these events, yet the inferences drawn from the Mughal activity, we can safely conclude that the Marathas were quite powerful and were not ready to accept forced Mughal domination over them.

It is interesting to note an incident of this period by which we can well imagine how big Mughal Sardars and princes were afraid of the Marathas. Sometime in May-June 1683, Khan-i-Jahan Bahadur was appointed as chief of the Deccan, as Aurangzeb himself wanted to go back to the North. He politely replied that "there is no secret about the campaign (Deccan). There is no hesitation about your orders. This slave is ready to serve all the time. But as your Majesty along with all the princes and Umrao

came to the Deccan, even then the enemy (Marathas) did come within a distance of 5 to 6 kos from the imperial camp and played mischief. How long can I keep watch over them?" Then as an alternative Aurangzeb ordered Shāh Ālam to take over the command of the Deccan. But Shāh Ālam stated that he was already once in the Deccan and therefore he be excused. This sufficiently makes clear the situation in the Deccan and comparative strength of the Marathas.<sup>101</sup>

## 2. THE MOGHAL OFFENSIVE AND FAILURE

In January 1682 Hasan Ali Khan descended into Thānā and entered Kalyān city. On 24th February Ranmast Khan also arrived at Kalyān.<sup>102</sup> They ravaged the country and at the end of September Ranmast Khan seems to have left for Ahmadnagar probably on the orders of Aurangzeb to punish the rebels.<sup>103</sup> But according to J. Sarkar during September-October, Ranmast Khan marched into Konkan through Mahje pass and occupied Kalyān.<sup>104</sup>

In November 1682 Ranmast Khan entered into Konkan.<sup>105</sup> In the same month a Maratha force consisting of 6 to 7 thousand Maratha force cavalry and infantry men repaired a small fortress near Kalyān Bhivandi and established a post there. On 5th November Bahādur Khan fought a battle with them and defeated. Again, on 11th November

a Maratha army consisting of 10 thousand cavalry men and 12 thousand foot soldiers led by Rupa<sup>ji</sup> Bhosale, Kesopant and Nilopant Peshwā gathered there. A severe battle was fought. The Maratha force retreated. From there Bahādur Khan marched to Bitangā fort, and burnt the <sup>106</sup> Vādi of the fort. Shortly after this battle the Maratha army made two more night attacks on Banmast Khan's army. They were resisted severally. He repaired the fortress <sup>107</sup> but parapit wall was left incomplete. He employed 2000 men to keep watch on the fort and the vicinity.

During the last week of December 1682, Tukoji, a commander of Sambhaji arrived 8 miles away from Kalyān Bhivandi. He dug up the trenches. Immediately Banmast Khan, Sidai Yācūt Khan and his maternal uncle who had brought the foodgrains, others were left behind at Kalyān Bhivandi, also Dāud Khan, Abul Faiyād Khan etc. of the Mughal army were divided in 3 divisions in order to face the Marathas. A battle of arrows and bows and musket shots took place. Finally an assault of small arms was made. Tukoji with many others was killed. The Marathas <sup>108</sup> retreated to the nearby mountains. The month of January and the end of February 1683 appears to be without much of activity. But by 27th February we come across, what may be termed as a climax of Kalyān Bhivandi campaign, as a major battle was fought by the Marathas. On 27th

February, Hambir Rao the commander-in-chief of the Maratha army along with 20 thousand cavalry and 10 thousand foot soldiers, accompanied by a lot of equipment like tents and umbrellas marched into Kalyān Bhivandi territory.

Shamast Khan appointed Padam Singh and others on vanguard, to fight the battle. On 27th the battle took place.

Hambir Rao received an arrow wound. Khurpurā (1) along with 3 other Maratha Sardars was killed. About 200 Marathas were killed. On the Mughal side the casualties were very heavy. Padam Singh received 35 wounds and died. Bhagwant Singh, son of Mankoji Dakhni, was killed.

Ram Singh, son of Jatan Singh Rathod, after hearing the news of Padam Singh's death wanted to go to battle field inspite of his sickness. But he was so weak that due to fever he collapsed and died. Hari Singh, son of Puranmal Bandela who was wounded was thrown away on the battle field and the Marathas carried him away. He died on the way. Faghunāth Singh, Babli Singh, Madhorām Sisodiyā, Tukoji and other Mughal soldiers were wounded.

In Akhbarat of this date, there is a long list of the dead and wounded. In fact earlier report of the battle mentions that almost all the Mughal soldiers were killed or wounded.<sup>109</sup> Thus the Marathas displayed great strength and resistance, but the fort still remained with the Mughals.

On 5th March, Salabat Khan, an officer of the Mughal

artillery was sent to the Thānā of Kalyān Bhivandi and  
 110  
 was asked to remain alert.

By now Sambhaji intensified this blockade of Kalyān Bhivandi so well that it was not possible for Rannast Khan to procure foodgrains either from the plateau  
 111  
 of Fardapur or by way of the sea. On 10th March Ruḥullah Khan arrived at Kalyān Bhivandi and joined Rannast Khan. On 17th March, they gave a battle to the  
 112  
 Marathas. Most of the Mughal soldiers were killed. Next day, Ruḥullah Khan attacked the non-combatants of the Marathas and fought a battle, but with no known results. Again by the end of March, Saifullah, son of Ruḥullā Khan went to chase the Marathas who had appeared  
 113  
 14 miles away from Kalyān Bhivandi. He burnt 2-3 villages of the Marathas. Sambhaji's blockade of Rannast Khan's army was so effective that the Mughals had to  
 114  
 approach the English for rescue.

After the rainy season of 1683, the Mughal offensive in Konkan was opened. Shāh 'Ālam was appointed to conduct this campaign and capture all the forts in that territory and under the possession of Sambhaji. It was for the second time that the Mughal armies were marching in Konkan. Along with Shāh 'Ālam, were the chief of artillery Ātish Khan, Sarafraz Khan, Ikhlās Khan, the brother of

Bahlul Khan, Nago (Mane?) Maratha, Khwajā Abukarram and  
 an army of twenty thousand men.<sup>115</sup>

A few days after 10th September, 1683, Shāh'Ālam penetrated into Sōwantwādi and South Konkan by the Rānghāt pass. On his way the Marathas opposed him bravely. The roads were narrow and front guards of Shāh'Ālam's army had tough time from the Marathas. Many people died from both the sides. The Mughal armies at last reached Sampgson fort.<sup>116</sup> They laid siege to the fort. Jān Nisār Khan and two other sardars received wounds. The Marathas fought bravely but ultimately gave up the fort.<sup>117</sup> On 28th December he again descended into Konkan through Rānghat and burnt Kudāl and Sāndā.<sup>118</sup>

Khafi Khan has given a very graphic picture of this campaign. He says, "The territory was full with thorny trees and dense jungles. On one side there were high mountains and on the other side were deep valleys. Many infidels were put to death. Khwajā Abul-Abukarram and other sardars showed considerable valour. But the food and climate was unsuitable to the Mughal army. Even animals like horses and camels could not survive. In this campaign many men and animals perished. No horses were left in the army..... The infidels blockaded the roads from all sides, and their supplies were stopped. The condition of the army became precarious and it became difficult for the

prince to stay there. At last he requested Aurangzeb  
 119  
 for withdrawal."

On 15th January 1684 we find that Shāh Ālam arrived  
 at Nicholim. From there he proceeded to Vengurla and  
 120  
 on 20th February Shāh Ālam ascended the Rāmghat.  
 Men and animals perished alike in large numbers in this  
 campaign. Thus came to an end second Mughal offensive  
 against the Marathas with devastating results.

The Marathas were all the time preparing to fight  
 the Mughals. From a letter dated 3rd January 1684 addressed  
 to Deshmukhs of Āi we find that Sambhaji was quite aware  
 of the need of more soldiers in order to fight the Mughals  
 aggression. It speaks "Sultan Muazzam and Shihabuddin  
 Khan have entered into Konkan territory. On this occa-  
 sion there is urgent necessity of armed men. Therefore  
 Santaji Yemaji has been sent to recruit the men in Varghāt  
 territory. He will relate to you regarding the recruit-  
 ment of soldiers. You should act accordingly and send men.  
 This is a very delicate (important) task. If a large  
 number of men are recruited then there is no fear of enemy.  
 The enemy will be destroyed..... You must rise to the  
 121  
 occasion and prove worthy of it...."

Then there was simultaneous with this another  
 adventure of Aurangzeb. In April 1682, Aurangzeb ordered



Shihābuddin Khan to lay siege to the fort of Rāmsej.<sup>122</sup>

On May 24, Hayāt Khan was sent to attack the fort of

Rāmsej.<sup>123</sup> Accordingly Shihābuddin Khan laid siege, dug

trenches and mounted guns. But the Maratha Qiledār was

quite a match and had a lot of experience. In the words

of Anāfi Khan "Due to his constant efforts and strict

vigilance the Mughals did not gain any success." As an

eye witness he further continues "(In the fort) there

were not any metallic guns. But there was a lot of hide

and skin. These men inside the fort made wooden guns.

In that they filled this hide and charged. Thus one such

gun used to serve the purpose of ten guns."<sup>124</sup> Sambhaji

sent a large force to the rescue of the besieged. Fazbir

Bao during this period arrived with 18000 infantry to raise

the siege of Rāmsej.<sup>125</sup>

In the months of April-May, Rupāji Bhosale and Manāji More gave a battle to Shihābuddin Khan near Ganesh-gāon. They captured 500 horses of the enemy.<sup>126</sup>

Since May till August there does not appear to be any major clash between the Mughals and the Maratha Qiledār.

However, on 21st August 1682, a night attack was planned by Lāsīm Khan, by way of broken tower of Rāmsej fort.

About 5 to 6 hundred Sewātī (Sewādi) soldiers were kept

in readiness for going inside the fort and giving the

battle. Some men of Khwājā Khan and Lāsīm Khan went towards

the gate of the fort and shouted that "the diggers want to come inside." As a result of this, the Maratha soldiers inside the fort were put on alert, they threw stones and fired musket shots. Most of the Mughal soldiers were killed and wounded. No further progress was possible in view of determined opposition of the Marathas. In fact the siege appeared to go out of the hand. As a result of this failure of attack Qasim Khan was recalled and also Shihābuddin Khan.<sup>127</sup> By now Aurangzeb had sent a more able general Khan-i-Jahān Bahādūr to take charge of the siege and accomplish this most difficult task.

Shihāb-ud-din Khan left Rāmsej on 30th August 1682. He was ordered to leave his artillery behind him.<sup>128</sup> Immediately Khan-i-Jahān Bahādūr laid siege to the fort. He informed Aurangzeb that he was confident of capturing the fort.<sup>129</sup> But nothing seems to have happened except a gun which Marathas were carrying from Trimbak to Rāmsej, was attacked and captured by him. Finally on 19th October Aurangzeb ordered Khan-i-Jahān Bahādūr to go to Varghāt and from there to Konkan. It appears that by September the Mughal siege had virtually come to an end. And an amount of Rs. 37,630 was ordered to be recovered from Khan-i-Jahān Bahādūr towards the expenses of siege of Rāmsej as Khan-i-Jahān Bahādūr who had given an undertaking that he would capture the fort, had failed to do so.<sup>130</sup>

Looking at the excellent performance of the Giledār of Āmsej, Sambhaji honoured him by presenting a robe of honour, a pearl studded bracelet and cash.<sup>131</sup>

Thus came to an end the third offensive of Aurangzeb in a period of 4 years. His best generals and possibly all the military strength was utilized in launching the offensive. But the Marathas who bravely fought on all these occasions proved to be superior in military strategy. The only place where the Mughals got substantial success was, when they got the fort of Salher, through the efforts of Nekhām Khan.<sup>1</sup> But for giving of huge bribe by Nekhām Khan, probably there also Mughals would have certainly failed. Aurangzeb on hearing the news of continuous failures was much upset and looked to be more determined to wipe out the Marathas, as the English Factors at Karwar state "He is so inveterate against the Rājāh that he hath thrown off his nari and sworn never to put it on again, till he hath either killed, taken, or routed him (Sambaji) out of his country."<sup>132</sup>

F. THE MUGHAL-MARATHA ACTIVITIES  
APRIL 1684 - MAY 1685

With this fierce determination of punishing the Marathas and capturing Sambhaji, dead or alive, Aurangzeb strengthened his armies. He concentrated on capturing the forts. Fresh orders were issued to the army generals

to march into various parts of Maharashtra. Therefore, during the period of a year or so, the intensity of Mughal attacks was increased. More prominent generals like Bahullāh Khan, Shihāb-ud-din Khan and Khan-i-Jahān Bahādūr were seen in the battle fields. At the end of May 1684, Khan-i-Jahān Bahādūr took possession of Mangalvedhā, Sangolā and the environs.<sup>133</sup> On 21st September, Shihāb-ud-din Khan was sent to capture the fort of Rahiri.<sup>134</sup> Immediately on receiving the intelligence of Shihāb-ud-din Khan's movement, Kavi Kalash rushed to Sāisadh and reached there by 7th November.<sup>135</sup> By 14th January, 1685, Shihāb-ud-din Khan, travelled from Poona and came to Sangoli, descending the Por Chats. Kavi Kalash, who was on his tale, also followed him upto Sangoli, gave a fight to the Khan and drove him above the Chats.

Immediately Gāzi-ud-din Khan destroyed and burnt Nizampur and three other places in Sambhaji's territory. From there he reached Pāncheri vādi, a village at the foot of Sāisadh. He destroyed and burnt it. The Marathas on hearing the news of the presence of Gāzi-ud-din Khan, went inside the fort, probably to be in readiness to attack the enemy.<sup>136</sup> Sambhaji, as he got the news about the ravages near Sāisadh, he ordered Hambir Rao and Pupaji Bhosale with 15,000 cavalry to attack him. They attacked Gāzi-ud-din Khan's camp

which was 4 miles away from Āigadh. A battle of arrows and musket shots took place. Many men were killed on either sides. Though Āughals got victory, yet it does not appear to be real one as Gāzi-ud-din was forced to turn away from that region to Kothlāpādh.<sup>137</sup>

On 4th October Iakhr-ud-din Khan was appointed thānedār of Supā and Abul Kasūl Khan was appointed thānedār of Āivāpur.<sup>138</sup> By about 9th October cavalry and foot soldiers of Samthaji arrived in the vicinity of Junnar. Abul Khair, the Mughal Qiledār of Junnar rushed to resist the Maratha force. The Maratha force was defeated.<sup>139</sup> At this time Aurangzeb suspected about the loyalty of the Maratha rifleman in his service. He issued an order that all those who were in Samthaji's service should be imprisoned. Accordingly many men were arrested in various forts.<sup>140</sup>

On 15th October, a Maratha ardār with 10 thousand men arrived at Ātārā. Gāzi-ud-din Khan, who was at Āirval, rode the horse. A fierce battle took place. Two hundred Marathas and 70 Āughal soldiers were killed. Many were wounded on both the sides, without any result.<sup>141</sup>

On 25th October, Bakhshi Āhullāh Khan was sent to punish the rebels.<sup>142</sup> It is neither known in which direction he left nor there is any trace of his activities. By 16th March 1685 however he left for Bijāpur.

By the end of October a Maratha force was in the vicinity of Supā. Sayyid Uhlān rushed to resist it. Many men were killed and wounded. The Maratha force was driven away.<sup>143</sup>

In the month of November, the Marathas lost the precious fort of Kothlā to the Mughals. The Qāzi of Nāhiri wrote to Aurangzeb that the importance of Kothlā-gadh is so much that, whosoever controls that fort, will have control over Talkonkan. No doubt his assessment was correct. As we see from the records that the Marathas put up a persistent struggle and effective blockade of this region in order to get back that fort, after they had lost it to the Mughals, for quite some time.

Qāzi Muhammad and Abul Qādir accompanied by Rāmāji a zamindar from the region of Kothlā-gadh planned to take this fort. On 7th November, they observed that a large number of men from the fort were going outside. Immediately they set on the march and reached near the fort the next day. Abul Qādir with his men was asked to remain in ambush. At night the remaining people reached the lower gate of the fort and shouted "open the door the men have come back." The Marathas not realizing the mischief, opened the door. A fight took place. The Marathas outnumbered them, and as they were about to be driven away,

Abdul Qādir with his men arrived there. Then Mankoji Pāndhre, the Mughal thēnādār also reached there. The Mughals got the possession of the fort on the 16th November. Aurangzeb received the golden key of Kothlāgadh.

Immediately on 9th November, a fresh Maratha force arrived at the fort and laid siege to it. A total blockade of the region was effected. A battle of muskets and arrows was reported to be in sight. As a result of this the condition of the Mughal Qiledār Abdul Qādir became precarious. There was no grain, nor any ammunition, as the same was burnt by the Marathas. The Marathas outside did not allow any reinforcement to reach him.<sup>144</sup>

Abdul Aziz Khan, Qiledār of Junnar sent his son Abdul Khan to Kothlāgadh. As he arrived near the fort he saw Nāroji (Naro Trimbak), a commander of Sambhaji, who had stopped all the roads. A fight took place in the valley. Mānkoji and Radandās Khan also arrived there. Nāro Trimbak was killed and his head was sent to Aurangzeb.<sup>145</sup> But inspite of this the Marathas continued their efforts.

By December end another battle took place with no conclusive results. The Marathas continued their blockade of the region. The Mughal Qiledār became

helpless. Abdul Khan was asked to supply him grains, yet it appears that he did not reach there.<sup>146</sup> Then Marhamat Khan who was at Nasik was ordered to go there.<sup>147</sup> He gave a fight to 7 thousand Maratha force.<sup>148</sup> But it seems that the Marathas did not get any success. They continued their efforts. In April a Maratha force consisting of about 700 men well equipped with the arms arrived near Kothlāghadh. They threw arrows in the fort and about 200 men climbed the fort. Abdul Karīm the Mughal Qiledār gave a fight. Ninety Marathas and 15 Mughals were killed and the Maratha force was defeated. Apparently it seems, the Marathas gave up the blockade of the fort by the end of April 1685.<sup>149</sup>

On 1st December 1685 Bahrāmānd Khan was ordered to go to Sirval in place of Gāzi-ud-din Khan,<sup>150</sup> and Kadandāz Khan was ordered to join Bahrāmānd Khan, from Karde Nimone.<sup>151</sup> During December Kātyā (Tātyā?) Rao, a commander of Sambhaji appeared in Sirner and Bhāgor. The Mughal thānedārs were Muḥammad Khalil and Gobindrao respectively. It appears from the records that they did not resist the Marathas. Latuf-ullāh Khan was ordered to hasten for their rescue.<sup>152</sup> Similar orders were issued to I'tqād Khan in order to chastise the Marathas in Sirval and Bhāgor.<sup>153</sup>

The Marathas were also active in Karnātak. In



December Dādaji Kākadā, a commander of Sambhaji along with 3000 cavalry and 2000 foot soldiers landed up near the fort of Belhattur. The zamindar of Srirangapattan and an allie of the Mughals took 7000 cavalry and 15,000 foot soldiers with him in order to give fight to the Maratha commander. A battle took place near the fort of Belhattur. Dādaji Kākadā along with his son was killed. Timāji, another sardār of the Marathas, was wounded and Bhimāji, brother of Dādaji was taken prisoner. Seven thousand men were killed and many were wounded. The fort of Bithor came under the Mughal possession.<sup>154</sup>

On 12th December, a Maratha force appeared near Rāmsej. The Mughal officer Akram Khan gave a fight. Maratha About 200 soldiers and almost all Mughal soldiers were killed.<sup>155</sup> Again Sambhaji's men arrived near Belā, with the intention of causing troubles. But the Mughals did not resist.<sup>156</sup>

On 2nd January 1685 Sambhaji marched into Pārner in order to give fight to Bahrāmān Khan. Immediately I'tqād Khan accompanied by Mirzā Khan and an army of 2700 soldiers was ordered to rush there. In fact, the same night he left for Pārner.<sup>157</sup> The Marathas were active near Sanganner. They destroyed the region and carried away the cattles. The Mughal thanedār did not even resist them.<sup>158</sup>

On 7th June Radandāz Khan, the thanedār of Supā informed Aurangzeb that the Marathas were very active in that region. And it was not possible for him to resist them with his small force. Aurangzeb ordered Lutuf-ullah Khan to send his troops there.<sup>159</sup> Shortly, a Maratha force consisting of 10 thousand men was near Poona. Radandas Khan and Gamar-ud-din dashed against them. A fight took place, but without any result.<sup>160</sup> Again in the first week of January, the Marathas were in Poona district. The Mughal thanedār Iakhr-ud-din Khan gave a fight. Many men were killed on both sides.<sup>161</sup> From here the Maratha force turned towards Navlakh Umrā.<sup>162</sup> Abul Khair was the Mughal thanedār. He informed Aurangzeb about the presence of the Maratha troops. Immediately Atish Khan, who was sent to Poona was recalled to Navlakh Umrā for the assistance.<sup>163</sup> He was accompanied by Sayyid Izat Khan, Mir Bakshi of Shāh 'Alam's army along with 500 men and another 200 men from the army of prince Mu'izud-din.<sup>164</sup> Though the Mughals were in such readiness, yet nothing seems to have occurred.

In the same month, the Marathas were active near Karde-Nimone. Khojā Hāmid, the Mughal officer, had a very small force with him.<sup>165</sup> On 21st January, a Maratha force consisting of 700 cavalry men appeared near Malthan, a place 12 miles from Karde-Nimone.

Khojā Ḥamid rode a horse. But by the time he reached Marathas, the Marathas had moved to Sirur. They carried away the cattles. By now Jīvājī brother of Mānkojī, the thanedar of Shikārpur came to his help. Khojā Ḥamid returned to Karde Nimone.<sup>166</sup> Shortly afterwards a small band of 50 Marathas appeared near Rahugāon, which is 14 miles away from Karde Nimone.<sup>167</sup> And in the beginning of February, Rhandoji a commander of Sambhaji along with the army landed up near Sarasgāon and laid siege to it. On 7th February, Khojā Ḥamid rode the horse and reached Sarasgāon. A battle took place. Finally the Marathas gave up the fight and ran away. They were chased up to the Bhīmā river.<sup>168</sup>

By middle of January the Marathas appeared in the vicinity of Pārner. Gaḍṣafar Khan accompanied by 700 cavalrymen marched against them. A battle took place. Latafullah Khan, Abdul Karim, and Khojā Ḥamid asked to co-operate with each other and fight the Marathas.<sup>169</sup>

The Marathas were active in Sirval. Bahādur Khan was ordered to proceed there and assist Baharāmānd Khan in defeating the Marathas.<sup>170</sup> Baharāmānd Khan reached between Karde-Nimone and Shikārpur in the pursuit of the Marathas. And at the same time the Marathas carried away food grains and 1700 cattles from Sirval.<sup>171</sup> Immediately Bahrāmānd Khan was ordered to come back to Sirval.<sup>172</sup>

In January, a Maratha force was in the vicinity of Qadirābād. Sayyid Qaghan Multafit Khan, the Bakhshi of Shāh Alam along with one thousand force was ordered to chastise the Marathas.<sup>173</sup> By 31st January Sayyid Qaghan returned and Latuf-ullah Khan who was sent to Qadirābād was ordered to stay near the Bhima.<sup>174</sup>

The Marathas appeared near Parenda. Itqād Khan was ordered to chase them away. But as he was sick, Qadnagar Khan proceeded.<sup>175</sup>

Bahramand Khan attacked a Maratha force near Pulher. A battle took place. Marathas lost many men in dead and wounded. But equally big was the loss of Mughals. Almost all of their soldiers were killed.<sup>176</sup>

By the end of January the Marathas were very active near Nasik. Atish Khan, Ilāyar Beg from Badandāz Khan's army which was at Harde Nimone, Marhamat Khan from Navlakh Umra and Muhammad Khalil from Sivner were ordered to go to Nasik.<sup>177</sup> In the first week of February Akram Khan the Mughal thanedar of Nasik was left behind Munawwar Khan marched against them.<sup>178</sup> From there they intended to go to Aurangābād. But they went to Khandesh, though there was a report that they marched towards Bāglān. Munawwar Khan with two-third army of Faqail Khan went out in the pursuit. Badandāz Khan and Marhamat Khan chased them into Khāndesh.

Bahrāmān Khan also reached there.<sup>179</sup> On 6th February, Gazi-ud-din Khan went to Nasik to chastise the Marathas.<sup>180</sup> It seems from the movements of the Mughal army commanders that the Marathas were really playing havoc in Nasik region. Within about month's time, the best Mughal generals were ordered to be present in that territory in order to safeguard the Mughal communication as well as the domination.

In February the Marathas came near Hanumantgadh. The Mughal thanedar Bahram Khan did not resist them. Muhammad Ismail gave them a battle. Many men were killed on both the sides.<sup>181</sup>

On 25th February, Rāmā Jai Singh a commander of Sambhaji attacked Porenda with his men. Marhamat Khan the Mughal officer was ordered to resist him. From there the Maratha commander seems to have turned towards Indapur and Adgaon. The Mughal thanedar of Bhalwani gave him a fight. Rāmā Jai Singh was reported to be killed.<sup>182</sup>

On 27th February a Maratha force was passing by way of Aundhapattā. Gadnagar Khan hastened from the river Gangā (Māngangā). On 28th February a fight took place. Many of the Marathas and most of the Mughal soldiers were killed and wounded.<sup>183</sup>

Another Maratha force reached Chandan Vandan. Amān-ullah Khan the Mughal commander rode the horse. A

fight took place. Many Marathas were killed. The Mughals recovered 28 mares, 20 rifles, two flags and a kettle drum.<sup>184</sup>

In the first week of March Muḥallāh Khan arrived at Mangalvedhā. The Marathas were active near Shikārpur. The Mughal thanedar did resist.<sup>185</sup> Aurangzeb planned his march towards Pedgāon. Sayyid Izat Khan was appointed faujdar of Junnar in place of Abdul Aziz Khan with an additional force of 500 men from Muḥallāh Khan's army.<sup>186</sup>

In April new appointments of Mughal officers were made. Rājā Manohardās as qiledar of Mulher, Jan Nisar Khan as qiledar of Gulbargā and Ahirant gadh, and Muḥfar Khan as thanedar of Livner, were appointed.

During the first week of April the Mughals gave a fight to the Marathas near Upā. The Mughals suffered heavy losses.<sup>187</sup> The Marathas were active near Nandurbār and Sholāpur. Sardar Miyān Muḥammad was asked to chastise them near Sholāpur. On 22nd April a fight took place, apparently with no conclusive results.<sup>188</sup>

During middle of May Cāziud-din Khan sent his son Muḥāhid Khan to chastise the Marathas near Pratāpgadh. A battle took place. Pratāpgadh was reported to be burnt.<sup>189</sup> From there Muḥāhid was sent to Sātārā as Hanmantrao and others were active in that region.<sup>190</sup> By end of May the

Marathas were also active near Nanded.<sup>191</sup>

Thus the year from April 1684 to May 1685 was a most busy year from the point of view of military activities. It appears that the Marathas were quite strong and they harried the Mughal soldiers in every nook and corner of the Maharashtra. Sometimes they only appeared near a Mughal post, and sometimes they attacked it and gave fight. Many a time the Mughal officers even did not have courage to fight against them. During this period though Marathas lost a number of their army commanders, yet the warfare did not suffer on account of it. In fact, this year gives a definite clue about the comparative strength of the Marathas and the reason for Aurangzeb's turning to Bijapur and keeping the campaign of Sambhaji's territory incomplete.

During this year, the Mughals were not only fighting with the arms in order to subdue Sambhaji, but they also made effective arrangements to stop supply of the foodgrains which were coming to Sambhaji from Ahmadābād. Kartalāb Khan, the faujdār of Ahmadābād and Surat was given a strict warning about it.<sup>192</sup> Similarly Muhammad Husain Qāzi of Cheul was also ordered not to allow any foodgrains to pass into Sambhaji's territory. But it appears that the desired effect was not at all felt by the men of Sambhaji, as they continued fighting vigorously.

## G. AN OPPORTUNITY WASTED

From May 1680 to April 1685 Aurangzeb's army was penetrating into the every possible part of Maharashtra, taking as many forts as it could and occupying as many places as it could. This was the theme of these four years of Aurangzeb's stay in the Deccan. He tried to create chaotic conditions. All efforts were being made to spread disorder in the country. All measures were being adopted to induce people of Maharashtra to join the Mughal forces. Extensive use of bribes by the Mughal Sardars had become common feature. And above all there were forced conversions to Islām. These converts were being given official protection and thus induced many others to join Islām.

Every effort was being made to weaken the government. But to a great extent Aurangzeb was disappointed in his expectations. More to his surprise, his armies were defeated everywhere and the 'infidels' as he liked to call the Marathas, stood firm against him. Their technique of warfare was new to him and his armies. His armies were barely accustomed to the hilly tracks of the Deccan. They were excellent in their art only in the battles fought on the plains. They had to encounter new difficulties and new problems, which amongst foremost were the problems of transportation and conveyance of artillery. With



four years spent in Maharashtra, and with disastrous results to his credit, Aurangzeb decided to change his policy and plan of conquest of the Deccan. During 1684, he thought of subduing the other Deccani powers, the Sultan of Bijapur and the Sultan of Golkonda.

From the middle of 1684, Aurangzeb ordered his armies to march on the roads leading to Bijapur and Golkonda, and slowly the wheels of the Mughal artillery also started rolling in the same direction. His prominent generals and his sons were given orders to capture Bijapur and Golkonda.

Why did Aurangzeb change his course of action? Why did he give up his efforts of conquering the Marathas first, particularly when they were already weakened by his attack? During four years of hard struggle and the miserable failure his grand army had to face, he had to admit indirectly that running through Maharashtra was not a piece of cake. The Maratha kingdom had not become weak, since the death of Shivaji as he expected. The united opposition shown by the Marathas and followed by their victory in various parts must have forced Aurangzeb to abandon the Maharashtra for the time being. And then, he must have thought of launching a massive attack, probably with greater certainty of success, after the destruction of suspected copartners of the Marathas, Sikandar Adil

Shāh of Bijapur and Qutub Shāh of Golkondā.

Aurangzeb's design to capture Golkondā and Bijapur brought in a priceless opportunity for Sambhaji to prepare himself. Marching away of the Mughal armies from Maharashtra brought great respite to the Maratha army. Now was the time for them to make up military deficiency, strengthen their forts and awaken people everywhere against the Muslim invasion.

But did Sambhaji utilize this golden opportunity? Did he strengthen his defences? or raise bigger armies or unite people against this danger which was looming large on the kingdom? Having had to face war with Aurangzeb for past four years, an astrologer's forecast was not required to tell him that the army of Aurangzeb was sure to launch an attack on his kingdom again. Aurangzeb's return and his preparedness, would certainly strike a deathnail in the heart of Svarājya. There was no other alternative or option for him but to make use of this opportunity. Yet what do we see from the happenings of the subsequent years is far from expectation. When we go through the events of these years we are at a loss to know how he wasted away this wonderful opportunity. It would be worthwhile comparing the situation existing then, with the situation at the time of the Second World War, when Germany under Hitler was so powerful that, if

Hitler had directed his armies against England instead of Russia, England would have been a ruined nation. But Hitler thought of some different war strategy, and instead of marching his armies into England, he ordered his generals to go on Russian campaign. This provided a great relief to England. And the British people grasped the importance of the respite they got from the German arms and spared no pains in preparing themselves against a future attack from the Germans. And what were the results? The Germans were defeated finally and the Britain emerged victorious. But for the proper utilization of this opportunity, the results would have been disastrous for Britain.

Thus by comparison we see that there was a great resemblance between the two situations, one in 1684 and the other in 1940.<sup>193</sup> The Marathas and the Britons, in their respective age were passing through the most critical period in the history and life of the nation. The former did not prepare in time and the latter did. The results were obvious. In the earlier case people suffered greatly, in the latter case people rejoiced their victory and hard work. Obviously the Marathas had to pay a great price and equally great sacrifice in maintaining their independence.

From April, 1685, the time when Aurangzeb left

Ahmednagar for Solapur, in order to capture Bijapur, till his return to Maharashtra in December, 1688 that is, in a period of two and half years there was not much of Mughal activity in Maharashtra. There were not many prominent generals of the Mughal army left behind. The only names we come across are Shihāb-ud-din Khan and Mā'tabar Khan. Their accomplishment during this period was confined to capturing a fort or two or ravaging a few villages. Even the court historians like Khāfi Khan and Sāqi-Must'ad Khan found themselves at a loss in crediting big victories to the Mughal army in Maharashtra.

On 20th August 1685 the Mughals captured Rāwlā fort under Sambhaji. The story of capture is quite thrilling. On this date, ~~in~~ 1500 infantry men, mostly Māwle, in Mughal service chose the night to launch attack as it was a dark and cloudy night and therefore they could really give a surprise to the Marathas inside the fort. Muhammad Shariff the Mughal faujdār of Chandor equipped his men with portable steps, bows etc. and reached the fort along with the Māwle men. As the midnight had passed they put the steps to the fort and about 150 men climbed it. They killed the guards and broke open the lock of the gate. By then rest of the Mughal soldiers entered into the fort. The Marathas inside the fort woke up due to the noise. But it was too late. The Maratha Qiledār

Krishnāji Pawār realizing the dangerous situation hastened with his brother and kinsmen to attack the Mughal soldiers. A fight took place. Krishnāji, the Maratha Qiledār was killed, and the Mughals got the fort. <sup>194</sup>

On 26th August Kakkar Khan was appointed to the army of Gāzi-ud-din Khan. On 12th September, Sambhaji intended to send Hambir Rao towards Junnar. <sup>195</sup> On 11th October, Itqād Khan along with the army was sent to Vāngi in order to destroy Sambhaji's territory and drive the Marathas away. <sup>196</sup>

During October a Maratha/force consisting of 5000 cavalry men under the command of Nāgo Ballal arrived in the vicinity of Satara and Chandan Vandan, on their way to Bijapur. Mahadāji, the Mughal thānedār of Khatāv had a small force with him and therefore he asked for reinforcement, but he was curtly told to keep off, if his force was small. <sup>197</sup>

In March-April 1686 the Mughals captured Miraj. On 19th October, 1686 Itqād Khan, who was at Parner and Sanganner, in December of the previous year, was ordered to go to Mangalvedhā, against Sambhaji. On 7th February, 1687, Salher was captured by the Mughals. The Maratha Qiledār Yesāji, after surrendering the fort joined the Mughals. Similar was the fate of another small fort of Sangola, near Pandharpur. This was surrendered by the

Marathas on 29th May and the Qiledār Mankoji entered into Mughal service. Beyond that till the beginning of 1688 there has not been any Mughal activity in Maharashtra.

What did Sambhaji do during this period of two and half years? What were his activities?

It is difficult to say anything firmly, or point out to any particular historical record from which we can authoritatively quote about Sambhaji's activities during this period. What we have at hand today are a few Marathi letters, with the help of which we can certainly establish some link in his activities during this period.

Sambhaji was definitely aware of the Mughal activities, when Shankroji Karāyan, Sambhaji's ablest administrator informs in a letter to Krishnāji Dādāji Prabhu Deshpande of village Kari Vadatumbi, Koral and Koralkhind in Nohid Khore taluqa that the enemy was approaching at Mawal in the Mawal territory. They are asked to keep posts at Koral Khind, Dhavla ghat and Mandardevi. They should send information to Rajgadh about the enemy, then necessary help would be sent. They have been encouraged to defeat the enemy.

Similarly we find Chatrapati Sambhaji informing by a rājapatra issued in the name of Nāgoji, Kukundji, Vithoji Rauloji and Tukoji Yeshwantrao Ghorpade, about the news of

most of his time in drinking wine and indulging in sensual pleasures. Thus his attention was distracted from the administration and the statecraft.

Most of the generals and trusted followers of Shivaji protested against Kavi Kalash, the natural consequence of which we see in that on 29th October, 1684 Sambhaji arrested Mānāji More, Gangādhār Vāsudev and Kāhuji Somnāth. <sup>203</sup> No reason was attributed to their arrest.

Though such type of arrests were not a new feature, as we find during September-October of 1681, Sambhaji had arrested Annāji Datto Beshiv, on the advice of Kavi Kalash and had beaten him severely. Later, he succumbed to the injuries and died. Again, Kāl Prabhu, Somāji Datto and Hirāji Jarzand were arrested near Parali and put to <sup>204</sup> death for suspected conspiracy against Sambhaji.

Thus we see that the arrests of such prominent leaders and generals must have created a lot of stir among the people, though they might not have been able to say anything openly. This certainly did serve a blow to the cause of unity and worsened the internal situation. As a direct result of such activities of Sambhaji, Rājārām also must have planned to desert him and join Mughals. On 30th August Bahullāh Khan informed Aurangzeb that Rājārām was desirous of walking into the Mughal camp. He was promised a mansab. But due to the vigilance of

Sambhaji, Rājārām could not safely walk into the Mughal camp. On 21st September 1685, Nāhar Khan, the thānedār of Sirval informed Ruhullāh Khan that Sambhaji's men came and took away Rājārām.<sup>205</sup>

In December 1687 Hambir Rao, the most trusted general of Sambhaji, passed away.

The year 1688, was quite disastrous for the Marathas. In April, Parsoji, a Mughal officer, captured Madangadh<sup>206</sup> and Sayyid Abdullāh captured Sarasgad. By August, Holgad was lost to the Mughals.<sup>207</sup> And in September Māngadh was captured by the Mughals from the Marathas.<sup>208</sup>

On 6th August 1688, Multafit Khan was ordered to conquer the territory of the Marathas.<sup>210</sup> Rāgoji with his army went to Tārāgad of the Marathas. He burnt the villages. The Marathas resisted and probably drove him back.<sup>211</sup>

In September the Mughals opened secret talks with the Maratha Ciledār of Māheli in Konkan. Amansab similar to that of Ciledār of Sālher and Rs. 40,000 in cash were promised to him. But nothing seems to have been come out of it, as the Marathas retained this fort.<sup>212</sup>

In October-November, 1688, a quarrel broke out between Kavi Kalash and Shirke. Kavi Kalash ran to the fort of Khelnā for shelter and sought the help and interference



of Sambhaji. Sambhaji in order to settle down the matter and help Kavi Kalash came to the fort of Khelna from Rāigadh. He punished the Shirke.<sup>213</sup>

In between, during November-December 1668, at the instigation of Kavi Kalash Sambhaji arrested Pralhādanta Sarkarkun and many others. Here again we have to grope in darkness as to the fault of Pralhādanta and others which necessitated their arrests.<sup>214</sup>

From these events it appears that Sambhaji hardly devoted himself to the major task of military preparations against Aurangzeb. The internal dissensions had weakened the unity of the state. This dilapidated state of affairs was, further aggravated by Sambhaji's personal life, his indulgence in sensual pleasures and wine.

Thus passed away the period of two and half years when Aurangzeb and his armies were away from Maharashtra. Thus slipped away the golden opportunity that Sambhaji got, to keep himself in military preparedness. Thus was Maharashtra torn into personal feuds and faction, jealousies and rivalries, conspiracies and counter conspiracies. Thus was the opportunity utilized by the trouble makers on the borders of Maharashtra and thus the cause of Maharashtra's unity and independence weakened. Thus Sambhaji whiled away the time by indulging in sensual pleasures and wine. And thus one is inclined to agree with the views expressed by

Sir J. Sarkar, that Sambhaji made no adequate efforts to meet the danger that threatened all the Deccani Powers alike, his soldiers raided places in the Mughal territory as a matter of routine, but it did not influence the military situation."<sup>215</sup>

The biographers of Sambhaji have defended him saying during this period he was busy fighting wars with the Portuguese and the Bidis, who were a constant menace to his subjects. The defence sounds to be more lame, when one thinks over the destructive potential of each enemy with whom Sambhaji was fighting those days, whether at sea or on the land. It is evident from the happenings of the subsequent years that his real enemy was Aurangzeb. And his challenge was to be met first. The rest of his enemies, even if they were put together could not have possibly defeated Sambhaji. During all these years we see there was no preplanned action anywhere, nor any forethought was given to the likely consequences. Nor was there much coherency in administration, and Sambhaji's unprecedented high handedness in tackling the generals and ministers of repute brought with it a lot of discontent, and resentment from the people. The result of such activities is never unexpected. The then prevailing situation brought the end closer and probably at a faster speed.

H. THE TROUBLEMAKERS AND THE OPPORTUNISTS  
THE KHEM SAWANTS, THE DALVIS OF SALANTWADI,  
THE DESAIS OF HUKERI, BANKAPUR AND SONDHA

Sambhaji's neglect of his state affairs, his wars with the Portuguese, the Dutch and the Sidis, and his pre-occupation with internal quarrels gave a chance to some of his fiefs like Khem Sawant, the Desais of Hukeri, Bankapur, and Sondha to play mischief against him. The Desais of these districts or parganas that were on the borders of Maharashtra in South and West Coast did not lose sight of affairs that were taking place in the capital of Maharashtra. What they looked upon was their own stability, whether under the Marathas or any other alien rule. They used their men and might to protect themselves, rather than following any policy. To them self-interest was above all. And never did they waste single opportunity of creating troubles for the Maratha king. Nor did they ever hesitate in helping the invading Mughals or any foreign force. But whenever they saw the Marathas becoming powerful, or the Maratha leaders in their territory, without any hesitation they took the oath of loyalty to the Chatrapati and accepted him as their lawful king. But such promises and oaths of loyalty were only seasonal. With the trend of events and change in the balance of power they would also change. The history of these Desais and of these fiefs during the struggle of the Maratha War of Independence

is full with many such incidents.

Sambhaji's neglect of these Desāis encouraged them to play about as they liked. They almost considered themselves as independent units and many a time acted also accordingly.

The history of these years is full with such incidents, when they mostly became disloyal, and raised forces in order to help the enemy or the Marathas for some trifling gains. In fact it appears that their vision was narrowed down to the extent of preserving their own paraganas and greediness for more 'inām' villages.

Right from the year 1680 it appears that the Sāwants and the Dalvis enjoyed big mansabs under Aurangzeb. Thus in accepting the mansab they also accepted the Mughal domination over them. From a letter of Bahādur Khan dated 1682 the various mansabs given to Sāwants and the Dalvis were as follows :-

(1) Khen Sāwant Lakham Sāwant	5000 Dat,	5000 Sawar
(2) Ehop Sawant	2000 "	2000 "
(3) Ram Dalvi Khal Dalvi	4000 "	4000 "
(4) Mānd Sāwant Rām Sāwant	2000 "	2000 "
(5) Kān Sāwant Nār Sāwant	1500 "	-
(6) Mulji Kāmaji	1000 "	-

- |  |             |
|--|-------------|
| (7) Rām Dalvi (Khurd)                  | 1000 Zat, - |
| (8) Nanloji (?) Ramanji <sup>216</sup> | 1000 "      |

In 1684 Tān Sāwant is ordered by the Mughal Sardar Shaikh Muhammad Murid to unite with the Khem Sāwant and destroy the territory of the Marathas. He also mentions the intentions of Aurangzeb's conquest of the territory of Konkan after the victory of Bijapur.<sup>217</sup> The orders to destroy were carried out by the Sāwants. From the reports of Surat Council to Karwar we find "the ways are being molested by Delvi Desāi, one of Sambhaji's Governors who has lately revolted from him (in Kanad)<sup>218</sup>

On 19th February, 1685 the English merchants of Kārwar wrote about the Sāwants. "There is a Desai, lives near Goa that hath been some time rebellion against the Rājāh and taken part with the Portuguese, and with the 300 men sent by them and his own forces he hath burnt and robbed many places about Goa, and we hear the Desais of Sunda and Kudal are also up in the rebellion with Rām Dalvi, which altogether make about 15,000 strong, so that the Rājāh's people are in a miserable condition in several parts of his country."<sup>219</sup> On 21st April Surat Council repeats the same tale "Sambhaji Rājāh's affairs on this coast are in no good condition, the Mughal pressing hard upon him hath made some of his own people raise up against him."<sup>220</sup>

The Khem Sāwant always passed the intelligence about the Maratha territory to the Mughal officers. In 1686 Khem Sāwant pressed for certain news to be conveyed to the Mughal officers through the trustworthy persons.<sup>221</sup> It seems by 1686 Rām Dalvi performed some special service to the Mughals and he was rewarded with a mansab of 5000 Pat and 5000 Hawar, in addition to the gold, robe of honour and cash. He was also appointed to the Sardesh-mukhi of Konkan.<sup>222</sup> Probably after seeing Rām Dalvi being given high mansab, Khem Sāwant also sent a petition to Aurangzeb in 1688. But it was not granted.<sup>223</sup>

The result of these was seen very soon. One of the Mughal officers had encamped in the territory of the Khem Sāwant on 4th August 1688. But Khem Sāwant did not go and see him. The officer made enquiries and told him to forget the past happenings.<sup>224</sup> A rapprochement took place soon.

On 20th September of the same year Khem Sāwant was informed that Rām Dalvi and other Zamindars of Pāin Ghāt had been sent for administering the territory of Talkonkan, that they should with their sincere efforts bring the said territory under the Mughal rule. Those Marathas who returned from the enemy side, their crimes were pardoned.<sup>225</sup> From this it appears that the Mughals gave open promises to the Marathas returning from Sambhaji's side.

From a letter of the Mughal officer to Khem Sāwant it appears that during this period some fight took place between the Marathas and the men of Khem Sāwant. By 30th September, Khem Sāwant had united all the Zamindārs of Talkonkan and had defeated the Marathas there.<sup>226</sup> They were also ordered to capture the forts and the thānās of the Marathas.

By 21st October, Khem Sāwant informed Aurangzeb that he would lay siege to the forts in the possession of Sambhaji and capture them for the Mughals. For this great undertaking he was given the Sardeshmukhi of Kudāl. He also promised to make supplies to the Mughal army.<sup>227</sup>

From this we can well imagine about the attitude and outlook of the Sāwant towards the Maratha kingdom. In November, he was called to see Aurangzeb on a very urgent business. Though it is not known what exactly was the nature of the business, but it appears that this time he was given the task of launching campaign against Pārgadh which was then in the possession of the Marathas.

The only outstanding event of this period was the Maratha defence of Pārgadh, against a strong Mughal siege.<sup>228</sup> The fort was in the Maratha possession and Aurangzeb wanted to capture it. The campaign was mainly entrusted to Khem Sāwant, Sardesai of Kudāl. It appears that on 15th December, 1688, Khem Sāwant was asked to go to Pārgadh

and finish the affair of the fort.<sup>229</sup>

On 21st December, he was again told to proceed to Pārgadh accompanied by Jalāl Khan and Dulbā Nāyak, and capture the fort. As a reward a mansab was promised to him. Prince Aazam at that time had camped near Maneri.<sup>230</sup>  
 On December 23rd, Khem Sāwant/<sup>was</sup> reminded of the task entrusted to him and the services rendered by his son and Hām Dalvi sometime before were greatly appreciated by the Mughals. He was also told not to cause delay in capturing the fort.<sup>231</sup>

It appears that Khem Sāwant had been very useful to the Mughals on earlier occasions, particularly at the time of the capture of Mardāngadh. Therefore the Mughal officer insisted upon Khem Sāwant's presence at the fort and participation in the campaign. This haste also shows the pressing need of the Mughals to capture the fort.

On 28th December Khem Sāwant was again told to go to Pārgadh along with other zamindars. Till the capture of the fort prince Aazam was to stay at Maneri and he was asked to report to the prince after the capture of the fort and afterwards was asked to go to Kudal.<sup>232 A</sup> From it appears that Khem Sāwant had good knowledge of the fort. The Mughals also appeared to be certain about their success.

On 2nd January, 1689 Khem Sāwant was at Pārgadh



along with the other zamindars.<sup>232B</sup> He descended the Chats. This time a certain Shāh Bāz Khan has been sent to him. It is not understood why Khem Sāwant descended the Chats. This might be presumably for meeting some party of the Marathas. Did Khem Sāwant really go to the Marathas? If so, what were the results?

We see that on the same date Rām Dalvi, Kān Sāwant, Mānp Sāwant, etc. were at Pārgadh. If required Khem Sāwant was promised a reinforcement of troops by the Mughal officer.<sup>232C</sup> In a letter of 4th January, the Mughal anxiety over the happenings at Pārgadh was quite evident as Khem Sāwant did not send any news.<sup>232D</sup>

Khem Sāwant's silence was the cause of worry for the Mughals. Why was he silent? Presumably because he was losing the battle. From the news of 5th January, Khem Sāwant was asked to supply more troops and to withdraw himself from the campaign.<sup>232E</sup> Why this change was considered necessary?

In short, the campaign of Pārgadh though commenced in right earnest by the Mughals did not come to any end. It is rather unfortunate that as there are no records available in respect of this campaign, we are at a loss to know with what results it ended and who were the leaders on the Maratha side to defend it.

Such was the role played by the Vassals, the Desais of Sawantwādi and Kudāl during the struggle. In Karnātak there were also a few more Vassals like the Khem Sāwant, and the Dalvi of Sāwantwādi. These were the Desais of Hukeri, Bankāpur and Soncha.

From December, 1686, their activities became more pronounced. They were always in league with the Mughal officers. They utilized every opportunity that came in their way to secure new 'inām' or new land. For them personal safety was the supreme principle of life. As Sambhaji did not pay any personal attention to these par-ganas on the border of his state, the Desais, always played 'hit, grab and run' game, against the Marathas. They openly declared their intentions of joining the Mughal service and aspired to flourish under Aurangzeb's rule.

Early in December 1686, Alpondā Desai of Hukeri sent his petition to Ruhullāh Khan. And on 21st December he was given protection and entered in the Mughal service.<sup>233</sup>

By end of July 1687 we are informed that the same Desai took Gandharvagadh from the Marathas. As a reward for this act he was given the sardesgat of Chandgad and Ajare. He became a very trustworthy person in the eyes of the Mughal officers and even Khem Sāwant and Rām Dalvi who were in that territory were not allowed to proceed independently.<sup>234</sup>

Thus the Desai undertook to serve the Mughals loyally. Early in November 1688 he was ordered to see Aurangzeb with 200 men. But it is evident that at least till 16th November, he did not turn up at the desired place. He was again asked to send his brother there, as all the other zamindars were also summoned there.<sup>234A</sup> Till December 24th he did not go. Therefore his intentions were questioned by the Mughal officer. He has been pressed very hard to go, with as many men as he could collect. The nature of business is unknown. Though it is emphasized that it was quite important.<sup>234B</sup> What it must have been?

This happened on 24th December. Again from another letter from the Mughal officer to the Desais, we learn that the Desai failed to reach the desired place till 26th December. Then he was ordered to proceed to Kolhapur because the Mughal army had collected there. And he was asked to join a certain Miyan Shakir Muhammad. He was also ordered to make haste.<sup>234C</sup>

In March-April of the same year the Mughals captured Piraj from the Marathas. Thus we find the presence of the Mughal army in Kolhapur territory. The Marathas, though defeated appear to be strong in that region. Because in October, Itadkād Khan, who was in December of the previous year, at Parner and Sanganner was ordered to proceed to Mangalwedhā against Sambhaji. Therefore it appears, probably that the Desai was called upon to

to help the Mughals against Sambhaji's army in that region.

As there are no records to show, whether the Desāi actually took part in the campaign or not, but it is sufficient to note that on earlier occasions he did fight against Sambhaji and had showed sufficient loyalty to the Mughals.

Similar was the state of affairs in respect of the Desāi of Bankāpur. On 28th October by an order of Aurangzeb, Sayyid Adam Karim Sarjā and Khān Gauda Lakmeshwar Sarnādgauda of Bankāpur were praised for joining the Mughals with their army and were rewarded with the village of Segur in 'inām' and the office of Sarnādgauda of Kotigera Imadkanā, Kechkera, Qāziour, I'tmātpur and Ibrāhim-pur.<sup>235</sup>

The temptation offered was too big for the Desai for not joining. Consequently helped Aurangzeb with their armed contingent.<sup>236</sup> Thus, they fought against the men of their own Rājāh, whose Vassals they were for many years.<sup>237</sup> But in April, 1685, Kenchan Gauda Patil of Sāvsi village became disloyal. But soon he was arrested and kept in the prison of Nawalgund and a fine of 500 hons was imposed on him for the disloyalty.<sup>238</sup>

In January, 1687, the Deshaukh of Hukkeri was asked to supply foodgrains to the Mughal army. At the same time Nāroji Naghoji was appointed the Faujdar of Patehapur.<sup>239</sup>

During January, 1687, a very interesting incident took place in Targana Mukeri. This has <sup>not</sup> been recorded so far by any historian. Hither to an unknown person, a certain Bahimād Khan, declared that he was appointed to take charge of Islāmgadh (Pavitrāgadh) in Mukeri pargana, by the orders of Aurangzeb.<sup>240</sup> He sent orders to the Desai of Mukeri, to supply grain, gun powder, and armament to a certain Mirzā Khan belonging to the Mughal army.

On 27th January, the Desai was asked to help Mirzā Khan who would be taking over Islāmgadh. The two other Maratha Sardārs, Nāgoji Māne and Bahirji Pāndhare, each one holding the mansab of 5000 Tawar sided with the Mughals, were also encamping in the territory of Noor Khan at that time. In addition to this about 700 Pathāns and Miyān Faud Khan were ordered to encamp at Birol, in Noor Khan's territory.<sup>241</sup> (probably faujdar of Birol) What for these big preparations were being made is not known. Possibly the Mughals must have been expecting an attack from the Marathas.

But it seems, that the Marathas also were aware of the Mughal activities in that territory. Under the impression, that the Desai of Mukeri was loyal to them, the Maratha officer wrote to him, "The Chatrapati's letter has been received. He has written about Bahimād Khan, which you will know in course of time. Sturdy men and

horses should be sent (to me). Do not hesitate.....  
 Everything is under control."<sup>242</sup> After sometime again,  
 the Desāi is asked to be in touch with Islāmgadh alias  
 Navitragadh.

On 14th February, the Desāi is informed by the  
 Marathas that Rahimdād Khan, had escaped to Gokak. He  
 in turn, therefore, should order other Desāis to close  
 all his roads again and remain alert.<sup>244</sup> It appears  
 that during these days Annājipant Dhondo from the Marathas  
 was in Mukeri. On 16th February, the Desāi was informed  
 that Rahimdād Khan had been completely routed. He is  
 ordered to arrest or kill Rahimdād Khan, because if he  
 survives, he will surely cause troubles to the cows and  
 Brahmins and innocent subjects in that territory.<sup>245</sup>

In a letter of 18th February, the Marathas wrote to  
 the Desai expressing their worry as the Desāi did not  
 carry out the orders. A fear has been expressed that he  
 might become strong in that region and it would be very  
 troublesome to him also. The Marathas from their side  
 sent Anto Suru for his help.

We do not know what exactly was the outcome of these  
 orders. Nor there are any documents available to ascertain  
 if the Desai followed the orders of the Marathas. It is  
 interesting to note that on 23rd February, an officer of  
 Aurangzeb informed the Desāi about Rahimdād's not being

any more in the Mughal service and confiscating the  
jāgir given to him.<sup>247</sup>

The purpose of giving the whole incident in details, is to bring home, the fact that the Desāis of Hukeri and other parganas were opportunists. They swung themselves according to the balance<sup>OF</sup> power, without any hesitation.

But then there were also loyal followers of the Maratha king Sambhaji. They had great love for Mahārāshtra and owed their allegiance to the Maratha king. They fought against Aurangzeb and also became victorious. One such outstanding example is of Khan Gauda Desāi, the Desāi of Laxmeshwar and Nādgaudā of Koppal fort.<sup>248</sup> In 1687, the Mughal armies after capture of Bijāpur had encamped in the territory surrounding Bhujbalgadh and Koppal. They had taken many forts and occupied the territory forcibly. But in course of time, when they attacked the forts of Koppal and Bahā-durbandā (Bhujbalgadh), the Desai defended these forts well. He recruited more people to fight against Aurangzeb when so many others were deserting him.

Similar was the position of Hanmāji Banvaras Desai and Kulkarni of the Gudlanur fort. He always remained loyal and honest to the Maratha king. In recognition of his meritorious services, he was awarded Deskulkarniship of Gudlanur.<sup>249</sup>

## J. EXECUTION OF SAMBHAJI

By January 1688, Aurangzeb had completed his conquest of Bijapur and Golkonda and appointed his own governors for these provinces. Thus the major part of southern states was merged in the Mughal Empire. The only exception was the strong state of Maharashtra, remained to be liquidated. After his conquest of the Deccan Saltanats he looked to be quite satisfied. Hence forward he thought of subduing the Marathas. Quite confident of the fact that no more secret help would be coming from Sikandar Shāh or Qutub Shāh to Sambhaji, he looked to be more firm about his campaign against the Marathas and his success over them.

Though there was no much of strong Mughal force was left behind in Maharashtra, yet surprisingly in January of 1688, Mā'tabar Khan got a large victory and captured Vishrāngadh and the fort of Patta.<sup>250</sup>

In this very month, Aurangzeb called prince Azam to his presence and ordered him to proceed against Sambhaji. He was highly rewarded and 40 thousand troops accompanied him. In February-March Azam captured Belgaum and many other forts.<sup>251</sup> By 25th February Aurangzeb arrived at Gulbarga. In November-December, from Bijapur he arrived at Tulāpur on the banks of Shīmā.<sup>251</sup>



In December he deputed Sheikh Nizām to lay siege to the fort of Panhālā, which was in the possession of Marathas. While at Tulāpur, he summoned a number of his officers<sup>253</sup> to his presence. It might be probably to launch a strong offensive against Sambhaji. Among these generals were, Gāzi-ud-din Khan Bahādur Firōz Jang, 7000 Zāt and 7000 Sawar with 4231 men, Amr-ud-din Khan Bahādur Khan, 1500 Zāt, 1500 Sawar with 381 men, Rustom Khan, 7000 Zāt, 7000 Sawar, Khwājā Abdul Rahim Khan and Hidāyat Ullāh Khan both sons of Gulich Khan, and many other prominent Sardārs. Gāzi-ud-din Khan was sent to capture Hājgadh and forts in its vicinity.

From August 1688 Nā'tabar Khan was attempting the capture of the fort of Trimbak in Nasik district. On 25th August Mubasir Khan went to Trimbak to inspect the military stations there. From there he sent a message for reinforcement from other stations with a view to joining the siege.<sup>254</sup> Mubasir Khan hoped that in a few days he would be able to take the fort provided Sambhaji did not send any reinforcement.

It appears that till the end of 1688 Marathas guarded the fort well and did not allow the Mughals to take it by use of force. But in January of the following year, Nā'tabar Khan acquired the fort by bribing the Qiledār.<sup>255</sup> And with similar means, he got possession of Kalyān

Māhuli, Bhivandi, Durgādi and Malang gadh.

The year 1689 was a most fateful year in the history of the Marathas. In the beginning of the year, the Marathas lost the fort of Trimbak in Nasik district. And similarly all the small forts in Kalyan-Bhivandi area. It appears that the Mughal activity was intensified in Maharashtra during this time.

Shaikh Nigām who was ordered to lay siege to Panhālā was in the vicinity of Kolhātur during January 1689. His clever spies got the news that Sambhaji on account of the quarrel that was picked up by Ravi Kalaś with the Shirkas, had gone from Pāhiri to Khelnā. After making a settlement with that family he had gone to Sangameshwar. And there that fateful event of his capture took place. At this time Sambhaji least expected any such eventuality and therefore was least prepared for it.

Khāfi Khan has given a detailed account of Sambhaji's activities here. He writes, "It was a coincidence that this wretch (Sambhaji) left Pāhiri and reached Khelnā. There he made adequate arrangements of supplies. His stars were in descendance. He was unaware of the march of the royal army. Nāngangā is on the borders of Sangameshwar. He had come there to bathe in the river.

Sangameshwar is situated in inaccessible valleys. The minister of Sambhaji, Ravi Palas had built a palace there. Sambhaji, his son Shahu, Ravi Palas, wives, children and about two to three thousand horse reached there. He was unaware of his doom. They all bathed there. The approach to Sangameshwar from the ghats is very difficult. There are ups and downs on the road and also growth of thorny bushes. Taking all this into consideration Sambhaji thought himself quite safe and stayed there."

"Sambhaji's father was a hard working and honest person. But Sambhaji's behaviour was just contrary to it. He was fond of drinking and loved to stay in the company of women, whose cheeks were as delicate as flowers and whose foreheads resembled that of the moon. He was indulging in sensual pleasures. Muqarrab Khan's spies were moving in that territory. They received the intelligence of Sambhaji's activity. And Muqarrab Khan determined to capture him. Sangameshwar was about 45 kos away from Kolhāpur. He took two thousand brave cavalrymen and one thousand select soldiers with him and started (for Sangameshwar).... That brave soldier had started with the intentions of Jihād. .... He traversed speedily. Whenever the road was difficult, he used to get down from the horse and walk. From the thick of jungles they came out like lightening. Sambhaji's fate was sealed. His death

approached close. He and his men reached near Sambhaji."

"It is said that the spies of Sambhaji carried the intelligence of the approaching Mughal army. But Sambhaji was intoxicated with wine and folly and pride. He could not even entertain a suspicion, that Mughals would come there. He was very proud of himself. In addition to this he was intoxicated with wine which is the cause of all destruction. He ordered the tongues of the spies to be cut. He did not prepare for his defence or dug the trenches. Muquarrab Khan fell upon him. Most of Sambhaji's men deserted him. With rest of the people he got ready to fight. His intelligent minister Kavi Kalas took Sambhaji with him. There were renowned Maratha Sardārs. In the beginning of the fight Kavi Kalas received injuries to his hand, and slipped off from the horse. Sambhaji who was watching this also stayed behind. Five Marathas were killed and the rest fled. Kavi Kalas was captured. Sambhaji ran to a temple and hid himself there. The Mughals searched for him and located Sambhaji. He tried in vain. At last a few of his men (serving as his bodyguard) were killed. Then, Sambhaji, his wives, Shahu and other 26 persons were captured. Ram Rājā was not there. The Mughals tied their hands and they were dragged with the hair to Muquarrab Khan's elephant. In the meantime, Sambhaji had shaved clean and had changed the clothes. But he was identified because of his

pearl necklace."

"Then Muqarrab Khan carried him on his horse and thus they were brought to the base of the camp."<sup>257</sup>

Phimsan in Bilkusha gives more or less the same account except in some places where he differs in some minor details. Māsir-i-'Alamgiri also gives the same story. But according to its author Sāqī Must'aid Khan, along with Sambhaji there were about 4 to 5 thousand Deccani spearmen to support him. According to another version Sambhaji along with some men of Kothlāgadh was going to the fort, when Mukarrab Khan imprisoned him.<sup>258</sup>

The Marathi sources are silent about the ways in which Sambhaji was captured. Jedhe Shakavali only mentions that on 7th of Magh (Ed) 1610 āka, Sambhaji and Kavi Kalas were captured alive and taken prisoners by Shaikh Nizām at Sangameshwar.<sup>259</sup> In the absence of any other source material we have to believe the accounts given by Persian historians, though they appear to be a little partial and exaggerated.

The news of Sambhaji's captivity reached Aurangzeb at Akhuj. The place was therefore renamed Asad Nagar after receiving the happy tidings. On 15th February, Sambhaji chained and maced was brought to the Royal Court at Bahādurgadh (Pedgāon).

In the imperial camp, the king of Marathas was disgraced and humiliated. A wooden cap was put on his head. All the prisoners were dressed like buffoons. According to *Māsir-i-'Alamgiri* it was essential so that "the Muslims might be heartened and the infidels disheartened by seeing it." The Muslims in the camp particularly celebrated the occasion, as if it was *Shab-i-barat* or *Id*. All the prisoners were taken round the town and then brought to the court.

Khāfi Khan relates an interesting incident when Sambhaji and Kavi Kalas were brought to the court. Aurangzeb, who was so overwhelmed after the sight of the prisoners, stepped down from the throne, in order to offer his prayers to God. Seeing this act of Aurangzeb, Kavi Kalas, promptly composed a verse in Hindi, meaning, "Oh Rājāh (Sambhaji) after seeing you here the Emperor has forgotten his pomp, glory and pride, and has got down from the throne, in order to bow before you in reverence."

This gesture was certainly not appreciated by the courtiers. Soon the prisoners were sent back, with severe consequences to follow. The royal prisoners were not given any trial. According to *Māsir-i-'Alamgiri* the verdict on Sambhaji was given in these words, "In consideration of the harshness and insult he (Sambhaji) practised by slaying and imprisoning Muslims plundering the cities

of Islām, the destruction of the wicked infidel preponderated over the reasons for keeping him alive and the decision of the Masters of the Holy Law and faith.....  
 and State were in favour of despatching this hellish robber."<sup>260</sup>

There was no appeal in the judgement, though we know some courtiers did advise Aurangzeb to spare the life of Saabhaji.

The sentence was not executed immediately. On 3rd March Aurangzeb arrived at Koregaon. For next 8 days all the prisoners were tortured alike. The treatment meted to them was most inhuman and equally heart rending. In a short time the tongues of the prisoners were cut and the eyes removed. Thus even the death was cruel to them in approaching slow. On the 11th March, at Vadhu (near Koregaon) finally they were put to a cruel and painful death.

The vengeance was not over, and the flesh of royal prisoners was thrown before the dogs.<sup>261</sup> Their heads were separated from their bodies and were taken in procession in all the parts of the Deccan.<sup>262</sup> People were told that a tyrant, whose profession was to cause trouble to the public would always be rewarded with this punishment.

Thus fell down the king of Marathas, unhonoured and unsung. Thus came to an abrupt end the life of Maharashtra's warrior son, who showed undaunted courage even at the peril

of his life. And thus he chose a martyrs death, with no hesitation, with no expectation, in spite of most inhuman torture, he stood firmly for his countrymen.

The deterrent punishment given to Sambhaji hardly roused any fear in the people. Aurangzeb was disappointed in his expectation, when a few months' later, he saw the people were more courageous than ever. In punishing Sambhaji, he wanted to terrorize people and thus force upon them the Mughal domination. But it was the irony of fate, that, more he tried to suppress the people, more vehemently they defied the Mughals. The history of subsequent years is full with many such incidents.

The captor of Sambhaji, Shaikh Nizām was rewarded for this splendid service with the title of Khan-i-Tamān Iatah Jang, 25000 rupees, a special robe and a mansab of seven hazāri. For the fulfilment of his dream, Aurangzeb sent ten thousand rupees to Gesu Parāz at Ulbargā for distributing as alms. The trumpets of victory were blown for three days in the royal army. In this way the first phase of the Maratha War of Independence came to a close, a phase which brought a victory to the Mughals and a seeming defeat to the Marathas. But all was not over; the Marathas had only lost a battle and not the war. The mistaken ideas and impressions of Aurangzeb were soon to be corrected by the heroes of Maratha army and leaderless people.



V. POLITICAL ASSESSMENT - 1689 APRIL TO 1689 MARCH

With the execution of Sambhaji on 11th March 1689 Aurangzeb's dream was partially fulfilled. After the death of Sambhaji, according to Aurangzeb, the Marathas were left without a king and without a leader. What was expected to come out of such situation was nothing but chaos and disorder. In other words, he thought, the kingdom of Marathas was almost liquidated.

Within a few months after Sambhaji's death, Raigadh, the stronghold and the capital of the Marathas was captured by Zulfiqār Khan. By the end of this year, Aurangzeb appeared to be the unrivalled Lord Paramount of Northern India and the Deccan alike. The king of Bijapur, the king of Golkondā and the king of Marathas were all vanquished. Their respective kingdoms were all extinguished and their territory brought under Mughal banner. But then all was not well with the Mughal Emperor and his imperial dominion. As has J. Sarkar aptly described it, "All seemed to have been gained by Aurangzāb now but in reality all was lost. It was the beginning of his end the saddest and most hopeless chapter of his life now opened. The Mughal Empire had become too large to be ruled by one man or from one centre. His enemies rose from all sides, he could defeat but not crush them for ever. The administration grew slack and corrupt. The endless war in<sup>the</sup> Deccan

exhausted his treasury. The Deccan ulcer ruined him." <sup>263</sup>

What Sir J. Sarkar has missed the sight of, in the above statement, was the undaunted spirit of the Marathas to avert back the Muslim invasion. Uppermost in the minds of Marathas was love of their country's independence. To protect their freedom and liberty they were prepared to sacrifice their lives and everything. The situation was something like when Sam Adams spoke to people at the time of the American War of Independence. "I would advise persisting in our struggle for Liberty though it were revealed from Heaven that 999 men were to perish, and only one of a thousand to survive and retain his liberty. One such freeman must possess more virtue and enjoy more happiness, than a thousand slaves." Though nobody has recorded this type of words from any Maratha leader, but a historian, gathering his knowledge from facts that took place during these years can certainly sum up as above. Khāfi Khan can be quoted in support of the above argument, though in a negative way, when he describes the condition of Aurangzeb after the death of Sambhaji, "the God willed that the troubles started by the infidels were not to be uprooted from the Deccan. And rest of the precious life of the Emperor was to be consumed in arranging campaigns and taking forts." <sup>264</sup>

The period of nine years was a remarkable period both,

for the Mughals as well as the Marathas. It was a period of successive victories and high hopes for the Mughals. It was a period of continuous withdrawals, defeats and despair for the Marathas. Under the leadership of Aurangzeb himself, the Mughal army, led by generals of repute and experience marched through the Deccan. The efficient cavalry and well equipped artillery though unfamiliar to the terrain of Maharashtra penetrated deep in the country. With their superior number and vast supplies they were able to surmount all types of difficulties and were able to silence Maratha opposition temporarily.

The condition of the Maratha army was different. Sambhaji was more occupied with his wars at sea, the Dutch, the Portuguese and the Sidis. And freed from this, there were internal feuds and factions, the internal rivalries of his minister Kavi Kalas and the other sardars of repute. During this period Sambhaji did not give any organised fight to the invading Mughal armies.

What took place was only of the nature of skirmishes and raids. But none the less though king himself did not make any deliberate effort of defence or to drive away the enemy or to put hindrance to the inroads of Mughal army's march, yet the people in general and generals of Sambhaji in particular became aware of suspending thunderbolt of Mughal invasion, hanging loose over them and which might

have fallen upon them at any time. The results of which could been nothing but disastrous. Therefore they were quite active in repulsing the Mughals.

This period does show us partial opposition on the part of Marathas, yet it was apparent from the events, that there was will to fight among the people. They did prepare the grounds and network for the future war in order to maintain the independence. The willingness among the people to preserve the spirit of independence was evident. The great respect for the religion, the ideals of happy life which Shivaji had imbibed on their minds were still fresh and alive. Though the leadership of Sambhaji did not give enough scope to his generals to march against the Mughal armies, yet the spirit of courage and valour was not dead among the people.

From time to time Sambhaji made an effort to secure the support of various Deshmukhs, who virtually controlled the unmustered militia in the country. When prince Muazzam and Shihāb-ud-din Khan entered Konkan, Sambhaji sought the support of Deshmukh of Wāi and his armed men. He laid emphasis on the requirement of well prepared armed men to fight Aurangzeb. He expressed a high hope of defeating the Mughals, if he could succeed in making his army large.<sup>265</sup> Similar efforts were made by Favi Palas in 1684. He wrote a letter to the Deshmukh of Pānad Khore, the concluding

lines of which provide us with a striking example of political thinking then existing in Maharashtra, when it said "Last year the Chatrapati sent Bajāji Nāvādkar to you. Your object was not achieved and you were not satisfied. Therefore I requested the Chatrapati who orders you to see him. At this time all the Vatandārs should be united and the enemy should be punished." <sup>266</sup>

As the efforts to unite all the Deshmukhs, Desāis and Vatandārs were being made, some of them deserted Sambhaji and joined Aurangzeb. There were some prominent Maratha Sardārs who did so. But Sambhaji did not give up the hope. He was constantly making efforts to bring them back. In 1685, Sarjerao Jedhe had joined the Mughals. On the 5th October Sambhaji informed him that "If attacked, neither you nor the Mughals will stand even for two days. And they could be destroyed along with you." <sup>267</sup> Thus Sambhaji did not hesitate in threatening the disloyal elements. But then the political objects are not always attained by threats alone. Like a good statesman, he did not lose sight of the fact of winning over the Jedhes by a tactful way and green promises. The Maratha Sardār was persuaded to come back. Here the emphasis was laid on impending danger to the Swarāja. These people, who had joined the Mughal service, with certain material expectations were reminded that the Mughals were foreigners to this land.

Acceptance of service under them showed consent to slavery. Thus the self-respect of the Marathas was being aroused. They were constantly reminded about their own king, their own nation and their own religion.

But in spite of all this Sarjārāo Jedhe did not join the Marathas till February 1687. Yet the attempts to bring him under the Maratha banner were not given up. Nilkanth Poreshwar, the chief minister of Sambhaji wrote to Sarjārāo Jedhe in February 1687 saying, "You have joined the Mughal service. But what is there that attracts you so much? If you rejoin the Marathas you would be well rewarded. If you feel hesitant in coming back because you have joined the Muslims, you should not feel so. You are being par-  
 268 doned." Here we find clear thinking of the Marathas in respect of matters like recalling people who joined the Muslim service. On 4th March, he was extended complete  
 269 protection. And was asked to remain loyal to the Chatrapati.

"Similar attempts were made by Sambhaji to infuse spirit of loyalty and love for Swarāja in some of the Desāis of Karnātak. In 1686 the Moghe Prabhu Desāi of Hukeri was advised by Kavi Kalas to have loyalty towards the Chatrapati and to the person whose food he was eating. "The Desāis should know," wrote Kavi Kalas, "there is no necessity of compromising with the Mughals and disloyal

people. Display your good intentions towards the kingdom." 270

Such are the few instances from which we gather that though the Marathas were politically disturbed, yet they were making preparations to fight the aggression. Though these were only of a primary nature and limited to a few places and few people, yet it had its repercussions in times to come.

The subsequent events of Maratha history do bear witness to these facts. These were the days when the seed of unity was sown. It grew strong in later years, though some people did desert the Marathas side and thus betrayed the cause of Swarāja. Yet the movement was carried on. Nothing ever discouraged them from resisting the aggression or desisted from standing in unity against the Mughal sword. Instead of fear it brought more courage and greater determination in the people. Therefore, we see that they took up to the arms unitedly against the most powerful enemy even at the peril of their lives and belongings. To them, there was no other alternative, other than victory or death. Consequently we find that they established the fact that even in the absence of proper leadership, they were still capable of guarding the most valued principles that they had learnt from the Great Shivaji, the preservance of 'Liberty'.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 HS, pp. 214-15.
- 2 SKPS, p. 101.
- 3 HS, p. 215.
- 4 HS, pp. 215-16
- 5 SKPS, Vol. III, p. 144.
- 6 HS, p. 216.
- 7 HS, p. 216.
- 8 BISM, Vol. IX, No. III, p. 16.
- 9 SCP, p. 31.

Khāfi Khan in ML gives the date as 20th Muharram 1091 (H) and J. Sarkar quoting the same source gives the date as 30th January 1681. It is difficult to corroborate the same with any third source. Surprisingly, Mathir-i-Alamgiri and Dilkashā of Bhimsen are silent on this event. As most of the dates and events given in Jedhe Shakāvali have been accepted as authentic, I consider the date given in J.S. of this particular event also as authentic and presume that Burhānpur was plundered by the Marathas on this date.

- 10 MM, p. 77.
- 11 According to /Khāfi Khan, Akbar was received at Sambhaji's palace three miles away from the fort of Rajgadh, and that too on 1st June. This view does not appear to be correct.



- 12 Dutch view (From Surat 31 Jan 1682 D.P.Vol. 37) as  
quoted in HA, Vol. IV, p. 252.
- 13 HS, pp. 219-20.
- 14 BISMQ Vol. IX No. 1, p. 17.
- 15 BISMQ Vol. IX No. 1, p. 17.
- 16 HS, p. 220.
- 17 SCP, p. 31.
- 18 HS, pp. 211-12
- 19 HS, p. 212.
- 20 HA, Vol. IV, p. 283.
- 21 Appendix A No. 1, SKPS, p. 104.
- 22 Appendix A No. 2.
- 23 Appendix A No. 3.
- 24 Appendix A No. 4.
- 25 Appendix A No. 7 and 8.  
  
One has to accept the claim of the Mughals with caution  
as most of all their soldiers were killed in the  
battle. So it is doubtful if the victory was real.
- 26 Appendix A No. 9.  
  
As usual the Mughals claimed the victory. But it  
does not appear to be convincing as they were not  
even able to stop the Marathas from taking away the  
booty.
- 27 Indore
- 28 Appendix A No. 10 and 11.

- 29 MA, p. 211.
- 30 Appendix A, No. 12.
- 31 Appendix A No. 13.
- 32 MA, p. 214.
- 33 MA, p. 217.
- 34 Appendix A No. 14 and 15.
- 35 Appendix A No. 15.
- 36 Appendix A No. 16-a.
- 37 MA, p. 222.
- 38 Appendix A No. 17.
- 39 Appendix A No. 18.
- 40 Appendix A No. 19.
- 41 Appendix A No. 20.
- 42 Appendix A No. 21.
- 43 Appendix A No. 22.
- 44 Appendix A No. 22 and 22-a. It mentions name of  
Netaji Palkar.
- 45 Appendix A No. 23.
- 46 Appendix A No. 24.
- 47 Khāndān. Kheda in Khandesh.
- 48 Appendix A No. 25.
- 49 Appendix A No. 26.
- 50 Appendix A No. 27.
- 51 Appendix A No. 28.
- 52 Appendix A No. 29. On 7th November 1682 Aurangzeb  
received a petition from Gulich Khan begging favour  
for the battle against Hambirrao. But he did not  
accept the report as true and expressed his doubt

saying that if Gulich Khan was victorious then why so many Mughal soldiers were killed and why did he return alone to prince Azam. From this it is evident that not the Mughals but the Marathas were victorious.

53 Appendix A No. 31.

54 Appendix A No. 32 and 32A.

55 Appendix A No. 33.

56 Appendix A No. 34. Though the report may appear to be exaggerated, yet there appears to be excessive ravaging.

57 Appendix A No. 35.

58 MA, p. 215.

59 Appendix A No. 36. Candāpur. It is in Khandesh.

60 Appendix A No. 37. Bhojpurā. A suburb of Aurangābād.

61 Appendix A No. 38.

62 Appendix A No. 38. Mehāndali. About 5 miles from Kalyān-Bhivāndī.

63 Appendix A No. 39.

64 Appendix A No. 40.

65 Appendix A No. 41.

66 Appendix A No. 42.

67 Appendix A No. 43. Mankoji (Ballāl)

68 Appendix A No. 44.

69 Appendix A No. 45.

70 Appendix A No. 46, 47 and 48. No. 47. The Mughal victory does not appear to be real. If all this

their men were killed, then how could they take away 700 Marathas as prisoners. Even Aurangzeb, after hearing the news kept quiet, which means he had his own doubts about the news report. The place appears to be somewhere near Panhālā about 12 miles. The name of the place is not indicated.

- 71 Appendix A No. 49.
- 72 Appendix A No. 50.
- 73 SCP, p. 32.
- 74 Appendix A No. 51.
- 75 Appendix A No. 52.
- 76 Appendix A No. 53. Though the name of the place is not indicated, it appears that the place must be somewhere in Berar as the document mentions that Bahadur Khan was 6 miles away from the battle scene, and at this time he was in Berar.
- 77 Appendix A No. 54.
- 78 Appendix A No. 55.
- 79 Appendix A No. 56.
- 80 Appendix A No. 57.
- 81 Appendix A No. 58.
- 82 Appendix A No. 59.
- 83 Appendix A No. 60.
- 84 Appendix A No. 61.

85 Appendix No. 62.

If all the Mughal soldiers were killed in action, it is anybody's guess that who must have been the victor. Therefore, the Mughal claim of victory must be accepted with caution.

Nek Rai. Mākan gaon. Makahar.

86 Appendix A No. 63. Talgaon.

Melkhandan. Appendix A No. 48.

87 Appendix A No. 64.

88 Appendix A No. 65. It is difficult to come to any final conclusion about the victory of any party, particularly if one reads between the lines, the report of the news letters.

89 Appendix A No. 66. The Ciledar gave peshkash of 9 lakhs hons appears to be an exaggeration.

90 M.A., p. 235.

91 M.A., p. 239.

Karanpurā. To me it appears to be either a suburb of Ahmadnagar or a place very near to it.

92 M.A. p. 240.

93 Story of Bijapur kings by Kodak, Vol.II, p. 265.

Almaj appears to be Akluj. There is no other source to corroborate or contradict the same.

94 Appendix A No. 67, SCP, pp. 32-33 gives 27 Dec.1683.

95 Appendix A No. 68.

- 96 Appendix A No. 69. Tokah Umrā .
- 97 Appendix A No. 70.
- 98 Appendix A No. 71.  
Sangāon . Pur Kākoji .
- 99 Appendix A No. 72, the place appears to be somewhere near Nasik, as Aazam was still in Nasik.  
Timaji .
- 100 Appendix A No. 73.
- 101 Appendix A No. 74.
- 102 102 SKPS, p. 110.
- 103 103 MA, p. 222.
- 104 104 MA, Vol. V, p. 142.
- 105 105 SCP, p. 32, Appendix A No. 74a.
- 106 106 Appendix A No. 75. Marathi source (SCP, p. 32) does not reveal the exact date of battle. Rupāji and others were present in the battle, but whether on 5th or 11th November, it is difficult to say conclusively.
- 107 Appendix A No. 76.
- 108 Appendix A No. 77.
- 109 The entire incident has been reconstructed with the help of Akhabārāt. Appendix A Nos. 78, 79, 80 and 81 and 82 and 83 and SCP, p. 32. SCP mentions the place of battle as Titoliyā or present Titwālā. But Persian records are silent about it. The Marathi records mention only Rupāji Bhosale's name. From

109 Persian records it appears that Hambir Rao and Manaji More in addition to Rupaji Bhosale were also present. The major discrepancy appears about the date of the battle. Marathi records do not mention the exact date, but give the month as Saka 1605, Chaitra (March-April, 1683). Obviously, there seems to be some error about it. The News Letters mention specifically that the battle took place on 10th Rabi I, Julus 26 (27 Feb. 1683). Therefore one has to accept 27th Feb. 1683 as the date of the battle. From the News Letters we come to know that Aurangzeb was so pleased with Padam Singh's bravery and loyalty that as a gesture of royal favour he permitted his wives to perform Sati without any hindrance.

110 Appendix A No. 84.

111 Appendix A No. 85.

112 Appendix A No. 82 and 86.

113 Appendix A No. 83.

114 Appendix A No. 87.

115 KK, p. 291.

116 Campgaon is on the ghats near Gokak.

117 KK, p. 291.

118 SCP, p. 32.

119 KK, p. 280.

120 SCP, p. 32.

121 SCS, Vol. II, No. 271, p. 267.

- 122 SCP, p. 32. Fort is 7 miles from Nasik.
- 123 MA, p. 219.
- 124 KK, p. 282.
- 125 According to Factory records Surat 108, dated 30th July 1683, Hambir Rao was repulsed with a loss of 2000 men. This data appears to be wrong as the siege was abandoned by the Mughals in September-October 1682 SCP, p. 32.
- 126 SCP, p. 32.
- 127 Appendix A No. 88a.
- 128 Appendix A No. 88.
- 129 Appendix A No. 89.
- 130 Appendix A No. 90.
- 131 KK, p. 284.
- 132 HA, Vol. IV, p. 258.
- 133 HA, Vol. IV, p. 306.
- 134 MA, pp. 248-49.
- 135 SCP, p. 33.
- 136 Appendix A No. 93.
- 137 Appendix A No. 94, MA, p. 252 and Raigadghi Jivan Kahani by S.V. Avlaekar. In appreciation of this victory Gasi-ud-din Khan was given title of Firoz Jang Bahadur.
- 138 Appendix A No. 91.
- 139 Appendix A No. 92.
- 140 Appendix A No. 95.



141 Appendix A No. 96. Name of Maratha Sardar is  
[Naroji Bhosale.

142 MA, p. 249.

143 Appendix A No. 97.

144 Appendix A No. 98 and 99.

SCP, p. 33. The date of capture given in Marathi and Persian sources coincides. As Mawles had helped the Mughals and as they were the first to enter into the fort, Aurangzeb rewarded them with a bracelet of gold and silver to each one of them (Appendix No. A No. 106).

145 Appendix A No. 100 and 101.

146 Appendix A No. 102.

147 Appendix A No. 103.

148 Appendix A No. 104.

149 Appendix A No. 105.

150 Appendix A No. 107.

151 Appendix A No. 108.

152 Appendix A No. 109.

153 Appendix A No. 110.

154 Appendix A No. 111.

155 Appendix A No. 112.

156 Appendix A No. 113. Belā .

157 Appendix A No. 114.

158 Appendix A No. 115.

159 Appendix A No. 116.

160 Appendix A No. 116A.

- 161 Appendix A No. 117.
- 162 Appendix A No. 118.
- 163 Appendix A No. 119.
- 164 Appendix A No. 120.
- 165 Appendix A No. 120A.
- 166 Appendix A No. 121.
- 167 Appendix A No. 122.
- 168 Appendix A No. 123.
- 169 Appendix A No. 124.
- 170 Appendix A No. 125.
- 171 Appendix A No. 126.
- 172 Appendix A No. 127.
- 173 Appendix A No. 128.
- 174 Appendix A No. 129.
- 175 Appendix A No. 130.
- 176 Appendix A No. 131.
- 177 Appendix A No. 131.
- 178 Appendix A No. 132.
- 179 Appendix A No. 133.
- 180 Appendix A No. 134.
- 181 Appendix A No. 134A.
- 182 Appendix A No. 135.

Rāmā Jai Singh . MS reads Rānā Jai Singh.

- 183 Appendix A No. 136.
- 184 Appendix A No. 137.
- 185 Appendix A No. 138.

- 186 Appendix A No. 138.
- 187 Appendix A No. 139. Muḥammad son of Khidr, Rāfiullah, Sohrāb and Sharif are a few names who were killed in the battle.
- 188 Appendix A No. 140.
- 189 Appendix A No. 141. There is no other source to contradict this. But probably Pratāpgadh might not have been burnt instead a nearby village might have been burnt. This was the usual way of Mughal officers of reporting to Aurangzeb. A similar example we come across about Raigadh, but where Panchorawādi was burnt and not the fort.
- 190 Appendix A No. 141A.
- 191 Appendix A No. 142.
- 192 Appendix A No. 143 and 144.
- 193 Hitler's Russian campaign commenced in June 1941.
- 194 Appendix A No. 145.
- 195 Appendix A No. 146.
- 196 Appendix A No. 147.
- 197 Appendix A No. 148.
- 198 Rājwade, Vol. XV, No. 280, p. 287.
- 199 SKPS, No. 198, p. 66.
- 200 HA, Vol. IV, p. 298.
- 201 MK, p. 87.
- 202 Sambhaji by Sardesai, p. 74. The original source of his information is not known. In no other source material we come across this incident.

- 203 SCP, p. 33.
- 204 SCP, p. 31.
- 205 Appendix A No. 149. Unfortunately there is no other source available either to corroborate or contradict this information. Judging by the performance of Bajaram as a king, this act appears to be incredible.
- 206 Appendix A No. 150.
- 207 Appendix A No. 151.
- 208 Appendix A No. 152.
- 209 Appendix A No. 153.
- 210 Appendix A No. 154.
- 211 Appendix A No. 155.
- 212 Appendix A No. 155.
- 213 SCP, p. 34.
- 214 SKPS, p. 119.
- 215 HA, Vol. IV, p. 396.
- 216 Appendix A2 No. 1.
- 217 Appendix A2 No. 2.
- 218 HS, p. 225.
- 219 HSA, Vol. IV, p. 267.
- 220 HA, Vol. IV, p. 287.
- 221 Appendix A2, No. 3.
- 222 Appendix A2, No. 4.
- 223 Appendix A2, No. 5.
- 224 Appendix A2, No. 6.
- 225 Appendix A2, No. 7.

- 226 Appendix A2, No. 8.
- 227 Appendix A2 No. 9.  
SKPS, No. 271, pp. 89-90.
- 228 Pargadh is a hilly fort in the Sahyādri range, situated to the west of Belgaum near Chandgad. In December 1688, Aurangzeb launched this campaign. Hitherto no source or secondary source material was available on this campaign. Both Persian and Marathi sources published hitherto were silent on this incident. But fortunately among the records recently acquired by Prof. G.R.Khare from the Rājāsāheb of Sawantwādī (Ratnagiri) Shri S.R.Chitnis of the same place, there are a number of Persian and Marathi letters, written by some deputies of Aurangzeb between December 1688, and January 1689, addressed to Khen Sawant Sardesāi of Kudāl in Sawant Wādī and which throws light on this campaign entrusted to him.
- 229 Appendix A2 No. 10.
- 230 SCS, Vol. XIII No. 13, p. 16.
- 231 SCS, Vol. xth No. 14, pp. 15-16.
- 232a SCS, Vol. xiii, No. 15, p. 16.
- 232b SCS, Vol. xiii, No. 16, p. 16.
- 232c Appendix A2, No. 11.
- 232d SCS, Vol. xiii, No. 17, p. 17.
- 232e SCS, Vol. xiii, No. 18, p. 17.
- 233 Appendix A3, No. 1, 2, 3 and 4.

- 234 SCS, Vol. xii, No. 28, p. 15.
- 234a SCS, Vol. xii, No. 35, p. 22.
- 234b SCS, Vol. xii, No. 37, p. 23.
- 234c SCS, Vol. xii, No. 38, pp. 23-24.
- 235 SKPS, No. 238, p. 78.
- 236 SCS, Vol. VI, No. 77, p. 43.
- 237 SCS, Vol. VI, No. 79, p. 44.
- 238 SCS, Vol. VI, No. 74, p. 41.
- 239 SCS, Vol. xii, No. 9, p. 9.
- 240 SCS, Vol. xii, No. 10, p. 10.
- 241 SCS, Vol. xii, No. 13, p. 11.
- 242 SCS, Vol. xii, No. 14, p. 12.
- 243 SCS, Vol. xii, No. 15, p. 12.
- 244 SCS, Vol. xii, No. 18, p. 13.
- 245 SCS, Vol. xii, No. 19, p. 14.
- 246 SCS, Vol. XII, No. 20, p. 14.
- 247 SCS, Vol. xii, No. 23, p. 15.
- 248 SCS, Vol. VI, No. 76, p. 42.
- 249 SCS, Vol. VI, No. 46, p. 26.
- 250 HA, Vol. V, p. 146.
- 251 SCP, p. 34.
- 252 SCP, p. 34.
- 253 SDA, No. 4955, pp. 197-99.
- 254 SDA, No. 908, pp. 184-86.
- 255 HA, Vol. V, p. 147.
- 256 Sambhaji by Sardesai, p. 90. Sardesai has not given the source of his information.

- 257 KK, pp. 384-86.
- 258 Appendix A No. 156.
- 259 SCP, p. 34.
- 260 SA, p. 324.
- 261 Storia Do Megor, Vol. II, p. 311-12.
- 262 KY, p. 389.
- 263 Studies in Mughal India, pp. 50-51.
- 264 KX, p. 389.
- 265 SCS, Vol. II, No. 271, p. 267.
- 266 SKPS, No. 126, p. 39.
- 267 Rajwade, Vol. XV, No. 342, pp. 371-72.
- 268 Rajwade, Vol. XV, No. 281, p. 288.
- 269 SCS, Vol. II, No. 222, p. 221.
- 270 SCS, Vol. XII, No. 2, p. 5.

CHAPTER II : PHASE II -ARAJARAN (1689-1700)

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PHASE II : RAJARAM (1689 TO 1700)A. A COUNTRY IN CHAOS

Sambhaji was executed. For a period of one week before his death he suffered utmost torture and punishment. Humiliation, insult and injury, were mounting every moment that he passed in the Mughal camp. Once a king and a leader of a great race, he was now helpless. No doubt he was helpless, but he never begged for mercy. It is very difficult to recapitulate the thoughts in his mind, when he was subjected to most inhuman torture. No records are available to show his reaction to his enemy. But the way he withstood the onslaught one feels that his mind was occupied by his country and he might have said to himself "I shall never surrender or beg for mercy, I am determined to sustain myself as long as possible and die like a soldier who never forgets what is due to his own honour and that of his country.... Death."

And thus he faced a martyr's death, for the love of his country and for the liberty of his compatriots.

In punishing Sambhaji in a most cruel way, Aurangzeb had manifold intentions. The first and foremost was to create 'reign of terror' in Maharashtra and establish his supremacy over them. This he expected

could effectively work against the unity of people and they could thus be coerced to join the Mughal service. And to a certain extent, Aurangzeb was successful in creating these chaotic conditions in the country. Some opportunist Peshās and Peshmukhs did desert the Maratha king. With bended knees and folded hands, these Maratha sardārs went to Aurangzeb and thus accepted the 'royal mansab', a mark of humiliation and slavery from the Maratha point of view. According to his belief, there was neither intelligence nor virtue among the people sufficient to enable them to govern themselves. They could be subdued and humbled by physical force alone. In the death of Sambhaji, he had wishful thinking that he had vanquished the stubborn Marathas and for sometime at least he could repose as a victor. How sadly he was mistaken, the events proved it beyond doubt.

The conditions in Maharashtra after the death of Sambhaji were really explosive. The marks left behind by his death, were not to be obliterated so soon. The injuries were deep. The feelings of the people were like a volcano, likely to erupt any time. There appeared to be no longer a government. Danger pressed. Disaster thickened. The atmosphere was surcharged with vengeance. Vendatta was writ large on the faces of the people. They were to fight for Swarājya and the Maharashtra

Pharma. Patriotism overshadowed all other feelings and emotions of the people. Their sentiments were roused. And it is said that, "it is the sentiment which is the political salvation of free states", if ever it was to be true, the events of this period, give abundant evidence of the same.

The capture and execution of Sambhaji did not discourage the Maratha leaders in any way. Neither of the sources Persian or Marathi, have made any mention of miserable plight of the Marathas, after this debacle. What little we gather from the events is that the execution of the Maratha king kindled the fire of the Maratha opposition, it set forth a real revolution. The Maharashtra became active like a live volcano. After almost nine years of war the people now well realized that the only way they can have peace was to drive away their enemy with all their might. It was beyond doubt clear to them, that the task required nothing short of herculean strength. And the origin and source of that strength lay in the masses. The only way was united they stand.

For the last nine years what was the state of / Maharashtra? The great mass of the people were exhausted with suffering and longed for repose. The Mughal pestilence had almost destroyed them. The land was filled with the powerful enemy agents. The execution of Sambhaji

created a big vacuum in kingship and leadership of Maharashtra. There was no one man of sufficient prominence to carry with him the nation. Rājārām, the king apparent was only twenty years of age. Sambhaji's son, was considered not more than a child. The other prominent persons from the royal retinue and ministerial post, were hardly thought of. The storm of the capture and execution of Sambhaji hurled its new problems on the bewildered people of Maharashtra. But soon they were re-inspired under Rājārām, their new king.

At this time Rājārām was in prison at Raigadh. He was released from the prison by Chāngoji Pātkar, the quiledār of Raigadh and Yesāji Kank. This happened on 9th February, 1689.<sup>1</sup> The other Sarkarkuns who were under arrest, including Mūnāji More, were all released. They were reappointed to their original posts. Rājārām had been unknown to fame and fortune was enthroned at Raigadh on 12th February, 1689.<sup>2</sup> Almost in a matter of three days the Marathas had found their new king and a leader. He was resolved to subdue anarchy at home and aggression from abroad. The country was already disgraced and the humiliation had struck him deep.

Within a period of month and half of Rājārām's taking over the Government Aurangzeb sent Zulfiqār Khan on 25th March 1689<sup>3</sup> to capture Raigadh. He promptly laid siege to the fort. The siege was being pressed hard.

From the existing conditions it appeared that they would not be able to defend the fort for a long. Inside were stranded, the widow of Sambhaji, Yesubāī, her son Sāhu, Rājārām and many other ministers. The safety of Rājārām and Yesubāī were the matters of paramount importance. What we gather from some of the chronicles is that, Yesubāī, realizing the plight of all the persons, advised that in the fitness of the events it was Rājārām's safety which was more important. He should immediately abandon the fort to a place of greater safety. Hopes and fears of the people were centred on him. He was to guide their destiny. About her personal safety she was least bothered. Thus bravely she uttered to the ministers "fear not". Rallyed by these daring words the ministers recovered their lost courage. Yesubāī and the other ministers who had assembled there, their minds were occupied with the thought of Maharashtra and the millions of Marathas, whose destiny was hanging on fire.

All of them unanimously agreed to a certain plan of action. All the ministers, quilledārs and leaders who had gathered at Rāigadh regarded Rājārām as their master and thus their unequivocal support to him. And in turn, Rājārām contemplated them not as equals and confiding friends but as efficient and valuable instruments for the accomplishment of the cause of Swarājya.

## B. COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Rājārām's problem was to sustain the Maratha kingdom against heavy Mughal onslaught. The magnitude of the problem appeared to be greater when the Marathas were to hold it with the bare skeleton of an almost weaponless army, supported by little more than 'Sticks and Stones' of the inhabitants. Defence was vital and was to be pursued with all speed and every ingenuity and artifice and efficiency.

To tide over these problems, he had to select and appoint his ministers to execute the job. With consummate tact he selected the ablest men to occupy the most important departments and govern the provinces. And these able persons in their turn assured the enormous care of administering the new government for four million people. ✓  
Those who were selected by him were, Rāmachandra Pant ✓  
Shankaraji Sachiv and Pralhad Miraji, as administrators and Khandoji Naik Pansambal as the Chief of the army.

Rāmachandrapant and Shankarājipant, the two loyal servants of the kingdom were brilliant in wit and speech, relentless and stubborn, gauged with skill and insight, the strength and subtleties of their opponents mind. ✓  
Their point of interest was survival of Maharashtra against such an upheaval.

Khandoji Naik Pansambal was a brave soldier and a great warrior. In the past he had fought many battles and proved to be the master of war strategy. In addition to that there were other brave soldiers, like Santaji Chorpade, two Chorpade brothers, Dhanaji Jadhav, Nanaaji Shinde and Vithoji Chavan.

Santaji was to Rājārām a body of ten thousand horsemen, ever ready for a resistless charge. Dhanaji was a phalanx of infantry and cavalry, bristling with their swords and spears, which neither artillery nor cavalry could batter down or break. Nanaaji was an armed column of invincible troops, black, dense, massy, impetuous, resistless moving with gigantic tread wherever the finger of the Chatrapati pointed. These were but the few names of Rājārām's army leaders. They were like limbs obedient to the mighty soul which swayed them.

The foremost problem before the Council of Ministers was that the Mughal armies were chasing Rājārām and he was to be saved from the Mughal captivity. There was no real place of safety for him in his own country. The possibility of fighting through the forts, was not to last long. Though at that time the Marathas possessed some important forts, but how long would they have been able to sustain against the might of Aurangzeb. Therefore, it was thought that a place away from Maharashtra would

appropriately serve this purpose. Keeping this in view, a new plan and a new strategy was to be devised. And thus the idea of opening a "Second Front" at Jinji came into existence. The fort of Jinji was considered, in view of military strategy a less accessible fort to the enemy. And the chances of stronger and durable defence, with less manpower were considered to be very bright. Secondly by making Jinji as Rājārām's abode, the Marathas expected, the Mughal armies to follow him there. Thus they would attain their objective of diverting the Mughal armed forces far away from Maharashtra, who were the cause of great destruction both, to men and crops. This would offer the Marathas a better opportunity, to meet this divided force more effectively. In addition to this we authentically learn that "His (Rājārām's) aim was to divert the Mughal army from his kingdom of Poona and join with several Nāyaks and raise a considerable army to retake Golcondā and Bijāpur kingdoms."<sup>4</sup>

Though the Marathas were mainly having good army, yet, in the foreseeable future, they could have scarcely hoped to be in a position to throw as many divisions compared with their enemy. Therefore, the war strategy had to be based on keeping the enemy constantly harried and unsettled, of grasping every opportunity to inflict a wound, anywhere until atlast the sword might be driven home.



Thus Rājārām's able 'Council of Ministers' began to see that the Karnātak would open the way to victory and might be the only means of bringing about, finally the conditions which would make "Second Front" in Karnātak a military possibility. The other enemies in that territory were to be reconciled. The small satellites of Deshaukhs and Desāis of various parganās in the Mysore plateau and the Madrās Karnātak were to be made allies, they were to be induced to join hands with the Marathas, if necessary by use of force. Thus a road opened to march the Maratha armies in the southern most part of the country. Jinji was to become a centre of the Maratha enterprise in the south (East coast). This was a soldiers' view of warfare as the 'art of the possible'. And it was finally pursued and maintained.

But the 'Second Front' would become possible only if the Marathas could gain ready support from the Rājāh of Tānjore Shahājī II, a cousin of Rājārām and the other Nāyaks, the leaders of the Bedars in the Karnātak territory. It was not an impossible task. The people in that territory were also hopelessly watching fall of their Hindu Rājāh and they were willing to support the persons who would carry on fight against the alien Muslim invaders. Their own existence was in danger. Keshav Pandit expressed the same view about the contemporary rulers,<sup>5</sup> from which it is clear that these men who

mattered in Karnātak shared the same belief in the 'Common Cause' of uniting the people in the hour of national calamity.

The siege of Rāigadh was being pressed hard day by day. The 'Council of Ministers' realised the gravity of the situation. They knew that not an instant was to be lost. Life and death were trembling on the balance. The dawn of the day was to conduct them to a new scene of herculean toil in organising the state and removal of their new king to a place of greater safety. There was no time for repose. It was decided that Rājārām was to be escorted to Jinji by Pralhād Nirāji, many other loyal sardārs and a large number of trusted lieutenants.

#### C. JOURNEY TO JINJI

On 5th April, 1689, Rājārām left Rāigadh for Pratāp-  
 6 gadh. And from now onwards, the Maratha king was moving from place to place and in a matter of six months till he finally left for Vellore, he was moving from one fort to another fort escaping the every chasing Mughal army. On 5th August, 1689 the Mughals after having taken Rāigadh, Rohidā and Torna, marched against Pratāp-  
 gadh. The Mughal army was led by Kānhoji and Nāgoji the two Marathas in the Mughal service under Zulfiqār Khan. They attacked the wadi at the foot of the fort. Rambhāji, the Maratha commander arrived at Pratāp-  
 gadh and gave a

battle. Many men were killed. Then he closed the gates of the fort. The Mughals besieged it.<sup>7</sup> Rājārām quickly left for Panhāla. It appeared from the record that he stayed there upto the middle of September. Meanwhile Pratāpgadh also fell to the Mughals.

Finally the 'Council of Ministers' having viewed the grave situation decided that Rājārām should secretly leave Panhāla. He was accompanied by Khandoji Nāyak Pānsaabal, Pralhād Nirāji, Nilkanth Moreswar, Bahiro Moreswar, Krishnāji Anant Sabhāsad, Bāji and Khandoji Kadam, Mānāji More, Rupāji Bhosale, Santāji Jantāp, Khando Ballāl, Vithal Trimbak and his three brothers,<sup>8</sup> Bahirji and Māloji Chorpade joined them on the way.

Dressed like Gosāvis (people who have abandoned the material world) Rājārām and his escorts left Panhālā on 26th September, 1689.<sup>9</sup> From Panhālā, they reached Rānganā.<sup>10</sup>

From Panhālgadh to Vellore, the distance is about 500 miles. The hazards of journey were quite great. But the quiet and understanding self-confidence with which Rājārām entered upon this enterprise is one of the most remarkable events in the whole of short but extraordinary career. He took with him no armies. Relying upon the energies of his own mind and upon the strength of his few followers and upon the sympathies of the great mass

of the people, he started on this perilous journey but with a few companions. Never did he encounter more fearful peril. The Mughals had drawn arms against the Marathas and had thronged in arms the entire Deccan. How could he hope to escape? The sword which killed Sambhaji was still shimmering with red blood. Everyone who had dared to oppose Aurangzeb was put to silence by the powerful Mughal sword. How could Rājārām venture with such a tiny band of the Marathas to beard this terrible lion in his den? The Mughals were quite active and fast in their work.

As early as 25th April, 1687, the orders were issued by Bahādur Khan to the Desāi of Mukeri that, Rājārām had left Rājgadh. "He intends to run away. You should kill him or imprison him. His activities should be traced in that territory.....You should send messengers and get information about him and intimate us over night so that we will be able to capture him. If through slackness, the enemy passes through your territory.... You will be considered as culprit with dire consequences. Show no slackness in this respect."<sup>11</sup> Promptly, the Desāi of Mukeri gave the information of Rājārām's presence at Pratāpgadh. On 6th May, the Desāi was again ordered to keep Bahādur Khan informed about the activities of Rājārām.<sup>12</sup> And on 14th June, Asad Khan wrote to Lawrence Pit, the Dutch Governor of Māgadattan to keep

watch on Rājārām 'whose fall is imminent'. Pit was to capture and present him to Aurangzeb. The French and others were also asked to help Pit.

Thus all the passage of Rājārām's march to Vellore was blocked and guarded closely by the Mughals. Abdullāh Khan Bārha, who was in the Bijapur territory was ordered to capture Rājārām. According to Mā'sir-i-'Alamgiri, Rājārām had three hundred followers of the rank of chiefs, passed through the territory of Rāni of Bednūr. The Khan sent his eldest son Hasan 'Ali, in that direction and also reached himself by forced marches.<sup>13</sup>

Rājārām had taken refuge at the banks of Tungabhadra. A fight took place and more than a hundred men including Hinderāo, Vyankoji, Banirji and Māloji Ghorpade were taken prisoners.<sup>14</sup> Rājārām very cleverly escaped. Immediately the Rāni of Bednūr was suspected for concealing Rājārām. Santāji reached the scene of battle and Khan Matlab Khan and Charzah Khan resisted him. The Rāni was forced to pay some fine. And within a few days the Maratha leaders, who were imprisoned escaped from the captivity. The rest of the prisoners were put to death.<sup>15</sup>

From Bednur, Rājārām arrived at Ambur.<sup>16</sup> Here he stayed in a temple and was well looked after by a Maratha sardār Bāji Pākade. On 28th October, 1689 Rājārām arrived at Vellore.<sup>17</sup> From there he marched towards

Jinji, a place fifty miles South East of Vellore and  
 arrived at Jinji on 1st-2nd November.<sup>18</sup>

Thus Rājārām in his hazardous enterprise braved every peril. The most imminent and the most to be dreaded of all was captivity at the hands of the Mughal soldiers. For thirty two days they marched a distance of 500 miles, with utmost toil. None of his companions showed any signs of exhaustion and weakness. If ever they thought about anything, it was the safety of their king alone. And they guarded him at the peril of their lives. Rarely one comes across such an example of matchless devotion and unquestioned loyalty of followers to their leader and leader in his turn to the cause of 'Liberty'.

Rājārām's safe arrival in Karnātak, convinces us beyond doubt that though for 32 days he had been confronted by his enemies and the hostile men in the Mughal service, yet he had eluded their vigilance. This shows that there were men who staunchly supported him, though secretly against the Mughals. This was the greatest and the most triumphant moment in the Maratha War of Independence. Thus, first phase of the plan, that is of opening the 'Second Front', commenced successfully.

D. SECOND FRONT : JINJI

A month before Rājārām left for Jinji, i.e. on 19<sup>th</sup> August, 1689, Hārji Mahādik, the Maratha ruler of Jinji territory had released Keso Pant, the envoy sent by Sambhaji to that territory. And within almost forty days of Keso Pant's release Hārji Mahādik passed away.<sup>20</sup> The widow of Hārji Mahādik took upon herself the task of governing the territory.

On 2nd November, 1689, Rājārām with his followers entered Jinji, almost uncereemoniously. The arrival of Rājārām was followed by a peaceful take over of the Government by Rājārām from Hārji's widow. The councillors, though reluctantly, yet, submitted to the new rule and paid three lakh hone as a present. Rājārām sent summons to all in any considerable employment in the Government to make their appearance before him. The foremost task lay ahead of Rājārām was the formation of his cabinet and appointment of ministers. The following names were to form 'ashtapradhāna' or Council of 8 Ministers :-

- (1) Nilo Morashwar Peshwa or Prime Minister.
- (2) Janārdhan Pant Hanamante Amatya or Finance Minister.
- (3) Shankarāji Malhar Sachiv or Accountant General.
- (4) Rāmachandra Triabak Pande Mantri or Minister of Interior.

- (5) Mahādāji Gadādhār Sumant or Foreign Minister.
- (6) Bālāji Sunder Chief Justice.
- (7) Khandoji Nāyak Pānsambal Chief of Army and
- (8) Khando Ballal Chitnis.

In addition to the appointment of ministers, a few more worthy people were honoured by Rājārām. Rāmachandra Pant, who remained in Maharashtra was given the title of Hukumat Panhā and Shaṅkarāji Nārāyan was made Sachiv.

A separate post of Pratinidhi was created for Pralhād Nirāji, who virtually shouldered the burden of Government of Jinji. Parsoji Bhosale was considered in high esteem and was honoured by the title 'Senā Sāheb Subhā' and was sent to the territory of Gondvan and Varādh (the present Vidarbha territory). Similarly Sidhoji Nimbālkār who had established Maratha rule along Godāvari territory was honoured with the title of 'Sar Lashkar'. Khanderao Pābhāde was sent to Gujarāt and Bāglāna territory with the title of 'Senā Dhurandhar'.

Simultaneously, Tīmāji, son of Kesho Triambak Pingale and Sunder Bālāji were appointed subāhdar of Jinji and Kunimedu respectively.

After the establishment of Government, the administration faced financial crises. The ministers looked around to raise money from the European settlement on the



East Coast. Three hundred hons were demanded from the English factors as an advance and a like amount from the French and the Dutch. Rich traders were urged to lend 5000 or even 1000 hons each. At the end of the year, 5000 hons more were demanded as a fine for buildings and fortifications of each European company. The Government raised money even by selling the fort of Tevenāpatan. Similar efforts were made to procure 100 barrels of gun powder and 2500 weight of small shot, to carry on their war against the Mughals. But the English very cleverly avoided this demand.

The functioning of new government at Jinji, brought a sense of great relief to the Marathas. The general despair about the cause of Swarājya started disappearing from the people's mind, and the feeling that the Maharashtra Rājya, was doomed, slowly got away. Towards the new government, peoples looked upon with greater hope. They appeared to be re-inspired. And the able ministers in the Government were active enough to achieve the cause of freedom.

On 20th December, Peshwā Nilo Pant received his first diplomatic success. Muhammad Sadiq, Yāchappā Nāyak, Ismail Khan Makh and other 4 thousand people who were in the Mughal employment after the fall of Golkondā, deserted the Mughal service.<sup>22</sup> They made an alliance

with Rājārām and joined the Marathas at Chenāpattan (Madras). They began to usurp the country and collect the revenue. The Mughal representatives were hopelessly outnumbered and were forced to take to their heels to Lunimeḍu.

Similarly, Laxmi Nāyak, who was in Aurangzeb's service, deserted. He came to Rājārām at Jinji. He publicly told the people to fight against Aurangzeb for their own country and religion.<sup>23</sup>

In January of the following year, he came to Rājārām with his 3000 cavalry and 6000 foot soldiers. But Rājārām did not permit him to join straight away as he suspected some mischief. Laxmi Nāyak encamped outside Jinji. He pleaded openly that "We belong to the same religion. We must fight the common enemy."<sup>24</sup> Finally, by February-March he joined the Maratha king. According to Martin's information he had about 12 to 15 thousand cavalry and many musketeers.

Laxmi Nāyak started his march to the Karnāṭaka. The Mughals deserted their posts and some took shelter at Madras. But then his campaign was not very successful. In the month of May he was defeated by the Mughals.<sup>25</sup> And by September the Mughals recovered all the posts captured by Laxmi Nāyak.<sup>26</sup>

### 8. ARRIVAL OF ZULFIQAR KHAN AT JINJI

Aurangzeb having received the intelligence of Ismail Khan Makh and Yāchappā Nāyāk joining the Marathas and their becoming very strong in that area, rushed to send one of his greatest generals, I'tiqād Khan who had recently received the title of 'Zulfiqār Khan Bahādur'. He had been detached from the imperial court at Koregaon at the end of November, 1689, he marched by way of Rāichur, Karnul Nandiyāl, Yadavā, and Garamkondā, and then descended into the Karnāṭaka plain (about June 1690), fighting and capturing many forts on the way and reaching Conjeeveram in August and the environs of Jinji at the beginning of September.<sup>27</sup>

From Jedhe Chronology, it appears that Zulfiqār Khan arrived at Jinji on 27th August and laid siege to the fort. Rājārām having realized his insecurity in the fort, left further down south of Karnāṭak.<sup>28</sup> He had sent his troops along with Tanjore Trimbak Rao and Yāchappā Nāyāk, north westwards into the Karnāṭak plateau to prevent the Mughal generals descent into the eastern plains.<sup>29</sup>

The Mughal military strength increased in this area. The Marathas were driven back and in October Zulfiqār wrote to the French to prevent Rājārām's escape by the sea in an English ship.<sup>30</sup>

On his arrival, Zulfiqār Khan, was ordered to lay siege to the fort of Jinji. But he had no heavy guns nor enough ammunition for a bombardment. He asked for 200 maunds of powder and 500 gun shots, 500 soldiers and 30 gunners from Sadras.<sup>31</sup>

English supplied him with 200 maunds of powder and 300 iron shots.

Meanwhile on 23rd November, 1690, Nemāji Shinde, Mānkoji Pāndhare, Nāgoji Māne and other 2 thousand deserted the Mughal service and joined Rājārām at Jinji.<sup>32</sup> They took charge of defence work at Chakrapuri in the lower fort. In February Rājārām returned to Jinji. In his operations against the Mughals he received tremendous support from the Rājāh of Tānjore both in manpower and supplies.

The Mughal army before Jinji under Zulfiqār Khan was composed of 12 to 15 thousand best cavalry and 12 to 15 thousand Rajput musketeers. At this time, 2000 army of Rājāh of Tānjore joined the Marathas.<sup>34</sup> The battle commenced and from both the sides bombardment was being made.

In April 1691, the Mughal army before Jinji had become so large and well provisioned that the country around expected a speedy fall of the fort. But in reality the siege had made little progress in all these months.

The complete blockade was beyond the power of the Mughals. By now the Marathas recovering from their first consternation began to harass them incessantly."<sup>35</sup>

"The military superiority of the Mughals was rapidly lost after April, while the activity of the Maratha bands roving around stopped the supply of grain to Zulfiqār's camp. Many Deccani mansabdārs who had accompanied him now deserted to the enemy."<sup>36</sup> In May, 1500 cavalry and 2000 Rajputs joined Zulfiqār Khan.

Letters of spies informed Aurangzeb that Zulfiqār Khan abandoned the trenches of Jinji. The retreat was partly because the Marathas stopped the supplies to the Mughal army and also he was cut down from getting any reinforcement. Meanwhile Sayid Lashkar Khan brought the supplies to Zulfiqār Khan's army.

Aurangzeb got quite alarmed with the precarious condition his general was put to by his enemy. Immediately he ordered Asad Khan, who was at that time at Nandiyāl to hasten to his son's aid.<sup>37</sup> Similar orders were issued to prince Kāmbakhsh to proceed to Jinji. At this time Kāmbakhsh was busy with the siege of Wāgingerā.<sup>38</sup> He reached Kadapā on 4th October to join Asad Khan for onward march to Jinji.

While at Jinji, in June, both the armies clashed

two three times and there was considerable loss of life. Zulfiqār Khan abandoned his attack on Jinji and marched into South Karnāṭaka. This was mainly to collect revenue from the Zamindārs in that territory. At the end of August he passed by way of Cuddalore towards Tānjore. At the end of this year he captured Trinomali<sup>40</sup> (23 miles west of Jinji).

On 16th December 1691 Kāmbakhsh accompanied by Asad Khan reached Jinji. On 6th January 1692 they were enjoined at Jinji by Zulfiqār Khan, Sarfaraz Khan and Sayyid Lashkar Khan.<sup>41</sup>

#### F. JINJI - ITS DEFENCE

Asad Khan with his army having reached Jinji, the strength of Zulfiqār Khan's army was considerably increased. Ismail Khan Makh<sup>42</sup> rejoined the Mughal service but Yāchappā Nāyāk continued with the Marathas. Kakkar Khan, who<sup>43</sup> had accompanied Kāmbakhsh was made faujdar of Jinji. Zulfiqār Khan renewed the siege of Jinji with great vigour and took the post opposite the eastern gate near a hillock called Ali Madad<sup>44</sup> across one of the branches of Jinji river. Asad Khan and prince Kambakhsh encamped threemiles away from him, beyond the northern gate, on the road leading from Krishnasiri to Singhāvaran hill. Ismail Khan at north west of the fort in the direction

of 'Yarnatak-garh'. Each Mughal camp was walled round for safety. The gate of Shaitāndari could not be blocked and the Maratha garrison freely came in and went out by it, brought in provisions whenever they liked. An outpost under Kakkar Khan watched the path through the Vetāvalam wood by which supplies reached the fort, but the task was ineffectively done."<sup>45</sup>

Rājā of Tānjore sent large amount of money to Rājā-rām which enabled him to protect Jinji.<sup>46</sup> The Marathas continuously attacked the Mughals and Kambakhsh's camp in particular. "One night a Maratha force 5,000 strong sailed out of the north gate, but were defeated by the combined exertions of the entire Mughal army."<sup>47</sup>

Zulfiqār Khan who saw the danger to the safety of Kāmbakhsh removed his tent from there and appointed Lashkar Khan to the north gate. He aimed at capture of Chandrāyandurg and thus directed his guns towards it as well as Pondicherry gate.<sup>48</sup>

Though Zulfiqār Khan made very strenuous efforts to take Jinji, yet the condition of besieging Mughal army was quite pitiable. In the words of Shimsen "The rain fell with excessive severity. Grain was dear. The soldiers, having to spend days and nights together in the trenches, suffered great hardships. In the rainy season the entire tract looked like one lake."<sup>49</sup>

While on the Maratha side, in January 1692, they captured Vellore which was in the possession of the Mughals, by a Maratha Sardār Prishnā Antāji.<sup>50</sup> During March the Maratha force clashed with the Mughals near Pondicherry.<sup>51</sup> And if we have to believe the account furnished by Martin, it appears that though there was a regular fighting between the Marathas and the Mughals, yet there was also a secret understanding between Īājārām and Sulfiqār Khan. Thus supplies continued to go inside the fort,<sup>52</sup> unhindered.

Thus the fighting continued during May, June and July 1692. The siege was not very effective. On 19th July Īāsīm Khan faujdar of Karnatak left for Jinji.<sup>53</sup> The Marathas got their supplies from the western side of the fort through the jungles. After July another attack was launched by the Mughals, which resulted in the repetition of previous attacks. Their many people were injured and they had to retreat.

During September, the Marathas attacked the besieging army and were quite successful. They also captured one Mughal sardār (3000 Sawar) and a lot of equipment.<sup>55</sup> But in October, the Mughals became fairly brave and reached the walls of the fort. The Marathas fought bravely. On 21st November at night a Maratha force arrived near the siege line of Īasīm Khan. It challenged the Mughals.



Immediately Jamshid Khan and others were sent for rescue. Later on Zulfiqār Khan himself arrived there. At the same time Asad Khan ordered Ishaq-ullāh Khan to replace Ismā'il Khan towards Rājgadh (Jinji). But he flatly refused.<sup>56</sup> Though the Mughals were attacking continuously the news of a large Maratha army marching towards Jinji, brought a great relief to Rājārām's force who were inside the fort. And therefore, the suspicion grew stronger than ever, about the secret understanding between Rājārām and Zulfiqār Khan.

On 13th December, Shankarājipant sent Ishaqji to Jinji. On 14th December, Ranchandrapant, having had the intelligence of the siege of Jinji, raised a large force over 15000 horse and sent Santaji to Jinji. To quote Khafi Khan<sup>57</sup> "they had 15 to 20 thousand ready horse and many prominent Maratha sardārs were in their employment. These two sardārs had mercilessly attacked the imperial army. Santaji was the leader of them. He was well known in ravaging the prosperous cities and attacking the famous generals. And all those who had an occasion to meet him on the battle field, had to face one of the three consequences, firstly he is killed, secondly, he is wounded and captured and lastly he is defeated with his army."<sup>58</sup>

The Mughals were terror struck with the very name of Santaji and Ishaqji. The bravest of the Mughal generals

used to tremble whenever they used to hear about the presence of these great Marathas generals in their territory. And hardly any reputed Mughal general dared oppose Santāji.

The new army composed of such heroic generals, burst on the Kanchi district. The news of arrival of this army caused a great terror among the European people and they ran to Madras for refuge. Ali Mardān Khan, who was the faujdar went out to encounter Santāji near Pāveripak. A pitched battle took place. Ali Mardān Khan was wounded and captured along with many men.<sup>59</sup> The Marathas recovered 1500 horses and six elephants. Later on he was released after paying a ransom of Rupees two lakhs.<sup>60</sup> Many other Mughal sardārs also secured their release in the similar way.

Thus the Marathas in their very first encounter with the Mughals got an overwhelming success and a lot of war equipment as well as cash.

The Maratha cavalry reached the outskirts of Jinji. Sulfiqār Khan having noticed the superior number of the Marathas resolved to retreat. Sayyid Lashkar Khan and Fakkar Khan joined him. But Ismā'il Khan was on the west gate, and was rather delayed in retreating. Khanāji Jadhav fell upon him with the lightening speed and with 7 to 8 thousand horse. Ismā'il Khan gave a fight, but

finally he was wounded and captured. The Marathas got  
 61  
 500 horses and 2 elephants.

With lightening speed the Marathas secured their successive second victory against a well established Mughal army. According to Martin, who has analysed the success of the Maratha army says, "Their weapons of attack are spears and swords. There are some archers, but these are very few in number. In this respect the Mughals are superior to the Marathas. The aiming of the Mughals is better than the Marathas and they have a larger number of archers. Therefore the Marathas dare not go before the Mughals. The Marathas feel that the Mughals are superior in fighting. One thousand Mughals will not retreat in the face of 3 to 4 thousand Marathas. But Marathas are superior in 'surprise attacks'. They are superior and successful in manual labour more than the Mughals. They overlook personal comfort. Their equipment is light and they are contented with little."<sup>62</sup>

The victorious Marathas immediately proclaimed their authority over Maidarabadi Karnatak, the Conjeeveram and Kadapā territories. Peshav Rāmanā was appointed by the Marathas as subāhdār with 1000 horses and 4000 foot. This happened in January 1693.

The Marathas having achieved these spectacular

victories curtailed all free activity of the Mughals in the Karnātak and Madras. Their communication was stopped and line of supply broken. Thus the Mughal army besieging outside Jinji got besieged in turn by the overwhelming force under Shanāji.

In the Mughal camp, there were dissensions between prince Rāmbakhsh, and Asad Khan and his son Zulfiqār Khan. Rāmbakhsh was suspected of secretly negotiating with the Marathas. Asad Khan having duly considered the division within and a large number of enemy force outside, decided to abandon the trenches and thus the siege work of past two years, was hopelessly given up. But withdrawal was not very quiet. Zulfiqār Khan, destroyed his big guns which were posted there and ordered his men to carry the equipment back as much as they could. The Marathas did not let go the retreating army without giving blows. When the Mughals were almost four miles away from their base camp, the Marathas caught them unaware. In the words of Asir-i-'Alamgiri the condition of the Mughals was that "The audacity of the infidels passed all bounds, and death stormed the Muslims in the face."<sup>63</sup> Zulfiqār Khan was forced to give a fight in order to save the life. Thus the Marathas were forced to go inside the fort and shut the door. Their loss in life and animal was quite heavy.<sup>64</sup>

Prince Āmbakhan was put under arrest by Asad Khan and Zulfiqār Khan, for having opened a secret correspondence with the Marathas. Meanwhile Santāji, with his singular victory over 'Alī Gardān Khan, also arrived at Jinji. This brought great encouragement to the Marathas. According to Rhinssen, Santāji's great army exceeded 20000 men and fell upon Zulfiqār Khan's army with great impetuosity. Thus the siege was abandoned by the Mughals on 16th December, 1692.<sup>65</sup>

With the abandonment of the siege and the arrival of additional Maratha force, the condition of the Mughal army worsened. Above all there was acute shortage of grain and famine appeared to take greater toll of the Mughals than their enemy. Thus within a month's time, that is, by 22nd January 1693, "Zulfiqār Khan marched out with his own division to bring in grain from Bāndiwash."<sup>66</sup>

Santāji having had the intelligence of Zulfiqār Khan's movement, made a rapid march in that direction and blocked his road at Desur,<sup>67</sup> ten miles southwards and completely encircled Zulfiqār Khan's army. After two days the Mughals were attacked. "They fired so many muskets that the soldiers and banjaras of our force were overpowered. Bullets were specially aimed at the elephants ridden by the imperial commanders. Śāi Balpat and his Bundelās boldly charged to clear a way ahead.

The transport animals and guns stuck in the mud of the rice fields, artillery ammunition ran short, no powder or shot was left with any musketeer.<sup>68</sup> Lalpat Rāi Bundelā however fought well and saved the Mughal division.

How long the Mughals were to survive on the scanty food grains brought by Zulfiqār Khan? After a very short period, the army had to face the problem of acute shortage of food. The Maratha activity in that area was intensified and they kept closer watch on the Mughal soldiers. "Every day from dawn to sunset the Marathas assembled round our camp and made demonstrations. No aid came from any source except the Gracious to the lowly, neither money nor food stuff arrived. All the army, high and low alike, were distracted and depressed."<sup>69</sup> In short, such was the condition of the Mughal army. Gravely viewing the situation Zulfiqār Khan and Asad Khan sent their ambassadors to Rājārām with a request to let them go unopposed. Rājārām did not take any decision as Santāji, was away opposing a reinforcement that was coming to help the Mughals. According to Bhimsen, "the Maratha generals and ministers pressed their king to continue the war, crush the Mughal army which was half dead and thus establish his rule over that country before a new army could be sent by Emperor (Aurangzeb)."<sup>70</sup>

There are no records to show, why Rājārām did not

accept this advice of strategic move. If only he had followed it, the chapter of Maratha War of Independence would have come to a close at an earlier period.

A partial explanation of Rājārām's attitude towards the Mughal sardārs and his subsequent action, in not pressing on fighting against Zulfiqār Khan is available. Rājārām called Santāji and explained him that he had reached an agreement with Zulfiqār Khan, as Aurangzeb was not likely to survive for a long. After his death he expected Zulfiqār Khan to occupy the territory of Golkondā and the territory of Bijapur would be allowed to be retained by Rājārām.<sup>71</sup>

In addition to this <sup>by a</sup> secret agreement, according to Martin, Zulfiqār Khan paid one lakh of rupees and ornaments worth sixty thousand rupees to Rājārām so that he could be allowed to go unopposed.

On the other hand, Zulfiqār Khan was urged by Rāi Talpat not to withdraw; this was merely to save the face and future disgrace. But then Zulfiqār Khan's soldiers by now had become more impatient, particularly the artillery men. On one fine morning the artillerymen wound up their guns. The others also followed their suit. And thus the hunger prevailed above all. The Mughal generals were left with no other alternative but to retreat. When Aurangzeb learnt about the loss of artillery and

abandonment of siege, he ordered a recovery of rupees three lakhs from Asad Khan and rupees one lakh fifty thousand from Zulfiqār Khan.<sup>73</sup>

Phinssen has given a very graphic description of the Mughal camp at the time of abandonment of siege of Jinji. He writes "Owing to long continued starvation, most of the horses, camels and other transport animals, of the army had perished. Those who had a few left loaded just enough goods for these. Most men set fire to their belongings. Many in perplexity and helplessness at the terrible confusion and danger then raging.... took their own way forgetful of their friends and relatives. Many stores of the Emperor and nobles were left behind there... When the army marched out of the camp, about a thousand Maratha horse came after them like a rear-guard and plundered the men of the army of their property."<sup>73</sup>

This retreat of Zulfiqār Khan took place on 22nd January 1693 and at the same time Asad Khan and Fāmbakhsh left for the imperial court.

The Mughals retreated to Mandiwāsh. It took three days for Zulfiqār Khan to reach the place. Ten days later Qāsim Khan who was newly appointed faujdar of Conjeeveram brought the food grains from Padarā. On the way, Santāji attacked him between Kāveripāk and Conjeeveram. But with the timely help of Zulfiqār Khan, he was saved. And



the Mughals were successful in carrying the grain to their camp at Wāndiwāsh.

Thus by February, Marathas had sufficient cause to be jubilant, as they forced Zulfiqār Khan Bahādur the victor of Rāipadh, the terror of Marathas, a sardār who never knew defeat in his career, to retreat to Wāndiwāsh. He encamped there for four months (February-May, 1693). He was now helpless. He had neither money nor material resources to continue the war.

The results of three years continuous efforts on the part of the Marathas showed that the Second Front at Jinji, proved a success much beyond their expectations. The sudden blows administered by Santāji and Dhanāji to the generals of Mughal army, almost paralysed them. The Marathas took the advantage of it quickly. They proclaimed their rule over Golkonda Karnātake. And in March an expedition to capture Trichnopalli was launched. Rājūrām was personally present during the campaign. 75 Santāji laid siege to Trichnopalli. 76 Afterwards Rājūrām went to Tānjore to see Shahāji II.

But unfortunately all was not well with the Maratha leadership. There were misunderstandings between the king and his trusted lieutenants like Santāji and Bahirji Chorpade.

In the beginning of the year 1693, Yāchappā Nāyak,

who had remained loyal to the Marathas all these years, deserted Rājārām. In February-March he recovered Satgadh.<sup>77</sup> By now Santāji's differences with Rājārām became too sharp to be reconciled. In April-May he returned to Maharashtra.<sup>78</sup> In his place Khanāji was appointed to command the troops. During May-June, Yāchappā Nāyak and Sahirji Morpade were at Vellore and a quarrel broke out between them and Rājārām.<sup>79</sup>

Sulfiqār Khan who was quiet till May, at Pāndivāsh, began his activities. His ultimate goal was capture of Jinji. On the earlier occasion, he besieged Jinji without clearing off the surrounding territory of loyal followers of Rājārām. They constantly helped Rājārām and the Maratha army through these Karnātaki sardārs, attacked and harassed Sulfiqār Khan's army. It went to such an extent that the very existence of the Mughal army was in jeopardy. The Mughal general now decided to make good his mistakes of the past.

In November-December, Yāchappā Nāyak, after deserting Rājārām was moving independently, met Sulfiqār Khan and accepted the Mughal service.<sup>80</sup>

During February 1694, the fort of Pera-sukkal<sup>81</sup> was stormed by the army of Nāi Balpat's Bundela soldiers.

Then he marched towards Mānjore. Yāchappā Nāyak

gave all the help to him. Between January and February<sup>82</sup> he attacked Tānjore. Shahaji II, the Rājā of Tanjore was sitting on the horns of dilemma. His immediate neighbour, Nāyak of Trichinopoly joined the Mughals. Meanwhile the Marathas under Bahirji Ghorpade rushed towards Tānjore for its defence.<sup>83</sup> But it did not yield any results. The Rājā had to yield. He sought peace by paying a tribute of 40 lakhs (Chakrams). On 22nd May, he signed a formal letter of submission and promised not to extend any help to Rājārām. The terms of peace were quite heavy for Shahaji II. He was asked to pay a tribute of Rs. 30 lakhs annually, and cede the forts of Palankotā, Sittanur (?) and Tunganur, and the territory of Kul-Manargudi, Shri-mushnam, Tittapudi, Trinnaur (?), Elavanasore, Kala Burchi, Pandalum, which had been mortgaged to him by Rājārām.<sup>84</sup>

Rājārām after knowing about these terms of Shahaji II, sent his army to Palankotā to defend it, as this was mortgaged to Vyankoji. In June Tulfiqār Khan's army<sup>invested</sup> along with Talpat Rājā arrived there and the village. They captured it on 23rd June, 1694.<sup>85</sup>

The Mughal army thus consolidated their positions in the surrounding territory of Jinji. Till September, that is the end of the rainy season Tulfiqār Khan concentrated on reorganising his army and supplies. On 10th

September, he took over all the territory close to Jinji,<sup>86</sup> i.e. Vetāvalan forest through which provisions used to enter the fort and thus started the blockade of Jinji.

In October 1694 Zulfiqār Khan renewed the siege of Jinji in right earnest. He marched out of Bāndiwāsh and encamped north of Changanon fort and pass (42 m. of Jinji). The Marathas forced themselves in his camp and carried away horses. At this time he was suspected by Taud Khan Panni, Kishore Singh Bādā and Talpat Rāi Bundelā, of having been in league with Rājārām. But this view does not appear to be correct. Rājārām during this period wrote to Mudhoji Saib Nimbālkar about the Mughals being powerful in Karnātak and Vetāval having been taken over by them. The fear is expressed that within a short period Jinji might also fall. But Hindu Bāo Ghorpade's excellent service towards him proved of great help. But it has been urged by him that the enemy should be defeated. Santāji and Dhanāji were also asked to return. "The present situation is precarious. If you could come within a month the state would remain secure. But afterwards the state would be lost."

This leaves us no doubt in our minds that Rājārām was definitely passing through the most critical phase. The siege appeared to be a real danger. And hence it can

be argued that there was no secret understanding between 88  
Rājārām and Zulfiqār Khan as presumed by Martin and others,  
or at least by now it was terminated.

Shankarāji Pant, brought about reconciliation /  
between Santāji and Rājārām. He gave an army with him  
and sent him to Jinji with orders to raise the siege.  
Along with him was sent Yesāji Malhār Mutalik. The  
total number sent was 25 thousand cavalry along with  
Hannunt Rāo Nimbālkar and many other captains of fame 89  
and note.

During October-November, Zulfiqār Khan laid siege  
to Vellore. Within a very short time the news of Maratha  
army marching into Eastern Karnātak under the two gene-  
rals, Dhanāji and Santāji reached the Mughal camp.  
This caused a great alarm and fright among the people.  
And many started sending their families to Madras.

With Dhanāji's arrival near Vellore at the end of 91  
December 1695 Zulfiqār Khan was forced to raise the siege.  
Then Dhanāji encircled the Mughal faujdar in Teruvadi,  
but Zulfiqār Khan came promptly to his help and relieved  
him from any further distress. From there Zulfiqār Khan  
marched towards Arcot. By March 1696 Santāji arrived 92  
at Jinji and paid his obeisance to Rājārām. Thus with  
the arrival of Santāji, the Maratha force became very  
powerful and it was almost beyond the capacity of the

Mughals to meet them anywhere and everywhere. Zulfiqār Khan was particularly stranded for both money and reinforcement.

In April 1696, a skirmish took place between him and Santāji near Arni and Santāji was repulsed. Zulfiqār Khan confined himself in the fort of Arcot in a solely defensive way.

Thus once again the Marathas humbled the great Mughal general Zulfiqār Khan. He was forced to be on his defensive and thus was left without any initiative. A similar situation was forced upon him three years back, i.e. in February 1693, when he was compelled to retreat from Jinji. Once again the Marathas established their superiority over the vast Mughal forces and left the Mughal general without any money or reinforcement. If only for a little more time the Maratha generals should have remained united and fought the enemy, with vigour, perhaps, they would have been able to defeat and crush the Mughal army.

But the destiny has its own way and it is certainly not the way to be guessed. The difference between Rājārām and Santāji were carried too far, to the extent that the latter was unwilling to serve at Jinji. Similarly, the relationship between Santāji and Phanāji was also strained and it had almost broken. Consequently

in May 1690 Santāji left Jinji for Maharashtra.

Thus the internal feuds weakened the unity of the Marathas and ultimately the cause of Swarājya suffered to some extent. There might have been many reasons for it, but it is not possible, owing to the paucity of material for a historian to go into the details of it, but effect of it was that it helped the history of the Marathas to change its course to some extent.

After the disappearance of the two powerful Maratha generals from the war theatre of Jinji, Zulfiqār Khan pressed hard the siege. By August, the scales of war had turned and the Marathas were quite in miserable condition, particularly financially. On 2nd August, Rājārām sent his natural son along with Shankarāji Malhār to Zulfiqār Khan to seek peace. Zulfiqār Khan in turn sent Trimbakrao from his army to Rājārām stating that Rājārām should go and meet him.

But from some factory records it appeared that the move to negotiate peace was first initiated by Zulfiqār Khan. On 29th July, Zulfiqār Khan sent Rām Singh and Mondafhy with another chief man, with five or six hundred horse to Jinji. Rām Singh who negotiated the talks, gave a present of Rs. 15,000 to Rājārām and Rājārām in turn was to send Karnā with him to Zulfiqār Khan. Consequently, Rājārām was expected to receive Rs. 35,000 more. Rājā

Karnā was to stay with Zulfiqār Khan for two months, at the end of which, he was to receive another sum of Rs. 50,000 and the wife of Rājārām to be delivered back. Thus Rājārām was to receive a total amount of Rs. one lakh, in turn, he was expected to hand over the fort of Jinji to Zulfiqār Khan. In case the conditions were not complied with Karnā was to return to his father. According to Sarkar, it was Rājārām, who was in need of money and therefore had initiated the move. From the above letter, the circumstances and the conditions imposed in negotiating the talks, becomes quite clear.

But from the subsequent events it appears that these talks failed Karnā came back to his father in the middle of October. And Zulfiqār Khan renewed the siege of Jinji once again. <sup>95</sup> It commenced on 8th November 1697. <sup>96</sup>

#### G. END OF SECOND FRONT AND TRIUMPH OF MARATHA DIPLOMACY

From October 1689 till October 1697, that is for a period of eight years the Marathas maintained their 'Second Front' at Jinji in a most successful way. Their main purpose was to keep away the Mughal forces, which were concentrating in Maharashtra. Secondly, Jinji proved to be the best place of shelter, safety and security for their king. In the period of eight years both these



objectives were achieved effectively. The Marathas needed time to recover since the tragic end of Sambhaji and thus use that period for military preparedness as well as awakening of the people against the Muslim invasion.

The two worthy ministers, Ramchandra Pant and // Shankaraji Pant spared no energies in achieving the objectives. In 1697, they were confident enough to give the fight to the Mughals in Maharashtra itself. The necessity of continuing the Second Front at Jinji had ceased. They were not only sure of protecting the king, but also were equally sure of defeating the invaders.

Therefore we find that gradually, the entire policy of fighting at Jinji had undergone change. Instead of fighting in open battlefields Maratha statesmen now chose to fight out the siege diplomatically.

After the return of Karna from Zulfiqar Khan's camp, it became quite evident to the Marathas, that the enemy was quite keen on taking over Jinji. Their own strength was reduced to the minimum. Continuous fighting would have brought them nothing but disastrous results. Their best generals were away in Maharashtra. In the death of Santaji the Marathas received a great set back.

But all hopes were not given away. Rājārām reached a secret understanding with Zulfiqār Khan. It was a great diplomatic triumph for the ministers of Rājārām.

They could well read the mind of the old Mughal general, who expected Aurangzeb, his master, to die soon. And thus after the death of his master, he wanted to carve a principality for himself in Karnātaka. He was well aware of the growing strength of the Marathas and equally well he was aware of the struggle for the succession amongst Aurangzeb's sons. Having perused the existing situation, he chose his course of action and the course to suit his ambition. Therefore he chose to remain neutral and many a time passed the secret intelligence of attack to the Marathas, so that they could take timely measure to save themselves.

Thus the episode of Jinji took an entirely different turn, contrary to the expectations of Aurangzeb and to the greater advantage of the Marathas.

Zulfiqār Khan who had informed Aurangzeb about the peace negotiations with Rājārām, was ordered to abandon them. He received strict orders to capture Jinji. Thus early in November, 1697, the siege of Jinji was renewed with right earnest.

Zulfiqār Khan divided the various positions to be occupied, among his captains. He, with his contingent,

occupied the northern gate towards the Singhāvaram hill; Rām Singh Hāda, behind the fort, the western gate and Rāud Khan Panni at the foot of the hill, before Chikkali-durg. Though Rāud Khan's division lacked artillery and siege material, he captured Chikkali-durg in one day and one night through reckless attack.

According to Ehmsen, "If Zulfiqār Khan had wished it, he could have taken the entire fort the next day. But his secret policy was to prolong the siege in order to keep his army together, enjoy his emoluments and escape the hardships of active duty on some new expedition." <sup>97</sup> Therefore, he let know the Marathas that his attacks were for show. And he gave Bājārām enough time to escape before the fall of the fort. The siege prolonged for two more months.

Wilkes has more fantastic story to tell about the collusiveness of Zulfiqār Khan with the Marathas. He says, "To preserve appearances, it was necessary to report (to the Emperor) frequent attacks and repulses. On the other hand, Rāud Khan, second in command of the Mughal army, drank largely of the best European liquors, and when full of the god would perpetually volunteer the extirpation of the infidels Zulfiqār necessarily assented to these enterprises, but always gave secret intelligence to the enemy of the time and place of attack, and the

troops of Dāud Khan were as often repulsed with slaughter.

Rājārām, noticing the fall of Chikkali-durg and the Mughals having occupied Chandrayān-durg, decided to quit the fort. He left for Vellore on 26th December in the company of chief Maratha officers. But he left his family behind.

Then Zulfiqār Khan gave the orders for assault. While Dāud Khan with a large force was noisily exploring a track for scaling Chandrayandurg from the south and had drawn the defenders to that side, Dalpat Rao scaled the northern walls of Krishnāgiri and captured the outerfort, after a severe struggle. The garrison retreated to an inner fort called Kalakot, which Dalpat's Bundela's entered pell-mell with them and occupied. The surviving Marathas took refuge in Rājgarh or the highest fort.

Dāud Khan entered Chandrayan-durg. From there he advanced towards Krishnagiri. Seeing no further escape the men begged for capitulation. The Mughals secured a lot of horses, camels and equipment.

The family of Rājārām was at Rājgadh. Zulfiqār Khan had captured the entrance to Rājgadh, meanwhile Rām Singh Hādā reached Rājgadh by crossing the chasm at its foot by means of a wooden gangway. The Royal family begged for safety and Zulfiqār Khan granted it. Nearly 4,000 men, women and children were found in the fort but

very few combatants.<sup>100</sup>

H. THE DAWN OF LIBERATION : EARLY REVERSES  
(FEBRUARY 1689 - DECEMBER 1692)

While adopting the policy of forming a Second Front at Jinji under his leadership, Rājārām entrusted the burden of administration of Maharashtra in his absence to the two most able statesmen, Rāmachandra Pant and Shankarāji Nārāyan. Rājārām after reaching Jinji conferred upon them the titles of Anātya and Sachiv respectively. Rāmchandra Pant and Shankarāji Pant the two loyal servants of the kingdom were brilliant in wit and speech, relentless in their work, their point of interest being the survival of Maharashtra against the barbaric invasion of the Mughals and the preservice of Hindu religion in the broadest sense termed newly as Maharashtra dharma against the Islāmic aggression.

Within a short period after reaching Jinji, Rājārām by an order made two divisions of Maharashtra. The southern part beginning from Karnād, Talkonkan and Gokarna under Rāmachandra Pant and northern part of Varghāt beginning from Karnād and northern part of Konkan under Shankarāji Pant. <sup>101</sup> / Later on the territory of Mālwa was also added to the latter's part. Similarly, army was also divided under two generals, one under Santāji

Ghorade and the other under Jhanāji Jādhav. They were to function under Nāmachandra Pant and Shankārāji Pant respectively.

Thus another nucleus of Maratha Government was formed in Maharashtra. This resembled something like "war council" of the modern days.

"Where to start and what to do" became almost overwhelming problems of the War Council. They were vigilant no doubt. They went round the country. The conditions of the people were alarming. Almost every face they saw wore a look of despair, almost every mile they travelled was littered with the wreckage left by the invading army. Burning and looting of the villages had assumed undue proportions. What appeared in the place of habitation, was only dogs and desolation. Farms were without cultivation or tools, ploughs and seeds. Men were in desolute condition. The treasury was bankrupt. It was to be replenished. The army was in a desperate state. It was to be organised and equipped. The forts, <sup>only</sup> a few of them/under their possessions, were to be adequately provisioned.

Politically speaking, the entire Konkan was under the possession of Āthar Khan, the Mughal sardār. He was an unrivalled master <sup>of</sup> almost over fifty forts in that territory. A little earlier than the death of Sambhaji,

he was tremendously active in that territory. Except for the capture of Rājgadh, the Mughals had their claim over all other forts in the Konkan.

On the other side, the Mughals in the rest of the country were carrying out ravages on a very large scale. The Mughal armies were marching in all parts of Maharashtra, almost unhindered. All this was to be stopped.

Such was the magnitude of the problems, when the 'War Council' was appointed. But they worked hard. They were pressed in whirlwind of urgency. Their unquestioned goal was to drive out the invaders. For the accomplishment of that purpose they were ready to make any conceivable sacrifice. In that accomplishment was to consist all their glory. No fascination of an 'inā' land or a 'royal mansab' in the Mughal army could divorce them from their singular aim. They appeared to be possessing bodies incapable of fatigue, and minds, whose energies were never exhausted. They worked in unanimity with others. They consecrated themselves to this great enterprise by day and by night and with an untiring energy which bewildered their contemporaries in the enemy camp.

Their problems were manifold. Yet first and foremost was 'how to stop widely spreading Mughal army?'. They certainly knew that even if they attack the Mughal

army openly, even then the Mughal army at no stage could have been crippled with gigantic losses in men and materials. The Mughals were still capable of coming within a hair's breadth of imposing the will of their dictator on the final day of decision.

Therefore, it was essential for the 'War Council' to work out a war strategy. The principle of this strategy was to give maximum blows with minimum force, to recapture the forts one by one from the enemy mostly by surprise and night attacks. In other words, they were to follow an offensive warfare though not in open battlefields. The forts were to form the nucleus of warfare. Therefore, the whole galaxy of assault and capture of the forts were considered the ultimate key to victory, and the only means whereby the Marathas might hope to challenge the Mughal power firmly rooted in the Deccan.

From the activities of the next few years, it is evident, that 'war council' worked tremendously hard. The country gradually recovered from its defensive role to an offensive warfare. From the events of this period we see that the 'war council' feared nothing and would stop at nothing.

The Marathas had to face their strongest enemy Aurangzeb, who had the backing of tremendous experience, personal knowledge of the Deccan plateau and immense



resources of wealth as well as armed forces. He himself built up the Mughal war strategy of the Deccan. He always conceived that the strength of Marathas lay in their forts. If all the forts in the Deccan were captured, according to him, the Marathas would be automatically forced to surrender. And thus he could establish the Mughal rule in the entire Deccan. In order to achieve this aim, he spared no pains, made use of all conceivable means, including strategem, diplomacy, cunning and bribery. His approach to the problem was simple and had three conceivable stages. Firstly he would make use of force to capture a particular fort, then coercion of people and if both these means failed, then resort to bribe quiledār.

Thus it is seen that, he captured, in the extreme north, fort of Sālher (21st February 1687), Trimbak (8th January, 1689) in the centre of Sinhgad (November, 1684) and Rājgad (May, 1689), in the north Konkan, Rātābar Khan had captured over fifty forts in that area. Vishālgaḍh, Sātārā and Panhālā were the only three important forts under Marathas.

On 2nd April 1689, Aurangzeb who was at Koregaon, intended to visit the fort of Islāmābād.<sup>102</sup> (Chākan). An incident took place at this time, which well deserves the mention. While Aurangzeb had encamped at Koregaon,

the three Chorpade brothers, Santāji, Bahirji and Maloji who were matchless in their courage and dare devil activities, along with Vithoji Chavān attacked Aurangzeb's camp. They carried away the gold pinacles of Aurangzeb's tents and brought before Rājārām who was then at Vishālpadh.<sup>103</sup> This created a great stir and bewilderment in Aurangzeb's camp.

The bald fact that within a period of two and half months of humiliation of Sambhaji, the Maratha army had been able to strike back, even on so small a scale gave courage and hope to not a few. The cheers which greeted the Chorpade brothers echoed round the mountains and valleys of Sahyādri. The morale of Maratha people which was at its lowest ebb, was recovering fast. Rājārām rightly honoured them by giving the titles of Manlakat-madar, Amir-ul-Darāo and Hindu Rāo, to Santāji, Maloji and Bahirji respectively. Vithoji Chavan was given the title of Himat Bahādur.

In June 1687, we are informed through the Persian records that Aurangzeb had intended to go back to the North during February-March 1690. The officers at Shāhajahānābād were ordered to keep the palaces and gardens clean. 1000 camels were ordered from Ahmad-ābād and Burhānpur.<sup>104</sup> But from subsequent events we find that Aurangzeb changed his mind, but the reasons are not known.

On 10th July Ruhullāh Khan was sent to capture the fort of Rāichur.<sup>105</sup> By 12th July, the Aigondā Desāi of Sukeri was asked to hand over Vallabhadh vacated by its Qiledār to Shaikh Abul Ali the Mughal representative and keep his armed contingent there.<sup>106</sup> During the same period in Talkonkan, about 1900 men of Abdur Razāk, the Mughal thānedār of Talkonkan deserted him.<sup>107</sup> A Maratha force appeared in the vicinity of Kholapur. Munnawar Khan, son of Khān-i-Zamān Fatch Jang went to chastise them.<sup>108</sup> On 17th July the fort of Prabal was captured by Mātābar Khan.

Similarly Māhuli was taken by giving bribes.<sup>109</sup> On 27th July Muḥammad 'Alī was appointed faujdar of Bindori. By the end of July prince Muḥammad Bidār Bakhat attacked gadhi of Sansani. The surrounding territory was ravaged and burnt. A tower of the gadhi which was blown up by mines fell on the prince's army. About 400 men died.<sup>110</sup> We do not know with what results this siege and attack ended.

On 1st August Aurangzeb received gold key of Rasālghadh near Rāhiri.<sup>111</sup> On 28th August Hatia Khan was appointed Qiledār of Chandangadh.

On September 22, Pān Sāwant and Mānp Sāwant were ordered to stop all the foodgrains being taken away by the Marathas from that territory. They were also given

the task of destroying the Thanas of Marathas and capture their forts. On 2<sup>th</sup> October, I'tqād Khan captured Kāipadh. Royal personages of the Marathas who were at that place were arrested. The Khan was rewarded with the title of Zulficār Khan Bahādur.<sup>112</sup>

In November, Bahrāmānd Khan attacked the fortress of Ashta under Maratha possession. A battle took place. Many Marathas were killed. Fakhr-ud-din Khan Bakhshi of Bahrāmānd Khan's army and many others from the Mughal side were also killed. The Mughals got the fortress.<sup>113</sup>

About December, 1689, Marathas lost Panhāla to the Mughals. After Sambhaji's death, this was under Maratha possession. Rājārām left Kāipadh and chose to go to Panhālā; from this it appears that this fort had strong garrison. Kāgalkar Pirāji Chātge was the quiledār since Shivaji's time. Immediately, on the arrival of Rājārām Shaikh Nizām was ordered to invest the fort. But soon he found that the task was beyond his capacity. Santāji and Jhanāji were ordered by Ramchandrapant to harrase the Mughal commander and they indeed made his life miserable. Thus the task of taking the fort was prolonged. Aurangzeb sent Abūhullāh Khan to Panhāla to see if the same could be secured through bribes. But the quiledār firmly refused the offer and requested for additional help from Santāji. But Santāji was not able

to send the timely help and in the meantime, Itiqād Khan captured Rājgadh, seeing this the Maratha quiledār sold the fort to Aurangzeb.<sup>114</sup> Thus the Mughals obtained a most valuable fort of the Marathas, as it had a lot of strategic importance.

During May-June, the Mughals had laid siege to Prachandgadh. Early June Acropant, went to break the siege. He was accompanied by Bāji Sarjārao Jedhe Ieshmukh who was earlier made a captive by the Mughals. They raised the siege and thus defeated the enemy.<sup>115</sup>

In the month of June, Abul Khair Khan son of Abdul Aziz Khan was appointed Subāndār of Rājgadh and Mubārak-ullāh son of Irādat Khan was appointed Faujdar of Islāmābād<sup>116</sup> (Chākan). By the end of June the Yhen Sāwant of Sāwantwādi and the Iesāi of Rudāl, became disloyal to the Marathas. Former informed Aurangzeb that he would help Mughal armies in that territory by way of food grains and establishing thānās. He also promised to open the road to Goa.<sup>117</sup> On 29th November Muḥallīh Khan captured the fort of Rāichur and named it as Firuznagar.<sup>118</sup> On 18th December, Aurangzeb left Koregāon for Bijapur and arrived there on 11th January of the following year. On 12th March 1690, Rath Jang Khan informed Aurangzeb that Shivaji's forts situated in the sea could be captured by blockading the supplies,

which reached the forts through the European traders.<sup>119</sup>  
 And also the guards of the forts could be persuaded to  
 give up the resistance.

In February, a Maratha force under Chanāji and  
 Hardya (?) was going to Bālāghāt by way of Parenda.  
 Latufullāh Khan gave fight to them near Vāngi. Many  
 men were killed on either side. Iftkhār Khan came for  
 the rescue of Latufullāh Khan.<sup>120</sup>

These in short were the various activities of the  
 Mughal army in Maharashtra as well as outside. The Mughal  
 infestation was so strong, during April 1689, till March  
 1690 that the Marathas were hardly left with any breath-  
 ing place.

The Marathas were busy preparing and uniting people.  
 On 23rd March, 1690, Bajaram wrote to Bābāji Sarjārao  
 Jedhe Peshaukh that "This is Maharashtra Rājya. You are  
 striving very hard for the existence of the Kingdom."  
 Chanāji and Santāji were being sent from Jinji to Maha-  
 rashtra, on their arrival, they were expected to start  
 recovering the lost territory.

Jedhe Peshaukh has been asked to remain alert with  
 his armed contingent. The letter is more interesting  
 as we see the undaunted courage of Rājārām when he writes  
 "hat is the strength of the enemy, when once you people

have resolved. Enemy will be nowhere. You people are striving hard for the kingdom, then you should not care for Aurangzeb."<sup>121</sup> It convinces us beyond doubt that; it was a people's war and people were expected to join it, unite themselves and fight the aggression fearlessly. The Marathas recovered the forts of Nāi, Pratāpghat, Tornā and Rohidā through the exertions of Rāmachandrapant and Shantārjipant.<sup>122</sup> Rāmachandra Wilkanth, immediately informed the Peshauks of Gunjamāwal Shi Peshauk to remain alert, to raise new troops, to destroy the enemy posts and thus to help the war effort.<sup>123</sup>

Abul Haair Khan was the Subah Quiledār of Bājghat. Having seen the large Maratha force in the vicinity of Bājghat, he lost his heart and begged to let him go unmolested. He vacated the fort, but on the way, the Marathas had free loot of his bag and baggage. Thus in a most embarrassing condition he reached the camp of Hiruz Jang.<sup>124</sup>

In a similar way, Sāji Banjarāo Jedhe Peshauk, recovered the Nichitraghat<sup>125</sup> from the Mughals about the same date. The Marathas were firm in regaining their lost territory. Then came the turn of fort of Sātārā. Sharāf Khān, a former Pijapuri general, who had subsequently joined the Mughal service, was given the title of Bustam Khan, and was ordered by Aurangzeb to lay siege

to Pētārā fort. On 29th May, 1657, Rūachandrapant, Shankarājicant, Dhanāji and Santāji along with their army surprised Sharzā Khan. Sharzā Khan sent his son Chalit to oppose, with the advance party. But soon he was defeated. Bannātaki foot-musketeers on the Maratha side charged the Mughals with deadly accuracy, their elephants were wounded, and they started trampling their own men. Sharzā Khan, seeing the miserable plight of his son, rushed for his help. He fought bravely and recollected the runaway men and started chasing the Maratha generals Santāji and Dhanāji. These two, following the usual Maratha tactics, pretended to give way and the Khan pressed impetuously on, driving his own elephant onwards accompanied by a few troopers. Just then the skirt of his dress was set ablaze by the enemy's fire. The Berad Musketeers took advantage of the confusion by falling upon the imperialists' baggage and rear guard and plundering them. The Mughal troops were distracted and they dispersed abandoning the fight."<sup>126</sup>

Aurangzeb on receiving the intelligence of Sharzā Khan's miserable plight sent reinforcement under Piruz Jang. Siddi Abul Quādir, while on his way to join the Mughal force was attacked by Kupāji Bhosale. He was injured, fifty men lost their lives and he lost his complete equipment.



Before 23rd July, Rānhoji Wazārrāo, the Peshwa of Pānad Pore captured Prachandgad and defeated a large section of the Mughals. Rāmchandrāpant, appreciating the success, entrusted him with the task of the capture of Pāpād and Singhgad.<sup>128</sup>

Farangzeb by now was much worried about North Cātārā, particularly, the defeat of Sharzā Khan, meant the loss of Mughal control over Cātārā territory. So, he ordered Lutafullāh Khan to leave for Khātāu on 30th May.<sup>129</sup> He was also instructed to establish the Mughal posts in that territory. He reached Khātāu on 6th July. As he was setting down, his men were busy pitching the tents and had thought of taking some rest, Santāji along with ten thousand men fell upon them. The rain was incessant. The Mughals were taken by total surprise. Lutafullāh's son hastened to encounter the enemy and saved the camp from plunder. Shortly he was reinforced by his father's troops. Santāji moved towards Nandhanād. There were heavy losses on both the sides. The Marathas lost 500 in slain, besides losing 300 mares, 400 spears, 200 muskets and kettle-drums. Comparatively the Mughal losses were less. They lost 67 in killed and 170 were wounded.

According to Inshāi Adhharā as quoted by J. Barker "But the Marathas were only baffled and not crushed. They

rallied their forces and reappeared in the East Sātārā region in force. Lutfullāh, urged by the Emperor, hastened to the scene. He halted at night in the village by Piliv (12 m.e. of Anasvad, and 15 m.s. of Akluji). Next morning a Maratha army reputed to be 20,000 cavalry and unnumbered infantry, led by Santā, Phana, Taffe, Kore and other generals, enveloped the small imperial detachment on its march. Lutfullāh placing his baggage in the centre, faced on all sides and engaged the enemy. Taffe had 10,000 Parnātaki foot musketeers, whose fire severely galled the Mughals. The battle raged from dawn to sunset, the imperialists beating back repeated attacks of the enemy. Finally, Santā and Phana at the head of 5,000 picked horsemen, charged the division of Lutfullāh himself, but were repulsed. At sunset the Marathas withdrew, leaving a thousand dead on the field, besides many wounded. The Mughals lost 200 killed and above 300 wounded."<sup>130</sup>

Though the Marathas were thus defeated, within a short period, Shankarāji made it known to the Peshauks Peshwade of Dhatāu that he was appointed to that territory by Śājārā and the revenue should be handed over to him.<sup>131</sup> From this it appears that the Marathas were not at all uprooted from Sātārā territory.

On 24th September 1699, Santāji dashed near a

village Nāndaj, in Ahmednagar and attacked the village, accompanied by three thousand cavalry and two thousand infantry. The Kotwal gave fight. But he was defeated. A certain Gopāl Gunastā of the village acted as an informant. The villagers paid chauth amounting to Rs. 5500 and he carried away all the camels from the fort.<sup>132</sup>

In the first week of September Āloji and about one thousand cavalry of the Marathas alighted in Āli-ud-din Khan's pargana (Pārner). They ravaged the territory. Sayyid Hussain Ali Khan was ordered to chastise them.<sup>133</sup> Another force appeared near in the vicinity of Sahādurgadh (Pedgāon) and Ahmadnagar. Yakkātār Khan was ordered by Bahrāmand Khan to remain alert in the vicinity of Ahmadnagar.<sup>134</sup>

From September till February next year there were very few movements of Marathas in Maharashtra, fewer still were those of Mughal troops. By about the middle of September 1691 Ānand, sons of Āphoji from prince Muhammad Azam's army who were left behind at Dhatar were attacked by the Marathas. A battle took place.<sup>135</sup> In the third week of September a Maratha force appeared near Forerāon. Āli-ul-Rutb Khan, the Mughal commander gave a fight to it. Many men were killed and wounded.<sup>136</sup> At the same time another Maratha force arrived in the vicinity of Shāh durg (Shāh durg - Panhālā). They

killed the Mughal officer there. Chatrasāl's son who was there could not even resist them.<sup>137</sup>

On 5th October prince Muhammad Azam marched towards Bahādurgadh in order to chastise the Marathas. Later on he received the intelligence of Santāji's being in Pātārā then he dashed towards Pātārā.<sup>138</sup> At the same time Marathas were active near Calraie. Tahaar Khan was ordered to chastise them.<sup>139</sup>

A Maratha force arrived at Chokhandi and besieged the fortress by about 12th October. The Mughal thānedār Sayyid Muhammad fought with it. But the Marathas outnumbered the Mughal troops took him captive and kept in the fortress.<sup>140</sup> At the same time, a Maratha force besieged Paragadh. The Mughal Qiledār Afrāsiyāb gave a battle but he was defeated and taken away as captive.<sup>141</sup> Another Maratha force under Shankarāji Pant arrived near Kartīdānagar. Fīdāu-llāh the Mughal faujdar sent his son Shujā' llāh to fight with him.<sup>142</sup>

The Marathas were active near Gulbargā. Abdu'llāh Khan from the army of Muḥullāh Khan was appointed to chastise them.<sup>143</sup> By middle of October a Maratha force under the command of Pesh (Bakho) arrived near Parendā. Hamid-ud-din Khan gave the battle.<sup>144</sup> But it seems his condition became precarious, as Fazāwar Khan was ordered to go for his help.

In November-December Tarjārāo Jedhe deserted Marathas and joined the Mughals. He was granted the Peshukhi of Bher in Jawal territory.<sup>145</sup>

On 16th December, 3000 Marathas attacked Phānāzār Khan and Lāūd Khan's men. From there they launched an attack on Rahullāh Khan's army. A battle took place. Many men were killed on either side. Marathas lost Krishnāji and 'Alā-ud-din.<sup>146</sup> At the same time Marathas were active near Bhatāu and Hamid-ud-din Khan was sent from Barenda to Bhatāu.<sup>147</sup>

Sometime after February 1692, Nānchandrāpant by sending men with Parshurāmpant, recaptured Panhālā fort from the Mughals.<sup>148</sup> This brought a great relief to the Marathas and gave equally big set back to the Mughals. At that time Aurangzeb's camp was at Galsalā. On 5th May he sent Muīzz-ud-din towards Akulj and on 6th May, he appointed Abdur Karīm Khan Lāri as faujdar of Bāhiri and Ponsan. He was also made a 4 hazāri Sardār.<sup>149</sup>

During May, Abāji Wondev, along with Jāulkar, Barekar, Kavale, Hāsarde, Gole and other men were ordered by Nājārāo to capture Bālgadh.<sup>150</sup>

The Mughals received one more set back in the death of Rahullāh Khan who passed away on 6th July.<sup>151</sup>

Thus Marathas made a successful start. They harried

the Mughals everywhere. In fact their infestation was growing stronger and stronger. And indeed the problem of Marathas became a nightmare for the Mughal Emperor. A contemporary report has well described his condition. It says "Aurangzeb was worried day and night about the enemy (Marathas) in the Deccan. Much of the territory has been brought under the imperial rule. But the army has become so weak that now there was no more strength left in it. The services and tasks which mansabdārs of 7500 (Sawār) could have performed, in their places the Emperor had to send princes as faujdārs. They are making wild chase and their task is not nearing completion. The Emperor is receiving the news of battles (with Marathas) from everywhere. He is not finding proper remedy for it." <sup>152</sup>

#### J. UNITING THE FORCES

In spite of the Maratha forces being driven back at Satara, and inspite of having lost many a fort under their possession, Rāmachandrapant and Shankarāji devoted more time in uniting the men, who had their backing, and who were either in the Mughal service or else were operating independently. Their's was an uphill task. They had no attractive terms to offer, yet they could appeal, emphatically to their sense of patriotism. But then this alone however well-meant it might have been it could not create the desired effect. Therefore it was thought,

appropriate to appeal to the people to join the Maratha force and promise them new land or new territory as a reward. But the territory promised to them was the one that they were expected to recover from the Mughal clutches, restore it to normalcy, raise new troops and be ready for new assignments, then and then alone they were entitled to claim that 'Inām', so called, because it was essentially a free gift (the revenue of it) to them. Thus -Ājārām, the king and his councillors, ensured two fold objective, firstly, an oath of loyalty to the cause of warājya and the kingdom and secondly fresh troops, under their own arrangements and an ever readiness to take up new task or fight against the enemy.

This in turn had its own effect. The people in general and the local leaders in particular took up initiative in the matter. This brought a great deal of confidence among them. The leadership was completely decentralised. Yet they were always expected to obey the commands of Rāmachandrapant and Shankārāji, Warāyan who were at the helm of the Maratha affairs. People became more alert and active and enlisted their support to the Maratha king and the government.

This had one more unique advantage. The merit and the loyalty became distinctly recognised, which was a dire necessity of the period. The task was lying open in front of the people and it became in the Napoleonic term

'a career open for talent'.

There were very many influential Maratha sardārs, serving under the Mughals. It was essential to bring them back under Maratha banner. From September, 1690 to the end of 1691, both Rāchchandrapant and Shankārājī-pant on the advice of Rājārām devoted vigorously to this task. This was the task the importance and magnitude of which could by no means be underestimated.

During 1691, Nāgoji Patāji Kāne who was serving under the Mughals deserted them and went to Rājārām at Jinji. There he expressed his loyalty to the Maratha King. On 12th April Rājārām gave him an assurance saying, "The Kingdom of the Chhatrapati is the Kingdom of Gods....The Maharashtra Dharma should last long." Nāgoji in turn, agreed to fight for the King. He was given Rasbe Chasvad and 12 hamlets as "Vatan of Sardeshmukhi".<sup>153</sup>

During May-June 1692 Nāgoji Kāne represented to Rājārām about Hanumantrāo and Prishnāji Chorpade, who were then in the Mughal service. On 4th June Rājārām wrote to Hanumantrāo Chorpade saying that "Your intentions and heart-felt desire of protecting 'Maharashtra Dharma' have become quite clear. Knowing the capabilities of these two persons Rājārām allotted them an amount of six lakh hons, new cavalry, half of the booty, which they might in the course of their actions acquire from the enemy, including



horses, elephants, cash and the standards, provided they did the following :

Hannantrāc Ghorpade was entitled to

62500 hons after the capture of Rāigadh.

62500 hons after the capture of Bijāpur.

62500 hons after the capture of Bhāgānagar.

62500 hons after the capture of Aurangābād.

250000 hons after the capture of Delhi

Similarly Krishnāji Ghorpade was entitled to

12500 hons after the conquest of Rāigadh territory.

12500 hons after the conquest of Bijāpur.

12500 hons after the conquest of Bhāgānagar.

12500 hons after the conquest of Aurangābād.

50000 hons after the conquest of Delhi.<sup>154</sup>

A student of history gets wonderstruck and amazed when he reads about this ambitious plan of the Maratha king, when his own survival was completely endangered. But one need not get either wonderstruck or amazed at it. It only shows the undaunted courage that the Maratha king and the Ghorpades possessed. In the hour of defeat the mind of the Maratha king soothed with schemes for victory and the conquest not only of his own forts and territory, but the citadel of the Mughal Emperor, the capital of the empire, the city of Delhi, which in the past

had changed the very course of history. This mighty and ambitious scheme, showed to the world, that with methods of offence and the means, whereby this small and battered David of a country might hurl its stone against the fabulous Goliath of Mughal military might.

In August, Rājārām granted a Sanad, on the advice of Sarjārāo Jedhe Deshmukh, to the Deshmukhs and Deshmukhkaris of Muthekhore, as well as to the Deshmukhkaris, Gādkulkarni and Chaugule of taluqa Gunjansāwal for their loyalty and integrity to the King. They have been told to obey the orders of Rameshchandrāpant and Shankarājipant and thus help the cause of the Chatrapati (King).<sup>155</sup>

During September, Rājārām entrusted the task of recovering the territory in Māwal, Burandhar and Junnar area to Sarjārāo Jedhe Deshmukh of Rohidkhore. Santāji was asked to give him adequate help for accomplishment of that task.<sup>156</sup>

Prior to September 1691, Haibatrāo Silinkar and Prayājji, Pinkarrāo Hatnolikar, two influential Maratha Sardars became disloyal. Shankarājipant promptly imprisoned them and imposed a fine of Rs. 40,000 on the latter. But Jedhe Deshmukh negotiated about them and thus secured their release. These men, later on were asked to serve the kingdom loyally.<sup>157</sup> Thus Rājārām, with his immense insight in human nature, won over the people, who had

openly became disloyal to him. Slowly and gradually he started having a large following in Maharashtra.

Similarly, Rājārām won over the Berad and Koli tribes in Maharashtra. He granted them the necessary protection and thus entrusted them with the task of capture of the fort Purandhar.<sup>158</sup> During November, the Deshmukh of Bicholi was induced to join the Marathas, by granting him the vatan of that territory, for remaining loyal, while his two brothers had deserted the Marathas and joined the Mughals.<sup>159</sup>

In 1692, Antāji Udhav, an influential Maratha leader was won over by Rājārām. He was given assurance of protection and was asked to join Rānchandrapant, with his armed contingent.<sup>162</sup>

Similar efforts were made to reconcile, the son of Nagoji Māne. There was some misunderstanding between Santāji and Nagoji's son, Subhānaji. Rājārām who rightly estimated the value of winning over people to his side, wrote to Rānchandrapant that 'Subhānaji Māne is a wellknown man and has got large following'. The Maratha general Santāji was reprimanded for his behaviour with Subhānaji.<sup>163</sup>

#### K. CAPTURE OF PANHĀLGĀTH

##### A GUARDIAN KNOT FOR THE MUGHALS

Sometime, after February 1692, the Marathas raised

their banner high over the fort of Panhālā. For a period of six months, i.e., till October, the Mughals silently watched it. During October, prince Muizz-ud-din, who was away at Akhoj was ordered to lay siege on Panhālā and capture the fort. Prince Muizz-ud-din arrived in the vicinity of Panhālā by the end of October and laid siege to the two gates of the fort, with the help of Iftikhār Khan. He blockaded the supply of food grain going into the fort. Lutfullāh Khan and Asālāt Khan who were ordered to go to Ahmadnagar on 24th October, were recalled and sent to the help of Muizz-ud-din. By the middle of October they joined the prince and worked with him like second-in-command and supervised the siege work.

Meantime Muizzud-din established firm communication between Panhālā, Miraj and Calgalā, where Aurangzeb had encamped. "Gradually the investment was tightened. Mines were taken to the walls, Mughal outposts were set up around them and in January 1693 four large pieces of artillery were sent to the prince by the Emperor." <sup>160</sup>

"But for a year the fort held out, and in October, 1693, the scene entirely changed. A vast Maratha army, (ten thousand horse and foot according to Akhtar-at dt. 27 Oct.) under Jhanā Jādhav, Rāmachandra and Shankārājī arrived for its relief and encircled the small siege force. The battle began on 20th and there were daily encounters

for some days. While this contest kept the besiegers engaged, the Marathas outside easily threw fresh troops and provisions into the fort, and in concert with the garrison raided the Mughal trenches with great success. Some guns and wheeled field-pieces (rahkala) were carried off from Saf Thikan Khan's position into the fort. Some imperial officers were slain, several others wounded, and one taken prisoner by the enemy."

"Meantime, the Emperor had issued urgent orders to hurry up two heavy reinforcements to the prince under the command of Firuz Jang and Khanazad Khan. When Nawab was ordered to keep back from helping the Marathas. The Maratha relieving force heard of their coming (at the end of October) and dispersed from the neighbourhood of Panhala. Shana made his way north towards Satara; but before reaching that fort he was sighted by Firuz Jang's army on its southward march to the prince's side. The Khan sent his vanguard under hisson Chin Kalich Khan and Rustam Khan, who overtook the Marathas near Karas. A severe battle was fought. The Marathas were defeated and dispersed with heavy slaughter, leaving 30 prisoners and 600 horses in the hands of the victors. The Mughals too lost many men." 161

"But Dhanā Jādhav had effectively spoiled the work done by Muiz-ud-din in a year outside Panhāla. The fort

had been reprovisioned, the siege work had been destroyed and heavy losses inflicted on the Mughal army. Thereafter, though the prince continued there for four months longer, he could do nothing."

"The siege was practically abandoned; the prince carried on his operations languidly, merely to deceive the Emperor, and opened negotiations with the garrison to secure the fort for a price. When four months had been thus wasted, Aurangzib on 7th March, 1694, ordered a force of 6,000 men to strengthen the prince, as the siege had now come to a stop. At the same time Muizz-ud-din was authorised to use his discretion if the fort was surrendered peacefully he could grant terms, if not he must renew entrenching and lay siege to it a second time." <sup>164</sup>

"But it was of no use. Already, about 8th March, the prince availing himself of the Emperor's permission, had begun to march away from Panhālā, while Luṭfullāh Khan and many other officers, who had positive orders to stay below the fort, joined him in the retreat. The Emperor on hearing of this (13th March) sent an officer to turn the prince back from Vadraon (14 m.e. of Panhālā) and take him back to that fort to make a decision about it on the spot by either securing it for a price or renewing siege operations against it. Four days later the Emperor changed his mind and wrote to the prince to come to court, while his officers were to be forced to go back

to Panhala under Luṭfullāh's command, to continue the siege. Muizz-ud-din was received in audience by his grand father on the 29th of the month. His cousin Bidar Bakht had been selected to undertake the task from which he had returned unsuccessful. Bidar Bakht, with a nominal muster-roll of 25,000 men and artillery, was given formal leave on 27th March and began his journey from the Court at Calgala on 5th April. "The officers who had come with Muiz to court without orders, were now driven by force back to Panhala."<sup>165</sup>

On 26th April a Maratha force arrived near Panhālā and was engaged in carrying grain and bulls. Prince Muizz-ud-din ordered Muḥammad 'Askari, the Bahshi of his army and 'Ali Murād along with their men to punish the Marathas. They marched about 14 miles from Panhālā and faced the Marathas. A battle took place and they recovered all the bulls. In the meantime 3000 cavalry of the Marathas arrived from Mahādev hills. Again a battle took place. Muḥammad 'Askari, 'Ali Murād and others from the Mughal side deserted the battle field. About 500 Mughal soldiers were killed.<sup>166</sup>

On 27th April Saf Thikan Khan an officer of the Mughal artillery destroyed by bombardment one tower of the fort.<sup>167</sup>

On 1st May, a Maratha force brought food grains to

to the besieged of Panhālā. Prince Muizz-ud-din appointed one thousand men to chastise them. At this time, Hamid-ud-din Khan who was beyond the Krishnā river was ordered to join the prince.<sup>168</sup> On 7th May, Hamid-ud-din Khan arrived at Kolhāpur. On his way Mir Bāqi, his bakhshi was attacked and looted by the Marathas.<sup>169</sup>

Thus the siege of Panhālā was hopelessly dragging on. The Marathas were attacking and plundering the siege camp. To all this was added arrival of Santāji with a big army from Jinji. Aurangzeb got alarmed at it and reinforced prince Muizz-ud-din's army. He ordered Khānāzād Khan son of Ruḥullāh Khan, Gāzi-ud-din Khan, Qāsim Khan and Khān-i-Jahān Bahādur to proceed to Panhālā.<sup>170</sup>

On 30th July 1693 Anwar Khan the Mughal chānedār of Kolhapur ran away from his post as he heard about approaching Maratha force.<sup>170</sup> In the first week of August the Marathas attacked the Mughals and carried away Hidāyat-ullāh, Muḥammad Fāhir and Muḥammad Momin. They demanded twenty thousand rupees for their release.<sup>181</sup>

Earlier Aurangzeb had ordered Bidār Bakht to take charge of the siege at Panhālā. But it seems that he reached there only in April 1695. His first acts were marked by vigour. Opening his approaches and planning his artillery, he sieged the village at the foot of the hill and demolished one bastion of the fort. (Akhbarat



11 May 1695. But the promise of these opening operations was not fulfilled. A desolatory siege was continued by him till the end of January, 1696, when the disasters to Qāsim Khan and Himsat Khan further south induced the Emperor to send prince to Basavpatan, and to entrust the siege of Panhālā to Ferus Jang, who, too, could effect nothing. In fact the capture of Panhālā was quite beyond the power of any divisional army, as Aurangzeb was to realize during his own siege of it in 1701.<sup>171</sup>

#### L. YEARS 1693 AND 1694 BRING NEW TACTICS

By 1693 Marathas had recovered beyond expectations of Aurangzeb. In 1689, they were considered to be crushed but by 1693, they had gradually but firmly raised their head in Maharashtra. The singular success the Maratha army, under Santāji and Phanāji achieved at Jinji, had revived the spirit of Marathas in Maharashtra. The terror these two generals created in the rank and file of the Mughal army, had greater impact at home. The morale of the Marathas had been elevated considerably high. They regained the lost faith in the existence of their state and thus got greater confidence in their activities.

The Marathas, by now decided to use more effectively their war tactics of harrying the Mughal army with small

bands or parties. The leadership was decentralised. People took every opportunity of helping these roving Maratha armies and wherever they were helpless, the people showed gratitude and sympathy.

Marathas were moving in small forces. They were well acquainted with the intricate paths of Konkan, the western ghats and the dense jungles. On the various forts situated in the Konkan and on the ghats they organised their armies and swiftly marched and made surprise attacks on the Mughal columns. It was a most irritating task for the Mughal soldiers to chase them.

Rājārām made arrangements to capture the territory of Aurangābād, Vānded upto Berar and Khāndesh. He sent orders to Rāmchandrapant that Nāgoji Māne, who had suffered great hardships for the defence of Maharashtra and the King, and defeated the Mughals many a time, was ordered by him to conquer the territory of Vānded and from Aurangabad to Berar. "He is a man of great ability if he is given independent mission he will achieve great success and will arrange the affairs (of the State) properly" wrote Rājārām on 15th and 28th March 1693 to Rāmchandrapant. Nāgoji Māne was expected to conquer that territory, raise new army, exact tributes and make the necessary appointments so as to run the administration of that territory smoothly.<sup>172</sup> Rāmchandrapant and Shankarājipant were asked to accord the necessary help.

For the achievement of this mission Rājūrām gave him 12 villages as inām and the rights of Sardeshaukhi. In addition to this on May 22, 1693, he was rewarded by Rājārām, with the Sardeshaukhi of Parandā, in recognition of his excellent work at Jinji.<sup>173</sup>

Now let us see the activities of the Marathās during 1693. In the third week of March 1693, a Maratha force arrived near Wandrup in Sholapur district. They played havoc. Bahrāmānand Khan's son Hasan 'Ali with a strong force was ordered to quell the Marathas.<sup>174</sup> They were frequently moving near about Deogadh. The Mughal Ciledār complained to prince Muizz-ud-din about his small force. But nothing seems to have been done.<sup>175</sup> By middle of April the Marathas had gathered near Mahādev hill for worshipping. The Mughals at Panhālā feared an attack from the Marathas. The Mughal commander Marhamat Khan from prince Muizz-ud-din's army asked for 7 thousand cavalrymen. Hamid-ud-din Khan was ordered to proceed and son of Subāhdār of Nanded was asked to despatch his army along with Hamid-ud-din Khan.<sup>176</sup> But the Mughals' fears proved to be baseless as the Maratha force consisting of nearly one thousand cavalry and foot soldiers reached in the vicinity of Bīr from Mahādev hills. Itish Khan, the Mughal faujdar of the place was ordered to drive it away.<sup>177</sup> At the same time Hamid-ud-din Khan was asked to chastise the Marathas near Miraj.<sup>178</sup>

By about 27th April the Marathas carried away  
cattles and bulls from the Mughal army at Talhangi.<sup>179</sup>

Shankarāji Nārāyan made preparations to capture  
a number of forts such as Sinhgad, Purandhar and Lohgad.  
These forts were of great importance. Rākāji Nārāyan  
of Māwal territory was asked to wrest some of these  
forts in Varghāt, from the Mughals. At this time,  
Rāigadh, which was captured by Zulfiqār Khan, long ago  
was still under the Mughals. It had great strategic  
importance. Trimbakant Mutāliq along with Vithoji  
Karke and the army was ordered to capture Rāigadh.  
Shortly they reached the Rājāsāchi of the fort.

Similarly Nāvāji Balkavade was exhorted to capture  
Sinhgad. This was a more dangerous and delicate task  
at this time, as an attempt in the previous year had  
failed and the Mughals had become quite alert. But  
Nāvāji bravely accepted the task. He marched with his  
men, descended down and reached near Sinhgad. Having  
selected his comrades in arms, Nāvāji tried to scale  
the fort, leading his team. The Mughals on the fort were  
quite alert. No time was available to put the ladders.  
At early dawn Vithoji managed to place the ladders near  
the steps of the fort. Nāvāji, with all his bravery,  
courage and determination climbed up the ladders. A fierce  
fighting took place. The garrison was defeated and thus

the fort was captured on 1st July 1693.<sup>182</sup>

In August-September Khān-i-Jahān Bahādur's son Himmat Khan was sent to Bhālwani. From there he was asked to go to Pāsepāon, Akluj, etc. and remain alert.<sup>183</sup> In the first week of September, Rāmāji and other Marathas were active near Kalār in Pargana Revsā. The Mughal Qiledār and faujdar 'Abdul ghafur gave a fight. A battle of arrows and musket shots took place. Rāmāji was wounded and another sardār Marsingrao was taken captive.<sup>184</sup>

But in October, Marathas lost Sinhghadh (29 m.s.e. of Mahuli) to the Mughal general Mātabar Khan. Though Mātabar Khan tried to take the fort by giving imperial assurance to the quiledār, yet, his attempts did not succeed. Finally on 20th October, with the help of Māvale people, the fort was gained by escalade. Two Maratha sardārs, Khandoji Fadan and Dāmāji Nārāyan came from Rājmaāchi, yet it was of no avail. They blockaded the quiledār in Sinhghadh. But soon Mātbar Khan sent reinforcements under Rākaji and Rāwat Mal Jhālā, who attacked the village and defeated Marathas after a fight.

Next six months passed without much activity either in the Mughal camp or that of the Marathas. In March Shankāraji Nārāyan sent men from Rājmaāchi to the Pen territory. Rūji Adhatrao was earlier a Mughal representative in that territory. Later on Mātabar Khan, appointed

Shivaji Telangrāo in his place. He had about 400 soldiers and strengthened garrison very well. But Shankarāji Nārāyan's contingent drove away the Mughal representative and thus added Pen to his territory, on 29th March, 1694.<sup>185</sup>

In August 1694 Rājārām ordered Mudhoji Naik Nimbalkar to join Jhanāji and Santāji in Sātārā and Phaltan territory as the Mughals had become immensely strong there. He along with his armed contingent was specially ordered to work under Jhanāji Jādhav. Amrit Rāo Nimbalkar was also asked to join them.<sup>186</sup> On 2nd August 1694 Jhanāji and Santāji with their armies arrived near Wārugadh (25 m.e. of Sātārā). From there they laid siege to Mahipatgadh (10 m.e. of Wārugadh) and carried out the blockade.

In September the Mughals made a successful attempt in gaining the fort of Kori. Trimbakpant Mutālik, Yādev Saurāj and Mahādāji Bāji were on the fort. Rāyāji Bāhulkar, who was the quilledār, was approached by the Mughals.<sup>187</sup> He accepted large amount of bribe and agreed to hand over the fort. The Mughal contingent sometime after 15th September arrived there, with the use of rope-ladders scaled the fort. The Maratha garrison which was not at all aware of the quilledār Rāyāji Bāhulkar's doings, defended the fort.

A gallant Maratha, Nāvāji Balkavade with his comrades in arms hovered over the fort. He did not allow the enemy to carry any ammunition towards the fort.

Mansur Khan's son was bringing reinforcement from Junnar, he had supplies, cavalry and guns with him but, Balkavade attacked him near Saud, defeated him and captured his horses.<sup>188</sup> He showed great bravery and courage.

On the Maratha side, Abājipant Sabnis, Girjoji Nimbalkar, Pankarrāo and many other soldiers were killed. Trimbakpant and Moro Nārāyān were captured by the Mughals. But Yādav Sāmraj and Mahādāji Bāji, with their families escaped through the western ghats towards Bhor. Thus the Mughals occupied Korigadh.<sup>189</sup>

But the Marathas were not prepared to let go the traitor, Bāyāji Bāhulkar lightly. During October-November Shankarāji Pant got the news of the capture of Korigadh while <sup>was</sup> /at Rājgadh. Immediately, he sent Pantaji Sirdev, Chāpji (Chāpāji?) Adam of Bhor, Lānāji Nārāyan and many other soldiers to besiege Korigadh. They besieged the fort and blockaded it. The Mughals were harrassed. Nāvāji Balkavade attacked the Sidis force at Kurdu Ghat who had come to Korigadh,<sup>190</sup> and stopped any reinforcement going to the fort. Finally an assurance was given to Joge, the representative of the Mughals, to let him go free. Immediately his men vacated the fort without any hindrance.

Immediately the Marathas occupied the fort. Tribakpant and Moropant were released, on hearing the news of the success, Shankaraji himself went to Korigadh. Rāyaji Bāhulkar was beaten as punishment for the treachery and was put in prison at Kājadh.<sup>191</sup> Thus Marathas, immediately made good their loss and inspired great confidence in the people.

By December 1694, the Marathas had one more victory to their credit. Sambhaji Naibatrāo Beshnaukh of Ashre-Dhārane, captured Suchāgadh from the Mughals.<sup>192</sup>

Thus gradually the scales of war were turning against the Mughals. The Maratha activities were widespread. This must have certainly disturbed Aurangzeb. A contemporary report has well described his condition when it says "An Emperor was losing his temper as he was receiving the news of fights of the Marathas from all directions. He even did not attend to the court matters. After the court was adjourned he bowed before God and thanked him saying "the day has passed well." The imperial provinces from where food grains, treasury and other equipment used to come has reached worse state. All the qiledārs are writing about the troubles of the Marathas. They were neither getting the supplies nor the help in time. The superior officers are not aware about it. The qiledār (therefore) surrenders the fort.



If he is caught alive, the Marathas torture him."

#### 4. KARNĀTAK - A NEW THEATRE OF WAR

After the death of Sambhaji, while Rājārām was still at Rāigadh, it was agreed upon and more wisely so by his councillors, that he should go and stay at Jinji, a place more than 700 miles away from Maharashtra. The chief aim of this operation was to keep the Mughal army divided, harry them, surprise them and thus reduce their effective strength and opposition. Secondly this would possibly enable the Marathas from keeping the theatre of war away from home-land. Thus the idea of opening second front at Jinji came into existence in October-November 1689.

Though the Marathas were, to a large extent, successful in opening the Second Front at Jinji and carrying out the operations against the Mughals, yet it did not prove to be very effective. The Mughal line of supply was not broken. The Mughals during that period were still the master of the territory through which the supplies and communication passed to Jinji. And that territory was Karnātaka; the territory of Bijāpuri Karnātaka and Golkondā Karnātaka, as those provinces were then called, came into the possession after the fall of Bijāpur and Golkondā sultans. Aurangzeb, appointed his own officers to Bijapuri Karnātaka, but there were not many changes in Golkondā Karnātaka. The desāis, Nādgaudās, Sarnādgaudās

had not declared openly their allegiance either to the Mughals or to the Marathas since fall of their respective former rulers. The Marathas and the Mughals, each in their own way presumed their loyalty conveniently to their respective sides.

Marathas did not remain under this illusion for a long time. By 1691, they had realised the real situation. Their foremost problem was to have money, and as they knew well that these territories have not been managed well by the Mughal officers they could exploit them. In addition to this, they considered it a matter of great advantage, in order to divide the Mughal forces further and keep the war away as far as possible from Maharashtra. This would have brought the resultant effect of breaking the Mughal line of supply and communication. Thus in 1691 they foresaw the necessity of opening a new theatre of war and Karnāṭaka readily provided the ground.

Before we go into the political history of this region, it is quite essential to understand the terrain and the geographical position of the various parts in that territory. Golkondā Karnāṭaka and Bijāpuri Karnāṭaka were sub-divided into uplands and plains. The upland of the Golkondā Karnāṭaka began south of Nandiyāl (a frontier fort of Bijāpur territory) and included Sidhout, Gandhi-kota, Gutti, Garankonda and Madapa (presently in Andhra State). Bijāpuri Balāghāt lay west of Golkondā Karnāṭaka

and included Sera and Bangalore districts (Belgaum, Sanglān, and Raibāg Mukeri of present Mysore State).

The first note of Maratha-activities in this region was taken by Aurangzeb in November 1690. Aurangzeb's encampment was at Calgalā (on the south bank of Krishnā river) during this period. On 12th November, 'Udat-ul-Maulik Asad Khan set out by command to punish the enemy roving on the further side of the river Krishnā'.<sup>194</sup> In fact he went to lay siege to Bhudargadh under Maratha possession.

Bhudargadh stands on a bluff rock, 36 miles south of Kolhāpur. It is situated on one of the six great ridges of the Sahyādri, which stretches east and north east across the Kolhāpur plateau. As the great Mughal general Asad Khan himself was despatched to besiege the fort, its strategic importance during Mughal-Maratha war must have been very great.

After laying siege and waiting for some time, it must have become clear to him that it was not possible to take the fort. The Desāis, Deshaukhs and Nādyaudās of Ajrā sub-division took great pains and underwent a lot of hardships in sending constant supplies to the besieged.<sup>195</sup> As it was not possible for Asad Khan to break this line of supply and thus cause complete blockade of the fort,<sup>196</sup> it appears that the Mughals lifted the siege on March 1691.

In April-May Bedars in ~~Ugar~~ became very strong. They joined hands with the Marathas and started ravaging the Karnāṭaka territory under the ~~Mughals~~. Their chief was Pidyā Nāyak, well known for his organization and fighting capacity. Aurangzeb had to send armies under his best generals to subdue him. Thus this effected a further division of the Mughal army in Maharashtra. The Marathas swiftly took the advantage of the situation and invaded Nāibāsh Mukeri<sup>197</sup> territory, the western region of the northern Karnāṭaka. In October, the Marathas captured Chikodi and took away horses and property. Alaoa of Mukeri received a threatening letter from Aurangzeb's officer for his treacherous act. However, he was persuaded to accept the Mughal service.<sup>198</sup> The Mughals immediately sent a detachment to that region. The Marathas on their part presumed the Pesāi to see Rāachandrapant who was expected to visit Bhudharagadh<sup>199</sup> shortly. It appears that by January, 1692, the Marathas were able to win over the Pesāis of Mukeri. In a letter to the Pesāis Yādevrāo Sar Subnedār, a Maratha officer at Kolhapur says "Nāgoji Sukdev is sent to you. You must convey your resolve. We are proud of you."<sup>200</sup>

As the situation was going beyond control of the Mughal officer Ināyat Allāh, he wrote accordingly to Abul-Mukarrim, the Diwān of Bijāpur. Immediately i.e. by May-

June, a strong force under Jānsisār Khan was sent to that territory to punish the Marathas.<sup>201</sup>

In January 1652 a Maratha force appeared near Gulbarga. Mamur Khan from Aurangabad, Momt Khan faujdār of Ter and Phwājā Safar 'Alī of Chāngach were asked to co-operate with each others and chastise the Marathas. In addition to this Siyādat Khan was also asked to go to Gulbarga.<sup>202</sup>

By now, Santāji, with his mobile force alighted in Karnātaka. Jān Nisār Khan and Tahaur Khan the two sons of Salābat Khan, were ordered to defend the Karnātaka territory. These two brave generals clashed with Santāji in Karnātaka. A severe battle took place. Many people on either side were killed and wounded. Jan Nisār Khan and Tahaur Khan both were wounded in the field. With great difficulty they managed to escape. Many other reputed Mughal Sardārs were put to flight. The Marathas got large share of booty and many Mughal soldiers were made captives.<sup>203</sup> The Maratha Sardār Santāji was well rewarded for the same. He received the rights of Iesh-mukhi of Miraj and other 22 villages. He was handsomely praised and got an extraordinary tribute for the extraordinary courage he showed during this period in defeating the very brave Mughal generals like Shaikh Nizām, Sharzā Khan, Ranaust Khan and Jan Nisār Khan.<sup>204</sup>

Until the rainy season was over there was no noticeable activities in this part. But soon Aurangzeb received reports that Phanāji and Santāji with an army of 7,000 men seized some forts in Phārwar Belgāum region and invested the city of Belgāum. They caused a lot of damage to the crop. By 27th October, the Maratha leaders left for Phārwar and from there they retired to Nargund.<sup>205</sup> And a small detachment of Marathas were ravaging the territory between Akluj-Indi. Though Intfūllāh Khan, a well known Mughal general was despatched to that part he did not gain any commendable success.

Aurangzeb was quite disturbed about the news of Karnataka. He ordered Hamid-ud-din Khan to proceed to Belgāum and Matlab Khan to Phārwar. As Hamid-ud-din Khan was proceeding to Phārwar on his way near Athni, Yalbarah Khan the Mughal thānedār of Athni went to see him. In the meantime the Marathas attacked his post. Seven men from the Mughal side were killed and one was injured.<sup>206</sup> Qāsim Khan was reinforced and was ordered to guard Bankāpur in addition to his existing duties. By middle of November he reached Salhati. Santāji and Phanāji were in Poppalgadh. Qāsim Khan reached 20 miles away from them.<sup>208</sup> But it appears that no fight took place. A little later Matlab Khan defeated the enemy near Phārwar.<sup>207</sup> By the end of the year 1692, Shāaji, the Gumasta of Marsingrao, Jāyirdar of Nulvi, joined the Marathas

and captured the fort of Hubli. But Levāji Hanaaras  
 Desāi of Hubli defeated him with great effort.<sup>209</sup> In  
 the third week of November Firuz Jang captured Junjargadh.<sup>210</sup>

In the beginning of January, 1693, Marathas appointed  
 Peshav Rāmanā as Subāhdār of Golkondā-Marnātaka with 1000  
 horse and 4000 foot.<sup>211</sup>

Santāji, who had come back triumphant after raising  
 the siege of Jinji, became active in October, 1693 in  
 Bijāpur territory. "Himmat Khan went out in pursuit of  
 Santā and over-took him about 22nd October.<sup>212</sup> The  
 Maratha general, at the head of a vastly superior force,  
 turned at bay at Mandgaon (or Mandvagaon) and attacked  
 Himmat, whose small column took refuge at the foot of the  
 village, "the enemy occupying three sides and the Khan  
 one." Evidently at this stage reinforcements under Hamid-  
 ud-din and Phwājā Khan joined Himmat, and the Mughals  
 resumed the chase of the raiders. They gained a signal  
 victory over Santa and his Berad allies (about 14th November)  
 at the village of Vikramhalli. Two hundred of the Berads  
 and 300 of Santa's own men were slain, and 300 mares and  
 some flags and Kettledrums captured by the Mughals, though  
 they too suffered heavy casualties (Akh. 19 Nov.). Then  
 the Mughal generals quarrelled. Hamid-ud-din and Phwājā  
 Khan, taking offence, left Himmat Khan, gave up the  
 pursuit and returned towards Hulbarga. Himmat alone

followed the enemy. Santa now safely divided his force, detaching 4,000 troopers under Arjit Rao to raid Berar, while he himself marched with 6,000 horsemen towards Walkhed, sending in advance threatening letters to the Meshukh of that place to this effect, "For long time past you have not paid the chauth. Send me immediately 7,000 hun." The couriers who brought these letters were arrested by the Mughals and put to death.

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 Foiled in his object, Santa turned aside to the hills of Targul (7) in the Berar country, while Himmat Khan halted at Walkhed, not daring to venture into that wild and broken region. In a day or two the elusive Maratha leader was out again and reported to be marching upon Mairabad. Himmat Khan, now joined by Sayyid Abdullāh, was immediately on his track and drove him into the small fort of Alur (14 m.s.w. of Walkhed). This happened about 214  
 21st November, 1693."

The next few months, till June, 1694, Karnātaka was comparatively quiet. In June, Shān-i-Zamān Path Jang from Bidar Bakht's army laid siege to Nargund (30 m.N.E. of Shārwār). Path Jang tried to take the fort by assault. But the attempt failed; later on he abandoned the siege and in his place Rājāh Udwat Singh of Ursaha was asked to lay siege. The Mughals captured it in November and changed its name to Bahādur-nagar. 215



Thus for a period of 4 years, the Maratha forces occupied kept the Mughals, tied down with all their resources in Karnāṭaka. Though there were no convincingly major battles fought during these years, yet, Aurangzeb himself had to encamp in that territory and detach a few of his best generals to meet the impending attack of the Marathas. The next year from November, 1694, till October, 1695 was quite peaceful. The Maratha general Santāji had left Maharashtra for Jinji in order to relieve Rājārām's forces at Jinji.

In October-November, 1695, Santāji came back from Jinji, ravaged the country of Karnāṭaka and was being chased by Himmat Khan, who was entrusted by Aurangzeb to defend the territory of Bijāpur.

At this time Aurangzeb, who had encamped at Islāmpuri, learnt that Santāji after robbing the imperial dominions was hastening with heavy loads to northwest Mysore. Immediately he appointed Safshikhan Khan, Muḥammad Murād Khan (the pay master of Prince Rām Baksh's army), Khanzād Khan (later Muḥullāh Khan II), Sayyid Saīlat Khan, Mirza Hasan, the cousin brother of Muhtiyār Khan, many Peccani Sardārs along with the army of Rām Baksh. Though on paper army consisted of 25,000 men, actually about 5,000 men were present. The army composed of such high officers, was assigned the mission of defeating and

destroying Santāji, who had created havoc in the region of Idneri. The army was ordered to operate in union with Cāsin Khan, who himself also had good standing army and artillery. They joined Cāsin Khan about 12 miles from the expected track of the Marathas.

As Cāsin Khan wished to entertain Khāsānā Khan and other imperial guests he brought out of the fort of Idneri, showy articles like Farnātaki tents not yet used, gold, silver, copper and chinaware of all kind and sent them next day with his own advance tents and those of other amirs at a distance of 6 miles in advance. But then all was not well. Santāji who had close intelligence of the movement of the Mughal troops, planned his strategy well in advance. He showed the highest tactical power in planning the operation and keeping his divisions in mobile and ready condition, in order to meet any eventuality. He divided his army in three divisions, ensured their timings, and co-operation of the moves in order to achieve the most effective results with minimum use of man power.

The first division went to plunder the advance-camp, the second was ordered to encounter the Mughal army and the third division was kept in reserve, to meet any emergency. Burnappa Jāyak, the Sasindar of Chitaldurg, who was humbled by Cāsin Khan, also joined Santāji with his men.

A little after mid-night the first Maratha division fell upon the advance tents, slew and wounded many and carried off everything. Heavy tents and equipment was set on fire. As soon as the news reached Qāsim Khan, who without waking up Khānāzād Khan from his sleep hastened to the battle. He had not crossed even 4 miles distance, when the second Maratha division fell upon the camp. Khānāzād Khan, who woke up with this surprise, left the camp, baggage and porters and advanced quickly to help Qāsim Khan. The Marathas who were estimated to be between 8 to 10 thousand in each division blockaded the passage of Khānāzād Khan. Thus he could not reach Qāsim Khan's help. Qāsim Khan having learnt of this intelligence became desperate. The Marathas had an overwhelming number, black musketeers, known as best marksmen; in addition to it they had also mobile light cavalry. A fierce battle was fought for the whole day. Khānāzād Khan and Aurād Khan showed tremendous courage while fighting against the Marathas. The whole Afghan army was terror-struck. The Maratha sword was so effective, that at night the Afghan sardārs did not alight their elephants, nor did they allow their horses to take rest, in anticipation of a fresh Maratha attack.

But it was only next morning that the reserve division of the Marathas fell upon the Afghans and looted the baggage. A pitched battle took place. Many were slain

on both sides. In spite of the steadiness of the Mughals and the destruction done by them, the Marathas did not yield one foot of ground or showed the least wavering.

For quite some time, the Mughal soldiers did not have food to eat nor the animals had any fodder. On the other hand, they were being constantly harried by the Marathas. The Mughal garrison shut the door at the fortress to the new force.<sup>217</sup> Khānāzād Khan and Qāsim Khan, shared the food they had brought with them and the common soldier had nothing to eat except the water of the tank, not to speak of grass and grains for horses and elephants. As the night closed, the Marathas surrounded the Mughals, who stood ready to fight. But for three days the Marathas only appeared in sight without giving a fight.

On the fourth day after looking for a suitable opportunity, Burdappā Wāyak's army attacked the Mughals. Mirzā Hassain and many other sardārs were killed. The Mughals could not even find time to recover their dead bodies due to the constant fear of the Marathas. Muḥammad Farād Khan's son Inudādād was wounded. Qāsim Khan and Khānāzād Khan were completely shaken. They held consultation and resolved to go to Jodheri, where there was a small fort and a tank.<sup>218</sup>

But it was not an easy task. The Mughal army was completely enveloped by the Marathas. They had to fight

for their way. Only in the evening they were able to do so and reach in the vicinity of the fort as the Marathas left chasing ~~away~~ and retired.

The fort was a small one and its stock of food grains was also limited. To aggravate the evil the Muskeeteers fell upon. The Mughal artillery and ammunition had been already plundered, and what little was carried with the soldiers was exhausted. In the words of *Āsir-i-'Alamgiri*, "The troops sat down in helplessness after running about, after groaning and sighing for some hours."

The survivors, seeing the gates of the fort closed, forced their way into it. But the garrison attacked them; one third of the Mughal soldiers were slain. On the day after entering the fort, all the soldiers, high and low alike were given bread of *Jowār* out of the provisions of the place and straw to the cattle. In the second day neither was bread left for the men nor straw for horses. Men were dying of hunger. The condition of animals was worse. They chewed each others tails, mistaking them for straw and the remaining oxen 'lean like the donkey's tail' were all slaughtered and eaten away by the Mughals. Thus there was complete starvation. To worsen the situation the Marathas besieged the fort. *Āsir* Khan died shortly. (after 3 days). *Āsir* Khan's death depressed the Mughals still more. Of the common soldiers, many left the fort

and joined the Marathas. The Marathas stripped them off whatever money and gold they had carried. Santāji's men carried out a roving business and sold the goods to the besieged at fantastically high prices.

Very shortly the food supply was exhausted. The Marathas adopted quite stringent methods in tightening the blockade. The living condition of the Mughals became unwholesome. Then Khānāzād Khan, sent his diwan and a Peccani Sardār to beg for terms of capitulation. Santāji demanded a lakh hone, besides the elephants, horses, cash and other baggage. A Peccani Sardār instigated Santāji and said, "What are you asking? Raise your terms. Khānāzād Khan alone can pay this amount as his ransom." At last the ransom was fixed at 20 lakhs rupees." 220

Santāji's men collected all the baggage and the animals from the Mughals. The Mughal Sardārs signed the bonds for surety and kept their relations as hostages. The Mughals did not abide by their terms but Santāji strictly adhered to them.

For two days he allowed the Mughal soldiers to come out of the fort, fed them and breathed in them a new life. On the third day Khānāzād Khan started towards Islāmpuri with a Maratha escort.

Thus came to an end the most glorious battle in the

Maratha War of Independence and equally ignominious in the history of Mughal warfare. This battle alone could prove that the Marathas were matchless in planning the battle strategy and conducting it in a most successful manner. No wonder if then the Mughal Sardārs trembled with the mention of the very name of Santāji. But what was more conspicuous about this battle was the magnanimous behaviour of the Maratha general Santāji. By his actions he proved that he was fighting the war against the Mughal aggression, the Muslim invader Aurangzeb and not against the people whom he had hired out because it was possible for him to be cruel, yet he pardoned them and treated them in the hour of their peril, as human beings. Rarely one comes across, a parallel example in the history of the world. And above all what delights one, is that, the whole account of this battle has been recorded by the Muslim biographer of Aurangzeb, Sāqī Mus'tafī Khan and thus unknowingly he has praised the Maratha general.<sup>221</sup>

Aurangzeb was grieved to learn the miserable fate of his selected army and chosen sardārs. He even did not allow them to come back to see him. Immediately, he ordered Himmat Khan with one thousand cavalry Basavnatan to proceed to rescue the Mughal army and punish the Marathas.<sup>222</sup>

After the battle of Lodderi, Santāji divided his

army into two divisions. Himmat Khan crossed the distance of about 32 miles and fell upon one of the divisions led by Santāji himself. On 20th January, 1696, he (Santāji) appeared before Himmat Khan's position at the head of ten thousand cavalry and nearly the same number of infantry. His Karnatakki foot musketeers -- the best marksmen in the Deccan, took post on a hill. Himmat Khan, with a very small force advanced to the attack and dislodged them from it, slaying 500 of them. Then he drove his elephant towards the place where Santā was standing, when suddenly he was shot by a bullet in the forehead and fell down unconscious into the hawda. His driver wanted to turn the elephant back, but the captain of his contingent (Jandar) Ali Bāqi, told the driver "The Khan is alive. Urge the elephant onwards. I shall drive the enemy back." But, he too was wounded, thrown down to the ground and carried off by the enemy. Then his son fell fighting. Santā received two arrow wounds. The leaderless imperialists fell back to their trenches. <sup>223</sup> After some days the Marathas went away with the captured baggage.

The news reached Aurangzeb about Himmat Khan's miserable plight. On 22nd January, 1696, Hamid-ud-din Khan was ordered to join Himmat Khan and relieve him at Basavpatan. But by 28th January, Aurangzeb received the news of Himmat Khan's casualty. Basavpatan which was besieged by Santāji's troops was being defended by Sayyid



Asmatullāh and Muḥammed Izz. On first February Hamid-ud-din Khan started from Adoni, with 12,000 men. After about 20 miles march he was attacked by Santāji's troops. This happened on 28th February. But the Marathas were driven away. The Maratha camp was looted.<sup>224</sup>

On 6th March 1696 Santāji attacked him again. But the Marathas were repulsed. Many Marathas were killed and wounded.<sup>225</sup>

In the meantime, Aurangzeb ordered Prince Bidār Bakht, "to proceed to the relief of Basavpatan, who was then busy at Panhālā. But by the time Bidār Bakht reached Chitaldurg and Basavpatan, the Maratha General had already left that territory to meet Sulfiqār Khan at Jinji. He ordered Hamid-ud-din Khan to go on the pursuit of Santāji.<sup>226</sup> Later on he was asked to remain at Hālāghat.

Thus virtually after March, 1696, the Marathas did not come back to that territory and hence Karnatak ceased to be any more a theatre of war for the Marathas. It had served its purpose as originally intended by the 'War Council' of the Marathas. Though in June Marathas again appeared near Tanjore.<sup>227</sup> In July, the Marathas threatened Sadāshiv Naik, the 'esāi of Sondhe, for payment of revenue to the Mughals. He was urged to pay the revenue to the Marathas, as the Mughals would be destroyed at any time.<sup>228</sup>

#### N. A NEW VISION - A NEW STRATEGY

The sinking of year 1697 and the dawn of new year struck a great blow to the cause of Swarājya. Rājārām at Jinji had to bow before the increased Mughal power and the intensive siege of Jinji fort. He well knew that the mission at Jinji was over and any overstay there would result in his destruction and ultimately of the Maratha kingdom also. In a hurry he had to leave that place for Maharashtra. And he acted upon it faster than his opponents could think about his moves. He was well ahead of them and reached safely at Vishūlgadh in February 1698.

Though the king arrived safely back to the land of Maharashtra, yet Marathas lost the precious fort of Jinji to the Mughals. In a way the established government over there was thrown away and for a while people were again startled at the fate of the king and his kingdom. But then they only had to wait for some more time and the events that followed, were to prove how unfounded was their fear.

On the other hand the Mughal army at Jinji had an occasion to celebrate the victory of Jinji. As they were rejoicing, the news of fall of Jinji reached Aurangzeb at Islāmpuri. He no doubt rewarded his generals and army men lavishly, yet he was not happy over it. How could he have been? For past seven years he had sent his best generals, large army, a great amount of wealth and had

diverted all the resources to fight against Marathas, to capture their fountain-head, the King Rājārām. But in disgust he learnt that much before his generals could lay hand on the fort of Jinji, the Maratha King had escaped to the heights of safety. He hopelessly learnt that it was much beyond the capacity of Mughals hands to arrest him. So also it was beyond the power of Mughal sword to kill. Thus his dream of putting this very powerful source of Maratha energy, the nearest of infidals, on the anvil of salvation remained unfulfilled. What added insult to the injury was that the Maratha king had come back to Maharashtra in order to give fight to him more openly than ever. He had mustered greater courage in showing such edacity to the Emperor of Hindustan, a descendent of Taimur, the greater warrior, Emperor Aurangzeb. Though worn out with the signs of age and decay, yet he was not willing to accept this humiliating situation. At heart he was still young. Accepting the realities of the situation would have defeated the very mission of his life.

Therefore, much against the wish of many of his generals, sardārs and followers he decided to continue the war with greater enthusiasm than ever. Now in spite of the old age, he took upon himself to lead his armies once again into the battle fields.

On the other hand though the Marathas did suffer the

loss of Jinji yet, they wisely followed the events. By now the Maratha leadership well knew the incapacity of any major retaliation by the Mughal forces. The Mughal army had become weary and sick of wars in Maharashtra. During the last 17 years they hardly had any time to repose. The dissensions and personal rivalries among the Mughal generals were ever on increase. The commands given by Aurangzeb very hardly obeyed to its fullest extent. By now a huge number of men had lost their lives in these battles. Much of the resources of the Mughal Empire had exhausted. The villages had become desolate and local inhabitants hardly owed their loyalty to the invading army. Those Maratha sardars who had joined the Mughals had the sole intention of personal benefits and prosperity. As long as it suited them, they sided with the Mughals. When Mughal orders ran counter to their self-interest, they, without any hesitation deserted the Mughal service. By now the Mughal army, exhausted and exasperated, had grown quite thin. A large number of well known generals were slain in these battles. And yet the menace of Marathas had not reduced a bit. Their sole purpose of this sacrifice was being defeated.

And the Marathas were quick enough to grasp this situation. They looked back upon their past. They were convinced that they effectively withstood such an onslaught. Though their losses both in manpower and material were by

no means less. Yet the determination to fight the aggression had not withered away. They did not become weary and sick of war. They mustered more courage in order to fight more vehemently. By now they had gained sufficient confidence that no single large army of the Mughals could wipe them out. They were capable of facing the guns with all the confidence of a soldier. This brought a total change in their outlook towards the present war. This gave them a new vision and vigour. They were more inspired and thus their morale was boosted very high. From now onwards their role was changed. From defensive role they chose offensive one and planned a new strategy of war, a strategy which finally humbled the great Mughal armies and forced them to retreat, even though they feigned to be victorious.

#### C. AURANGZEB'S FIERCE DETERMINATION

It was in the 43rd reign year (1698-99) of Aurangzeb's reign that the Maratha armed contingents started raiding the territory under Mughal faujdārs. By now Aurangzeb was well over 70 years of age, yet the years did not wear out his fierce determination of destroying the Marathas. The news of Marathas becoming powerful and ravaging the country under his possession gave a great blow to his prestige. For a little while he might have thought that the mission of his life had failed. The Marathas

rightly took the advantage of the situation. The generals of Aurangzeb had started paying lip-service to Aurangzeb and before executing the commands issued by Aurangzeb, within a short time they would turn away. They were more after repose than making any fierce battle. By now a stage had reached when the line of loyal obedient and brave generals had become quite thin/<sup>and</sup> as a result, the old age of Aurangzeb and his policy of continued warfare greatly weighed upon their minds. No doubt Aurangzeb himself was aware of the phenomenal consequences of his policy, yet nothing under the Sun could turn him away from his objective. When he saw his generals were not obedient enough and were not commanding the armies in the battlefield properly and when they were being repeatedly defeated by the Marathas, many a time at the hands of small forces, then he took upon himself to command them to victory. In the words of Khāfi Khan, we can read his mind in a very clear way when he says, "The shelter of this mean community was the forts. Those should be captured and thus the community was to be uprooted."<sup>229</sup>

Thus at the age of eighty, when most of the men at that age think of grave and God, Aurangzeb, with the enthusiasm of an energetic young man, planned a new strategy of war, i.e. capturing all the hill forts from the Marathas under his own command. He organized his army once again.

For last four years i.e., since 21st May 1695,

Aurangzeb had encamped at Islāmpuri. Most of his generals and army men had settled down well. They had built the houses and were enjoying most of the amenities of life. A wall was built round the camp in order to give added protection to the men. For long the Mughal soldiers were under the impression that Aurangzeb would launch a new campaign and at far away places. But alas, they received a jolt when Aurangzeb announced his intention of marching through the hilly tracks of Sahyādri ranges and capturing the forts under Maratha possession. The first fort Aurangzeb thought of capturing was Vasantgad. The Mughal army blew its trumpet of march from Islāmpuri on 19th October 1699.

Meanwhile, immediately after the fall of Jinji, Aurangzeb recalled Sulfiqār Khan. He left that territory via Arcot for Islāmpuri. On 22nd February 1698, Rājārām, with his long marches and successful escape arrived at Khelnā.<sup>230</sup> On 2nd April, 1698, Bidār Bakht was sent to Panhālī to punish the Marathas.

From March-April till November there do not seem to have taken place any major events. At least the records are silent. In November-December, Bidār Bakht was chasing the Maratha army under Shanāji at Khelnā.

Early in 1699 Rājārām set out on a tour of inspection in Konkan, visiting all his forts, returned to Sātārā, at

the end of June, whence he went to Vasantgad about 20th July.<sup>232</sup> Here Rājārām and his followers seem to have planned future course of action. But then it is difficult to know what exactly was this plan. The inference that is drawn from the events which took place about this time, it seems that Rājārām, planned to march into the territory of Berar, then cross the Narmada river and attack the Mughal territory in the North India. At the same time, the king of Deogadh, who had embraced Islām deserted the Mughal shelter for repeated atrocities committed by the Mughals in his territory. He extended an invitation to Rājārām to join hands with him in order to defeat the Mughals, their common enemy. Rājārām readily accepted the offer and appeared with his army in that territory. Aurangzeb immediately ordered prince Bidār Bakht to proceed to that territory.<sup>233</sup> Even Kiraz Jang, who was engaged in fight with Bedars, was asked to make peace with them and was hastened to go to Deogadh to punish the joint forces of Rājā of Deogadh and the Marathas.<sup>234</sup> Rājārām ravaged the territory of Berar and got a lot of equipment and cash.

While the famous Maratha Sardars Nandaji Shinde and Phanaji Jadhav, with a large army arrived at Burhanpur and besieged that city. For three days Najabat Khan and other Mughal officers were fighting the Marathas. Later on the Maratha army left for Bijāgad. Their intention



was to cross the Narmadā river at Akbarpur and thus invade Malwā. But Fīruz Jang who was present in that region did not permit them. He chastised the Marathas. The Marathas with eight thousand army turned to Mandarbār Parganā. They ravaged that country. Hussain 'Alī Khan was the Thānadār of Thālnar. He bravely fought the Marathas, but he was hopelessly outnumbered. A pitched battle took place. Three hundred of Hussain 'Alī Khan's men lay dead, he himself was wounded. He jumped down from the elephant and was captured by the Marathas.

Maratha army got a lot of equipment, horses and elephants and war material. A sum of Rs. two lakhs was demanded as ransom from Hussain 'Alī Khan and was paid by him.<sup>235</sup> Victoriously, thus Marathas returned.

By now Rājārām who was at Sātārā received the secret intelligence of Aurangzeb's campaign of capturing the hill-forts. He quietly removed his family from Sātārā to Phelā. Rājārām planned a march towards Gondavasa. But he did not embark on it. On 28th October, he left Sātārā for Chandan Vandan in order to lead the northern campaign. In his new undertaking he was accompanied by veteran Maratha sardārs like, Venājī Phinde, Khanderāo Tābhāde, Parauji Bhosle and Haibatrāo Himbālkar. Phanājī, Sāchandrāpant, Tādo Malkār and other generals with seven thousand strong force accompanied him up to Chandan Vandan. While Rānoji Ghorpade was left behind to guard the territory of Sātārā, with a brave force of 4 thousand men. At Chandan

Vandan he halted for three days. Another contingent of 12,000 troops joined him. After Lusera on 31st October, Rājārām rode the horse, towards Surat, which later on was to prove as the last campaign of his life. Unlike the days of Shivaji, the news of his intended campaign did not remain a secret. The country which was infested with the Mughal spies speedily brought the news at Aurangzeb's camp.<sup>236</sup>

Aurangzeb immediately issued urgent orders to Prince Bidār Bakht, who was at that time 20 miles west of Miraj to go in pursuit of the Maratha force. Sulfiqār Khan, who was in Karnātaka region was also asked to rush with his army and join Prince Bidār Bakht. Sulfiqār Khan left his baggage at Sholāpur and joined the Prince Bidār Bakht at Chārthāna, and also Chin Gulich Khan was ordered to proceed. He was in Aurangābād at that time.

Bidār Bakht's army fell upon the Marathas near Parandā. Rājārām, who had encamped 8 miles away from the main force, detached Phanāji with his force to stop the march of Bidār Bakht's army. A fierce battle took place, the losses in dead and injured were quite heavy on both the sides. Finally the Maratha army was defeated. The Marathas then marched towards Ahmadnagar.<sup>237</sup> According to Rhinsen, Phanāji with his men raided the imperial camp at Islāmpuri unsuccessfully. Meanwhile, Sulfiqār Khan, who returned to Islāmpuri, successfully drove away the Marathas.<sup>238</sup>

Chin Gulich Khan joined Bidār Bakht at Pārsī (near Paranda). By 22/23 November, they reached Ausā in pursuit of the Maratha army. And returned to Aurangzeb after a month. Rājārām, with his troops arrived near Sātārā, with the intention of proceeding to Vishālgad. Thus came to an end Rājārām's last campaign, without any results. But it was of great consequence to the Marathas war on the whole, as it gave impetus to the other Maratha chieftains to fight the Mughals, wherever it was possible for them. By now the Marathas divided their army into small divisions under various sardars and spread into various parts of Maharashtra, with the result that it became difficult for the Mughals to oppose them every now and then and run after them without any tangible results or measurable gains.

Chānoji Ghorpade harried the Mughals at Parārābād (Parād) and Sāngolā. Here Chānoji's strong men joined him. Hamid-ud-din Khan, who was detached from Sātārā by Aurangzeb, arrived there with a large army. A great battle ensued. The Marathas outnumbered him. Many soldiers were slain and finally, seeing his doom close, the Khan was fast on his heels and retreated ignominiously at Asur. This happened on 20-21st December.

To the good fortune of Hamid-ud-din Khan, Tulfiqār Khan, with his army rushed to his rescue. He arrived at Asur near about 9/10 January 1700. A fierce battle took

place between the Maratha forces under the leadership of  
 Phanāji, Rānoji and Hanmanterāo on the one hand and Zulfi-  
 qār Khan's army on the other. Marathas lost 500 in killed. <sup>239</sup>  
 The Marathas retreated from there. Later on Phanāji attacked  
 the Mughal post at Khānāpur and carried away Avji Idhal,  
 the Mughal officer. Though Zulfiqār Khan arrived there,  
 but it was too late for him to do anything.

On 25th January he met Phanāji near Undirgāon (19  
 m.s. of Paranda). Marathas lost about 100 men and left  
 that territory.

Shimsen in his account relates that Zulfiqār Khan  
 with his army moved into the territory of Tuljāpur, Haldurg  
 and Gunjoti chasing the Marathas. From there he proceeded  
 to Hyderabad, viz. Pāndhri, Kungipaitnan, Hirukalā, Ashti,  
 Parandā, Nānded, Ausā and Undfir on his way. He fought  
 many a pitched battles with the Marathas, who were led by  
 Phanāji. <sup>240</sup>

At this time Rānoji Ghorpade and Phanāji had decided  
 to meet at Almela <sup>241</sup> for reconciliation. Zulfiqār Khan,  
 who received the intelligence of the Maratha movements  
 rushed to Almela. Phanāji bravely attempted to stop the  
 Mughal army, which was on his pursuit. At Perozābad, a  
 place on the bank of Bhima, Phanāji joined Rānoji, it is  
 estimated that Rānoji was in command of 35 thousand Maratha  
 troops, where the Mughal troops under Zulfiqār Khan were

estimated to be only 3000 (Shinsen's exaggeration looks to be limitless). He continues and describes that the Marathas attacked the right flank of the Mughal division. But the attack was successfully repulsed. And the Marathas were put to flight. A large number of Marathas were killed and innumerable were Wounded. At this time Nāc Jalpat joined the rear division of the Mughals. <sup>242</sup>

Similarly, Shinsen records another incident in which Marathas were put to flight by Sulfiqār Khan across the China river and opposite the imperial camp. From there the Marathas left for the territory of Bāgingera.

Aurangzeb who had left Islāmpurī on 15th October 1699 for the campaign of Vasantgad, <sup>243</sup> reached Miraj in twenty days. Prince Muhammed Azam who was summoned from Bedgāon joined him there. At the same time Ruhullāh Khan and Hamid-ud-din Khan were ordered to ravage the territory of Panhāla and Pātārī.

By rapid marches the Mughal army reached Parād. After a brief halt over there, Aurangzeb arrived at Masur, 6 miles away from Vasantgad. The Mughal army encamped there.

Immediately the orders were issued to Farbiyāt Khan, the Chief of Artillery to dig the trenches and he was put in charge of the siege work. He carried the artillery

equipment under the gate of the fort and placed guns opposite it in order to destroy the Marathas. The Marathas faced the attack bravely. They did not care for the Mughal cannonade, nor the showering fire of their guns. They in turn counter-attacked the besieging army by their guns and muskets. With their bravery and courageous counter-attack, the conquest of the fort looked to be a remote possibility.

Aurangzeb, having learnt the miserable plight of his soldiers, ordered his tent to be pitched within two miles from the fort and thus gave a hope and courage to the army who had already lost their heart. In spite of the infirmity of the old age, the determination displayed by Aurangzeb on this occasion is really commendable. Here in once again, and beyond doubt, by his own utterance that the mission of his life was to exterminate the infidels (i.e. Hindus), convinces us that he was a fanatic of an extreme order. He was not prepared to spare his life, leaving apart the others, in order to put in practice his fanaticism. No wonder mankind has always paid dearly for such extreme acts of religious fanatics. He also on this occasion, many innocent people, without knowing the real purpose sacrificed their lives.

After great bloodshed, the terms of capitulations were offered. The Maratha Guiledār, who having seen that, it was beyond his capacity to retain the fort in the face

of large army, agreed to hand over the fort after receiving a large sum. His men, womenfolk on the fort, and the equipment was allowed to go out of the fort unharmed.

Thus Aurangzeb captured Vasantgad on 25th November 1699. The fort was renamed as Bilid-i-fath, the key of the victory.<sup>244</sup> But it was an irony of the fate that now onwards started the real tragedy of the Mughal invasion of the Deccan. In fact, the conquest could rightly be described more appropriately as the key of destruction, rather than the victory. It was a success disillusioned, and subsequent events bear enough evidence to this.

#### 1. PIECE OF SĀTĀRĀ - A TRAGEDY

After the capture of Vasantgad, Aurangzeb with his army left for Sātārā on 8th December 1699. He crossed the Krishna river and reached Yaranjā and on 24th December, the Mughals pitched their tents with a regular wall and a compound.

The fort of Sātārā is 11 hundred yards in length and in width six hundred yards, in height it is about 900 feet from the surrounding region and tapers in a triangular form at its top. It has got two main gates, one on the northern side and the other on the southern side, northeast of the fort is Vangalāi Gate. It is situated on 90' steep rocks and over it was built a stone wall of 18 feet high in order to give adequate protection from the guns of the invaders.

Aurangzeb knowing the topography of the fort, ordered Tarbiyat Khan to dig the trenches and carry the guns to the suitable elevations, from where they could be effectively operated. It was indeed a difficult task as the land was completely rocky, yet with the help of Mirāchano and Tulā, he accomplished the task of digging the trenches and raising the rafts and platforms. In a short time the monstrous guns were carried to these selected places.

As this was being done Aurangzeb posted Prince Azam and Khudābandā Khan to be in the western side of the fort, Tarbiyat Khan was positioned before Mangālāi Gate, Yunim Khan was asked to be on his right, Bahullān Khan was made in charge of the Southern Gate assisted by Mansur Khan, who was in charge of Peccani Artillery. Thus the most important generals under the command of large army were ordered to surround the fort and keep watch on the Marathas. Strict orders were issued to enforce blockade of the fort from all sides.

The Maratha Quiledār on the fort was Subhānji. He was fully aware of the danger to which the fort and his men were exposed. So also were the other Maratha leaders like Jānchandrārant and Parshurām Triabak, aware of the siege of the fort and impending attack. They were preparing themselves with a resolve to fight. On 22nd December, Parshurām Pant wrote to Vithoji Pābar Peshwa of Paryāt



Kānē Uhol that Shajaran was at Sinnagadn and was organising  
 a large army in order to march against Aurangzeb. ....  
 Hearing this news, a confusion has prevailed in the enemy  
 camp.... with the grace of God, Aurangzeb is being defeated.  
 .....the enemy is not to be cared for .....<sup>245</sup> Vitnoji  
 was asked to recruit more men in order to continue the  
 fight. Similar orders were issued to Luro Vitthal the  
 havildar of Pānnoli to attack Aurangzeb's troops.  
 Shandajirao, Yanājirao and Pānājirao Pandathar have already  
 gone to Pātārā. Subhānji Pandathar with his men was  
 posted at Ambavalā ghat in order to guard the passage.<sup>246</sup>

Pānājirao Jādhav, Walhār rāo, Nemāji Shinde,  
 Parsōji Shesale and many other prominent generals, who  
 were carrying on the operations, across the Ghia, were  
 recalled to break the siege. In order to blow up the con-  
 centration of the Mughal forces near Pātārā, Parathas,  
 deployed 15,000 strong men under the generalship of Pānoji  
 Gorpade and Jādhav rāo in the territory of Chandan  
 Vandan.<sup>247</sup>

The giledār had managed to keep a few guns in readi-  
 ness and so also the storage of necessary supplies, which  
 would be required if the siege was prolonged. In the  
 words of "Āqī Mustafā Khan," there were brave people on  
 the fort. "The then sacrifice of their lives was a most  
 trifling thing. They were capable of charging rockets,  
 small rifles and many other firearms like Makkā, Chādar  
 and matwalā."<sup>248</sup>

Such was the preparation of the Maratha forces besieged by Aurangzeb. The Mughal army was innumerable and at any time it was capable of outnumbering the besieged Maratha force. They were in possession of superior arms, better equipment, plenty of ammunition and above all big guns which were capable of blowing up the mountains and cause devastating effects.<sup>249</sup> The Mughal forces had gathered around Pātārā to vanquish the Marathas.

In this way the siege commenced. The Mughal tightened up siege effort on all sides and would thus exhaust the Marathas. The Maratha garrison would open fire from the fort on the besieging Mughal army. The retaliation by the Mughal soldiers was massive. They would fire the guns. But due to lack of accurate aim, it amounted to only the wastage of ammunition rather than creating any deterring effects on the Maratha garrison. On 17th December, Aurangzeb under his personal supervision launched an attack but with little success.

On the other hand field forces of the Marathas under Inanāji and Shankarāji Pant made frequent attacks on the besieging army. Foraging parties had to have strong escorts as Marathas would frequently attack them. They ravaged the country surrounding Mughal camp and would not permit grain to reach the Mughals nor forage for their animals. They attacked the outposts of the Mughals and

captured Ghorikhan, the faujdar of Varārūbād, though rescued by Ramid-ud-din Khan later. On 27th December Ikhlas Khan was encircled by Hanumantrao (Chorpade) in the vicinity of the signal camp. He and his son were killed to death. So also many other soldiers were killed. The Marathas appeared in small batches on all sides of the besieging Mughal army.<sup>250</sup> They used to fall upon them with lightning speed, and equally fast they used to disappear from the range of the Mughal guns. Thus throughout the siege the Marathas could frequently go inside the fort and come out with equal ease. And this was more true, when the contemporary records suspect Prince Azam's connivance from the fort gate, the territory which he was supposed to guard.

On 11th December, at night, the Marathas came out of the fort and attacked the division under Munim Khan. A pitched battle took place. The Mughals successfully turned away the Marathas with huge losses of manpower. A similar attack was launched by the Marathas on the night of 16th December. Two prominent Mughal sardārs faced the attack. Munim Khan and Satvāji Waphale's son Bājirao showed great valour. Munim Khan was injured and the Marathas were repulsed.<sup>251</sup>

These activities of Marathas created devastating effects on the Mughals. Firstly all the supplies of food

grains and the forage from outside was stopped. The food prices in the Mughal camp shot up very high and thus they were forced to starve. Similar was the condition of their animals. This greatly demoralised the fighting Mughals. And there was an echo of all this, that they should abandon the siege. The resultant situation was that they themselves were besieged.

On 10th January, 1700, three most prominent sardārs, Tulfiqār Khan, Baharāmand Khan and Hamid-ud-din Khan, were sent to meet Maratha army under Jhanāji, Hanumantrāo and Rānoji, beyond Rahimatpur. The Marathas had 15,000 strong force. According to the Mughal estimates (Akhbarat) five hundred Marathas fell in the battlefield. The Mughal losses are not known. But it can be fairly estimated that the casualties on their part must have been equally heavy. On 22nd January, Jhanāji captured the Mughal faujdar of Shānāpur. And thus made their position secure in Chaudan Vandan and stopped the Mughal communication to the North. <sup>252</sup>

Thus in early months of siege, Marathas gave a determined fight and indeed caused fright in the rank and file of the Mughal army. Some Mughal sardārs seeing the precarious condition raised a cry of abandoning the siege. But Aurangzeb was a matchless military leader. These attacks of the Marathas did not make any impression on him. He looked to be more determined than ever before. He gave

up his plan of spending month of Rāzān at Chelapur and took upon himself to guide the operations.

He ordered Path-ullāh Khan and Mughliāh Khan to take their batteries up to the main gate of the fort.

renches were dug near the fort. Mughlis Khan and Nasid-ud-din Khan with a few thousand foot soldiers and Karnāṭaki musketeers were ordered to be at the foot of the fort. <sup>253</sup>

The chief of Mughal artillery, Farbiyat Khan raised his gun platform 24 yards high, to the level of the bastion of the fort gate. "In procuring materials for it, not a tree was left standing within thirty or forty kos of Sātārā." Eight thousand sacks were taken from the grain market and filled with sand to form a bulwark round it. Three hundred oxen were set to transport timber for the battery. But the stones showered by the enemy made further progress impossible. Orders were then issued to fill the empty chests of the public treasury and of the money changers with stone and sand and line the battery with them. 150 water carriers being posted there to put out fires promptly. <sup>254</sup>

The Mughal army generals were making tremendous efforts to secure the fort. But they had little success. The Maratha opposition within the fort under its veteran ciledār Subhānji was more than formidable. Whenever the

garrison had an opportunity to retaliate, it never wasted it.

This brought a great despair in the Mughal camp. The chief of artillery, Tarbiyāt Khan, dug a mine, with great effort. It was 24 yards long and reached under the fort wall. The Mughal plan was to breach the fort wall and carry on assault. But under the circumstances it was considered impracticable and thus given up. Immediately, a surprise attack, by 2000 Mavle, who were known for their skill in hill climbing in the Mughal army, was carried. These Mavle were paid three years pay in advance, as an incentive for successful accomplishment of the task. But the Marathas, who had spread their spying in the Mughal camp, received the intelligence much before the actual hour of operations. They were all waiting in readiness. The attack was launched a little before the dawn on 23rd January. It was met with equal firmness by the Marathas and thus both the element of surprise and the attack failed.

During this period, Maratha troops in small divisions were carrying out their surprise attacks on the Mughal lines of siege. On the night of 1st April, a division of Maratha army, marched from Parali. It was effectively checked by the Mughal generals Muhullāh Khan and Fath-ullāh-Khan. The next day 300 men from the garrison of

the fort sallied forth. They attacked the besieging Mughal troops and spoiled all the siege work. They lost five in killed and were repulsed. Path-ullāh Khan was founded, in the clash.

As Aurangzeb came to know about the failure of surprise attack by Navlas, he immediately ordered Path-ullāh Khan and Supullāh Khan to run another trench from the side of the gate of the fort. On 15th March, they carried it under the revani and within about a month completed the work. It was the night of 12th April, 1700, dark and cool, the Mughal army, including cavalry, infantry, artillery, Phāschauki, Afghan and Chakkhar men, Yarnātaki troops and the brave generals like Hamid-ud-din Khan and Mukhlis Khan took their positions for a desperate battle the next morning. The sky was clear and the cool wind was blowing. Opposite Mangalai gate, the Mughal troops formed in a battle array. A potentially destructive mine 24 yards in length was laid under the fort wall, by the chief of Mughal artillery to hurl destruction into the bosom of their foes. The midnight storm wailed its mournful requiem over the sleeping host. The hostile host were at but a cannon shot from each other. Indomitable determination inflamed the souls of Maratha officers and soldiers. It was an awful night, the harbinger of a still more awful day. The dark morning of 13th April, had not yet dawned when the fuse of first mine was lit. We can well imagine

what havoc it must have created. It was terrific. The very earth shook beneath the tremendous detonation. It created an un-intermittent roar of the most deafening and appalling thunder. The Marathas who were in the region of explosion presented themselves unprotected to the flying missiles of stones from the exploded wall. The air was soon so filled with smoke that the day was as dark as the night. Under this black and sulphurous canopy the infuriated Mughal soldiers rushed in. Horsemen plunged to the charge. Prayāgji Trābhu, the havildar of the fort was buried alive under the debris of the wall.<sup>255</sup>

A few minutes passed, as both the sides were plunged into utter confusion, the second mine was blown up by the skilled Mughal artillery men. Like the previous one it made enormous sound and blew up a large portion of the wall. But unlike the previous one, this time the hills of clay and stones were showered on thousands of Mughals, who were already in forward march. Two thousand were buried instantly under the ground. The bodies of wounded and the dead covered the plain. Many of the torn and bleeding victims were trampled by the rush of frenzied charges. The piercing shrieks rose above the roar of explosion. Prominent among the dead were Takhi Khan, Sayyid Shamasud-din Khan, Ahmed Khan Lochi, Asad-ud-din Ahmad and Muhammad Bāqir.<sup>256</sup>



The explosion caused 70 yard breach in the fort wall. With disastrous second explosion there was none from the Mughal army to assault the Marathas who were defenceless. It was so sudden that it stunned the Mughal soldiers so much that they were paralysed of any action. Prayāgi's body was removed from the debris and surprisingly he was still alive uninjured. The loss of the Marathas was comparatively less. They recovered from the shock speedily and charged the Mughals. Meanwhile they started speedily repairing the walls. Thus the plan was upset. All the Mughal efforts were undone in a twinkling. Speedily the news was carried to Aurangzeb. He rushed to the scene and consoled the crying and ailing army men. He issued orders to Bar-afrāz Khan to take the men and make fresh efforts to attack. Next day Bauliā infantry men, who lost many of their relatives, on seeing that it was impossible to extract their dead bodies, secretly set fire to the whole wooden work.<sup>257</sup> And it is reported that the fire continued for seven days, the flames consuming Hindus and Muslims alike. The whole siege work was in flames, so also the surrounding area was ablaze. An eye witness has described it that nearly two thousand men awfully torn by explosion were prostrate upon bloodstained earth. A wall of anguish rose, which froze the heart of the beholder with terror. Fragments of projectiles, guns, swords, horses dead or cruelly mangled, neighing, plunging, shrieking in their agony presented

a scene of unparalleled horror. And still the battle continued.

After the disastrous explosion and a big breach in the fort wall, the condition of the Maratha giledār became quite precarious. The giledār Subhānji was fighting the fort more on moral courage than on any material supply of the things. During the siege since December till April, the stocks of food grains which were stored were consumed, there was not much of external supply, though Shankaraji Pant, once replenished the stocks from Parali. Secondly, the frequent attacks of the Mughals had adversely affected the manpower on the fort. The breach in the fort wall was irreparable. Day by day the Marathas were being exposed to the guns of their enemies. Considering the situation and possible defeat, the giledār decided to surrender the fort. He sent a word to Rāchhandrapant and Shankarājipant about it. Rāchhandrapant and Shankarājipant through Bāsāji Pandit and Abāji Pandit respectively sent for the terms of capitulations to Prince Azam. The Prince in turn, got the sanction for the same from Aurangzeb. On 21st April, 1700, the Marathas vacated the fort. The Marathas were permitted to go out unharmed. The Mughals secured seven guns, five rehala, nine jamburak guns 14 maunds of gun powder and 11 rockets. The giledār Subhānji, also joined the Mughal service. As the fort was secured through the negotiations of the Prince Azam it was named as Azamtārā.

FOOTNOTES

1 SCP, pp. 34-35

2 SCP, p. 35

3 SCP, p. 35

4 RA, Vol. V, p. 63

5 Rājā Rām Charitam

कर्नाटक विषयमैपरेकीमय महीपते:

श्रुपायनानि दत्तानि धनानि विविधानि च

सेना बहुविधाः स्त्रीया दानम तनप्रतोपिताः

प्रेषितास्तस्य सेवायै म्लेच्छमर्दनक्षमाः

6 SCS, p. 35

7 Appendix A No. 156a

8 Rājā Rām Charitam

9 SCP, p. 35

10 Rajaram by Sardesai, p. 25

11 Appendix A3 No. 5

12 Appendix A No. 17b

13 RA, p. 328

14 A, p. 328. The last name Māniā Ghorpare identified by J. Sarkar appears to be incorrect. Māniā, it is suggested can be read as Malyā, which may originally be Māloji, as it is common practice with the Persian writers to write the names like that for example, Bantya for Santāji, Moyatyā for Mohite, etc.

- 15 MA, p. 329.
- 16 Rajaram by Sardesai, p. 26.
- 17 SCP, p. 35, Varsor is probably Vellore.
- 18 HA, Vol. V, p. 62.
- 19 SCP, p. 35.
- 20 FCP, p. 35.
- 21 HGR, p. 265 suggests name of Shamji Rao Punde as  
Matri, Nirāji Rānāji as chief justice, Santāji  
Ghorpade as commander-in-chief and also includes  
Srikarāchārya Kalgaonkar as Pandit Rao, the last one  
was certainly not a ministerial post.
- 22 SCP, p. 35.
- 23 Martin's Diary, As in HGP, p. 236.
- 24 Martin's Diary As quoted in HS, p. 237.
- 25 Martin's Diary. As quoted in HS, p. 238.
- 26 Martin's Diary. As quoted in HS, p. 239.
- 27 HA, Vol. V, pp. 68-69.
- 28 FCP, p. 35.
- 29 HA, Vol. V, p. 69.
- 30 HA, Vol. V, p. 69.
- 31 HA, Vol. V, p. 72.
- 32 SCP, pp. 35-36.
- 33 HS, p. 240.
- 34 HS, p. 240.
- 35 HA, Vol. V, p. 73.
- 36 HA, Vol. V, p. 74.

- 37 MA, p. 352.
  - 38 MA, pp. 354-55.
  - 40 MA, p. 345.
  - 41 Appendix A No. 165.
  - 42 HA, Vol. V, p. 76.
  - 43 MA, p. 350.
  - 44 HA, Vol. V, p. 76.
  - 45 HA, Vol. V, pp. 76-77.
  - 46 HS, p. 242.
  - 47 HA, Vol. V, p. 77.
  - 48 HA, Vol. V, p. 78.
  - 49 HA, Vol. V, p. 78.
  - 50 Martin's Diary. As quoted in HS, p. 242.
  - 51 Martin's Diary. As quoted in HS, p. 243.
  - 52 Martin's Diary. As quoted in HS, p. 243.
  - 53 Appendix A No. 166.
  - 54 Martin's Diary. As quoted in HS, pp. 243-44.
  - 55 Martin's Diary. As quoted in HS, p. 244.
  - 56 Appendix A No. 167.
  - 57 SCP, p. 36.
  - 58 KK, p. 415.
  - 59 KK, p. 416.
  - 60 SCP, p. 36 and Appendix A No. 169.
  - 61 Appendix A No. 168 and 170.
- MA, p. 357 maintains it was Santaji who captured  
Ismail Khan Makh. SCS, Vol. V, No. 778, p. 23 and

J.S. p. 36 states it was Shanāji who captured Ismail Khan. Evidently the name has been mistaken in Persian sources.

62 Martin's Diary. As quoted in HS, p. 246.

63 HA, p. 357.

64 HA, p. 358. HA, Vol. V, p. 85.

65 SCP, p. 36.

66 HA, Vol. V, p. 88. Wāndiwash is 24 miles north-east of Jinji.

67 HA, Vol. V, p. 88.

68 HA, Vol. V, p. 89.

69 HA, Vol. V, pp. 89-90.

70 HA, Vol. V, p. 90.

71 Martin's Diary. As quoted in HS, pp. 248-49.

72 Martin's Diary. As quoted in HS, p. 248.

73 Appendix A No. 171 and MM p. 119.

74 HA, Vol. V, p. 91.

75 SCP, p. 36.

76 SCP, p. 37. The date given is 23rd April 1693.

77 SCP, p. 36.

78 SCP, p. 37.

79 SCP, p. 37.

80 SCP, p. 37.

81 This fort is 18 miles north of Pondicherry and 6 miles east of Tindivanam.

82 HA, Vol. V, p. 97.

83 SCP, p. 37.

- 84 HA, Vol. V, p. 98.
- 85 HA, Vol. V, p. 99.
- 86 SCP, p. 37.
- 87 SCS, Vol. IV, No. 729, pp. 81-82.
- 88 HA, Vol. V, pp. 100-101.
- 89 SCS, p. 37.
- 90 HA, Vol. V, p. 103. Madras Diary 5 December 1695 as quoted by Sarkar.
- 91 SCS, p. 38. HA, Vol. V, p. 103.
- 92 SCS, p. 36.
- 93 Appendix A No. 178 and SCP, p. 39.
- 94 PIHRC, Vol. XIX, pp. 160-61, letter from Fort St. David to Fort St. George dated 29 July 1697.
- 95 HA, Vol. V, p. 105.
- 96 SCP, p. 39.
- 97 HA, Vol. V, p. 106.
- 98 HA, Vol. V, p. 106. Wilkes (I, 133) as quoted by Sarkar.
- 99 HA, Vol. V, p. 107.
- 100 HA, Vol. V, pp. 107-108. The entire narrative is based on Bhimsen's Dilkashā. There is no other source material either to corroborate or contradict the same.

NOTE ON THE DATE OF CAPTURE OF JINJI BY THE MUGHALS

- (1) According to P.A., p. 391, Jinji was captured by the Mughals on 16th Shābān, 1109 (18th February, 1698). I do not know from where Sarkar has borrowed the date 6th Shābān, which according to him is 7th February.

Apparently it seems that Sarkar, incorrectly read 6 for 16th Shābān (H. of A. Vol. V. p. 108). Therefore, Sardesai and Pagadi, both have repeated the same mistake, i.e., fall of Jinji on 7th February (6th Shābān).

- (2) According to Gadādhara Prāhād Shākāvalī (S.C.P. p. 66) it was taken by Zulfikar Khan on Pausa (Ed) 12, S.1619 (the day of Sankrānti- 30th December, 1697). Thus, there is a radical difference between the dates of the above two sources. According to Bhimsen, an eye witness (Dilkashā 135a) the fort fell on Sankrānti, which according to Sarkar would correspond to 2nd or 31st January. There is one more source, Madras Diary of 2nd January, 1698, which says, "A letter from Amir Jahan from the Mughal camp received today advises that the Nawab has taken the Jinji fort all but one which also offers to capitulate" (H. of A. Vol. V, p.108 - Foot Note). Another source, Letters to Fort St. George, p. 6 as quoted in HGR pp.346-47, says "that Zulfikar Khan had taken Gingee and became absolute master of the country and also warned the fort St. David authorities to be very careful and be prepared for an attack". This letter was written on 5th January.
- (3) From the above sources, it appears that, Madras Diary, Fort St. George and Bhimsen are very close to exactness in giving the date as mentioned in G.P.Shākāvalī. Therefore, I am inclined to believe the date of this



incident i.e. the date of the fall of Jinji as 30th  
December 1697.

- 101 MSIH, Vol. I, No. 76, p. 66 and SCS, Vol. II, No.225,  
pp. 222-23.
- 102 MA, p. 326.
- 103 KIS, No. 3, p. 5.
- 104 Appendix A No. 157.
- 105 MA, p. 331.
- 106 SCS, Vol. XII, No. 43, p. 25.
- 107 Appendix A, No. 158.
- 108 Appendix A No. 159.
- 109 HA, Vol. V, p. 150.
- 110 Appendix A No. 160.
- 111 Appendix A No. 161.
- 112 MA, p. 331, SCP, p. 35, gives the date as 4th November.
- 113 Appendix A No. 162.
- 114 HA, Vol. V, p. 32. Sarkar has supported it by  
Bhimsen's Dilkashā.
- 115 SCS, Vol. VI No. 112, p. 76.
- 116 MA, p. 330.
- 117 Appendix A2 No. 12.
- 118 MA, p. 332.
- 119 SDA, No. 780, p. vii.
- 120 Appendix A No. 163.
- 121 Rajwade, Vol. XV, No. 282, pp. 288-90.
- 122 SCP, p. 36.

- 123 Rajwade, Vol. xvii, No. 20, SCS, Vol. VI, No. 113.
- 124 KK, p. 392, Appendix A, No. 164.
- 125 Rajwade, Vol. XV, No. 283, p. 290.
- 126 RA, Vol. V, p. 30 (Ishwardas 141a-143a and RA, p. 336).  
According to Sarkar, the date of attack is 25th May.  
J.S. p. 36 gives 25th May (S.162 Vaish. B.12). Sarkar  
also mentions that this is the first signal victory  
of the Marathas. There are two Marathi letters written  
by Ramchandra Wilkanth to Mārne Deshmukh of Muthakhore  
and Haibatrāo Silamkar Deshmukh Tal. Gunjan Māwal  
dt. 6 May, 1690 (S. 1612 Vaish S.8). It states that  
the fort of Māi, Pratāpgadh and other forts have been  
taken by the Marathas, though J.S. mentions this inci-  
dent after 25th May. Therefore, it creates doubt in  
our minds, if taking of Māi, Pratāpgadh and other forts  
was not the first major victory of the Marathas. How-  
ever, considering J.S. more authentic, I have arranged  
the events accordingly.  
Rāmchandrapant to Mārne Deshmukh SCS, Vol. VI, No. 113 and  
Rāmchandrapant to Silamkar Deshmukh, Rajwade/xvii/No.20,  
p. 37}.
- 127 RA, Vol. V, p. 30.
- 128 Rajwade xvi No. 27, p. 43.
- 1 Was it taken back by the Mughals?  
Apparently there is some mistake as Rājgad was  
was captured earlier.
- 129 RA, p. 337.

130. HA, Vol. V, pp. 39-40 (Inṣā-i-Madhuram) Sarkar in the footnote says that 'the first Maratha attempt at revival was temporarily checked and Dhana and Santa were driven into hiding and comparative inactivity for six months. (Oct. 1690-April 1691). It does not appear to be correct. Santāji was active in Ahmadnagar during September-October.
131. MISH Vol. I, No. 76, p. 66.
132. Rajwade, Vol. XV.
133. Appendix A No. 180
134. Appendix A No. 181
135. Appendix A No. 183
136. Appendix A No. 184
137. Appendix A No. 185
138. Appendix A No. 186
139. Appendix A No. 187
140. Appendix A No. 188 Chokhandi(?)
141. Appendix A No. 189
142. Appendix A No. 189 (Murtidā Nagar (?))
143. Appendix A No. 190
144. Appendix A No. 191
145. SCP p. 36.
146. Appendix A No. 192
147. Appendix A No. 193
148. SCP p. 36

- 149 MA, p. 347
- 150 Rajwade, Vol. VIII, No. 43, p. 46
- 151 MA, p. 347
- 152 Appendix A No. 194
- 153 SL, pp. 166-67
- 154 SCS Vol. V, No. 767, pp. 10-12.
- 155 SCS Vol. II, No. 225, pp. 222-23 and SCS Vol. VI,  
No. 116, p. 79.
- 156 Rajwade, Vol. XV, No. 352, pp. 382.
- 157 SCS, Vol. VI, No. 117, pp. 79-80 and Rajwade, Vol. XV,  
No. 354, pp. 384-85.
- 158 Rajwade, Vol. XV, No. 352, pp. 382-83.
- 159 SCS, Vol. VIII, No. 47, pp. 52-53.
- 160 HA, Vol. V, p. 33.
- 161 HA, Vol. V, pp. 34-35, SCP, p. 37 does not give the date  
of attack. The Marathas arrived at Panhālā during  
Oct-Nov. (Saka 1615, Kartik). They helped besieged  
as a result of which the siege was lifted.
- 162 SCS, Vol. V, No. 923, p. 172.
- 163 SCS, Vol. V, No. 849, p. 104.
- 164 HA, Vol. V, pp. 35-36.
- 165 HA, Vol. V, pp. 36-37.
- 166 Appendix A, No. 195
- 167 Appendix A No. 196
- 168 Appendix A No. 197
- 169 Appendix A No. 198
- 170 Appendix A No. 199

171 I have extensively quoted from HA Vol. V, pp. 34-38 by J.Sarkar. In the words of Sarkar "The entire narrative from Dhana's attack on Muiz to this point has been reconstructed from Akhbarat or daily newsletters of Aurangzeb's camp preserved in MS in London." There is no other source material available so far either to corroborate or contradict the same.

172 SCS, Vol. V, No. 845 and 846, pp. 98-101.

173 SCS Vol. V, No. 847, pp. 101-2.

174 Appendix A No. 200

175 Appendix A No. 200

176 Appendix A No. 201

177 Appendix A No. 202

178 Appendix A No. 203

179 Appendix A No. 204 Talhangir?

180 Appendix No. A, No. 205

181 Appendix A No. 206

182 SCS Vol. V No. 936, pp. 188-90.

The date of the capture of the fort is given (S 1615 Ashadh (s) 8), 1st July 1693. In recognition of the services of Navaji Balkavade, he was given the village of Savargaon with all the rights.

183 Appendix A No. 207

184 Appendix A No. 208

185 MSIH Vol. VI No. 9, p. 10

186 SCS Vol. IV, No. 728, pp. 80-81

- 187 A certain Dage from the Mughals approached Mayaji.  
 188 SCS Vol. V, No. 939, pp. 190-91. In appreciation of his services Balkavde was given Mulkhed in 'inam'.  
 189 SCP, pp. 37-38, after 15 September 1694  
 190 SCS, Vol. V, No. 939, p. 191. As a reward of this gallant act he was given the village of Daravli in 'inam'.  
 191 SCP, p. 39, after October-November 1694  
 192 SCS, Vol. X, No. 23, p. 36  
 193 Appendix A No. 209  
 194 MA, p. 338  
 195 PIHRC, Vol. XXII, p. 84.

This is an unrecorded campaign of the Mughals. The information is based on a document, which is an original order given by a divisional officer of Rajaram dt. 7th November, 1691. It refers to a grant made to the Desaias Dosh Kulkarnis, Nadgaudas of the Ajra sub-division. Document does not mention the date of siege, but that of grant which was not long after the siege.

- 196 SCS Vol. XII, No. 46, p. 26.  
 197 HA, Vol. V, p. 41.  
 198 SCS Vol. XII, No. 89, p. 28.  
 199 SCS, Vol. XII, No. 51, p. 29.  
 200 SCS, Vol. XII, No. 52, p. 30.  
 201 Appendix A3 No. 6  
 202 Appendix A No. 211

- 203 KK, p. 417
- 204 APyV No. 4, p. 6.
- 205 HA, Vol. V, p. 42. Nargund: 30 m.n.e. of Dhārwar.
- 206 Appendix No. 212
- 207 HA, Vol. V, p. 42.
- 208 Appendix A No. 213
- 209 SCS Vol. VI
- 210 Appendix A No. 214
- 211 HA Vol. V, p. 80
- 212 Place of overtaking appears to be near Bupal gadh,  
65 m. n.w. of Bijapur.
- 213 Torgal (Torgul), it is a fort in the Bijapur territory.
- 214 HA, Vol. V, pp. 43-45. Sarkar's narrative is based  
on Akhbarat, hence reproduced extensively.

Akhbarat dated 22 Oct 1693 (Appendix A No. 215) gives no more detailed information about Santāji's movements. It states "Hami-ud-din Khan and Khwājā Khan who were with Himmat Khan went towards Gulbarga in pursuit of Santāji. Santa sent Amrit Rao with 4000 cavalry towards Berar. He has got 6000 men. From Bidar he went towards Malkhed. Aurangzeb ordered Hamid-ud-din Khan and Khwājā Khan to go in pursuit of Amrit Rao. Asad Khan along with Lashkar Khan accompanied by his men was ordered to help Himmat Khan and chase Santa."

- 215 HA, Vol. V, pp. 45-46.
- 215 SCP, p. 37. Santaji left for Jinji during October-November 1694. Sarkar in HA, pp. 47-49 gives the

encounters between Santaji and Himmat Khan and Hamid-un-din Khan during this period. If J.S. is considered as an authentic source, then Sarkar's information becomes superfluous. It is not known on which source material Sarkar has based his narrative.

- 217 KK p. 431 gives more vivid and interesting account about how Mughal Sardars secretly planned to go inside the fort and did not care for others.
- 218 According to KK, p. 430, the battle continued for 4 days. This seems to be most unlikely, the Mughals would have completely perished if they had stayed any more.
- 219 According to MA, he was an opium-eater. His life depended on it and lack of it caused the death, but many suspected of suicide for the possible disgrace in near future, at the hands of Aurangzeb.
- 220 KK, p. 433, gives the amount as 7 lakhs. SCP, p. 38 indicates one lakh only.
- 221 MA, pp. 375-79, KK, pp. 428-33 and HA, Vol. V, pp.110-20.
- The entire narrative is based on these sources.

#### The data of the Battle of Deodderi

According to MA, p. 375 Khānāzād Khan and Qasim Khan united their forces before sighting the enemy on 23rd Jamadi II, 1107 (19 Jan 1696). According to Sarkar this date is wrong by two months. In his opinion Akhbarat, which is a more trustworthy source, shows that 'on that day the mace



bearers sent by the Emperor returned to him at Brahma-puri after delivering his gifts to the vanquished officers, who had then reached Adoni. Qāsim Khan had died more than a month before 19 Jan. The Madras Diary records on 5th December, 1695, the report of Asim Khan having been already defeated (say, about 20th November) (HA, Vol. V, p. 119 footnote).

According to SCP, p. 38 (Jedhe Shakavali) "after Paush (S) 11, S.1617 (after 5 January, 1696) Santāji Chorpade imprisoned Asim Khan and Khanazad Khan. Qāsim Khan died, Khanazad Khan paid ransom of one lakh rupees."

Therefore, from the above sources it appears that, Dodderi was not besieged before 5th January by the Marathas. In other words Asim Khan died some time after 5th January and not on 20th November as Sarkar maintains.

If we accept J.S. as authentic source, then both M.A. and Sarkar have apparently made the mistake in calculating the date.

222 MA, p. 379.

223 HA, Vol. V, pp. 120-121. Sarkar's information is based on Akbārat, hence it has been extensively reproduced. MA, p. 379, SCP, p. 38, it gives the date of killing Himmāt Khan as Dec. 1695-Jan. 1696.

224 HA, Vol. V, p. 122.

225 Appendix A No. 216

226 Appendix A No. 217

- 227 Appendix A No. 218
- 228 SCS Vol. III, No. 479, pp. 85-86
- 229 KK, p. 459
- 230 SCP, p. 66
- 231 MA, p. 393.
- 232 HA, Vol. V, p. 131.

Rajaram arrived at Khelna in Feb-March (SCP, p.66).

- 233 KK, p. 461
- 234 SCP, p. 66
- 235 KK, pp. 456-58.

No other Persian source has given this information. According to Bhimsen, Krishnā Sawant a Maratha sardar crossed the Narmada with 15,000 men. He ravaged the territory surrounding Dhamuni. From there, he retreated. Since the days of Muslim sultans till date the Marathas had never crossed the Narmada. <sup>usual</sup> As/Bhimsen has not given the date of the incident. But it is quite likely that the event might have taken place at the same time as, Nemaaji Shinde and others crossed the Narmada, as mentioned by Khafi Khan.

- 236 HA, Vol. V, p. 132
- 237 HA, Vol. V, p. 133. The date of incident given by Sarkar is 13/14 Nov.
- 238 HA, Vol. V, pp. 133-34, Bhimsen's Dilkashā as quoted by J. Sarkar.
- 239 HA, Vol. V, p. 134. We are not aware of the losses of men of the Mughals, as the records are not available. Surely, there must have been some losses on their side too.

240 MM, p. 145.

241 Almela?

242 MM, p.146. Firozabad? It is on the banks of the  
Bhimā river in Gulburgā district.

As no dates are indicated it is difficult to place  
the incidents in exact chronology of the events. However,  
from 1756 Sanvant Vikram, it appears that, the happenings  
took place same time at the end of 1899.

243 Vasantgadh is a hilly fort. It is situated in Karad,  
a taluk of Sātārā district (25 M.S.W. of Sātārā).

The fort was in Maratha possession and was known  
for its strength.

244 The narrative of this campaign is based on MA, pp.408-11  
and KK, p. 462.

245 Rāmdās āni Rāmdāsi, Vol. VII, p. 92.

246 Sh, Ch. V, No. 27, p. 180. Ambvalā ghāt?

247 Rāmdās āni Rāmdāsi, Vol. VII, p. 92.

248 MA, p. 414.

249 MA, p. 414.

250 HA, Vol. V, p. 163.

251 PIHRC, Vol. IV, p. 6.

252 PIHRC, Vol. IV, p. 7.

253 KK, p. 465.

254 HA, Vol. V, p. 164.

255 MA, pp. 416-17, PIHRC, Vol. IV, p. 9.

256 MA, p. 417, PIHRC, Vol. IV, p. 10, MM, p. 148.

257 MA, p. 419.

258 MA, pp. 420-21, PIHRC, Vol. IV, pp. 10-11.

CHAPTER III : PHASE III : SHIVAJI-II (1700-1707)

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PHASE IIISHIVAJI IIA. DEATH OF RAJARAM AND THE PROBLEMS

On 21st April 1700, the Marathas surrendered Satārā to the Mughals. Exactly fifty days earlier another calamity had befallen the Maratha Kingdom. It was indeed a terrible stroke of the providence. On 2nd March, 1700, Rājārām, the Maratha king bade farewell to this earthly kingdom for ever. He was at Singvadh when he was enveloped in a terrible fever, a disease from which he was never to recover. The ailment of fever was aggravated by vomiting of blood and before he could finally settle down the arrangements of his kingdom, the hand of providence separated him from his beloved country. The best years and the most creative days of his life, he sacrificed for the independence of Maharashtra. At the peril of his life and exposed to the utmost severity of disintegration he took upon himself to guide the destinies of four million people. With untiring efforts he worked to retard the Mughal invasion, he never cared for personal comforts and luxury. Over he wished to sacrifice himself to this

noble cause of 'Maharashtra Dharma' and no wonder if he had prayed for a martyr's death. Alas! The providence and fate were cruel enough in not granting his so cherished a prayer, though, by the hard toil of day and night for the protection of his people, the energy and life force were consumed like a slow burning candle, giving light and energy to its seekers. /

The unexpected blow of Rājārām's death was too severe for the Maratha people and leaders to bear silently. No doubt, by progressing years in the nation's life, the people and its popular leaders had experienced more severe and more cruel blows in the past. Every calamity that befell the nation, had brought in its train of sadness, some ray of hope and aspiration in the form of a new leader, in the past. After the death of Shivaji, with great vigour and confidence people looked upon Sambhaji, to guide the destiny of the nation. And befittingly he fulfilled their hopes, till his most cruel and forgetful death. After the death of Sambhaji, people rushed to Rājārām as their legitimate leader and a sheet-anchor of the state. And unmistakably he proved worthy of it. In his short but most memorable span of life he gave determined opposition to the Muslim invaders of Maharashtra, with the most indomitable courage. In the death of Sambhaji Aurangzeb had most wishfully thought that the opposition of the Marathas was crushed completely

As the cruel executioners were blowing the splinters of Sambhaji's body and soul. But with the rise of Rājārām, in a few days period he had to humbly accept the eddict of the Marathas who were capable of raising their head above the dust of humiliation. Indeed he thought that it was not an easy task for him to subdue the Marathas.

With the rise of Rājārām, begins the most glorious chapter of the Maratha War of Independence. But with his death this chapter was left incomplete. The nation was bereft of a king and an ardent fighter for freedom.

Immediately after his death came to the forefront the most burning question of succession to the throne.

The heirs apparent to the throne were two minor sons of Rājāshahī and Arābhī as son of Sambhaji was in Aurangzeb's captivity.

As both these women were ambitious and crafty by nature, each one wanted her own son to succeed. The situation was deteriorating day by day, as each of these widows started seeking support of the most prominent Maratha generals. Bāchandrāpant, the veteran and the champion of Maratha cause, under whose able leadership Marathas, successfully fought Aurangzeb during Rājārām's stay at Jinji was placed in a most delicate situation. The quarrel for the succession to the throne was bound

to create dissensions amongst the rank and file of the Marathas a matter which was to be most closely guarded as Surangzeb with his mighty army was in the very heart of Maharashtra. With his shrewdness, diplomacy, tact and the financial resources he would have certainly exploited the situation to his advantage. A thing which he could not attain after the most determined fight for 17 years in Maharashtra he would have been a master of it, by winning over one side or the other. In other words the very existence of the Maratha Kingdom was on the threshold of destruction. Shanaji Jadhav, Shanvaraji Warayankar and Parashuram Tristal, no doubt, were keeping the Mughal armies occupied elsewhere, yet it did not reduce the gravity of the situation. What was required was most tactful, diplomatic and cool handling of the situation.

And we find that Rāuchandrapant did use all his ability in bringing about a peaceful solution to the problem. Shivaji II, son of Tārābāi, was hardly four years old and Sambhaji II, son of Bājabai had not even completed two years of age. As both the contestants to the throne were minors, Rāuchandrapant, suggested to run the government in the name of Prince Shahu, who was in the prison of the Mughals. But this solution was not acceptable to any of the party, though, people in general and all the prominent sardars of the Maratha army welcomed



the move. The knotty problem remained unsolved. Meanwhile Tārābāi, won over Parashurān Irinabak and Shankarāji Kārāyan. This indirectly forced Nāchandrābant to give consent to crown Tārābāi's son. And in a way the quarrel for succession came to a peaceful end.

9. PREPARATION, OFFER OF RESOLVE  
KARATHA LEADERSHIP BY AURANGZEB  
(APRIL 1700 - APRIL 1707)

On 21st April, 1700 fort of Pātārā fell into the hands of the Mughals. On 22nd April, Aurangzeb entered the fort of Pātārā and appointed Matra Bāl Bāthod<sup>1</sup> quiledār of the fort.

The day Pātārā came into the Mughal possession, Aurangzeb ordered Fath-ullāh-bhan with his army to march towards Parali-padh and besiege the same without loss of any time.<sup>2</sup>

The fort of Parali is 6 miles away from Pātārā. It is bigger in size than Pātārā fort. Parashurān pant was appointed by Rājārān to look after the territory of Parali and Pātārā.

The heart-breaking news of the fall of Pātārā soon reached Parali. The Karatha quiledār was quick enough to grasp the situation and was well aware that, his was

the next target for the Mughal army. He had already made extensive preparations to defend the fort against possible attack.<sup>3</sup>

Iath-ullāh-khan reached Farali on 21st April and ran trenches directed towards the tower under which was a small door of the fort. The Mughal officers and men worked hard and conveyed all the siege material from Pātārā to Farali.

On 30th April, Aurangzeb himself arrived in the outskirts of Farali. He was accompanied by great Mughal generals like Ruhullāh Khan, Chin Gulich Khan and Prince Nazam and beside it there was the Mughal army, artillery, cavalry and innumerable followers.

Chin Gulich Khan and the other Mughal sardārs laid siege to the fort. Ingress and egress to the fort was closely watched. Ruhullāh Khan became air marshal. He ran trenches and carried the guns to an elevation near the fort. Everything appeared to bring speedy fall of the fort and indeed it was impossible for the Marathas to hold the fort against the innumerable Mughal army which was storming it.

But to the ill-luck of the Mughals, nature did not favour their plans. There suddenly appeared excessive and incessant rain. Due to it was the scarcity of grain

and fodder. And the misery of Dughal hardships became excessive, when, Sarathas in small divisions kept on attacking the Dughal lines of siege.<sup>4</sup> They stopped all the supply of food grain and forage going to the Dughal camp from the nearby villages. They did this job so well that the Dughal army was being destroyed by starvation.

Many men perished, yet it hardly created any effect on Aurangzeb, nor did it bring any change in his plan and design of war. He continued with it mercilessly.

Fath-ullāh Khan carried the trenches under a very broad and long sloping rock, which on one side fifteen yards high, was situated opposite the small door. Mounting of guns on this rock would have eventually been helpful in capturing the fort. In 4th June 1700,<sup>5</sup> a few ladders were placed on the side which was ten yards high and the soldiers were ordered to escalade it. The Khan (Fath-ullāh-Khan) mounted the rock by means of another ladder secretly planted, with a body of heroes, and brought under their swords the enemy in the plain which extended upto the small door of the fort, and afforded ground for horse-riding. The infidels unable to resist ran to the door and the Dughals arrived there speedily. As it was not the Khan's intention to enter the fort, he wished to mount the rock, station his men on it, and mounting a gun on it break the door. At this

time he himself went down to send up bundles of wood and straw to make a refuge for the soldiers. In the course of the fight, three or four *Surhals* and one *Banahia* entered the fort through the small door along with the infidels; others too wanted to do the same, when suddenly, a *Surhal* was shot down, and a *Banahia* losing his heart, fled away in such a way as to mingle himself with others who were already in flight. Seizing the opportunity the enemy closed the door, and began to fire muskets and threw *huccas* from the top of the wall, and set fire to the gunpowder which, in anticipation of such an incident had been hidden underground on the way leading to the fort. *Bagir-ullāh Khan*, grandson of *Fath-ullāh-Khan* and sixty or seventy others were killed, and many were wounded.<sup>6</sup>

Thus the effort of *Fath-ullāh-Khan* to take the **failed** fort with terrible loss to the *Mughals* both in manpower and prestige. Yet the biographers of *Aurangzeb*, maintain contrary to the factual conditions that, "This feat struck terror into the hearts of the infidels."<sup>7</sup> Anybody can guess as to what had happened.

*Aurangzeb* realizing the incapacity of his generals and army to take the fort by force, allowed prince *Azam* to carry the negotiations with the *Maratha* *qileddār*. Terms were made with the *qileddār* of *Varali*.

Thus on 10th June 1700 i.e., after fighting the

fort against all the opposition for a period of 50 days, Karathas handed over the fort to Aurangzeb for a large amount.<sup>8</sup> It was renamed as Jauras-tārā.

### C. TRAGIC MARCH OF MUGHAL ARMY

These two sieges had caused an enormous waste of men, horses and transport animals in the imperial army. The treasury was empty, the soldiers were starving as their pay was in arrears for three years. Heavy and unprecedented rain began to fall early in May and continued till the end of July. The army was eager to withdraw to a greater place of comfort and plenty. On 21st June, the return march towards Bhushanpuri commenced, but the sufferings of the miserable soldiers were only aggravated by the change.<sup>9</sup>

Though the march of Mughal army commenced on 21st June, yet there was hardly any transport animals available to convey the luggage. Most of them had perished or had become feverish. The Mughal sardars burnt a lot of equipment, as they were not able to carry it with them. After suffering great hardships the Mughal army arrived on the banks of the Prithvī river. The river was in full spate and it was impossible for the soldiers to cross it. Many men perished while crossing the river.<sup>10</sup> At last the army reached Ābitgachi on 25th July. After going

a short distance Aurangzeb arrived at Bhushangadn and encamped there.<sup>11</sup> It took 35 days for the Afghan army to traverse 45 miles distance! Here Aurangzeb halted for a month and the preparations were being made to replenish the equipment and food supplies to the army. As many soldiers had perished during the last campaign and the recent march, orders were now sent out to the subahdārs to send in new troops, fully equipped and fully paid.

Prince Azam was sent to Bhāndesh to re-equip and refresh his army,<sup>12</sup> and rest of the sardārs to their respective jāgirs or to the province of Bijāpur. Simultaneously orders were issued that, Bidār Bakht should proceed to Panhālā and lay siege to it. Immediately Sulfiqār Khan and Farbiyat Khan with the artillery were despatched to Panhālā.

Thus, after making adequate arrangements for the new campaign Aurangzeb left for Bhavāspur for taking some rest reached it on 30th August.<sup>13</sup> On 1st October while the men were fast asleep, a high flood caused by untimely rainfall came suddenly, sweeping through the river-bed. Many men and animals perished, many more including even the nobles, were left absolutely poor and naked, nearly all the tents and property were damaged."<sup>14</sup>

The Marathas quickly took the advantage of the

situation. On 10th August, Nanumantrao (Nimbalkar) plundered the thānā of Inatava and killed the Mughal thānedār, Rāmachand, the Berad chief, Pidiyā Nāyab levied chauth over the Bijapur district. The Marathas ravaged the country upto the tank of Nānapur outside Bijapur city. Rānoji, Ghorpade, a Maratha commander, killed the Mughal thānedār of Rāyewādi and looted the outpost as well as the town of Indl.<sup>15</sup>

Meanwhile, Aurangzeb issued orders to the governors of North India "to enlist strong men and buy good horses and to send them to the Deccan, two thousand horses were brought in Fabul and 2000 mares locally."<sup>16</sup>

In 10th December, Aurangzeb left for Miraj. On 1st January, 1701 he encamped at Miraj. Here, Muklis Khan Bakshi passed away. The new recruits and new material for fighting the war were received.<sup>17</sup>

## 7. PANHĀLĀ - AGAIN

Fifty thousand army and thirty thousand cavalry headed by Bidār Bakht had already arrived near Panhālā. Gulfiqār Khan and Tarbiyat Khan were also there with their full artillery support. Gulfiqār Khan had besieged its western (Honkani) gate. Aurangzeb in person arrived at Panhālā on 9th March 1701. The total area covered by the Mughal army by way of siege was 14 miles and it also

covered Pāvangadh, a fort near Pannālā. Sulfiqār Khan was given special assignment of chasing the Maratha division wherever they appeared. Farbiyat Khan dug the trenches and guns were fired at the fort. In a short time five towers of the fort were demolished to more than half their height. Farbiyat Khan laid a mine, large enough for three men to walk abreast erect, which was gradually carried under the tower and outer breast-work of the fort-gate. It was a most elaborate structure in which twenty artillery men could sit. He stationed his artillery men there. From there, they would fire incessantly so that the Marathas could never look down the fort. They were also adequately protected against the<sup>19</sup> musket shots of the defenders.

The Mughal army wanted to complete the capture of Pannālā before the dreaded rainy season. But, as the region was hilly and stony, the work of laying mines consumed more time and inspite of the best efforts, the rainy season approached fast. In addition to it the two great generals, Farbiyat Khan and Sulfiqār Khan, never liked each one stealing march over the other. Thus the mutual co-operation became a matter of imagination only.

Fath-ullāh-Khan who had returned, was ordered to lay mines. He also, Muḥammad Murād Khan, who was a small officer in Gujaraṭ, was assigned the task of con-



pleting the siege work. This actually brought the mutual jealousy among all these officers to limelight and ultimately the siege did not make any progress.<sup>20</sup>

Fath-ullāh-Khan was ordered to lay mines from Pām Bakhsh's position. Working incessantly in rivalry with Farbiyat Khan, he carried his mine to the foot of the gate in one month. So also Farbiyat Khan on his part pushed his covered lane further to the fort. As they were jealous of each others, "they secretly thwarted each other and thus spoiled their master's business and prolonged the siege."<sup>21</sup> Muḥammad Murād Khan was given charge of the attack on Pāvānādh. Similarly Khān Janān, son of Hājī Muḥammad was sent to Pām bakhsh's army.<sup>22</sup>

Karathas did well. Both within the fort and outside the garrison showed commendable strength and courage in fighting the besieging Mughal army, and outside Karatha divisions under Khanāji and Kāchhandrapant harried the enemy countrywide. On 23rd January, Khanāji Jādhav appeared near Mughal camp and a fierce battle raged all the day. Many men perished and the battle engaged all the Mughal forces in the surrounding area. The Mughals entrenched at night. Two days later, Khanāji Jādhav, retreated 4 miles from the present post as the news of Sulfiqār Khan, having started with huge army reached the Karathas. Sulfiqār Khan was reinforced by Ḥaid-ud-din

engage a landless person either a tenant or a wage labourer. Accordingly during this period Nepal's political and economic system might be described as an agrarian bureaucracy that depended upon a central authority for extracting the economic surplus from the peasantry. The state granted a large areas of land to the political elites and the bureaucracy (land owning elites) who derived their political and economic rights and authority from the state. So they enabled to dominate the peasantry during the whole Rana period.<sup>25</sup> It added that they had the right to share in the produce of the land, the right to appropriate the proceeds of miscellaneous taxes and levies collected from the inhabitants of the lands and villages granted to them, the right to exact unpaid labour on a compulsory basis from those inhabitants, and the right to dispense justice within the prescribed limits.<sup>26</sup> During the whole Rana period they enjoyed maximum right to take a part of the peasants' produce in the forms of rents, but they never provide any return services to the peasant.

The landowning elites did not stay in the villages where their lands were. They had to collect the agricultural rent from their lands so they needed the services of the person who permanently settled in the village. For the collection of agricultural rent they gave the power to the villages headmen and other local revenue collection functionaries. They collected rent on the behalf of the landowning elites.

Shan's army exhausted was chasing the Maratha army whose movements were as fast as lightening. The Mughal army suffered heavy losses both in manpower and transport animals. On 20th April, news was spread in the Mughal camp that Rānaji Chorpade was heading towards the camp with twenty thousand strong men. During this period his brother Bahiraji was captured by the Mughals. Rānaji moved towards Sinhgad with a very small force and from thence he despatched a Maratha division 15,000 strong under Mādo Malhār to ravage the territory in the Mughal possession. <sup>26</sup>

By now the Mughals had completed their siege work. Farbiyat Khan posted his guns at the appropriate places of attack, and Fath-ullāh Khan laid his mines under the fort. But the Mughal army was not prepared to assault the fort. The Mughal soldiers had not forgotten the devastation caused by blowing up mines at Sātāra; their morale was at the lowest ebb. Their lines had become thin because of huge losses in the siege of Sātāra and Karali. Added to it, the Maratha gilesār Trimbak of Panhālā constantly fired guns and rockets and showered stones on the besieging army. The losses inflicted on the Mughal army were quite heavy.

Thus the siege of Panhālā continued over a long period without any success to the Mughals. Realising this, Mughal generals were permitted to open secret talks if the

fort could be vacated by bribe. Through Darbiyat Khan secret negotiations were opened.<sup>27</sup> A large sum was paid to the Maratha qāledar and he delivered the two forts on 28th May. Thus the Mughals gained the fort after suffering huge losses in manpower,<sup>28</sup> material and finally emptying their treasury.

On 28th May 1701, the Mughal flag was hoisted for the second time on the fort of Panhālā. On 29th May, winding up his campaign of Panhālā Aurangzeb started for Thatāva for repose. Path-ullāh Khan was created a Bahādur for extra-ordinary gallantry and bravery shown at the time of siege of Panhālā. He was ordered to proceed with his men in advance and capture the forts of Vardhan, Māndgir, Chandan and Vandan.

With long marches and great speed he arrived at the fort of Vardhan gadh. He launched attacks on all the four forts, ravaged the country, killed men and carried away the transport animals. The Maratha garrison survived the first impact of heavy Mughal fire, but as large army of the Mughals was approaching there, the garrison asked for terms of capitulations. On 6th June, the fort was vacated by the Marathas.<sup>29</sup> The fort was renamed Sādiqgadh.

On 23rd June Aurangzeb moved 1 mile away from Thatāva. From here, Path-ullāh Khan together with a large army under the command of Baharāmāz Khan was sent to conquer Māndgir.

In a short period of twelve days, the Maratha garrison surrendered the fort. The fort was renamed Nāngir.<sup>30</sup>

From here the Mughal army marched towards the fort of Chandan. The fort was besieged and in a short period the garrison surrendered the fort. From thence, the Mughal army laid siege to Vandan. It was considered to be a first rate fort. Though for some time the Maratha garrison fought, yet it was not possible for it to continue the fight. The fort was surrendered on 8th August 1701.<sup>31</sup> Thus in a short period of 3 months Aurangzeb conquered four forts from the Marathas.

#### B. CAMPAIGN OF VILALGAD OR KHOLSA

Though Aurangzeb was capturing the forts of the Marathas, yet neither their strength nor their resistance was reduced in any way by the Mughal sword. In December 1701 they were active near Karād. Muḥammad Amin Khan was ordered to chastise them. However before he could land up at Karād the Maratha force was active near Malkāpur. Immediately he was asked to go to Malkāpur. The Marathas ravaged that territory and carried away a cattle etc. But the Mughal officer gave them a battle at Bāsegāon near Karād. This hardly reduced the strength of the Marathas. This type of warfare became a common feature during the forthcoming sieges of Aurangzeb.<sup>32</sup>

After the fall of four forts in a matter of four months, Aurangzeb decided to capture one of the most closely guarded and most difficult fort of the Marathas i.e., Vishālgadh or Khelnā.

Khelnā is a hill fort. It is located in the Sahyādrī range, about forty miles north-west of Kolhapur. Its height is 3345 feet, length 3200 ft., breadth 1040 ft. It is on the crest of Sahyādrī hills. The district is wet and cool, and the hills were thickly covered with dense forest in the 17th century. The fort stands on an isolated spur jutting into Konkan and is joined to the Sahyādrī range by a narrow neck of land. The easiest way of reaching it is by Ambā Ghat, 7 miles north of it and some 35 miles from Kolhapur.<sup>33</sup> The fort has got main gate on the eastern side and near the gate there was a tower and a gutter. Similarly on the western side there is another gate facing directly Konkan. A passage from there leads to Tākharpā in Talikonkan. Next to this gate was a tower and a gutter, by the side of the fort wall was rawani (a space between the fort wall and the ditch) of the fort. There was also a hidden passage kept for emergency use.

On 7th November, 1701, the Mughal army brought down their tents at Vardhan gadh (Sadiqgadh) in order to march towards Khelnā. The huge monstrous Mughal army, cavalry and equally large artillery of the Mughal under the most prominent leaders started rolling in the direction of

Malkāpur, as the road to Srelnā passes through Malkāpur. The Mughal army rested at Malkāpur for a week.

At Malkāpur, Santāji Pindhare attacked the Mughal outpost and destroyed it.<sup>34</sup> This created a lot of terror in freely advancing Mughal army. The Marathas had become aware of the impending danger. The efforts were being made to protect the fort and defeat Aurangzeb. Their resolve is seen when Tārābāi wrote to Pratāprāo More that "Aurangzeb is trying his best to capture Vishālgaḍh. You should try and capture his family, recover equipment and always attack his camp, then he will be surrounded by the difficulties. On many occasions you with other Maratha sardars have given him fight, similarly you must unite and chase Aurangzeb - You are Chatrapati's most loyal servant. Now you have to fight the chief enemy. Aurangzeb has been more troubled with this (news) and a great task has been accomplished. At present the Chatrapati is at Pratāpgaḍh. On such difficult occasions the Chatrapati should have powerful army. The enemy, Aurangzeb is a treacherous one. It cannot be predicted as to how he will act on each occasion. Therefore, if you are with the strong army, he dare not make any moves. On such occasions the chief reliance is on people like you.... therefore after understanding the importance you should come over here with the army and harry Aurangzeb by capturing his family and the equipment. You should act in such a way

that Aurangzeb gives up, thought about Vishālgadh....You must remain at close quarters and be available at all time....."<sup>35</sup>

Thus the Marathas were preparing themselves for the inevitable. They had the rock like determination, and the same spirit is very distinctly indicated in the contemporary documents, from time to time. They do not show in the least, any worry about the loss of a few forts, on the contrary they were uniting their lives with more courage.

At Malkāpur Aurangzeb appointed Asad-ullāh-Khan, Fath-ullāh Khan, Jamid-ud-din Khan, Sunīz Khan, Iqbal Khan, Rājā Jaisingh to conduct the campaign of Vishālgadh. Bidār Bakht who was in Gokax-nukeri region joined Aurangzeb. On his way he ravaged and burnt the villages.<sup>36</sup>

For Aurangzeb's army to reach Vishālgadh, the road was through Ambā pass. Eight miles from Malkāpur begins the head of Ambā pass. These eight miles leading to the defile were very difficult ground. The passage was narrow and restricted to such an extent that barely a man could walk erect, there was no question of columns passing abreast or artillery rolling down with its heavy equipment.

Fath-ullāh Khan was appointed to make a road wide enough to pass the Mughal cavalry and artillery. But this was a great and formidable task. Added to it were the off



season excessive rainfall and terrible slush. In all paths of this hilly region there are impenetrable forests and dense thorny jungles through which the sun cannot peep. Lofty and stout trees abound on all sides. The branches were so intertwined that even an ant could hardly pass through them. The track was difficult for footmen. The defiles and pits were deep, the rocks firmly rooted in the soil."<sup>37</sup>

On 6th December 1701, the Mughal army encamped at 7 miles away from Vishnalgach. "When Path-ullāh Khan was clearing the barriers the Marathas troops often attacked the Mughals, taking shelter of the thick jungles and dense bushes there. Path-ullāh Khan had to make a counter-attack."<sup>38</sup> Thus the progress of work was not much, though Ishāfi Khan maintains to contrary. From the Maratha side orders were issued to Yeshwantrao and Chāndaji Māndekar to protect the Ambā pass. They were made in charge of it, and were asked to post fifty to sixty men for continuous vigilance of the pass. In addition to it they were also asked to keep men at Tiryāhat in order to guard the entry of Mughals through it."<sup>39</sup>

In spite of best efforts on the part of Marathas to unnerve the Mughal army, it crossed the Ambā pass. On 26th December, Asad Khan was ordered to lay the siege. His vanguard under Asad-ud-din Khan, Munim Khan and Path-

ullāh Khan captured the defile before dawn. A small hill, which was close to theinā was under Maratha possession. The Marathas had strengthened the tower walls of it. The Marathas used to attack the Mughal posts. About four to five thousand Maratha had collected near the entrance of the pass. They fired incessantly the bullets and the stones by taking shelter of the bushes -- Many Mughals were killed." 40

But Path-ullāh Khan himself went to the right side of the hill and charged it and drove away the Marathas from the top. In their attempt to escape to theinā they fell into a Mughal ambuscade. Many of them were killed by the Mughals. Next day they captured one more hillock, from where they could fire the shots into the fort.

Thus the Mughal army reached one mile away from the fort. On 16th January Aurangzeb himself arrived in person to conduct the campaign. Ullāh Khan has given a very vivid picture of the 'seven mile march of the Mughal army. He writes "The imperial army suffered a lot during the journey of these seven miles. Many thousand men and equally large number of transport animals died while crossing the pass..... The Marathas used to attack from all sides, kill many and strip them off their weapons.... Almost half the equipment was lost and equal was loss of life. It was not possible to carry the equipment. Secondly the attacks of the enemy (the Marathas) were incessant." 41

Immediately after reaching in the environs of Shelnā, Aurangzeb ordered prince Bidār Bakht to proceed towards Panhālā, in order to guard that fort against a possible attack of the Marathas and also keep open the supply line to Shelnā, which was frequently cut down by the Marathas. Muhammad Amin Khan was ordered to descend into lowlands of Konkan by way of Ambā pass. He was also made responsible for adequate provisioning to the besieging army. He ravaged the country, burnt many houses and killed many men. And similar feat of ravaging the countryside and killing men was performed by Farbiyat Khan.<sup>42</sup>

Marathas strongly resisted the Mughal army commander's activities in Konkan, particularly Chandoji Karajkar<sup>43</sup> and Chondo Bhaskar Meshulkarni,<sup>44</sup> both these Maratha sardars against most possible odds brought help to the besieged Marathas, burnt the Mughal posts and rehabilitated the country.

The Maratha activities outside the fort were strengthened under Chhanāji Jādhav and many other Maratha sardars. Their main aim of the fight was not to allow the total concentration of the Mughal forces outside the fort. For achieving this effect they had to make attacks on the siege, and supply lines of the Mughals. This tactics had desired effect and Aurangzeb had to send a large army under Sulfiqār Khan to drive away the mobile Maratha divisions.

and also another army under Asad Khan to protect the imperial camp at Islāmpuri.

Mulfiqār Khan chased the Maratha force towards Parenda. The Marathas never gave any open fight. There were many skirmishes near Chārtān between these two forces. Marathas fought valiantly. From thence the Mughal general in pursuit of the Maratha forces entered Berar. In this territory the Maratha leaders joined hands with the local chieftains and raised a force of 60,000 men. Mulfiqār Khan sought the help of Mughal Subhādār Ali Qardān Khan who was at Blichpur, who gave some help but very reluctantly, as he was afraid that he would be defeated.

From Blichpur, Mulfiqār Khan pursued the Maratha armies in Māded territory. The faujdār of Māded was Khudābandā Khan. He was so terrorstruck with the activities of the Marathas that he showed great reluctance in joining the Mughal general. There was a general fear that he might be defeated. With a meagre force of 2,500 men, Mulfiqār Khan advanced towards Nailāspad in Hyderabad Subha. The Maratha roving force constantly attacked the chasing Mughal army and killed many soldiers. The condition of Pān Singh Pādā, who was at the rear guard of the army became precarious. Many skirmishes took place and both the parties suffered the casualties.

After some days, a major fighting took place on the

banks of the river Bāngangā. Many were killed and many injured. The whole day the fighting took place. At last with the fall of night the fighting ceased. The Marathas, in accordance with their usual tactics of fighting, disappeared from there over night. From thence Mulfiqār Khan moved to Maloni in anticipation of Maratha force. Shortly he came back to Mānded.

Thus in a period of six months, Mulfiqār Khan with his two lieutenants Pām Singh and Māi Dalpat, fought nineteen small and big battles and traversed the country over six thousand miles.<sup>15</sup>

As a result of this diversion caused by the Marathas into the Mughal army, Aurangzeb had to pay heavily both in manpower, transport animals and war equipment. In the words of Bhimsen, "This year much forced marching was done. All the troops became worn out and distracted in mind.... The enemy were kept in rapid movements for eight successive months.... The horses of the imperialists were so worn out as to be unable to walk and many of our troopers had to march on foot..... The elephants became lame and weak.... I too lost my horses and camels."<sup>16</sup>

During these months siege of Khelna was being made more and more effective. Aurangzeb had deployed his troops in five different places surrounding Khelna.

(1) Asad Khan with the imperial army under the direct command of Aurangzeb was posted to south-east of the fort near Gaḡāpur. Tarbiyat Khan the artillery commander was asked to assist Asad Khan and was positioned near him. (2) Next to Asad Khan was Faṭh-ullah Khan opposite the main gate or the eastern gate of the fort. He was to keep watch on the entire valley to the north of the fort. (3) Next to Faṭh-ullah Khan's siege line were the troops of Muḥammad Amin Khan, towards the north-west of the fort near a hillock called Kātar Khelna. His troops appear to have crossed this place from Ambā ghat by crossing the valley and high hill of Māchāl, as the hill of Kātar Khelnā is next to Māchāl. He was assisted by one thousand troops commanded by Sidi Yāqūt Khan, sent by Sidi Asher. (4) Next to Muḥammad Amin Khan was the army of Raja Jay Singh under the command of his minister Budh Singh. He had positioned his troops to the west of the fort opposite Konkani gate, from where there was a direct road to Falkonkan and Sākharpā. (5) To the South-west of the fort was the camp of prince Bidār Bakht. His soldiers were supposed to guard the southern side of the fort in the direction of Prabhāvali, a hilly region infested with dense jungles. Bidār Bakht was appointed overall commander of the siege.

Out of these five siege lines, information about the siege line of Asad Khan is not available.

It is interesting to know the happenings at these different camps during the period of the siege.

#### Siege line of Fatahullah Khan

Fatahullah Khan planted the guns and boldly carried the covered lane up to the ditch situated before the wall of the fort. Marathas fired continuously on the Mughal soldiers who were employed on this work. The casualties were quite heavy and Fath-ullah Khan had to induce labour for ordinary work by paying gold muhars.<sup>47</sup> But the Mughal general persisted in his work inspite of heavy losses and high cost of labour. "The lives of friends and foes alike were not worth purchasing at half a grain of barley."<sup>48</sup> Such was the condition of the besieging Mughal army. Inspite of the best Mughal efforts, the Marathas destroyed ladders which had been raised from the midst of the pit to the level ground under the fort gate. But Fath-ullah Khan made more ladders and rafts and reached the waist of the tower and could advance no further. Inspite of a severe bombardment by the guns Sher-dahān and Karak-bijlī, which could split hills, only a few stones were loosened from the tower.<sup>49</sup>

On 26th March Fath-ullah Khan erected a raft in front of the fort. 8 persons in the siege line were

wounded. Next day one more raft was erected. The Marathas fired bullets and threw stones continuously on the siege line. As a result of it, the siege work had to be abandoned. Three days later, he then raised a parapet wall in front of the gutter of the fort. On 1st April, there was heavy shower of stones and bullets from the fort. His three men were wounded. On 2nd April he erected one more raft. His six men were wounded. On 3rd April, the Marathas from within the fort threw packs of grass ablaze on the siege line. They also constantly fired guns and threw stones on Fath-ullah Khan's men. As a result of this one person was killed and ten were wounded. On 6th April the Marathas fired gunshots at the siege line. Ruqullah Khan and Hamid-ud-din Khan arrived in the siege line, probably to find out the progress of Fath-ullah Khan. Next day, after having consultations with Fath-ullah Khan, they returned to Aurangzeb. But by 12th April Hamid-ud-din Khan returned to the siege line. The Marathas intensified their stone throwing and let ablaze the siege line. Fath-ullah Khan employed men to put off fire by water. The same operation continued for next two or three days. Five men from the siege line were wounded. Thus his siege was progressing from bad to worse. On 16th April Sidi Amber and Hamid-ud-din Khan arrived at the siege line. Two persons in the siege line were wounded.



The Marathas put up a gallant opposition. They continuously fired matwalas weighing hundred maunds and 200 hundred maunds. They made night attacks and destroyed lot of siege work of the Mughals and killed many. On 23rd April Fath-ullah Khan himself was struck down by a stone thrown by the Marathas. The hit was so severe that he was thrown deep into the valley and was sick in the bed for about 3 weeks.<sup>50</sup>

By about 16th May, it seems he recovered well and again fired gun at the tower of the fort. As a result of it part of the tower was destroyed. He was confident of destroying the tower in ten, fifteen days. But nothing seems to have happened. After this date there was no noticeable activity from his siege line. It may be probably due to the peace talks opened by prince Bidār Bakht.

#### Siege line of Muhammad Amin Khan

Muhammad Amin Khan crossed the hill of Māchāl and camped near Kātar Khelnā towards the western side of the fort and in the Talkonkan region. Along with him were 1000 men commanded by Sidi Yāqut Khan sent by Sidi Amber.

On 16th February 1702, his army crossed 10 to 12 yards distance of the perimeter wall of Kātar Khelnā. On 14th March Sidi Yāqut Khan was warned to remain alert

lest Parshurāmpant, the Maratha commander may run away. On 14th March Muhammad Amin Khan occupied accompanied by Jamshid Khan, Māmūr Khan and many other soldiers gave a battle to the Marathas on Kātar Khelnā. Many men of the Marathas were killed and wounded. Though the Marathas put up a brave resistance, yet the Mughals captured the old and new wall of the Kātar Khelnā. He established a post and alighted army and bazar over there. During this fight, he lost a few men in killed and nearly 100 in wounded.<sup>51</sup> After this date, there does not appear to have taken place any prominent activity in his siege line. This may be probably due to his sickness also.

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#### Siege line of Rājā Jai Singh

The siege commander was Budh Singh, the minister of Rājā Jai Singh. His troops were positioned in front of Konkani gate. On 16th February Budh Singh complained that the stock of gun powder was less in his siege line. The Marathas were firing bullets and throwing stones continuously. The Marathas were preparing a hidden lane as an emergency measure in order to stop unwarranted march of the Mughals. On 1st March Rājā Jai Singh and Budh Singh inspected the siege line. The Marathas fired at them. Budh Singh gave a fight and established 3 posts outside the fort. About six Rajput soldiers were wounded. Next

day again Budh Singh attacked a post of the Marathas. The Marathas fought bravely. In the meantime, he sent Bhitī Singh along with 50 cavalrymen and 20 infantrymen in the valley, in order to stop the approach of the Marathas through the valley. There was an exchange of fire. About 10 Rajput soldiers were wounded and one died.

On the night of 8th March Budh Singh advanced the siege line by 50 yards and established a post. Marathas injured two men from the siege. On 10th March the Marathas threw stones from the fort. Barkhat Singh was killed. Next day Tegh Singh, a servant of Rājā Jai Singh also lost his life.

By middle of March Rājā Jai Singh having had the wind of the situation, got in touch with Parashurāmpant, the Maratha commander. On 21st March an exchange of letters through the spies took place. This might have been done probably in order to get the fort by a bargain. On 24th March at night, he advanced by ten yards. Again on 27th March Budh Singh advanced by another 12 yards. He erected 5 rafts. Three men were injured due to stone-hit and bullets. The progress of the siege stopped as a big black stone appeared in front of the gutter of the fort. It seems that the Rajputs took about 20 days to remove the obstacle. Even then the progress was considerably slow,

due to stiff resistance of the Marathas. On 16th April Budh Singh erected another 3 rafts. But by about 24th April, the Marathas destroyed 21 rafts, wounded twenty men and fired guns from the fort. Again there was a period of lull in the siege line. Probably because prince Bidār Bakht was negotiating talks with the commander. On 16th May, Budh Singh vehemently resisted any negotiations with the Marathas, as the Marathas had killed a large number of men of Rājā Jai Singh. And therefore he preferred a battle to the last. But as is evident from the events that his say did not prevail and prince Bidār Bakht actively negotiated the talks with Parashurāmpant. After this date, there was no noticeable activity in the siege line.

#### Siege Line of Prince Bidār Bakht

On 4th March Bidār Bakht was recalled from Panhālā and was ordered to lay siege to south west side of the fort. His siege line was next to Rājā Jai Singh. Rājā Jai Singh's troops were to assist him.<sup>53</sup> On 9th March Bidār Bakht along with Rājā Jai Singh and Janshid Khan inspected the siege line of Rājā Jai Singh. On 11th March the gun Nasserī was conveyed to his siege line. On 15th March, the three persons sent by Sarwar Khan went inside the fort. This may be probably to illicit the information

about the fort. On 17th March a spy called Prabhā was sent to the fort in order to collect the intelligence of the enemy. He went inside the fort along with some brāhmīns and stayed inside the fort for 15 days. He, therefore, must have had a real piercing look at the affairs of the fort and therefore his report should be regarded as based on factual information. Indeed he revealed many startling things. He declared "Parashurāmpant (often called Parsa shaqi in the documents) was inside the fort. He had just received the information about the death of his father. Therefore he had shaved off his head and beard. The stock of gunpowder was very less in the fort. He gathered the information that there were two secret hilly passages to the fort, one running from the siege line of Fath-ullah Khan and the other towards Prabhāvali. But the Mughals were ignorant about them.

The Marathas had 1000 cavalrymen always in readiness and another force consisting of 1500 was kept in reserve in order to meet any eventuality. Parashurāmpant himself led them. He was quite aware about the intentions of Aurangzeb to uproot this force, as this was the force which caused him a lot of trouble everywhere.

The Marathas inside the fort were expecting help from Shanāji Jādhav, who was expected to arrive there. Simi-

larly, Rānoji Ghorpade with his infantry was also expected to alight there. Parshurāmpant was ordered by Shivaji II not to give up the defence and give a determined fight."

The above information reported by a Mughal spy sufficiently speaks about the Maratha will, determination and readiness to fight the Mughals. There cannot be a better contemporary evidence than this which would truly speak about the Maratha war of Independence. Parshurāmpant was adequately equipped with arms and ammunition by Bas Prabhu Desai of Mukeri.<sup>34</sup> For this precious help he was rewarded with Sardeshgukhi of Mukeri.

Simultaneously, Bidār Bakht was exploiting the grounds for bargaining the fort. On 17th March he sent one Brāhmin and ten spies inside the fort. On their return they conveyed him that Parshurāmpant was willing to hand over the fort provided an amount of three lakhs of rupees in cash and a mansab for his son, instead of a mansab to himself were given. These men were sent to Sarafrāz Khan. The Mughals took ten days probably to agree to the terms of the commander. As we find that on 28th March the same party along with Sarafrāz Khan's servant went inside the fort at night by way of the siege line of Rājā Jai Singh. At this time a prominent Maratha named Harvant (Harimant) gumāstā of Sardeshmukh of Muzffarābād and zamindar of Rājāpur appeared on the scene of negotiating

the talks. In the month of March he frequently visited the fort. It appears that both the Marathas and the Mughals trusted him equally.

Though the talks were opened by the Mughals, yet the Maratha commander was still persisting in the defence efforts. On 11th April Rāmchandrāpant asked Dhanāji Jādhav to hasten for the help of the besieged.

On 4th April Sarafrāz Khan conveyed to Bidār Bakht that Parashurāmpant agreed to hand over the fort. He intended to send his vakils to Bidār Bakht for acceptance of his demands. Though the negotiations were in progress, yet Bidār Bakht did not remain idle. During this period he warned Sarafrāz Khan about the fast approaching rainy season and the calamities that would follow the rainfall. Therefore he was speeding up to finalise the talks. He sent Hanvant to the fort for bringing Parashurāmpant's vakils. On 11th April Shankrā and Gopāl, the two vakils accompanied by Hanumant came to the siege line of Rājā Jai Singh. They stayed with Hanumant. On the same day a certain Rāmā Pandit was sent to the fort. On 10th April Bidār Bakht called Suhullah Khan and Sarafrāz Khan for secret talks. On 17th April Nāroji Ghorpade with 5000 cavalrymen was active in Mūdhā, a place 5 miles away from Panhālā fort. Anup Singh, brother of Rāwat Mal Dildār of Panhālā and Khan Alam with the imperial men hastened

to chastise them. Khwājā Khan was sent to assist him. As a result of this and possible diversion of Maratha commander towards Khelnā, on 18th April, Rāwat Mal sent his men to the siege line of the prince in order to protect the noncombatants. Bidār Bakht inspected the siege line. On 24th April he inspected the arrangements of the gunners and warned Jamshid Khan and Māmūr Khan to keep planks, arrows and bows ready for action. It appears from the preparations of Bidār Bakht that he did not trust the Marathas much. The next day, a small force of the Marathas consisting of about 50-60 men arrived near the siege line. Budh Singh hastened to give fight. Two men of Rājā Jai Singh were wounded.

In the meantime, the vakils of Parshurāmpant were asked to see Sarafrāz Khan with regard to the demands of their master. But by and large, nothing substantial appears to have taken place. Not only that but Bidār Bakht started getting doubts about the whole affair.

On 26th April he called Hanmant and said "They are not handing over the fort. I will incur the wrath of the Emperor." Hanumant replied "I am helpless. I have no army along with me. Their demands must be accepted." He said "Very well, I will find out their weakness ....goaway. I will see how long the fort will remain like this." From it appears that the terms of Parshurāmpant were very stiff.



In a letter to Aurangzeb he put two conditions firstly that after the fort was handed over, Aurangzeb should not attempt to capture any other fort under the Marathas, but he should retire from there. Secondly, a written assurance was to be accorded to him that no injury would be caused to the garrison.<sup>55</sup> Earlier he had already made a demand of three lakhs of rupees in cash.

About the same time, Bidār Bakht received a letter from Parashurāmpant. Here again he clearly stated "The Emperor is opposing (us) and if for certain he is going to kill us, then why should we not go for a worthless battle. Finally without the acceptance of the demands, the broth is in the pot. On account of this I wish to die in the battle. But if he pays attention and accepts the demands the fort is ready (for handing over). And if he is opposing and not accepting the demands then I will fight to the best of my capabilities." This sufficiently indicates the superiority of the Marathas and that Parshurāmpant was in a position to dictate his terms. The letter was sent to Asad Khan, probably for the concurrence of Aurangzeb.

On 27th April Bidār Bakht sent a reply to it. On 1st May he viewed the siege line from Katār Khelnā and ordered Ruhullah Khan to warn the men to capture the rewani of the fort. Immediately Janshid Khan, Mānsur Khan, Ituād Khan

Rājā Jai Singh and others were called by him and were asked to remain in readiness for an attack. In the afternoon the men of Jai Singh placed the ladders on the wall of the rewani. A small skirmish with the defenders took place but his men captured the rewani. Later on the other Mughal soldiers joined him. Marathas lost about 70 men, and two to three hundred were injured. Many men of the Rājā Jai Singh and an equal number of men from Bidār Bakht's army were also killed and wounded. The Mughals planted their flag as a mark of victory on the rewani of the fort. Thus so far and no more was the progress of the Mughal forces. At the western gate of the fort Parshurāmpant himself with a strong force of two thousand men stood in readiness to meet the Mughals.

On 9th May Daulat Khan while he was carrying the ladders was killed by stone-hit. In the afternoon Bidār Bakht along with Muḥullāh Khan, Rājā Jai Singh and Khan-i-Ālan inspected the siege line. The Marathas poured fire; as a result of it one raft was burnt.

On 11th May a battle took place near the rewani of the fort. The Marathas resisted firmly. They fired musket shots, arrows and threw stones. Parshurāmpant personally supervised the operation. The Mughals destroyed the hidden lane prepared by the Marathas near the rewani. About two to three hundred Mughal soldiers were wounded

and most of them died. Still Bidār Bakht pressed his men to capture the fort soon. On 12th May he ordered the artillery men to batter the gate of the fort. As a result of it, a small part of the fort wall near the gate was damaged. But there was no further progress, neither the fort wall could be broken nor the determination of the Marathas to resist could be shattered.

However, the secret talks with the Maratha commander were in progress. On 13th May Timā a zamindar of Rājāpur and Rāyāji Kulkarni of Sakharpā were selected to conduct the negotiations. They came to the fort. On the same day Hanvant returned to Bidār Bakht and informed him about the demands of the commander. On 15th May Hanvant and Rāyāji met Bidār Bakht twice, probably to take a final word from him for the commander as they were going to the fort.

On 16th May Parshurāmpant was threatened by Bidār Bakht and the message was duly conveyed through Hanvant and Rāyāji. But the Maratha commander did not care for such threats, as he knew well that it was beyond the capacity of the Mughals to capture that fort or kill him. As we see that on the same day Hanvant returned to Bidār Bakht empty handed.

Thus till this date the negotiations appeared to have been in doldrums. On 21st May Bidār Bakht inspected the siege line. On 25th May he enquired about the progress

of the talks with Parshurāmpant. Timā sent a letter to him in the fort. Govind, Shankrā and three other persons came to Timā from the fort, probably with a message from Parshurāmpant. As a result of it on 26th May, Shakur Khan and Budh Singh informed Timā that Aurangzeb has spared the life of Parshurāmpant and has accepted the demands. In the absence of Ruhullah Khan who used to convey all these talks to Aurangzeb, Shakur Khan directed Timā to see Fasāil Khan. He was asked to carry the flag of Bidār Bakht to the fort. But he replied that Parashurāmpant had directed him to conduct the affair through Ruhullah Khan and not through Fasāil Khan. However, Ruhullah Khan arrived there the next day. He had brought with him a copy of the farman of Aurangzeb, sparing the life of Parshurāmpant and granting his demands.

Thus finally Aurangzeb conceded to the demands of the Marathas in order to get the fort. He also gave a sum of two lakhs of rupees to the Qiledār.<sup>56</sup> Mir Atā ullah accompanied by Govind and Hanvant, with a copy of farman went to the fort. Ghansām rao, an imperial mansab-dār accompanied them in order to identify Parshurāmpant.

On 2nd June Shankrā and Govind went inside the fort. On 3rd June, Parshurāmpant was asked to plant the flag of Bidār Bakht on the fort. He sent back a reply that he would do so on coming Thursday i.e. 4th June.

On 4th June, Budh Singh along with armed Pajpute sat in front of the western gate of the fort. The flags of Bidār Bakht and Ruhullāh Khan and Rājā Jai Singh were sent inside the fort. Parshurāmpant demanded that only un-armed persons should enter the fort. Bidār Bakht kept a careful watch outside the fort and did not allow any Maratha to go out. On 5th June it was reported to Bidār Bakht that Parshurāmpant planted the Mughal flag on the fort. Mansur Khan carried the flag of Bidār Bakht inside the fort. It was planted on the tower towards the siege line of Fath-ullah Khan.

On 5th June Bidār Bakht received a message from Shaikh Abdus Salām who had gone inside the fort saying 'Parsā had called me in the morning and said I along with my men and material are ready to go out of the fort. I have no work. You should convey this to the prince.' Then I asked him by which way you would go out. He replied "I would go out by Konkani gate towards Prabhāvali or any other way as I would like."

It appears that he did not vacate the fort on 5th June. On 6th June we learn through the report of the spies that road towards Konkani gate was being repaired for the garrison to go out. And on the same date in the morning Parshurāmpant went out by way of wicket gate of the fort along with forty men. He left towards Prabhāvali.<sup>57</sup>

Thus after an incessant struggle of about six months (26th December 1701 - 6th June 1702) and after suffering innumerable hardships, having lost six thousand mansabdars, spending colossal amount on siege lines and finally emptying the treasury by paying Rupees two lakhs to the Maratha commander Aurangzeb could lay his hands over the most impregnable fort of the Marathas. What was more interesting to note was that till last the Marathas proved their superiority in this struggle, not only that, but the Maratha commander Parshurāmpant made Aurangzeb to accept his terms, what could be ordinarily termed as 'humiliating ones'.<sup>58</sup> As was usual with Aurangzeb the fort was renamed as Sakhharlana and his sardars were lavishly rewarded. Zābit Khan was appointed qiledār of Khelna.<sup>59</sup>

The campaign of Vishālgach was over. Aurangzeb was a victor. The Mughal emperor glanced the Mughal flag that was hoisted on the impregnable fort, with great pride. He had marched thousands of miles from the

capital of Hindustān. He had captured the most powerful forts like Panhālā, Warāli and Dātārā in Maharashtra, had vanquished the two rival Muslim states of Bijāpur and Golkondā. No wonder his own historians showered upon him unparalleled praise on these marvellous achievements. And yet the victor in the hour of great triumph was desponding. He was ill at ease.

The campaign of Vishālgadh brought home two points to the victor. Firstly, the Marathas were not to be subdued inspite of the best generals, a large army and equally big cavalry and also a most effective artillery. During this campaign he observed that field after field was red with blood and its colour certainly did not distinguish between Hindu and Muslim. Mothers with their babies fled from houses before the sweep of this awful avalanche of woe. In each village and in every small place the Marathas made a stand. Many villages had become desolate. The dwellings were doomed. The crash of cannon balls, the explosion of shells the storm of bullets speedily did its work. In the deep defiles of the mountain ranges so also in the thick of jungles horsemen and footmen met hand to hand in the desperate fight. Fields of grain were trampled in the mire. Many thousand lives were consumed by the blazing flames of war which swept on mercilessly and unrelentingly. The scenes were heart rending. What a price of victory!

The devastation was utter ruin and yet Marathas did not bow before him. Nothing seemed to cause fear in them and ultimately he had to bargain his victory and pay a substantial price for it to the Marathas. Even in the hour of the defeat Marathas looked to be indomitable. Thus the success seemed to him more illusive than ever. And yet with his untiring energies, he was not willing to spare the humanity. A ruthless march was ordered.

#### F. CAMPAIGN OF SINHGADH

On 10th June 1702, the Mughal army started retreating from thelnā in order to escape rainy season at the hilly track and also to take repose after the campaign. Though Aurangzeb ordered his armies to march out of that place, yet by now, the monsoon had fully set in that region. Due to incessant rains the terrain became one of the most difficult passage of land to cross. It was covered with slush and the Ambā pass looked to be more dreadful than ever. "The camels refused to set foot on this path. The elephants in a dazed condition, tried to carry the loads,.... but sank into the mud like donkeys. Porters carried on their heads the property and baggage of all the men."<sup>60</sup> Many men perished on the way due to sudden floods in the small streams. Grain sold at one rupee a seer. Neither food nor forage was available. Noblemen and commanders were subjected alike to this torture.<sup>61</sup>



The first halt of the retreating army was at Balkāpur on 25th June. From there it reached Panhālā on 17th July. Thus the army traversed 30 miles in 38 days. After a halt of five days at Panhālā, it arrived at Vadgāon by way of Banasgāon-Vāthār. Then again the march was resumed and it crossed the Krishnā river and arrived at Miraj on 23th September. From there it arrived at Baflāpur on 3th October by way of Balgaon-Bhulgāon. Next place to arrive at for the army was Akluj on 24th October by way of Pratappur, Jujharpur, Vajra (on the Mān river), Vācutpur-Vaki, Bhālvani and Velāpur. Army halted at Akluj for three days. And then resumed the march. It arrived at Pedgāon on 13th November, by way of Babulgāon, Indāpur, Salthan, Markuti and Palasdev." <sup>62</sup> Thus in short the Mughal soldiers took 156 days since starting from Khainā to reach Pedgāon, out of which, at various places they halted for 43 days. The Mughal army suffered huge losses in respect of manpower, material and transport animals during this march. By the time it reached the destination Pedgāon, it found itself exhausted and exasperated.

At Pedgāon, the Mughal army gave a sigh of relief. Here it reposed and refreshed itself and was harbouring under the impression that there would not be any more bloody battles or tragic marches. But alas! soon their image and impression was to be shattered by the design and

order of their victor, Aurangzeb. The army had still not recovered from the dreadful march from Khelnā to Pedgāon, their wounds were yet to be healed, and their woes were yet to be forgotten with the past, when Aurangzeb issued orders for the conquest of Vinhgadh.

After the fateful march from Khelnā to Pedgāon and as the Mughal army was taking a repose there, an interesting incident took place. The elephants of the Mughal army were away in the fields for grazing. The Marathas managed to smuggle them. Immediately, a famous Mughal sardar, Muhammad Amin Khan Bahādur was ordered to recover them from the Marathas. Muhammad Amin Khan not knowing the Maratha tactics of fighting attacked them. The Marathas defeated the Mughal sardār, got hold of his elephants, horses and the other baggage. Not only this but he was stripped off his clothes and was driven back in a most desperate and embarrassing situation.<sup>63</sup>

Barely 18 days had passed since Mughal army arrived at this place, it was put again on long marches. All the bag and baggage was conveyed from Islāmpuri to Pedgāon, Prince Bidār Bakht was sent to Aurangabad as viceroy. The Mughal army left Pedgāon on 3rd December, and arrived at Kondānā on 27th December.<sup>64</sup>

Under Tarbiyat Khan, Mir Atish the army started its siege work of digging trenches, laying mines and carrying

the guns to hillock from where they could fortify the besieged.

The Marathas who had become well-versed with the technique of the Mughal generals of taking fort, defended Singhgad very well. In spite of the fact that so many <sup>other</sup> forts of the Marathas had fallen, it neither discouraged nor deterred them from the determination of giving a fight. Bālāji Vishwanāth, the Far Subāhadār of Poona and the commander in chief of Maratha army and Dhanāji Jadhav worked with untiring energy and zeal and fought the besiegers. The extent of danger and destruction to which they were exposed can be well understood, when Bālāji Vishwanāth wrote to Kāshi Vishwanāth and Abaji Purandare "Hasten immediately on receipt of this despatch.... A delicate task awaits you. Do not delay. There is an urgent requirement of gun powder. Bring two and a half maunds of it, in the absence of which the destruction and defeat is in sight. If only you render the help in protecting the state, then alone you deserve to stay in the state. Do not postpone. You must strive hard and secure it."

Thus the siege dragged on for over three months. Mughals lost many men. Their efforts were slackened. And again the dreadful rainy season was approaching. There was no other alternative but to pay a bargain price to the

Maratha giledār, or alternatively perish in the incessant and heavy rain. Finally, Tarbiyat Khan, managed the affairs. He had successful negotiations with the Maratha giledār and paid a sum of Rs. fifty thousand to him through Comaji Vishwanath Purandare.<sup>66</sup> On 8th April,<sup>67</sup> the Mughal flag was hoisted on Singhgad and Marathas quietly withdrew. The fort was renamed Bakhshendā-Bakhsh.

G. TASK OF CHASTISING THE MARATHAS  
A WILD GOOSE CHASE

Since the time the great Mughal general Zulfiqār Khan was recalled from Jinji, he was assigned only one task and it was to chastise and punish the Maratha divisions wherever they appeared. The general was not at all assigned any particular campaign, but mostly was entrusted the task of protecting the imperial camp at Islāmpuri and also to rush to the rescue of Mughal army whenever it was attacked by the roving divisions of the Marathas. In this wild chase of the Marathas, with the hope of destroying them once for all, Zulfiqār Khan, in a period of six months fought 19 battles and traversed the country over six thousand miles, with ridiculous results. In none of these battles, he was ever able to overpower his enemy nor was he any time successful in capturing large war equipment, or prisoners. In fact it appears from the events, that, though a master in arrangements of divisions on the open

field of a battle, he could, really never understand the technique followed by the Marathas. Nor could he successfully employ any other technique of fighting a battle by which he could have reduced his enemy to dust. In the way he fought with the Marathas, he could not have got but disastrous results. The victorious general, was seen many times on his defensive rather than offensive. This happened till June 1702.

The history of later years is also not very different than that of the past, nor were the results by any chance different than what were in the past. Khimsen who was an eye witness, has graphically recorded all these happenings. After June 1702, Sulfiqār Khan was again on the tale of Shanāji Jādhav. At this time Shanāji was at Ichasāgh. During the rainy season, Sulfiqār Khan halted at Surandhar fort. From Surandhar he was ordered to go to Aurangābād territory on the same mission. Prior to his departure, on account of the death of Maharāmand Khan, Sulfiqār Khan was appointed to the post of Mīr Bakshi.

During December Shanāji was active at Miraj. Sulfiqār Khan arrived there. Hardly had he encamped there, soon the intelligence was received that the Marathas had attacked Chin Sulich Khan, sixteen miles off Bijāpur on the banks of the Krishnā. Sulfiqār Khan went there and repulsed the attacking Marathas. From there Shanāji moved

moved towards Gulbargā territory. The terror Dhanāji's army had created amongst the Mughal soldiers was so much, that Firuz Jang, who was appointed to repulse Dhanāji from the attack on Chinulich Khan i.e., his own son, did not at all rush for help, fearing danger to his own life from the Marathas.

Firuz Jang was recalled from Gulbargā. In the beginning of 1703, the news of the Marathas crossing the river Narmadā and ravaging the territory up to Ujjain was received by Aurangzeb. As usual, Zulfiqār Khan along with Rāi Dalpat Bundelā who had recently become a mansabdar of three thousand hastened to put down the Marathas, but with no results.

In the meantime prince Bidār Bakht despatched Jai Singh and Rustum Khan Deccani against the Marathas. As the Marathas were very strong, prince Bidār Bakht was also ordered to march against them. As Zulfiqār Khan reached Fardāpur (near Ajantā), the Marathas raised the siege of Burhānpur and marched towards Berār. Prince Bidār Bakht, appointed Ali Mardān Khan as his deputy to Burhānpur and Rustum Khan Deccani as a deputy to Berār.

In the meantime, son of Dhanāji Jadhav laid siege to Sultanpur and Mandurbar. Zulfiqār Khan turned in that direction. On his way he received the information of the

Marathas having moved towards Māhārāṣṭra, chasing them, Sulfiqār  
 has arrived at Abulā (2). <sup>68</sup> As he reached that place,  
 he received information about the movement of Utharājī's  
 marching  
 son/towards imperial camp. With long and force marches  
 he arrived at Shirval near Poona and drove away the Marathas.  
 But it was not the end in itself. The Maratha divi-  
 sions had now become very strong and they were active near  
 the imperial camp. Sulfiqār Khan was again riding out  
 his horse in order to defeat his ever elusive enemy.

After April-May 1703, i.e., after the fall of Jinagadh,  
 the Marathas mustered an army of thirty thousand strong  
 men in Khāndesh. Mājā Gopal Inga Chandrāvat was ordered  
 to proceed to that region and chastise the Marathas.  
 Sulfiqār Khan also ordered some of his divisions to move  
 to Khāndesh. He himself went to Aurhānpur. Swiftly  
 Marathas moved into Berār. From thence Sulfiqār Khan  
 turned towards Ahmadnagar.

In Berār, Mustum Khan Baccani the deputy of Bidār  
 Akht marched out of Blichur with a large army to attack  
 the Marathas. A fierce battle was fought and he was  
 made captive by the Marathas. He secured his release by  
 paying a huge amount to the Marathas. <sup>69</sup>

h. PRACE EFFORTS BY AURANGZEB

After the capture, in April 1703, of Jinagadh it seems

from the contemporary records that Aurangzeb reviewed the prevailing political situation. Contrary to his expectations, when he realized that the Marathas were not at all humbled, in fact, day by day their strength and opposition was increasing, he made efforts to solve the dead lock which was entirely his own creation. Prince Kām Bakhsh was appointed to conduct the peace talks with the Marathas.<sup>70</sup>

On 27th November 1703, Shahu the Maratha King in captivity was removed from Gulālbār (imperial enclosure) and was lodged with Kām Bakhsh. A word was sent around to the Marathas to attend the peace talks and subsequent release of Shahu. But there was no response from the Marathas. The reasons were obvious as Bhimsen puts it, "The prince Kām Bakhsh sent his men repeatedly to Dhanāji Jādhav. But did the Mughal conquer the Marathas? The entire Deccan had come into their possession like a soft pudding, why should they make peace? Thus the envoy of prince Kām Bakhsh, Sai Shan, the natural son of Shahuji returned with disappoint. Shāhābād was again removed to Gulālbār."<sup>71</sup>

But then all hopes were not given up. According to Staffi Khan fresh approaches were made to Dhanāji Jādhav, who on behalf of the other prominent Maratha sardārs informed Aurangzeb the conditions of peace. In that it



was mentioned that Aurangzeb should give an assurance of protection to all the sardars of Jārābāi. Then all of them would assemble near Fān Bakhsh's camp. Rājā Bahū would be brought 4 to 5 miles away from the Mughal camp so that the Marathas could freely exchange their views. Then they would meet prince Fān Bakhsh on behalf of Rājā Bahū. And thus finally, an audience would be arranged with Aurangzeb.

Accordingly, Aurangzeb issued 7 farmans to be written, but in the end he distrusted the Marathas and withdrew this proposal. He suspected that Marathas with forty to fifty thousand force would surround the imperial camp and with treachery they would remove Rājā Bahū. Sultan Hussain, who conveyed this message to the Marathas on behalf of Fān Bakhsh had to fight his way back.<sup>72</sup> Thus the hostilities were resumed once again.

#### RETURN TO POONA

After the conquest of Lingadh, Aurangzeb decided to retire at Poona in order to refresh his troops. In 1st May, 1703, the army arrived in the vicinity of Poona. There it reposed for over seven months. But the misery of the Mughal army was not to be reduced nor comfort was to be restored. In 1702 there was excessive rainfall throughout Maharashtra. All the seed was spoiled and there

were no crops. The year 1703 saw an unbearable drought in Maharashtra as well as in <sup>73</sup>Khandesh. The entire kharif crop was spoiled and there was acute shortage of food grain throughout the country.

The excessive rainfall and draught were followed by plague. A large number of soldiers and followers in the Mughal camp perished.<sup>74</sup> The hunger was predominant everywhere. According to Khizzen, the grain was sold two seers a rupee.

But nothing could move the dictator. He expressed his wish to go ahead with the plan of conquest of other forts of the Marathas. What price of human life has been paid for such an obstinacy!

During this period another interesting incident took place. After realising that his peace talks had failed, Aurangzeb, put forth a proposal through Hamid-ud-din Khan, to convert Rājā Shahu to Islām. He publicly proclaimed the same, probably with the intention of bringing pressure over the Maratha leaders. But this strategic move of Aurangzeb hardly created any stir in the Maratha camp. They did not yield to this pressure. Finally Aurangzeb was persuaded by his courtiers to give up the move. But his fanaticism would not yield. Alternatively, two Maratha sardars, Khanderāo and Jagjivan, who were along

with Shahu, accepted conversion to Islām if that could save their master. Such was the intense feeling of sacrifice and loyalty of the Marathas to their king and kingdom.

On 10th November 1703, once again Aurangzeb's army bit the drum of march towards Rājgadh and Torna.<sup>75</sup>

#### 8. RĀJGADH AND TORNA

Rājgadh is situated at a tremendous height from the sea level. The total area covered by the hill on which it is situated is 24 miles. It was a well fortified fort with adequate Maratha garrison for its protection. It was one of the most difficult hill forts of the Marathas to reach particularly heavy artillery and other war equipment. It has got three different fort walls, which were of a solid construction and the bombardment could hardly create any effect on it. It is divided into three sections, Pedaivāt towards Mesh upland, Duvela and Langi-vani in the direction of Talakonkan. To describe it in the words of Persian historian, "Imagination cannot estimate its height. The wind alone can cross its thorny jungles and spectre-haunted chasm."<sup>76</sup> The surrounding jungles were infested with poisonous snakes and thorny bushes through which to obtain a passage was a most difficult thing.

On 10th November 1703, the Mughal army commenced its

most hazardous march towards Rājgadh, which is only 30 miles from Poona, under the command of Tarbiyat Khan and Hamid-ud-din Khan. Thousand of workmen were ordered to prepare the passage for the march of the army. For this short distance, the army took two weeks, with huge losses of baggage and men and transport animals. Such was the type of efficiency prevailing in the Mughal lines during the period. Finally on 2nd December 1703, after a journey of 18 days the army reached Rājgadh and commenced the siege of the fort.

The Maratha qiledār on the fort was Santāji Bilimkar.<sup>77</sup> Orders were issued on behalf of the Maratha king to the qiledār and Mahipatrāo Bilimkar, the Deshmukh of Gunjan-māwal region about the siege of Rājgadh by Aurangzeb's army. They were asked to keep themselves in readiness to face the attack, defeat Aurangzeb and not to worry about it, as rest of the arrangements for defence were in hand.<sup>78</sup>

Bankarāji Nārāyen Sachiv was active in making the defence preparations complete and necessary supplies of foodgrains to the fort.

The Mughal generals in their usual manner started the siege work. Hamid-ud-din Khan and Tarbiyat Khan, ordered the digging of trenches and carrying the guns to a hillock in order to batter the fort. But the area to be besieged was so vast that it could not at all be effectively invested.

They could not stop free food supplies reaching the besieged from outside. The mines were laid and the fortification was carried to the fort walls. The guns were also mounted at high places. Farbiyat Khan and Hamid-ud-din Khan made good progress in their work towards Padmāvati. At Padmāvati there was a triangular enclosure, which is called a 'bond' (or 'trunk') by erecting two thick walls from the postern gate of the fort, to the end of the hillock and making these two walls meet at a point. Below these walls, the path declines so sharply and is so full of slippery holes that no one can pass there even on foot. At the junction of two walls was another strong tower which opened upon the back of the hill opposite to it. At the apex of this tower is thirty yards in height, straight as a stretched rope, the Mughal soldiers raised a battery opposite this tower.<sup>79</sup>

The Maratha garrison opposed bravery at Juvēlā. They fired guns and shots in addition to incessant shower of stones over the besieging army.<sup>80</sup> Thus the siege dragged on over two months. During one of these encounters the Maratha filedār Santāji Bilimkar was shot dead by the bullet of a Mughal soldier.<sup>81</sup>

On Saturday, the 8th February 1704, the Mughal soldiers launched a severe attack. They mounted the guns on the tower and fired and battered the fort towers. Marathas were

Driven back. The Maratha Tarnaubat Sidhoji Thopte of Fadnāvati, showed great courage and bravery while fighting with the enemy he was struck by a cannon ball and was blown into pieces.<sup>82</sup> The enemy captured the fort wall.

Inspite of this the Marathas continued the resistance for next ten days. Finally negotiations were opened between the Mughal general Suhullah Khan and the Maratha general Parūnji and Hāmānji.<sup>83</sup>

It was agreed upon to surrender the fort as per the terms of peace talks to the Mughals and the Maratha garrison would be permitted to go out with its bag and baggage in safety.<sup>84</sup> On the night of 10th February, the Marathas vacated the fort and the Mughal flag was hoisted.<sup>85</sup> The fort was renamed Nābi Shah gadh.<sup>86</sup>

Inspite of the success achieved by the Mughal army it hardly gained any benefits. The grain was in acute shortage. Even the grass was being sold two seers for a rupee. Many men perished. Nābi Shah was ordered to send supplies.

Under these severe conditions of famine Mughal army commenced its march towards Tornā, a fort eight miles to the west of Rājgadh.

The siege was laid on 23rd February 1704.<sup>87</sup>

Terbiyat Khan engaged himself in digging trenches and laying mines on the sides of the fort gate. Muhammad Amin Khan blockaded the fort and restricted all the movements of the garrison. Amān-ullāh Khan, a grandson of Aishwirdi Khan came to assist the siege work. The Paratha garrison fired the musket shots incessantly. Twenty persons of Sultan Hussain a Ughal commander, were killed. From Paratha side, some 80 persons who were carrying supplies into the fort were captured by the Ughals.

In the night of 10th March 1706, Amān-ullāh Khan, with his Kavle infantry men silently scaled the fort wall by means of rope ladders, blew the trumpet and charged the garrison. At the same time Hamid-ud-din Khan also scaled the fort. The garrison fought bravely this surprise night attack. Many were killed on both sides. Finally the garrison asked for the terms of capitulation.<sup>88</sup> They were permitted to go away leaving behind their weapons.

Thus Torna fell to the Ughal sword. According to Staffi Khan this was the only fort which was captured by the Ughal sword and not by any other means.<sup>89</sup> The fort was renamed 'Fatah-ul-ghalib'.<sup>90</sup>

The victory of this fort must have certainly brought some satisfaction to Aurangzeb, as this completed his plan of conquest of all Paratha forts.

# 1. THE LAST LAP

On 10th March 1701, Tornā fort fell to the Mughals and that completed the grand design of Aurangzeb "to capture all the forts of the Marathas". On 17th October, 1697, he had left his base camp at Islāmpurī with all his army, cavalry and artillery. On 20th November 1689, he captured Vasantgad, the first fort in his ultimate struggle of throwing out the Marathas from the power. By 10th March 1701, i.e., in a period of four years, five months and 2 days the Mughal army captured, Vasantgad, Tātārā, Parali, Chandan-Vandan, Panhālā, Tāwangadh, Vishāl-gadh, Inhgadh, Rājgad and Tornā. Most of these forts as we have seen came under Mughal possession after giving huge amounts as bargain-price to the Maratha commanders of the fort. According to Muslim historians like Khāfi Khan, Tornā was the only fort which was conquered by the Mughal sword. After exhausting the Mughal army and finally emptying the Mughal treasury Emperor Aurangzeb captured the enemy forts (if at all it could be described as capturing). In fact, according to Khāfi Khan, an eye witness to these historical events, Aurangzeb through his spies and news writers used to know secretly the price paid by a Mughal general or a mansabdar to a Maratha commander and he would pay the respective army commander the exact amount paid by him in taking the fort, by way of



reward. Thus a review of these four years period of war necessarily brings home one conclusion, beyond any doubts, that, Aurangzeb's struggle for supremacy had come to an end long ago with but one answer. That had now continued was fancy of fulfilling his imagination, a dream to see the Marathas humbled and for that he was prepared to pay any price. The treasures which had remained untouched since the days of Jahāngir and Shāh Jahān were conveyed to the Deccan, ironically enough, to be distributed to the thieves (as Aurangzeb fancied to call the Marathas). The coffers were emptied in order to derive the satisfaction of his dream being fulfilled. And seemingly he reached very near his expectations. Soon all the strategic and important forts came under the Mughal possession in Maharashtra. But alas! The success did not seem to last long. It appeared to be more deceptive than the elusive Marathas. Hardly he had reposed from this gigantic task of punishing his enemy, the news started pouring in from all the country side about the increased Maratha activities with greater dynamism and vigour. This was certainly not expected of a vanquished foe. And as he was busy going through the news report Marathas were busy in retaking their forts. This was a most agonising piece of news for Aurangzeb. It shattered his image of success and delivered a heavy blow on his fragile and age-worn body. It brought a physical break-down from which he was never to recover till the termination of his life.

In launching the campaign of the Deccan, Aurangzeb's chief aim was to bring the entire region of the Deccan under the Mughal banner, and to establish the supremacy of Muslims over Hindus. It was not directed to regenerate any fusion of the two dividing and opposing forces. It was meant to strengthen these cross currents. In the course of these battles over a few years, <sup>could</sup> the two forces which had been such determined enemies, have really come together? Could they have really become only one people, identified in principles, maxims and interests? If ever this could have happened, the results of Aurangzeb's campaign of the Deccan would have been astounding and would have certainly left the trail of its success till our days. Apart from the contemporary generation, even posterity would have rejoiced it.

But such was not the design of his campaign nor were the consequences similar, which sprang from this design. The entire project had something dreadful in it and the results attained also speak the same. No doubt, it was carried out with an unequalled firmness but without any moderation least to talk about faith, of people in it. How many sufferings that were endured by the Muslims as well as the Marathas, would the unhappy people not have escaped alike, but for the extreme fanaticism of its dictator. Never was a project least useful to the civilization in general and people in parti-

cular, was conceived with such tremendous interest and executed with such devastating results. It is a remarkable fact that during the course of these events, the obstacles which occasioned the failure were not only the outcome of fierce determination of the Marathas but were also backed by the elements. The forts in the hilly track of the Sanyādrī ranges, frustrated Aurangzeb's task, the burning of villages (people became desolate), the excessive rainfall accompanied by pestilence, and followed by a severe draught throughout Maharashtra completed the ruin of the Mughal army. Brinsden, an eye witness has repeatedly complained about it. He has ventilated the feeling of the army men, when he says, "....the realm has been desolated, nobody gets justice, they (men) have been utterly ruined. The ryots have given up cultivation; the jagirdars do not get a penny from their fiefs.... Many mansabdars in the Deccan, starving and impoverished, have gone over to the Marathas...."

Marathas exploited the situation to their greatest advantage. They made the condition of their enemy more miserable when we learn from Brinsden that, "this year their audacity was even greater than in the past. Out of the capital cities of the eight chief Subahs of the empire, population has decreased in the three Deccan towns of Bijāpur, Salcārābād and Durrānūr, while the villages round them have been totally ruined. From the Baranādī

southwards throughout the entire Deccan, in every pargana and village, the Marathas have spread like ants and locusts." <sup>92</sup>

The aim of the Marathas during this period was to cause a total break-down of the Mughal administration. This would have essentially created chaotic conditions and would have thus disrupted and dislocated the sources of revenue as well recruitment which were needed most by Aurangzeb, in order to continue his struggle.

Thus the Maratha leadership, unanimously planned to execute this new strategy. It was more essential to deliver such a blow to their foe, than a major victory in any battlefield. Dislocation of administration meant paralysing the active limbs of the Mughals. This aim they could have achieved provided the campaign was launched throughout the length and breadth of Maharashtra, in small villages as well as big cities simultaneously. They successfully created such conditions. Brinsden has bluntly expressed the same, "The mansabdars, on account of the small forces under them, cannot gain control over the territories granted to them in jagirs. The local zamindars, growing stronger, have joined the Marathas, levied troops, and stretched the hand of oppression over the realm. ... As the imperial dominions have been given out in tanks (fief) to the jagirdars, so too the Marathas

have made the distribution of the whole empire among their generals, and thus one kingdom has to maintain two sets of jagirdars..... The peasants subjected to this double exaction have collected arms and horses and joined the Marathas."<sup>23</sup>

The condition of the Mughal army had become most precarious. There was a long continued famine and nowhere grain was cheap. The Mughal raiders were left without any source of income. Therefore many of them goaded by poverty took to plundering in order to support themselves. "And some went into shares with Maratha raiders."<sup>24</sup> The arrears of pay of the Mughal soldiers were mounting high day by day. And in order to accelerate the fall of their enemy Marathas intensified their activities in all parts and gained more comfortable ground. In all parts of the country under the Mughals, wherever the Marathas attacked, they engaged in regular revenue collection of the place. They appointed their own *Karavisdārs*. They stopped all the roads used for conveying Mughal supplies and treasury and never missed any opportunity to attack any Mughal caravan in their sight. They collected regularly chauth from these villages. "The powerful headmen of ~~least useful~~ certain villages in concert with Maratha subāhdārs built small fortresses and refused to pay revenue to the imperial government, the Maratha troops supporting them. Up to the boundary of Ahmadabad

and Belwa they raided and reduced the country to dust. They looted caravans even when they were close to the imperial army and also plundered the grain market of the emperor's own camp.<sup>95</sup>

In June-July 1703 the prince's camp, bag and baggage was looted by Damāji Thorāt near Khanvadi as the prince was marching from Rājewadi to Poona. The condition of the Mughal soldiers was very miserable and embarrassing as they were stripped off everything including their garments. As the incident was reported to Aurangzeb, he ordered for the arrest of Deshmukh and Deshkuikarni of the village. A collective fine of two thousand rupees was imposed on them. But poor people had no money to pay. Their condition was desperate.

In 1704, Marathas could clearly see that their tactics and strategy yielded the necessary results. They put the Mughal commanders on their defensive. With their excellent tactics they proved to be the masters of the complete theatre of war. They made the condition of Mughal sardars fairly miserable. What their opponents sought was their escape from fast moving Maratha sword, and in most of the cases they paid price for it as demanded by the Marathas. Thus the strength and courage of the Marathas grew beyond any expectations of Aurangzeb. They had mustered large number of recruits and big divisions

were engaged in operations under prominent Maratha sardars. Aurangzeb's dismay and despair must have been intense in watching the growing strength of Marathas. According to Panucci, "These (Maratha) leaders and their troops move in these days with much confidence, because they have cowed the Mughal commanders and inspired them with fear. At the present time they possess artillery, musketry, bows and arrows, with elephants and camels for their baggage and tents. They carry these last to secure some repose from time to time.....In short, they are equipped and move about just like the armies of the Mughals ....Only a few years ago they did not march in this fashion. In those days their arms were only lances and long swords two inches wide..... at present time they move like conquerors, showing no fear of any Mughal troops...." <sup>97</sup>

At the end of 1703 and in the beginning of 1704, this was the condition both of the Mughals as well as the Marathas. Marathas had already stolen the initiative from their enemies and were now on the offensive and were preparing to strike a decisive blow.

#### 4. GRAND TRIUMPH

On the 17th April 1704, Aurangzeb's army with its vast paraphernalia arrived at Ahmednagar after a brief halt at Junnar. The imperial tents were pitched there, and <sup>as</sup> was the practice

of Aurangzeb the village was renamed as Kartūḍābād.<sup>98</sup>  
 on 9th day, Mughal army lamented the loss of its best  
 general, Muḥullāh Khan due to sudden death.<sup>99</sup> Here  
 Aurangzeb received most disturbing news of Bedar activit-  
 ies and particularly their leader Pidyā Nāyak becoming  
 strong in the Bedar territory in Kārnāṭaka. He had  
 started exacting taxes from the subject of Aurangzeb in  
 the Kārnāṭaka. Therefore in order to crush this rebellion  
 Aurangzeb thought of launching a new campaign. Accordingly  
 on 22nd October 1704, Aurangzeb's army with utmost reluct-  
 ance and unwillingness commenced its march,<sup>100</sup> towards  
 Wāgingerā, the stronghold of Bedars. The march of the  
 army commenced by way of Bahādurgadh. After the conquest  
 of Tornā, Aurangzeb had vainly satisfied himself that his  
 foe was vanquished. But the destiny did not will so.  
 The activities of the Marathas were ever on increase.  
 They attacked the Mughal camp at Bahādurgadh.<sup>101</sup>

Aurangzeb's army arrived at Wāgingerā on 14th February,  
 1705 and laid siege to it.

Meanwhile, Aurangzeb had hardly made any effective  
 arrangements in Maharashtra to check the Marathas. Marathas  
 on their part utilised the exit of Aurangzeb to their  
 utmost advantage. Sometime before the first week of  
 January 1705 Bahiro Pandit Pradhān issued orders to Dhēvjī  
 Viśār to capture Lohgadh. Accordingly, he captured Lohgadh



by escalade.<sup>102</sup> In June Rājmaṅchi came in their possession through the exertions of Dhāvji Viṣār.<sup>103</sup> In June-July the Mughal qiledār of Linhādḥ was caught unaware and the Marathas captured it by escalade.<sup>104</sup>

The Marathas had struck such terror that the qiledār without any resistance handed over the fort to the Marathas. The Mughal sardārs Tarbiyat Khan and Gulfiqār Khan were sent back to take the fort after six months. Marathas had launched vigorously their campaign of retaking the forts from Aurhals. Under the command of Shankarāji Mārāyan Rohidā and Rājgadh were brought under Maratha rule. Before the end of 1702 other notable forts, like Penkālā,<sup>105</sup> Pāwangadh and Sātārā were taken back through the operations successfully supervised by Marashurām Trimbak. Thus in a short time Maratha leadership, with their vigorous efforts, rocked all the work done by Aurangzeb in order to consolidate the Deccan. The Marathas by now had become so powerful, that in the words of Manucci, ".....They move like conquerors and showing no fear of any Mughal troops."

As they started consolidating their position at home, they did not lose the opportunity of helping Bedars in their fight against Aurangzeb. On 8th March 1704, the Maratha army under its Commander in Chief Dhanāji Jādhar and Hindurāo Ghorpade with five thousand

cavalry, and twenty thousand infantry of Bedars arrived<sup>106</sup> at Vāgingerā. There they created havoc. They attacked Bughal camp continuously. This was done with the chief aim of rescuing their families (Parathas) kept there as a safe refuge while Aurangzeb was attacking their forts in Maharashtra. The Paratha attack was so strong that the Bughal army itself was besieged. Its activities ceased and it was confined to its own lines. The Bughal generals were not prepared to come out and give fight in open due to the extreme fear of the Parathas.

In November-December 1703, Namāji Shinde and Kesopant attacked Sherzā Khan, Mālb-Subhādār of Berār.<sup>107</sup> They captured 2000 horses, 11 elephants and Sherzā Khan was taken captive but released after receiving a ransom of 3 lakhs of rupees. In January 1704, the Parathas crossed the Narmada river under the leadership of Namāji Shinde, Parsoji Bhosale and Kesopant. It was estimated that they had fifty thousand strong troops.<sup>108</sup> They besieged on 24th January 1704, Borēhā village, imprisoned the Bughal faujdār, burnt the village and looted every house and did not leave any thing with the inhabitants except the garments on their persons. Aurangzeb ordered Piruz Jang to meet this Paratha expedition. A fierce battle took place between the two forces, the Parathas were defeated.<sup>109</sup> Prince Bidar Bakht was hastened to meet the Paratha divisions in Mālwā territory.

after 20th April 1705, Gunā Shinde with a large Maratha army raved the two districts of Mātānjan and Kartur in the Aurangabad territory. Zulfiqār Khan hastened to repulse the Maratha attack. By the time he reached that territory Marathas had disappeared from there.<sup>110</sup> Then the news came of the Marathas becoming strong in Phāndesh.

Zulfiqār Khan was ordered to go to that territory. He despatched a force under Hāsingh Rādā and Bāi Balpat to Vaijāpur<sup>111</sup> and Shilpeth in Aurangābād region. The Mughal force could hardly trace out their enemy because of the swiftness and rapid marches of the Marathas. In the meantime the imperial cash and treasury which was being conveyed from Burhānpur to Aurangabad was looted by the Marathas at Bardāpur.<sup>112</sup>

But none of these activities influenced Aurangzeb's campaign of Āgingerā. On 27th April 1705 Bedarā surrendered the fort to him and thus Āgingerā was annexed to the Mughal dominions.<sup>113</sup> After the campaign was over Mughal army moved to Devāpur, a quiet green village near Krishna, 8 miles south of Āgingerā. This was done mainly to give his troops that much desired repose and relief.

At Devāpur Aurangzeb suddenly fell ill. His spare frame had been enabled by regular habits and a sober life to stand incessant work and rigorous marching for well-

nigh ninety years marvellously well, but at last it seemed to have been worn out. And if he died... the North-Indian army, girt round by countless ill-situated enemies in that far off southern land of hills and jungles and strange peoples would perish helplessly. Despair seized all men.... when Aurangzeb fell ill and took to his bed."<sup>114</sup> The rumours were being spread fast of Aurangzeb's death. But the destiny willed otherwise and he recovered from this terrible illness.

On 23rd October, after the rainy season was over, he issued orders for onward march to Ahmadnagar.<sup>115</sup> The imperial tents were brought down and Aurangzeb sitting in a palki, with easy marches moved from Devāpur. In a month and a half he reached Rahādurgadh. (6th December 1705). Here he stayed during the month of Ramazān. After Ramazān was over, the troops were ordered to march towards Ahmadnagar. The army commenced its march on 14th January, 1706, and reached Ahmadnagar on 20th January.<sup>116</sup> Thus after a long interval of 22 years, since he had first arrived there in order to capture Bijapur, Aurangzeb returned to Ahmadnagar.

On 23rd January, Sulfiqār Khan was sent to recapture Kondānā. He was assisted by Jarbiyat Khan, the chief of Mughal artillery. Along with Sulfiqār Khan, Rājā Bahadur was despatched on this campaign as Rājā Must'ad Khan

mentions 'for some political reason'<sup>117</sup> probably, this looks to be one more effort on the part of Aurangzeb to reconcile with the Marathas. But later events show that this strategy did not yield any results as Marathas did not respond to the call of Aurangzeb.

The siege continued for some time and Zulfiqār Khan opened negotiations with the Maratha qiledār through the mediation of Rām Singh Lal.<sup>118</sup> Finally, Zulfiqār Khan got the Fort on 21st March 1706, only after paying the bargain price to the Maratha qiledār.

#### BATTLE OF RATANPUR - MARATHAS BECOME SUPERIOR

On 20th November 1705, subahdār of Gujarat Prince Muḥammad Azam left Ahmadabad in order to see Aurangzeb. On 25th March, 1706, he arrived by way of Junnar at Ahmadnagar.<sup>119</sup> Immediately Prince Bidar Bakht was appointed as Subahdār of Gujarāt. He arrived at Ahmadabād on 30th July 1706. The Marathas fully utilized this interval of eight months by launching a campaign of Gujarāt. The Maratha army stated to be 80 thousand strong under Shanāji entered into Gujarāt, which in the absence of a proper subahdār had become virtually defenceless. The deputy governor of the province detached a force against the Maratha army. But the Mughal commanders did not see eye to eye each other, and hence they defeated the very purpose.

They assembled their forces at Bābā Pyara ford on the banks of the Narmadā. The forces were lying there without making any operations over a month. From thence these forces advanced towards Batanpūr on the eastern bank of the Narmadā near Rājpiplā. Here Maratha force fell upon them mercilessly. A fierce battle took place. Many were lost in killed and wounded on the Mughal side. Many of the soldiers abandoned the battlefield and were on their heels to broach. Two of their chiefs Safdar Khan Babi and Nazar Ali Khan were captured. They paid a ransom of Rs. eight lakhs to the Marathas. The Mughal camp, bag and baggage were looted and many were taken as war prisoners. This happened by about 10th March 1706.<sup>120</sup>

The Deputy Governor of Gujarāt, Abdul Qasim Khan, was immediately informed about the miserable plight of the Mughal army. He hastened to the help of his colleagues at the head of a small force. As he arrived near Bābā Pyara ford, Marathas, with their vast and superior force surrounded this detachment. All were taken captive including the deputy governor. Their entire camp was plundered. Then the victors levied chauth on the villages and surrounding territory and then retired.<sup>121</sup>

The Marathas were becoming stronger day by day. It had created its decisive effects both over the health of Aurangzeb as well as on his empire and more apparent on his

army. The warfare of 20 years in the Deccan, left nothing behind but desolation of the country, an avalanche of woe and misery, pyramids of dead and echoes of heart-rending wails of the wounded. Manucci has given a very graphic picture of the situation when he says, 'Aurangzeb withdrew to Ahmadnagar leaving behind him the fields of these provinces devoid of trees and bare of crops, their place being taken by the bones of men and beasts. Instead of verdure all is blank and barren. The country is so entirely desolated and depopulated that neither fire nor light can be found in the course of a three or four days journey.... There have died in his armies over a hundred thousand souls yearly, and of animals, pack-oxen, camels, elephants etc., over three hundred thousand.....In the Deccan provinces from 1702 to 1704 plague (and famine) prevailed. In those two years there expired over two millions of souls.'<sup>122</sup>

During Aurangzeb's return march from Bahādurgadh to Ahmadnagar a vast Maratha force followed his army in the rear. It effectively cut the supplies. Samid-ud-din Khan was despatched to defeat the Marathas. He in turn deputed his lieutenants to carry out this job. Marathas realizing the worthlessness of the soldiers and their leaders fell upon them mercilessly. Many were killed and a large number of them taken prisoners. Marathas recovered horses.<sup>123</sup> On another side they attacked the imperial

camp and could have easily captured even their enemy Aurangzeb.

In April-May 1706, a vast Maratha army under the great generals like, Chhaji Jadhav, Hemaji Nisde, Jado Balhar, Dasbaji Simbalker and many others appeared four miles away from the Mughal camp at Ahmadnagar. Aurangzeb sent Khan-i-Alam and other commanders to drive them away, but this force was hopelessly outnumbered and had to be re-inforced. There was long and severe contest, before Marathas withdrew from the vicinity of the Mughal camp.<sup>124</sup>

After this event, another pitched battle took place between Maratha Sardar Balaji Vishvanath and the Mughal army, sometime before April 1706. The Mughal army was encamped in the village of Vani. Balaji, the Maratha Subhndar of Poona territory, at the head of ten thousand men, ravaged the village of Dindori, adjacent to Vani for three days. Then he fell upon the Mughals.<sup>125</sup> Many were slain and an equally large number wounded. The Mughals were put to flight.

By now Marathas had become so strong and so active that the Mughal camp at Ahmadnagar, was virtually under siege. They guarded the roads to it so vigilantly that hardly any Mughal sardar escaped their sight and vigilance. During October-November, Asin-ud-din Ali Khan who was the Faujdar of Konkan and Kasir came to see Aurangzeb. An



his way back, 16 miles from Ahmadnagar, he was attacked by the Marathas. In the small skirmish, he was injured and with great difficulty he managed to escape from clutches of Marathas.<sup>126</sup> Similarly, another Mughal Sardar, Siyadat Khan was captured by the Marathas. A large equipment, treasury, horses and camels were being brought in from Aurangabad to Ahmadnagar.

In Aurangābād territory Marathas had struck terror. After the capture of Gondānā, Zulfiqār Khan was ordered to go to Aurangābād territory. Leaving his baggage at Ahmadnagar, he advanced towards Tisgāon and then followed the Marathas toward Bid. From thence he turned towards Parli-Vaijanāth in order to chase Chanāji and crossed the Shreempurī pass. Marathas keeping the track of Zulfiqār Khan's movements, swiftly turned towards Ausā, Tuljāpur and Parendā, and then crossed the Bhima river in order to reach Mahādeva hills. Hopelessly pursuing the Marathas, Zulfiqār Khan came back to Ahmadnagar. The Mughal army suffered heavy losses both in manpower as well as transport animals and horses.<sup>127</sup>

Shortly again Zulfiqār Khan was sent to Miraj to chase Chanāji. Chanāji swiftly crossed the Krishna river, leaving Zulfiqār Khan to his fate as the monsoon had already set in.

In July Marathas took the fort of Penukonda from its

Mughal giledār.<sup>128</sup> This singular success was achieved by Hindurao Shorpade. Immediately, Aurangzeb detached Iarbiyat Khan, to protect that territory.<sup>129</sup>

From thence Marathas marched into Sirā. Siyadat Khan a Mughal commander was captured and was held to ransom. During the same period Marathas achieved another signal victory by capturing Vasantgad from the Mughals.

During the last few months of the last year of Aurangzeb's reign the Marathas were tremendously active in Karenda, Mangalvedhā, Khandesh and Malwā. Prominent among the Maratha leaders were Dhanāji Jadhav, Nasaṁji Shinde, Kesopant, Farsoji Bhosale and Santāji White. About Santāji White, much information is not available. However, it appears from the events that he was one of the most active and powerful Maratha commander. There is no recorded relevant history of the last year of Aurangzeb's reign, either in Persian or Marathi. Here with the help of the Persian News letters an attempt is made to record the events during 1706 and till February 1707 i.e. a few days prior to the death of Aurangzeb. The diary of these events by itself will speak about the comparative strength of the Marathas and the miserable plight of the Mughal officers. The Marathas were so powerful that they grabbed every opportunity to strike the Mughals, ravage their territory, extract chauth and plunder the royal treasury.

After the rainy season was practically over in September, 1706, Shanāji with his army rushed into Khāndesh and Berar. Immediately Zulfiqār Khan was on his tail. Nothing of any consequence seems to have happened during this chase, and Zulfiqār Khan returned to Miraj.

In November 1706 Mir Nūmān, the Fakhsī of Chin Gulich Khan's army along with 1000 cavalry men was attacked by the Marathas near Mārdi. He was wounded (later on he died at Tholapur). To his rescue, Amān-ullāh Khan rushed. By the time he was able to make up the distance, Santāji Mohite along with 3000 men plundered Mārdi and destroyed the fortress. 130  
Amān-ullāh Khan gave a battle to him.

In December 1706 and January 1707, the Marathas were so vigilant and so active that they did not permit the normal movements of the Mughal officers from one province to another. In December Izzat-ullāh Khan was proceeding to Pālwā on being appointed Subahdār of that province. He could hardly reach Salātkatpur when he was compelled to halt there till a new force joined him. 131

In the first week of December 1706 a Maratha force consisting of about ten thousand men was freely moving in Gārdapur in Khāndesh. On 1<sup>st</sup> December 1706, the Mughal Faujdar Amānat Jāyyid Akhad gave a fight to them. But he was defeated. He lost 60 men in killed and many were

wounded and taken prisoners by the Marathas.<sup>132</sup>

In the same month a certain Sujah Beg, who was proceeding from Nevasat (Nevāsā) to Burhānpur was attacked by the Marathas. They looted his bag and baggage as well as horses and camels and taken prisoner. Later on he secured his release probably by way of paying some ransom. In the same month, Rangnāth, son of Karbāji, Mughal thanedār of Baner was attacked and killed by a Maratha force consisting of 200 men. They carried away horses and weapons.<sup>134</sup>

During the last week of November 1706 Parsaji Bhosale along with 5000 men laid siege to Vetāl-vādi fort (near Aurangābād). The Mughal filedār Kuchak Khan defended the fort. Immediately Mansur Khan was ordered to reinforce him and also to escort the royal treasury which was being conveyed to Aurangābād.<sup>135</sup> A small contingent which had started from Aurangābād was attacked by the Marathas near Jānzani.<sup>136</sup>

It seems that from Aurangābād Parsaji Bhosale started for Burhānpur by way of Surat. His men reached the suburb of Burhānpur called Fairāmūr. This was evidently with the intention of looting the royal treasury which had arrived from Bengal and which was kept in the fort. The Mughal officer Hajibāt Khan defended the town.<sup>137</sup> Another Maratha force was active near Mandurbār and had the intentions of

going to Surat. The Mughal officer Asān-ullāh Khan was asked to remain alert.<sup>138</sup>

By the middle of December a Maratha force consisting of about 1000 cavalry men was active near Aurangābād. A battle took place about 12 kos from Aurangābād. Khwājā Gulī Khan, Khwājā Masūd Khan, and Mir Muḥammad fought from the Mughal side. They lost about 15 men in dead and many in wounded.<sup>139</sup> By the end of the year Marathas recovered Viśālgadh a fort of prime importance from the Mughals.<sup>140</sup> In January 1707 the Marathas were again active near Purhānpur under the command of Santa (Svaliyā? Atoliyā? or Māwliyā?). He lifted the siege of Laver village and marched towards Chāngdevī. The Mughal officer Najābat Khan gave a fight to them. Meanwhile, Parsoji Bhosale, collected chauth amounting to Rs. one lakh and fifty thousand from the town of Gandhli in Amalner paraganā. From there he headed towards Bhūsāval. Najābat Khan, the Mughal officer instead of resisting and chasing them away returned to his town.<sup>141</sup>

In the first week of January, it seems he had moved towards Vandurbar. Yakkā Tāj Khan the Mughal officer chased them away. They crossed the Tāpatī river.<sup>142</sup> At the same time, a Maratha force consisting of 400 men under the command of Hanumanth's (Chorpade) son was active near Aurangābād. The Mughal officers resisted him.<sup>143</sup> Mansur Khan was ordered to reinforce them.

The Marathas were active under Shanaji Jadhav and Santaji Mohite in the vicinity of Mangalvednā. Zulfiqār Khan had reached about 10 kos distance in order to chastise them.<sup>144</sup> From thence they reached fortress of Sāngolā. Further, it appears that the Marathas moved towards Bijāpur territory. Zulfiqār intended to go on their pursuit.<sup>145</sup> Queen Jārābāi arranged to send a reinforcement to Shanaji.<sup>146</sup>

On 3rd January 1707 Shanaji along with 1000 cavalrymen laid siege to the ~~village~~ village of Kāyāpur in pargana Ausā. Amān-ullāh Khan who was at Parandī rushed for the rescue of the besieged. The Marathas lifted the siege.<sup>147</sup> ~~the~~ ~~Marathas~~ In the same month Marathas laid siege to the fort of Medak in Hyderabad territory. Farbiyat Khan was ordered to chastise the Marathas and rescue the besieged.<sup>148</sup>

By the middle of January 1707, Timājī, a commander of the Marathas along with 500 men arrived at Pimpalgāon, from Sahādurgadh. He was collecting chauth. There was no defence from the Nughals. The condition was so bad that leaving aside the adequate measures of protection, the Nughal thanedar Amān-ullāh Khan even could not manage to keep 4 men for its defence.<sup>149</sup> It appears that by January the Marathas had become very strong not only within their own territory, but they had firm hold over the forts like Sāngolā and others in Belgaum district. Their strength can be well judged from a spy report of the Nughals dated 13rd January 1707

from the Pāngnā fort. It says "Chivaji II ordered Parshurām pant to establish a post near Kolhāpur. But Parashurām pant was so confident about his men and their capabilities, advised Chivaji II, not to make haste about it, but at the time Aurangzeb would march from Ahmadnagar to Aurangābād, he would capture all the forts in one day.<sup>150</sup> This certainly tells upon the morale and the strength of the Mughal forces and vice versa.

The above-mentioned incidents, though do not give us a very coherent and detailed history of the uprisals and the Marathas, yet it throws sufficient light on the activities of the Marathas, their strength and the high morale. By now the Mughal army had become terribly weak. Most of its prominent commanders and generals with the exception of Zulfiqār Khan and Arān-ullāh Khan did not appear active at all. The game was being played, because it could not have been stopped. The orders were issued by Aurangzeb to chastise the Marathas, but from the events it appears that the Mughal officers hardly obeyed them. They appeared to be fear-struck and most of the times they avoided direct clashes with the Maratha commanders.

Thus the end of the warfare was approaching. The Emperor of Hindustān, the strongest Mughal king, the most active ruler of the Mughal dynasty, Aurangzeb had to bow before the nature. His sickness was increasing day by day.

Hardly he could sit down or attend to the court matters. Added to it was the worry of the Marathas. Their strength was increasing and they had become quite powerful in almost all the territory. There was nothing but disappointment and helplessness. His chief aim of marching his armies into the Deccan was not achieved. His generals and army commanders proved to be ineffective before the strength of the Marathas. Due to his sickness, his energies were exhausted. He was lying in helpless condition on the sickbed at Ahmadnagar, praying God and awaiting grimly the approaching end.

At last on Friday, the 21st February 1707, he breathed his last at Ahmadnagar<sup>151</sup> and the guns in the Bughal camp fell into silence. The fighting ceased. The Bughal divisions and the army commanders were recalled. The war which commenced 25 years back came to an end.



FOOTNOTES

- 1 MA, p. 424
- 2 MA, p. 425
- 3 KK, p. 471
- 4 KK, p. 471. Khafi Khan has given a very graphic account of the misery that befell the besieging Mughal army.
- 5 MA, p. 426
- 6 MA, pp. 426-27.
- 7 MA, p. 427
- 8 HA, Vol. V, p. 168, Map. 427. ICP, p. 67 mentions only month i.e. Saka 1622 Ashādh (1700 June-July) about the capture of the fort.
- 9 HA, Vol. V, p. 168
- 10 KK, pp. 473-74
- 11 MA, p. 429. Sābit gadh.
- 12 According to KK, Azam was sent to Ujjain (KK, p. 474)
- 13 HA, Vol. V, p. 170.

Where is this Khavāspur. In the words of Sarkar, "I conjecturally place it on the Mandani river west of Bhushangadh and not on Yevla (east of B.) which has an unfailing water supply." (HA, Vol. V, p. 170 footnote). According to Bhimsen the camp was on river Mān (Bhimsen as quoted by J. Sarkar HA, Vol. V, p.170 footnote). According to Sarkar this was impossible in view of the statement of Māsir-i-Alangiri.

13 Now let us see what Māsir-i-Alamgiri has to say.

According to it the Mughal army commenced its march from Bhushangadh on 19th Safar H.1112 (15 July 1700) and reached Khavāspur on 26th Rabi I (31 August 1700) i.e. it took about 45 days to reach Khavāspur (Map 30). Therefore Khavāspur is not at a day's march from Bhushangadh. A careful reading of the text of Māsir-i-Alamgiri suggests that the march of Mughal army had already commenced from Bhushangadh. It must have halted at some place from where Khavāspur was indicated as at a distance of a day's march. In view of this Sarkar's interpretation appears to be incorrect.

Marathi source SCP, p. 67 (C.P.Shakāvali) is more informative. According to it Aurangzeb encamped at Māini which is about 8 miles east of Bhushangadh and then reached Khavāspur on the banks of the Mān river, which is about 45 miles to the east of Bhushangadh. The Mughal army took about 45 days to reach that place, which appears quite probable in view of the many obstacles on the way.

Therefore in my view Khavāspur referred to, appears to be on the Mān river.

14 MA, p. 431. KK, pp. 475-76.

15 HA, Vol. V, p. 172.

16 HA, Vol. V, p. 172.

- 17 HA, Vol. V, p. 173. Sarkar's information is based on Akhbārāt dated 2/3 August 1700 and 11 January 1701.
- 18 MM, p. 150.
- 19 MA, pp. 436-37
- 20 HA, Vol. V, p. 174
- 21 MA, p. 437, KX, p. 488.
- 22 KX, p. 484
- 23 HA, Vol. V, p. 177. MM, p. 151. Also Fai Dalpat and Mukhlis Khan fought with Dhanaji at Mukeri, Raibagh and Chikodi.
- 24 HA, Vol. V, pp. 177-78. Dilkashā and Akhbārāt as quoted by J. Sarkar.
- 25 HA, Vol. V, p. 178. Ghimlen contradicts this information. According to him, Ramchandra started from Vishālgadh (Khelnā) at the head of a large infantry and cavalry. They came near Panhālā in order to attack the besiegers. They attacked the siege work. Ten <sup>away</sup> miles from Panhālā is Kolhāpur, by that road Banjārās were conveying the food grains. Marathas attacked them. Bidār Bakht sent his men to rescue the Banjārās. Immediately, Sarfaraz Khan Dakhani had also hastened for help. But the Maratha army was quite large and it put the Mughal forces to their heels. Sarfarāz Khan solicited help to Bidār Bakht and Zulfiqār Khan, Rāi Dalpat along with Rām Singh Hādā were despatched to meet the Marathas. A pitched battle took place and Marathas lost about 400 men in killed. (MM, pp. 151-52).

- 26 HA, Vol. V, p. 179.
- 27 HA, Vol. V, p. 177. KK, p. 490 indicates that the negotiations were opened by Muḥammad Murād Khan for handing over the fort to Kāmbaksh.
- 28 HA, p. 438. KK, p. 490, SCP, p. 67.  
<sup>it,</sup>  
 According to/the Mughals got the fort on Saka 1623  
 Jesht (V) 14 i.e. 1701 June 24 for an amount of 55  
 thousand rupees. This is the only source which mentions  
 the exact amount paid by the Mughals. There is also  
 contradiction in the date of vacating the fort. Accord-  
 ing to HA, p. 438, the fort was vacated on 28th May,  
 while SCP, p. 67 gives the date as 24th June. There  
 is no third source available to verify this.
- 29 HA, p. 442. KK, p. 491 makes the statement that  
 Parangadh was taken by the Mughals and renamed Panig-  
 gadh which evidently, the author has mistaken for  
 Visha Vardhangadh. SCP, p. 67 states that Vardhan-  
 gadh was captured by Bidār Bakht sometime in September-  
 October. Evidently there is some mistake about it.  
 It further states that he captured two other forts  
 namely Sāmāngadh and Kalanīdhī during the same time.  
 Persian sources are silent about the capture of these  
 forts. Therefore it is difficult to contradict this  
 information.
- 30 HA, p. 443, SCP, p. 67 gives the date as August-  
 September 1701.

- 31 MA, p. 444. SCP, p. 67 gives the date as Bhādrapad  
Saka 1623 (August-September 1701) which is very close  
to Persian sources.
- 32 Appendix A, No. 219.
- 33 Bombay Gazetteer, XXIV, 2-5.
- 34 APV, No. 2, p. 2.
- 35 APV No. 2, p. 2.
- 36 MA, p. 448.
- 37 MA, p. 449.
- 38 KK, p. 493.
- 39 SCS Vol. V, No. 979, p. 270 Tiryā
- 40 KKP, 493
- 41 KK, p. 495
- 42 KK, pp. 495-96
- 43 KGIS Part II, No. 64, p. 132.
- 44 KGIS Part I, No. 11, pp. 8-9.
- 45 AM, pp. 153-61.
- 46 MA Vol. V, p. 184. Lilkashā as quoted by J. Sarkar.
- 47 KK, p. 496, MA, 453.
- 48 MA, p. 453
- 49 MA, pp. 453-55
- 50 MA, p. 455. It states that Fath-ullah Khan was struck  
by a plank of the raft. It further states that he was  
in bed for a month. From Akhbarat it appears that he  
recovered in 3 weeks.

- 51 MA, p. 454 gives the date of battle as 4th March.  
In the Akhbārāt the date is given as 14th March.  
Therefore, I have placed this incident under 14th March.
- 52 Pājā Jai Singh: According to J. Sarkar he is grandson of Mirzā. Rājā Jai Singh called Sawāi Jai Singh.  
(MA translation by Sarkar, Index p. 340).  
Bhimsen also pays the same (MM, p. 160). But Māsīr-ul-Umrā (Vol. I, p. 164) we come across the information that he was great grandson of Mirzā Pājā Jai Singh.
- 53 MA, p. 455 states that Fath-ullah Khan was also to assist him. This appears to be improbable as Fath-ullah Khan's camp was in front of the main gate to the eastern side of the fort and Bidār Bakht was exactly opposite him on the western side of the fort. It also states that Sidi Yāqut Khan with 2000 men and material was placed at prince's disposal. This again appears to be incorrect as he was already positioned with his men near the siege line of Muhammad Amin Khan near Katār Khelnā.
- 54 CCS, Vol. XII Supplement 36A No. 79, page Cha. The letter is dated 18th March 1702.
- 55 HS, p. 274.
- 56 SCP, p. 67 (G.P.Shakāvali).
- 57 The date of vacating the fort as given in Akhbārāt is 6th June, according to MA, p. 457 it is 22 Muharram i.e. 8th June according to SCP p. 67 (G.P.Shakāvali)

it is Jesht (V, 7 1624 i.e. 5th June). It is difficult to arrive at a correct conclusion, however the date given in Akhbārāt i.e. 6th June appears to be more probable and realistic.

- 58 KK, p. 500 accepts the contention that a bribe was given in order to capture the fort. MA has tried to hide this fact cleverly by saying that some brahmins came from Parashuram's side to negotiate peace, p.457. It is only G.F.Shakavali which mentions about the exact sum paid (see, p. 67).

- 59 MA, p. 459.

The entire narrative from the description of the siege and happenings at various siege lines commencing from February 1701 till the end of the siege is based on original unpublished Akhbārāt i.e. News letters pertaining to 46th regnal year of Aurangzeb's reign. The information is very exhaustive. Unfortunately a few Akhabārāt are missing. However, available records are eloquent about the facts of the siege. The mode of getting the information was either through the spies or the despatch writers employed at each siege line. The reporting has been sincere and factual which helps us to arrive at the correct conclusion (Appendix A Nos. 243 to 267). I have reconstructed it according to the chronology of the events and I have also compared it with other published sources both in Persian and Marathi, wherever possible.

- 60 MA, p. 463
- 61 KK, pp. 303-7 gives graphic account of the sufferings of the Mughal army including the plight of prime minister Asad Khan and Aurangzeb himself during this retreat.
- 62 HA, Vol. V, p. 188. The entire details of the march of the Mughal army are based on information given in Akhbārāt year 46, as quoted by J. Sarkar.
- 63 MM, p. 163.
- 64 MA, p. 469. KK, p. 510 gives the date of arrival of Mughal army as 22nd December. SCP, p. 67.
- 65 Purandare Daftar, Vol. I, No. 20 and 21, p. 12.
- 66 SCP, p. 68. KK, p. 510 mentions that the fort was secured for a large sum. MA is silent about it. Purandare Daftar No. 22, p. 11, mentions that the name of Gomājipant. It is not known whether he is Purandare or not. Only Rajaram by Sardesai, p. 120 mentions the name as Gomāji Purandare. The author has not given the source of his information.
- 67 MA, p. 474. SCP, p. 68 gives the date as 14th April 1703.
- 68 MM, p. 166 Abolā Could this be Abhone close to Bāglān or Ranolā 8 m. from Nandurbār.
- 69 The entire narrative is based on information recorded by Bhimsen. I have used MM pp. 161-68 for this purpose.
- 70 MM, p. 167.
- 71 MM, p. 167



- 72 KK, p. 520. Khafi Khan puts this incident sometime after 1708, which does not appear to be correct. I think it must have taken place as Bhimsen indicates during 1703.
- 73 ECP, p. 68.
- 74 HA, Vol. V, p. 190. According to Manucci two million people perished as quoted by J. Sarkar.
- 75 MA, p. 477.
- 76 MA, p. 478.
- 77 Rajwade, Vol. IV, No. 288, p. 297.
- 78 Rajwade, Vol. XVII, No. 23, pp. 39-40.
- 79 MA, p. 479.
- 80 KK, p. 513.
- 81 Rajwade, Vol. XVII, No. 24, p. 40. No. 27, p. 41. No. 29, p. 42.

As a reward of this gallantry his son Prataprao was promoted to Sena Panch Hazari. The letter from Shankaraji Narayan Sachiv to Pratāprao Silimkar dated 10th January 1704 (No. 25, p. 40).

- 82 MSIH, Vol. I, No. 70, p. 60.
- 83 MA, p. 485. Sarkar has suggested the reading of these names as Firangoji and Dhanāji, but it does not appear to be correct. KK, p. 513 gives only one name i.e. Hanamāji. To me this name appears to be close to Hanamāji which makes some sense. Otherwise names given in the original text are unintelligible.

- 84 SCP, p. 68.
- 85 MA, p. 485. SCP, p. 68 gives the date as 18th February.
- 86 KK, p. 514 indicates the name as Bani Shāhgadh. This evidently appears to a mistake in reading the text. A similar mistake has appeared in reading the name of the fort Nabi Shāhdurg (Panhālā)
- 87 MA, p. 486.
- 88 MA, p. 487, KK, p. 523. SCP, p. 68.
- 89 KK, 523.
- 90 MA, p. 486.
- 91 HA, Vol. V, p. 238. Bhimsen as quoted by J. Sarkar.
- 92 HA, Vol. V, pp. 139-40. Bhimsen as quoted by J. Sarkar.
- 93 HA, Vol. V, pp. 240. Bhimsen as quoted by J. Sarkar.
- 94 HA, Vol. V, p. 240.
- 95 KK, pp. 517-18.
- 96 MSIH, Vol. III, No. 287, pp. 33-36.
- It is not known from the letter who was this prince. Rājevādi and Khānvādi are in Poona district.
- 97 Storiado Mogor, Vol. III, p. 505.
- 98 MA, pp. 489-90.
- 99 MA, p. 489.
- 100 MA, p. 489, SCP, 68.
- 101 KK, p. 173.
- 102 SCP, p. 68. KK, p. 174. Peshwa Daftar, Vol. 31, No. 88, p. 77.

- 103 Peethwas Daftar, Vol. 31, No. 90, p. 79.
- 104 SCP, p. 68.
- 105 Rajaram by Sardesai, pp. 109, 121 and 122.
- 106 HA, Vol. V, p. 225. The date of arrival of the Maratha force is 26th March. According to KK, p. 530 Maratha force consisted of 8 to 9 thousand cavalry.
- 107 SCP, p. 68, MA, p. 480.
- 108 Appendix A No. 220, SCP, p. 68.  
According to Persian sources Nasa'ji was active in Chānda and Deogadh after crossing the Narmada river, MSIH, Vol. IV, No. 29, p. 35.
- 109 SCP, p. 68. MA, p. 480. Firuz Jang received a cash reward of one lakh rupees and promotion to 7 hazāri. Bhimsen contradicts this information. According to him Firuz Jang sent a false report (MM, p. 172).
- 110 MM, p. 180. Kona Shinde, this name appears to be unintelligible. I suggest, it may be Gānāji, abbreviated on the style of Persian writers as Gānā and in the text it might have been written as Kona, which is a normal practice with Persian writers.
- 111 MM, p. 171.
- 112 MM, p. 173.
- 113 SCP, p. 68 gives the date of capture as 1st May.
- 114 HA, Vol. V, p. 245, KK, p. 539.
- 115 MA, p. 510. SCP, p. 69.
- 116 HA, Vol. V, p. 247.

- 117 MA, p. 511, SCP, p. 69.
- 118 MM, p. 182. Persian sources are silent about the amount paid by Zulfiqār Khan. SCP, p. 69 mentions that Zulfiqār Khan paid some amount to the Qiledār.
- 119 MA, p. 512. SCP, p. 69 gives the date as 12th April.
- 120 MA, Vol. V, pp. 431-32.
- 121 MA, Vol. V, p. 432. The author of Mirātul-Ahmadi, pp. 378-88 gives the date as 4th March. KK, p. 518 informs us that Maratha army consisted of 15-16 thousand men and 8 thousand infantry of Koli tribe. Itafit Khan Faujdar of Thaneshwar and Godhra was also present in the battle and he was the only person who escaped safe.
- 122 Storia de Mogor, Vol. IV, p. 252.
- 123 MM, p. 182.
- 124 MM, p. 182.
- 125 MSIH, Vol. No. 136, pp. 136-36.
- 126 Appendix A No. 221, MM, p. 186. Akhbārāt mention that a certain Kāskā who was with Zin-ud-din Khan received a bullet in the throat and most of the Mughal soldiers were killed.
- 127 MM, p. 184.
- 128 MM, p. 184. MA, Vol. V, p. 252. According to Sarkar the Marathas secured the fort by giving bribe to the Mughal Qiledar who was starving for his pay. Manucci (Storia de Mogor, Vol. IV, pp. 249-52) and Bhimsem express an identical opinion. The Qiledar was held to ransom.

- 129 KM, p. 184.
- 130 Appendix A No. 222.
- 131 Appendix A No. 223.
- 132 Appendix A No. 224.
- 133 Appendix A No. 225.
- 134 Appendix A No. 226.
- 135 Appendix<sup>A</sup>/No.227.
- 136 Appendix A No. 228.
- 137 Appendix A No.229.
- 138 Appendix A No. 230.
- 139 Appendix A No. 231.
- 140 Rajwade Vol.XXI, No. 14, pp. 36-37.
- 141 Appendix A No. 232.
- 142 Appendix A No. 233.
- 143 Appendix A No.234.
- 144 Appendix A No. 235.
- 145 Appendix A No. 236.
- 146 Appendix A No. 237.
- 147 Appendix A No. 238.
- 148 Appendix A No. 239.
- 149 Appendix A No. 240.
- 150 Appendix A No. 241.
- 151 According to Marathi sources Aurangzeb died at  
 Bhingār a place close to Ahmednagar. With regard  
 to the date of his death there appears to be some  
 confusion. J. Sarkar in HA, Vol. V, p.267

gives the date as 20th February 1707. According to MA, p. 521 he died on Friday 28 Zīgādā 1118 A.H. i.e. 21 February 1707 (Swamikannu Pillai's Indian Ephemeris Vol.VI - A.D.1600 A.D. 1700 p. 216). The week day was quite definite. Aurangzeb several times expressed his wish to die on Friday. MA has specifically mentioned that he died on Friday. The date corresponding to Friday 28th Zīgādā is 21 February 1707 and not 20th February.

#### CHAPTER IV : AURANGZEB AND THE DECCANI SALATANETS

## CHAPTER IV

AURANGZEB AND THE DECCANI SALTANATESA. ĀDILSHĀHĪ OF BĪJĀPUR DESTROYED

It is said that Aurangzeb was a born Muslim and died a Muslim and the mission of his life was to carry out into practice the tenets of Islām, to propagate that religion everywhere and rule the population according to Islāmic Law. If it be so, then it was quite natural for him to destroy and wipe out all that was non-Islāmic, both in shape and form of animate as well as inanimate. It was more true regarding the destruction of a kingdom which was in existence and which was non-Islāmic in faith. This was the primary concern of his life and ambition. Therefore, one can easily understand about Aurangzeb's motives behind his life long campaigns against the Rajputs and the Marathas. To the modern age his ideology might sound inconsistent, irrational and against human rights. But he made no pretensions about it. The contemporary events and the historical records bear witness to his phastly design and his missionary zeal in carrying it out till the termination of his life. In the proper perspective of events and against the background of Islāmic rule an ideology often pronounced by



Aurangzeb, a student of history fails to understand the real motives of Aurangzeb's destruction of the Deccani Sultanates, which were also Islāmic states with sympathetic bias for spread of Islām. Why did their existence become a soar point for Aurangzeb and could Aurangzeb not have been able to carry out his mission with the assistance of these two Muslim kingdoms? So on and so forth there is an unending train of questions which requires an answer.

To understand answers to these questions it is essential to have closer look at Aurangzeb's life and much deeper analysis of his Islāmic faith. No doubt he was a firm believer in Islāmic faith, but in his own way, he believed in Suni sect and despised as much the Shiya sect. To a great extent in this respect he was selfish and even when he was spreading Islām everywhere, what he actually did was to propagate Suni faith. And wherever he got an opportunity to do away with the followers of Shiya sect, he did it unhesitatingly. What he longed for was a Muslim rule throughout the length and breadth of India, and what he ultimately wished was a Suni sect. Therefore, to his courtiers, he accorded a preferential treatment. Those who were Sunis, definitely benefited more than their deserving Shiya brethren. This particular trait of Aurangzeb's mind which was more often put in practice, explains to a

great extent his intentions in invading the Peccani Sultanate. Aurangzeb who believed in Sunni rule everywhere, saw that both the Peccani states of Bijāpur as well as Golkondā were firm believers of Shiya sect. And he certainly was not willing to accommodate them under his regime, least to talk about their flourishing. This was one of the primary motives of his invasion of these states. But he very cleverly camouflaged it, when a deputation consisting of renowned religious men of Bijāpur awaited on him at the time of his actual invasion. He was confronted with the question of the deputation that both were Islāmic states and would it be proper on his part to destroy the other one which was weaker than his own. In fact did Qurānic instructions permit him to do such an act of aggression against another Muslim state. Aurangzeb with his shrewdness and tact avoided the basic issue in the question and without revealing his real motive, pointed out that, the invasion was a punishment as the ruler of the state was actively but secretly helping an infidel, that he has been found incapable of governing people in accordance with the law of Islām. In addition to the misfortune of these Muslim states being Shiya, they did not cooperate in the past with the emperors of Delhi. In the past the Mughal Emperors always tried to destroy these kingdoms but they were not successful. More recently in 1679,<sup>1</sup> a fresh attempt was made to conquer Bijāpur, but the Mughal general was defeated and

had to go back with utter disappointment. Now he found a ready excuse for invading these states, as they were engaged, so he believed, in helping the Maratha King, his sworn enemy. His grievance was more deep about Bijāpuri ruler than the ruler of Golkondā. But the acts of both of them greatly offended him. At a later date two envoys Cidi Sa'aud Khan and Sayyid Wakhadum of Bijāpur were sent to the Mughal court for enquiring about "Why Aurangzeb made war upon them?" To this Aurangzeb replied that his action was directed not so much against them as against Sambhaji.<sup>2</sup> From 1661, Aurangzeb was busy in preparing the necessary background for his invasion of the Deccani Sultanates. On 13th July 1661, he wrote a friendly letter to Harzākhān, a general in Bijāpur army. He was earnestly called upon to cooperate with the Mughal generals who were entrusted with the task of defeating Sambhaji and recovering the territory from him. It was further added "The Emperor is going to the Deccan to punish Sambha and wrest the Bijāpuri Forts from him. Don't be alarmed but assist Shāh-i-Jahān in his work." And a similar appeal was preferred by Shahar Bānu, a Bijāpuri princess wedded in the Mughal house.<sup>3</sup>

But nothing much of any consequence seems to have happened for next three years.

On 30th March 1664 a farman was despatched to

Sikandar 'Adil Shāh urging him to give Mughal army necessary supplies <sup>at</sup> a free passage and keep a force of 5 to 6 thousand ready to reinforce the Mughal army. He was also warned to keep off from Sambhaji.

Neither the Bijāpuri king, nor his courtiers bothered about the orders from Aurangzeb. This poor response to his call made Aurangzeb to march against the king of Bijapur.

On 13th November 1683 Aurangzeb arrived at Ahmadnagar. Immediately he issued orders for the campaign of Bijapur. The Mughal plan of action was to establish a number of outposts in the Bijapur territory under Razas in north west and Shāh-i-Jahān in the north east. In June 1684, Shāh 'Alam returning from Konkan arrived at Ahmadnagar and he was ordered to proceed to Bijapur territory.

The condition of Bijapur court was helpless because of internal feuds, dissatisfaction, personal jealousies and rivalries. Peace was no more to be seen. Nidī Mas'ud after being prime minister for five years retired from Adoni in November 1683. He was succeeded by Aṣṣaṭṭhau but shortly death deprived him of that post. The king of Bijapur, Sikandar 'Adil was a young boy and could hardly match the diplomacy and statecraft of other courtiers. Thus no adequate arrangements of protecting

Bijapur could be made by him in view of the impending attack. Sharzā Khan was entrusted with the task of defending Bijapur. Sharzā Khan, who had the past experience of fighting the Mughals, got on to the job of organizing the defence. He invited Pān Naik of Wāsiagerā to join him with two Badar followers. A similar request was made to Trinivās Kesāi of Gadag. A letter was despatched to Khan Sawant of Kudāl that he should remain friendly with Sambhaji, should not keep any friendship with the Mughals, and keep the troops ready to descend the Ghats. Thus Sikandar Adil Shāh started moving with his defence preparations. Meanwhile he sent a spirited reply to Aurangzeb demanding return of tribute and territory that had been extracted in the past and withdraw the outposts from his territory. They should march through Sambhaji's territory alone. Finally he refused to banish Sharzā Khan, a demand which was made by Aurangzeb.<sup>7</sup>

This last straw broke down the cause of friendship between the Mughals and Sikandar Shāh. Hostilities were openly declared. The wheels of Mughal artillery started rolling in the direction of Bijapur. The generals were ordered to plant outposts and in 1655 a regular war against Bijapur commenced.

Meanwhile Sikandar Adil Shāh wrote a pathetic letter

beseeching Qutb Shāh of Golkondā to come to his help and send some troops to him. A similar request was made to the Maratha king. The defence of the capital was entrusted to Chintu Chimanā. Sharzā Khan and Abdur rauf took the command of field army. They inflicted a severe defeat on Prince Azam in August 1684.<sup>8</sup> Then a series of events took place.

On 21st February 1685 a Maratha division under Milaji Pandit arrived at Bijāpur. On 28th March Khwāja Abdul Wahmān the Mughal envoy was attacked by Bijāpuri troops. On 1st April 1685, the first trenches were dug and thus commenced the siege of Bijapur. The Mughal preparation of attack was quite extensive. 2900 Barkandaz, 110 pieces of artillery, 40 jāghal, 154 shutarnel, 7501 pounds of gun powder and 23027 men were brought in at the line of the siege.<sup>9</sup> Asghuliāh Khan and Qasim Khan opened trenches on Shampur, half a mile distance from the fort wall, Khān-i-Jahān near Zuhāpur in the west, and Azam's supporting army was posted far away, south west on the bank of the Tungabhadra.

In early April Sharzā Khan had attacked them.<sup>10</sup> It was estimated that Sharzā Khan commanded men twenty thousand strong. During the encounter prince Azam received some wounds.<sup>11</sup> On 24th May Aurangzeb arrived at Sholapur. On 29th May Khān-i-Jahān was sent to Indī

to watch the road from Hyderābād. On 14th June prince Izzat arrived at siege lines and took over the command of the army.

While the Bijāpuris were trying their best to continue the resistance, a force consisting of thirty thousand men was fighting in the siege line, whereas another force, equally strong was out on ravaging and burning the Mughal territory. Thus one year of siege passed away. And the Bijāpuri force kept on fighting courageously. Many a time it attacked siege lines and inflicted casualties in Mughal lines. To the good luck of Sikandar 'Adil Shāh on 10th June Gidi Mas'ud with his troops arrived at Bijāpur. On 14th August a Golkonda force under Anbuji Pandit arrived and on 10th December arrived a Maratha force. This was diverted to ravage the Mughal territory.<sup>12</sup>

On 2nd September 1685 the Mughal army captured an elevated place where they could raise a gun platform to mount their guns and thus the siege lines were pressed closer to the fort wall. On 14th June Aurangzeb left Sholapur and arrived on 3rd July near Masulpurā, a suburb, west of the fort. The siege was pressed hard with the result that supplies to the besieged were cut off. Countless men and horses died in the fort. Inspired by this news the Mughals made an assault. But it failed.

Much losses were sustained by the Mughal forces.<sup>13</sup> But the Mughals remained steady in their attack, and stopped all outside help to the besieged. With continuous fighting the garrison was reduced to a bare strength of 2000 men.<sup>14</sup> At last forced by the circumstances, two Bijāpuri generals Sharfā Khan and Abdur Hauf waited on Piruz Jang for the terms of capitulations. Next night, Sikandar 'Adil Shāh himself paid a visit and agreed to surrender the fort. Thus Sunday, the 12th September 1686<sup>16</sup> saw the downfall of 'Adil Shāhi dynasty and Sikandar 'Adil Shāh was made a virtual prisoner.

#### B. QUTH SHĀHI OF COLKONDĀ DESTROYED

For long, since Aurangzeb became emperor of India he wished to annex the kingdom of Colkondā to the vast map of Mughal dominions. He looked back at the past invasions of the Mughal army in 1656 and 1679 and in 1685 under various generals which brought him nothing but defeats. And every failure saw him getting more and more wild with anger. But the peculiar circumstances then in existence made him swallow these defeats and also the anger. However, the defeat was not forgotten. Since then he had started listing down the sins committed by the ruler of Colkondā Abul Hasan and a follower of Shiya sect. The foremost sin of Abul Hasan, was the



appointment of Madannā and Akhannā, two Brahmins as his ministers and thus giving the supreme control of the state into the hands of infidels. These Rafirs, in their turn extended active help to infidels like Shivaji and Sambhaji by making a pact of defence in case former was attacked. This was certainly intolerable to Aurangzeb, as it was contrary to the mission of his life, i.e. the extinction of the non-believers. The officers of Cutb Shāh had given an offence to the Mughals by seizing the districts of Malkhed, Sedum and some other places which belonged to the Mughal province of Bidar. The war indemnity promised in the treaty of April 1656, and tributes of two lakh hons a year, were in arrears. But this was not a very strange thing, as it was a normal condition of vassal states during those days. During the Mughal invasions of Bijapur, according to Aurangzeb, this Sultan, had the audacity of sending troops to Bijapur in order to continue its efforts against the invading Mughal army.

If helping a brethern in peril in the absence of which the destruction was a certainty and which eventually meant bringing the noose closer to his own neck, and if it meant giving an offence to the Mughal Emperor then Abul Hasan certainly did offend Aurangzeb. King Abul Hasan, who publicly allowed all types of sins like public taverns, brothels, gambling houses, had himself indulged

in excessive sensual pleasures. This was in the opinion of Aurangzeb, contrary to the law and practice of Islām and for which he deserved punishment. Aurangzeb went to an incredible extent in his design and instructed Mirzā Muhammad to play a deliberate mischief in the Golkondā court. And he kept his armies in readiness to march against Golkondā.

Evil was further aggravated by a letter of Qutb Shāh written to the king of Bijāpur sometime before 1st March 1685.<sup>17</sup> In this letter he had stressed upon joint action by the king of Bijāpur, Sambhaji and himself against the Mughals. Herein, he had argued out that this pact of common defence would be very useful in case of Aurangzeb's attack on anyone of them, as ultimate aim of Aurangzeb was to destroy everyone of them. Therefore it was in the interest of each one to help the other. Thus by the end of March 1685 he sent three thousand men and one lakh horses to Sikandar 'Adil Shāh. But unfortunately, this letter was intercepted and Aurangzeb came to know the secret designs of Qutb Shāh. In 1685, Shāh 'Ālam with his vast army was ordered to march against Golkondā. Shāh-i-Jahān was ordered to join him from his out post at Indi. Near Malkhed they were opposed by Golkondā army, headed by prominent generals like Mir Muhammad Ibrāhim, Shaikh Minhāj and Rustumrāo, the gallant nephew of Madannā and the Mughal march was stopped.<sup>18</sup>

In the month of August Jān-Nisār Khan took the fort of Sedum.<sup>19</sup> For a few days there was no fighting. But a little later, the battle was resumed; Shaikh Minnāj and Rustam Rāo were wounded, and their army fled back to Hyderābād. The commander-in-chief of Golkondā army Mir Muḥammad had secretly joined the Mughals. By October 1685, Mughal army started their march towards Hyderābād.<sup>20</sup> Abul Hasan, having heard this news, desperately fled away to the fort of Golkonda. People were panic stricken and confusion prevailed in the city. By about 8th October, Shāh 'Ālam posted his troops in the city. Qutb Shāh begged for terms of peace. He was prepared to pay two lakhs of hons as tribute and one crore and twenty lakh hons as peshkash. He was to give up all claims over Malkhed and Sedum. Finally, he was to remove Madannā and Akannā from their posts.<sup>21</sup>

Sometime in March 1686, Abul Hasan cut off and sent to Shāh 'Ālam the head of Madannā as a proof of his own obedience and submission.<sup>22</sup> Till October-November 1686, the amount of peshkash was not paid. Immediately, Aurangzeb sent his men for recovery. Once again in December Qutb Shāh begged for mercy, but the appeal was rejected. On 29th January 1687, the Mughal army started digging the trenches two miles away from Hyderābād. Qutb Shāh retreated to Golkondā fort and was besieged by the Mughal army.

In January-February, 1687, he surrendered Basavpattan and Hyderābād (Hāyānagar) to Aurangzeb.<sup>23</sup>

The Mughal army, at this time had the most prominent generals to lay siege to the Golkondā fort, to mention a few, Prince Muazzam, Asad Khan, Supullāh Khan, Mahābat Khan, Rājā Shīa Singh, Itiqād Khan, Gulich Khan and many others. Gulich Khan was the first victim of retaliation by the Golkonda army.<sup>24</sup> On 7th February, the trenches were dug and the siege work was accelerated, even then the siege continued for next eight months. The garrison fought bravely, almost day and night.

On 16th May the commander-in-chief of the Mughal army Piruz-Jang made an attempt to take the fort by escalade, but he failed miserably. The garrison gave a sound rebuff. In addition to it there was general confusion in Mughal artillery on account of Saf Shikan Khan quarrelling with Piruz-Jang. And then came utter famine. The Mughal camp was in the grip of starvation. The Golkondā forces joined by the Marathas prevented the movement of grain into the Mughal camp. The misery was aggravated by excessive rain fall in June. Everywhere there was mud and slush and no movement of any type could be effected. The siege work was damaged and lost. The Golkondā soldiers, caught the opportunity and attacked the terrified Mughal troops. Every one deserted its post. Aurangzeb sent reinforcement and some transport elephants.

On 16th June Ispullāh Khan with an armed contingent was sent to face the enemy and progress the work. Meanwhile, Abul Hasan through the captive Mughal officers beseeched Aurangzeb for peace and promised to pay one crore of rupees as an indemnity. But Aurangzeb rejected this offer.

On 20th June a fresh attack was planned. Mines were laid and men were kept in readiness for assault. But to the misfortune of the Mughals the blast of explosion blew the outer part of the fort and thus killed the Mughal soldiers who were waiting in readiness for an assault. About 1100 men were killed. The defenders fell upon the Mughals and added to the confusion and killing. Firuz-Jang rushed to the scene of disaster with a large contingent. There was a fight between the two armies in order to over power each other. Firuz-Jang Rustum Khan and Falpat Kāi were wounded.<sup>25</sup>

"The men could not advance one inch in the face of the murderous discharge of muskets, rockets, chain shot and bombs."<sup>26</sup> Such was the disastrous condition of the Mughal army. Aurangzeb himself in person rushed to avert the defeat and disaster. Asad Khan and Kam Baksh brought reinforcement. The siege which was initially considered to be a matter of a few days, became a challenge for the Mughal prestige and power. Even immense wealth was spent but the siege dragged on. All hope of taking

Colkendā by escalade or breaching the fort walls was gone. On 15th July Prince Hazan was appointed commander-in-chief, in place of Piruz-Jang. New platforms for guns were raised and siege work commenced freshly. And thus eight months were lost without success being in sight for the Mughals. Then the month of September brought change in the situation. 'Abdullāh Pani, an Afghan soldier and a trusted general of Qutb Shāh deserted his master and joined the Mughals.

He opened the porter gate of the fort. 'Abdullāh Khan crossed the breach area and entered the fort unchallenged on 21st September 1617. Prince Hazan with his soldiers joined him and thus at last the victory was proclaimed, though Abdur Razzāq Khan Lāzi, a most loyal noble of Qutb Shāh gave a most gallant and heroic fight, almost single handed to the last, killed many of them and fell wounded and unconscious in defending his master. Abul Hasan was conveyed to Prince Hazan's tent and then presented before Aurangzeb. He was made a virtual prisoner and finally lodged in the fort of Paulatābād.<sup>27</sup> Thus after a great blood shed and unbearable human sufferings, Aurangzeb succeeded in establishing the Mughal rule over the dominions of Qutb Shāh. Thus after a large scale massacre he put down the only surviving Shi'ī state in order to establish the superiority of Suni sect.

Thus finally Aurangzeb cleared off the obstacle in the conquest of the Deccan and derived the satisfaction and happiness of punishing a suspect, who secretly helped the Rāfirs against the law of Islām and reached a step closer in realizing his dream of bringing the entire Deccan under the Mughal banner.

FOOTNOTES

1. In 1603 Shivaji and Ādil Shāh had entered into a treaty. In 1679 Marathas sent precious help in order to defeat Diler Khan. Thus in Sambhaji, both Ādil Shāh and his advisers knew that their only reliable friend in the hour of need.
2. Dutch Records, Vol. 37, as quoted by J. Sarkar in HA, Vol. IV, p. 301.
3. EUS, p. 520.
4. EUS, p. 521.
5. ASI, Vol. III, No. 86, p. 100.
6. A History of the Sawantwādi State. Appendix 1 Nos. 13, 14 and 15, pp. 14-16.
7. HA, Vol. IV, p. 306.
8. HA, Vol. IV, p. 307.
9. HA, Vol. IV, pp. 308 and 311.
10. MA p. 256.
11. Factory Records, Surat; as quoted by J. Sarkar in HA, Vol. IV, p. 312.
12. HA, Vol. IV, p. 313.
13. HA, Vol. IV, p. 323.
14. HA, Vol. IV, p. 324.
15. MA p. 279.
16. KK, p. 294.
17. SCS Vol. II, No. 394, pp. 395-97.



18. HA, Vol. IV, p. 343. Dilkashā as quoted by J. Sarkar.
19. HA, Vol. IV, p. 344.
20. KA, pp. 298-306.
21. KA, p. 307. MA p. 267.
22. HA, Vol. IV, p. 351.
23. SCF, p. 34.
24. MA, p. 290.
25. HA, Vol. IV, pp. 376-77.
26. MA p. 295.
27. HA, Vol. IV, pp. 381-385.

## CHAPTER V : THE MARATHA AND OTHER POWERS

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THE MARATHAS AND OTHER POWERSA. THE MARATHAS AND THE SIDISRELATIONS BETWEEN SHIVAJI AND THE SIDIS

Shivaji was quite aware of the Konkan part of his kingdom being exposed to the danger of attack by sea. He foresaw the necessity of creating his own navy capable of withstanding any attack by any sea power. And so the navy was created. Naval ships were built and Daulat Khan was appointed the chief of navy. His formidable enemies on the sea were, the Sidis, the Portuguese, the Dutch and the English.

Quarrel between Shivaji and the Sidis broke out since the conquest of Rāiri and its adjacent region by Shivaji, on which Sidis had laid their claim since long. This continued for quite some time. The Sidis on the other hand were in possession of Janjirā island, an inaccessible fort in the Arabian sea. It had strategic position on the sea waters and controlled the sea routes.

The island of Janjirā includes Murud, Mandgaon, Mandla, Shrivardhan Mhasale, Govale and five other villages. The total area covered by this island is 325 square miles.

North of it flows river Kundalika and the creek of Rohā, the East is part of Rohā, Māngsōn and Mahād, to the south is the river Āvitri and the creek of Bankot and to the west lies the Arabian sea. The greatest advantage it afforded to the shipping was coast worthy of shipping.

In 1639 Venkoji Satto totally defeated the Sidis and captured all the territory except Janjirā under their command, where the Sidis were forced to take shelter. From a few years since this time, Shivaji could not launch any campaign against the Sidis. But there was a persistent desire in his mind to capture Janjirā along with Landarajpuri. In 1661, Shivaji made an attempt with the help of the English to drive away the Sidis. But the English did not cooperate much and the attempt failed.<sup>1</sup> In April 1669, Shivaji besieged Landā Rājpurī, but failed.<sup>2</sup> Again in 1676 Moropant with a force of ten thousand strong marched to Landārājpurī in order to capture the same. Idi Qāsim, who was then at Landārājpurī defeated the design of Moropant.<sup>3</sup>

In 1677 Sidi Qāsim came to Bombay and stayed there till the end of March 1678.<sup>4</sup> During this period Shivaji sent Maulat Khan, the chief of his Navy, with the armada to destroy the ships of Sidis anchored at Mazgaon. But before Maulat Khan could reach Mazgaon the Portuguese opposed him near Lanvel and he had to return without accomplishing the mission. In August 1678, once again

Shivaji attempted to take Janjira. He sent his forces to lay siege to the island. The siege was carried on for a long time but it did not yield fruitful results.<sup>5</sup>

In 1679, another development took place. Shivaji captured Khanderi. The Sidis and the English were equally opposed it, as each one pretended its claim to this island. The Sidis started from Surat in November and launched an attack on Khanderi. But the attack was successfully repulsed by Shivaji's men. Then the Sidis got into their usual activities of looting and burning the country and landed their men successfully at Underi, another island close to Khanderi.<sup>6</sup>

In January 1680 an agreement was reached between the English and Shivaji in respect of the menace of Sidis to the subjects and territory of Shivaji. It was generally agreed upon that the enemy of Shivaji (the Sidis) would not be allowed to cross Nagothana and Pen. Saud Khan, who had caused great damage to Shivaji's territory would be driven out of Bombay. The Sidis were to be asked by the English to remove their armada at Underi. If this was not done alternatively the English were not to supply food grains, gun powder, ships and manpower to the Sidis.<sup>7</sup>

Thus having secured the support of the English immediately on 27th January Saulat Khan was ordered to assault Underi. But to the ill luck of it, the intelligence about

the intended attack had already leaked out. The assault only brought the disastrous results to the Maratha general.<sup>8</sup> Not having satisfied with this attempt, four days later, on 31st January Isulat Khan once again attacked Underi. The results were not very different than those of the previous occasion.

Such was the chequered history of various battles fought between Shivaji and the Idis. They were open enemies, yet nobody had been able to establish the supremacy over the other, or subdue the other. The period of ten years or so had been marked with continuous battles. This gave an opportunity to Shivaji to build his Navy and a formidable armada.<sup>9</sup> Yet it didnot prove to be very effective against the Idis, who were considered for along a strong sea power and who had occupied the strategic island of Janjirā.

#### CAUSES OF HOSTILITY BETWEEN SAMBHAJI AND THE IDIS

The enmity which began in the days of Shivaji between the Marathas and the Idis continued even during the reign of Sambhaji. The causes of it were the same as those in the past. Idis' fleet had occasionally rushed naval ships from Surat used to come to Bombay for shelter during monsoons. Idis who settled in Sazoon began to ravage the Kaurle Apte territory which belonged to the Marathas. The

Sidis used to bring into Bombay harbour their Maratha prize-vessels and the captives seized by them in the villages of the mainland for ransom. The Bombay council could not prevent such outrages, though by an agreement reached between them and Shivaji, they were very much bound on their neutrality. Sambhaji in turn threatened the English and offered them his alliance if they would only exclude the Sidis from this harbour; but the President of the Council of Surat feared more of the Mughal's displeasure than Sambhaji's, ordered the admittance of the Sidis fleet.<sup>10</sup> The Maratha vessels under admiral Daulat Khan being small in size and armament than Sidis lay sheltered up the Nagothana creek and in Khanderi harbour during the monsoons without venturing pitched battles.<sup>11</sup> The Sidi's presence in these seas closed the passage of the Maratha trading vessels. This was certainly not to be tolerated by Sambhaji. Thus Sambhaji always looked forward for an opportunity to destroy the Sidis and their armada.

The first battle on record given during Sambhaji's time is dated 1st August 1680. A party of Marathas landed in the dark on the island of Khanderi. The Sidis promptly resisted. Many Marathas were killed and a large number were taken as captives. As the report goes '80' heads of the Marathas were brought to Sidi who was at Naggaon.<sup>12</sup> Thus the first venture of the Marathas ended in a disastrous failure.

Subsequently, in October Sambhaji lodged a protest note to the English stating that they had allowed the Sidis to remain in Bombay and also they had supplied them arms and ammunition which was in contravention to the agreement reached between Shivaji and them and finally threatened them that if they failed in driving out the Sidis and allowed the supplies to the Sidis/<sup>they</sup>would be made responsible to pay such cost as incurred by Sambhaji in driving away the Sidis.<sup>13</sup>

This protest note of Sambhaji hardly created the desired effect. On 20th November, Sambhaji sent Avaji Pandit to Bombay with a similar protest. Then Bombay factors wrote to Surat on 27th November seeking their advice in the matter.<sup>14</sup>

Thus passed one year without much activity. In the middle of August 1681 Sambhaji's flotilla consisting of 22 gallivates tried to land 4 thousand men on Underi; but were beaten off by the Sidis' fleet after a fight of four hours.<sup>15</sup>

On 7th December 1681, the Sidis burnt Apte, 10 miles south of Panvel and Raigad was once again a scene of plunder, outrages and insolent captures by Sidi Amir. Glated with these series of successes which the Sidis had gained over the Marathas, the Bombay Gallivats sailed along the shore of Kaurle, carried off the inhabitants



of the place as prisoners and treated them mercilessly.<sup>16</sup>

The news of the outrages soon reached Sambhaji at Rāigadh. He immediately left Rāigadh at the head of 20000 force for Janjira. He also ordered his artillery to move there. Janjira was bombarded from a hill opposite for 30 days incessantly. The fortifications were raised to ground.<sup>17</sup> Another strong force of the Marathas was sent to Bandārājpuri. It bombarded the town for fifteen days and destroyed the fortification completely. The Sidis took shelter in the hills and asked help from the Portuguese. They also threatened them to burn Choul in case the help was refused.<sup>18</sup>

But the Maratha success appeared to be illusive. They did not command the sea and their vessels were unable to transport their army across the base of the channel half a mile breadth to the island in the teeth of Sidi Jasin's fleet stationed there.<sup>19</sup>

Sambhaji more determined than ever, set fifty thousand men to fill the channel eight hundred yards broad and thirty yards deep with stones in order to form a causeway for his storming parties.<sup>20</sup> Had this been accomplished not a single sailor of troublesome Sidis would have escaped alive. But to the misfortune of the Maratha king the Mughal invasion of the North Konkan and the capture of Rāyān on 4th February 1682 forced him to

hasten to Raigadh. The very existence of the state was in peril. He was compelled to leave only ten thousand men behind him to continue the siege work. As a consequence of this, success was ill achieved and once again Sidis got off lightly. Finally Sambhaji raised the siege of Dandārājpuri.

The English continued doing their job in a most unabated way. They paid least response to the protest lodged and requests made by Sambhaji. They constantly engaged themselves in supplying goods to the Sidis. They did not give such importance to the good relations they were to maintain with Sambhaji.<sup>21</sup>

For the next six months Maratha squadrons did not indulge in warlike activities with the Sidis. They kept on preparing and in July 1682 the Marathas delivered an assault on Janjira with a few boats that were at their disposal. They could hardly gain footing on the coast and had to retire with heavy losses. Bād Prabhu<sup>was</sup> made commander. The soldiers were given a lot of encouragement and even gold and silver coins were distributed. In spite of such heavy preparation and inducement the success was ill achieved. The Maratha losses in killed were heavy and not more than 500 returned alive.<sup>22</sup>

Within a month of this disastrous failure of Bād

Prabhu, the Sidis ravaged Zurla (15th August 1682). The  
 Karatha bavaladar Gavan was taken captive and as a mark  
 of humiliation, the Sidis cut off the noses of several  
 inhabitants and carried away many from Nāgothana.<sup>23</sup>

This act of Sidis did not pass unnoticed. Soon in  
 October Sambhaji ordered Sidi Mirri, another of his naval  
 commander to attack Sidi Āsim near Bombay. In 6th October,  
 Sidi Mirri with 30 gallivats gave battle near Bombay to  
 Sidi Āsim who had a squadron of 15 vessels. After a  
 pitched battle, Sidi Mirri was mortally wounded and thus  
 suffered a defeat. But he had captured four vessels of  
 the enemy. Daulat Khan who was in the Nāgothana river was  
 expected to come for the help but did not turn up in time.<sup>24</sup>

From 1683 till the end of 1685 practically there were  
 no activities of the Sidis. In 1684 the Sidis departed  
 from Lazgaon. From this time onwards Bombay was no more  
 the headquarters of the Sidis winter sports.<sup>25</sup>

The peace in Bombay seas lasted till the beginning  
 of 1686. In February Sidi Āsim departed from Pandā-  
 rājpurī. Then he besieged the fort of Kalyan with  
 the hope of capturing it soon. This was done with the  
 sole intention of cutting off supplies and trade with  
 Khanderi and thus take that island by forcing a virtual  
 blockade.<sup>26</sup> But contrary to the expectations, the siege  
 did not last long. Sidi Āsim was ordered to proceed to

Rājāpur in search of prince Akbar.<sup>27</sup>

In March the Sidis landed at Fatahpur by way of Rājāpur. The Maratha squadrons who were after him gave a fight. Sidi lost 400 in killed. He himself received four wounds and very narrowly escaped the death and lost 4 gallivats.

Then there was news of his moving towards Dandārājpurī. In spite of severe defeat in March, the Sidi continued their activities of ravaging the Maratha territory.

In October, he took some forts of Sambhaji and recovered a big gun.<sup>29</sup> After this apparent success the Sidi had big plans of invading and capturing Chanderi. The English at Bombay wisely wrote to Surat council that the Sidi is resolved to attack 'Sandrey'. It will have bad effect on the island of Bombay. The letter advises that the Surat Governor should send a man to Sambhaji and request him to hand over the island of Chanderi to the English untill it becomes a part of their possessions and then to return it to him again. As a result of the activities of the Sidis Pen was certainly in a danger of being lost to the Sidis.<sup>30</sup>

From October 1686 till February 1689, the country remained peaceful. The Sidi did not come to Wazgaon or Bombay. But in February 1689 the Sidi fleet which was

at Bandārājpurī consisted of 11 ships and 7 small vessels. The English at Bombay appear to have been worried as they suspected a surprise attack on them. And shortly their suspicion proved true. On 11th February Sidi Yāqut Khan landed in Bombay with 25 thousand men, looted it and carried away 14 cannons, 2 mortars, some powder shots and shells. The English deserted Mazgaon. This cowardly behaviour of the English further emboldened Sidi Yāqut Khan to despatch a party of his men towards Māhim where they plundered the poor peasants to their hearts content.<sup>31</sup> But to the good luck of the English the Parathas hastened to their help and thus the free passage of the Sidis was stopped.<sup>32</sup>

Finally in June 1690, the Sidis left Mazgaon for good. Mazgaon went in the possession of the English who posted 10 Englishmen, 200 Hindus and 44 Christians for the defence of the place and Sewree Bay.<sup>33</sup> This brought to an end fighting between the Parathas and the Sidis which consumed a lot of energy of the Paratha kings in maintaining peace and independence in the territories adjoined by the sea under their rule.

B. THE MARATHAS AND THE PORTUGUESERELATIONS BETWEEN SHIVAJI AND THE PORTUGUESE

During the reign of Shivaji, the Portuguese were considered only to be a small community mostly engaged in trade activities. Though they built small naval ships, yet they never exhibited an ambition of becoming a great maritime power. Their chief concern was expansion of trade and along with it spread of Christianity which they considered as their religious duty. For the expansion of trade, they indulged in political activities, though it was not their basic aim or policy. The naval ships which they had built were only sufficient to carry their trade and not any prolonged war at sea with a formidable enemy. But it does not mean that they did not built up their army with utmost care and discipline. They also made use of more modernised weapons of war than any other eastern country. Their army was well trained, well disciplined and well maintained. Similarly they carried out systematic expansion of Christianity. Their primary means of achieving their objective was through conversion of the local population to the Christianity. And this was certainly done with more than the missionary zeal. The churches and the local priests were regularly paid by the Portuguese government. This aim was certainly very ambitious on their part. Mostly the local population was Hindu.

Therefore in order to carry out their plan of spreading Christianity they had to induce the people. Wherever the usual inducement or abetment failed, they resorted to force. Coercion became a more prominent method of converting Hindus. This forced conversion had its effects on the people. The local population certainly protested against it.

Thus during Shivaji's time this was one of the important problems before the Hindus in Goa and in the adjacent regions. The subjects on the bordering villages were kidnapped and forcibly converted. Then followed the horrors of inquisition. This problem greatly disturbed the mind of Shivaji. Though there was no direct war between the Portuguese and Shivaji, yet in the heart of heart Portuguese Viceroy at Goa well knew the strength of Shivaji. Therefore as far as possible, the attitude of the Portuguese was to maintain peaceful relations and settle down their problems amicably.

As early as 5th December 1667, a treaty was signed between Shivaji and the Portuguese. In that it was agreed upon that Lakham Savanta and Keshava Naik were to be treated as the vassals of Bijapur. Therefore they were not to be granted any shelter by the Portuguese in Goa and were also not allowed to invade Shivaji's territory. Traders were permitted to carry out trade freely provided

they paid the customs duties.<sup>34</sup> Similarly in 1670 an agreement took place between Shivaji and the Portuguese in respect of their affairs on the Western sea-coast the plying of the boats of each nation in each other's territory and other mercantile matters. The Portuguese showed willingness to help Shivaji against the Imām of Masketh in Arabia but not against the Sidi of Janjirā whom they called as their vassal.<sup>35</sup>

Thus on the whole the relations between Shivaji and the Portuguese were more or less amicable. The Portuguese never directly declared any war nor invaded Shivaji's territory. At the end of Shivaji's career there were long drawn out negotiations between him and the Portuguese about the payment of 'Chaauth' near the Taran border in the north.<sup>36</sup> The haunting problem of forced conversions did not figure in any of the agreements; this might have been due to the might and the potentialities of Shivaji. From the historical records it appears that these friendly relations continued till the death of Shivaji. In fact on the death of Shivaji the Portuguese offered condolence to Sambhaji and assured their friendship to him.<sup>37</sup>

#### CAUSE OF FACTION BETWEEN SAMBHAJI AND THE PORTUGUESE

If such were the cordial relations existing between Shivaji and the Portuguese then, after the death of Shivaji,



what made his successor to take up arms against this foreign power? On Shivaji's death, the Portuguese extended their hand of friendship to Sambhaji. The treaties which were made by Shivaji were not at all nullified or withdrawn.

It is therefore evident that the trouble with the Portuguese does not appear to have developed suddenly. The foremost cause of friction is traceable as early as January 1677. From January 1677 till March 1678 Shivaji was out on his grand expedition of Karnāṭaka while Sambhaji who stayed behind in Maharashtra was looking after certain affairs of the state. He demanded from the Portuguese sixty villages on the ground that they belong to the fort of <sup>38</sup> Bonda. These villages were under Maratha domination. The Portuguese refused to concede. As a result of it the Marathas made an attack on this so called Portuguese <sup>39</sup> possession.

According to the treaty signed by Shivaji with the Portuguese the merchants of either territories were permitted to carry on the trade freely after payment of the requisite taxes. But a little later it was found that the merchants of Goa, who were to get passage through Bicholi up the ghats were refused the same.

The Maratha Subahdār of Bicholi tyrannized and robbed the merchants. It certainly created a feeling of in-

security among the merchants from the Portuguese territory. Soon Sambhaji transferred the Subāhdār from this place. In Daman the Portuguese killed some Marathas. And Sambhaji seems to have sent a force against them as contemporary records speak the Portuguese at Daman being in great trouble. At the end of 1661 Sambhaji besieged Janjira, a strong hold of the Idis who had been menacing the Maratha subjects for long and requested help from the Portuguese of Chaul. The Portuguese refused the same. Sambhaji having seen his political cause being weakened, threatened to burn Chaul, in order to bring pressure upon the Portuguese. The Portuguese viceroy reacted to it in a most violent way. The viceroy led an expedition against Phondā, a Maratha possession, in order to create a diversion in favour of the besieged Portuguese at Chaul. In this encounter with the Portuguese, Kesāji Kank and his son Krishnāji, the two notable Marathas gave determined fight to the invading Portuguese. This has gone in the history of Marathas as a great act of valour and bravery of these two men, who were severely injured. Subsequently Krishnāji Kank succumbed to the injuries and died. Both were meritoriously rewarded by their king Sambhaji.<sup>40</sup>

In spite of this the matters did not inflame much. In 1662 island of Anjdiv, south of Karwar, was vacated by Portuguese and the English, due to bad climate. Sambhaji wished to occupy it and sent a Maratha force for necessary occupation.<sup>41</sup>

The Portuguese Viceroy, Conde de Alvar sent Portuguese soldiers loaded in ships to drive away the Maratha force, and began to fortify the island. Not only this, the Portuguese added insult to injury to the Maratha Rājā by an unfriendly act of passing the Mughal ships under the Portuguese fort of Thānā up the creek to Kalyan, carrying provisions, for Mughal army under Ran Mast Khan, then ravaging the district.<sup>42</sup> And the last straw was added to this mounting tension between the Portuguese and the Marathas, when, on 5th May, 1682, the Portuguese demolished a Hindu temple and turned it <sup>in-</sup>to a church. This act of the Portuguese brought in the most devastating results. According to contemporary record, "The Portuguese have done such actions already in burning men alive and destroying pagodas that Sambhaji will not easily put up with them."<sup>43</sup> As a result of possible retaliation, 200 families (Portuguese) migrated from the territory of Sambhaji. The Portuguese desired to settle down these families as well another 500 families in the island of Anjdiv. By now they well fortified the island of Anjdiv against a possible attack from the Marathas. Sometimes before July, Sambhaji, sent a strong force of 4 thousand men under Sād Prabhu in order to take possession of Mandārājpuri. A fierce battle ensued and the Marathas lost 500 in killed. The campaign did not bring any success to the Marathas.<sup>44</sup>

In the last week of March, 1683, the Mughal army under Shah Alam, after having disasterously blown up, withdrew from north Konkan. Thus Sambhaji was temporarily freed from the worry of Mughal invasion. And without loss of much of time, by 15th April he launched his attack on the Portuguese territory. His army consisted of two thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry. The first town to be the victim of this invasion was Tārāpur. It was burnt and looted and then followed a mass action. All other villages from Daman to Basaien were destroyed by the mighty force of Sambhaji. Manual Alvares, a native of India and captain of Tārāpur resisted the attack and according to the Portuguese source of information as many as 700 Marathas lost their lives in this combat.<sup>45</sup>

#### OCCUPATION OF CHAUL - A BONE OF CONTENTION

Chaul, a small territory near Alibāg, Bombay was divided into two parts, upper Chaul, and lower Chaul. Upper Chaul was under the possession of the Marathas and the Lower Chaul was governed by Don Francisco da Costa, a captain of the Portuguese. The territory of Chaul controlled the passage of march of army by the sea to the Portuguese territory of Goa. Therefore, each state, tried to exercise full control over the entire territory of Chaul. Each one was on the look out of an excuse and attack the other,

in fact all the strategy was directed to catch the other one unawares.

In the beginning of May, 1683, the Portuguese captain of Lower Chaul bombarded and partly demolished upper Chaul in reprisal for the detention of a Portuguese priest in prison there.<sup>46</sup> The news speedily reached the Maratha Headquarters. Sambhaji hastened to take action. By 10th August 6000 infantry and 1000 cavalry of the Marathas arrived at Chaul and besieged Lower Chaul.<sup>47</sup> After eight days since the siege, i.e. on 18th August an assault was made by the besieging army. The night watch had dispersed and the men, weary from their vigil, were resting and others were withdrawing to their houses the Marathas attacked the walls, with many scaling ladders, which they easily set up there being very few to oppose them. But the alarm being sounded religious and lay men flew to the walls, slew those who were already upon the walls and threw down all the scaling ladders. The Marathas suffered great loss and in a short time were forced to abandon their attempt.<sup>48</sup>

On the same day the Marathas made a gallant attempt to storm the fortress of Murvo which is situated at the mouth of the bar of the town of Chaul. Six persons were sent in advance to get the intelligence of the enemy. They were to scale the fortress walls, kill the sentries,

there and give a signal by sounding the trumpets, so that the rest of the Maratha army could follow them and attack the enemy unaware. But to the ill luck of the Marathas, the things did not go as planned. The six persons after scaling the wall of the fortress, were captured by the Portuguese most unaware. They were put to severe torture and thus confessed the purpose of their visit. The captain of the fort promptly ordered to load the guns and gave signal of attack by blowing trumpets. And now it was the turn of the Maratha soldiers to get surprised by their enemy, by falling in their own trap. As soon as the Marathas heard the signal, they made a singular dash towards the fort wall and with equal swiftness, the Portuguese guns burst open, with thunderous sound and earth shaking noise. The Marathas fell before the artillery fire like ants, helpless, powerless and astonished. More than five hundred were lost in this surprise venture. As the realization dawned upon the Maratha leaders, they withdrew from the attack. Thus on two different parts Marathas faced severe defeat at the hands of the Portuguese. Sambhaji's desire of delivering a blow to the Portuguese power remained unfulfilled.<sup>49</sup>

Then for a month or so there was no major battle fought between Sambhaji and the Portuguese. But certain skirmishes did take place. In the plain of Ghaul

outside the fort is Capuchin convent and church of the Virgin, with a watch tower in one corner of the enclosure. It was held by a small force of Indians and Portuguese soldiers for over five months. Marathas wanted to bring it under their possession, for commanding the interior of the fort. They attacked it several times but could not capture.

Some time later, Francisco de Tavors, the Viceroy of Goa, received the report of Sambhaji's march to his territory with a large army. On 27th August, he promptly called out and armed all the monks of the city. Then within a few days he took the decision of invading Sambhaji's territory. On 7th September, at midnight, he assembled all the Indians on the island and ferried them across the river to the mainland of Sāwantwādi with a general licence to plunder.<sup>50</sup>

#### BATTLE OF PONDÁ

Before November 1683 Sambhaji was at Rājpurī. He was constantly receiving the reports of increased activities of the Portuguese. He was much annoyed to learn that the Portuguese soldiers landed at Sāwantwādi and burnt the villages. The Viceroy of Goa planned to lay siege to Pondā, 10 miles s.s.e. of Goa town. He disembarked at Durbahat on the right bank of Rachol river, 3 miles s.w.

of Ponda. He had 800 white and 3000 Kanarese troops and 5 pieces of artillery with him. An exchange of fire took place between the Portuguese and Maratha troops for three days. The Portuguese fired their guns at fortress wall and breached it with great difficulty. On 9th November they decided to scale the breach of the inner wall. But to the ill luck of the Portuguese, a Maratha force under Sambhaji ~~came~~ arrived that very day and the Portuguese soldiers were in appalling condition. On 11th November the Portuguese decided to retreat from Bhubhat to Goa. A hill dominated the place of embarkation. The Portuguese Viceroy ordered to take its possession from the Marathas for their safe retreat. The Marathas who were in ambush behind the hill retreated quietly and waited for an opportunity to attack. The Portuguese infantry followed them and reached the plains. The Portuguese in their elusive chase and in the wild happiness of seeing Marathas on their heels, forgot the Maratha tactics of war. As the infantry appeared in open the Maratha cavalry fell upon them ruthlessly. The Portuguese army was put in total disorder and many soldiers were trampled under the hoofs of the Maratha horse.<sup>54</sup> 'If the Portuguese infantry nearly a whole company of sea-men were killed....the dead and wounded amounting to two hundred'. Thus at the battle of Bhubhat, the scales were turned against the Portuguese and the Marathas became victorious. Marathas not only



retained Ponda but created devils fear in the Portuguese rank and file.

#### OCCUPATION OF ST. STEPHEN ISLAND

The island is small one and located to the east of Goa. It is also called Sento Bastevao. It was under Portuguese possession and was considered vital in view of war strategy, if an attack was to be launched on Goa. The Maratha Raja, Sambhaji, thought it fit to occupy the island in view of the attack and occupation of Goa. On 24th November, 1683 at 10<sup>0</sup>' clock by means of a dry channel which could be forded at low tide with the water to the knees, forty Marathas entered the island of St. Stephen, and climbing the hill they reached the fort. They placed scaling ladders against the walls, without any resistance entered fort and killed the Portuguese captain. An alarm was sounded and the Portuguese arranged themselves in order to resist the attack. Next morning (25th November) the Portuguese viceroy himself disembarked at the island with 300 picked men. The men climbed the hill and were ordered to attack the Marathas. On the hill were 40 Maratha musketeers. As they were attacked by the Portuguese, they did not resist, but started retreating. Shortly a reinforcement of 300 cavalry joined them. And then they fell back on the Portuguese soldiers. The Portuguese

soldiers had least expected such an action and were put to flight. A great confusion prevailed. The Portuguese Viceroy was attacked by cavalry men. But owing to his good luck, he managed to escape from the hands of the Marathas. He took to flight. The Portuguese suffered a loss of 150 in dead and wounded.<sup>55</sup> Thus Marathas successfully occupied the small island of St. Stephen.

But the Portuguese gained a striking success immediately afterwards. They pretended to evacuate the small island of Cambarji, immediately to the east of Goa and south of St. Stephen. The Maratha army fell into the Portuguese trap. Sambhaji occupied this island with 7000 picked troops. The object in occupying the island was to get clearer to Goa. The Portuguese flotilla had occupied the two wide streams that enclose Cambarji, while on the remaining side, the guns from the fort kept on pouring fire on the invading army of the Marathas. The Marathas suffered heavy loss of human life. To the good luck of the Marathas, their leader and King Sambhaji had left the island after its siege immediately.<sup>56</sup> Thus Cambarji brought disastrous results to the Marathas.

The immediate effect of this battle looked to be great on the Maratha war strategy as at the same time Shāh Ālam's invasion of South Konkan began. The Marathas King Sambhaji engaged himself in making peace with the

Portuguese. He employed Durgādās as an ambassador to negotiate peace with the Portuguese.<sup>57</sup> But nothing seems to have come out of these efforts.

By the end of year 1683, the conquest of Goa was almost in sight of the Marathas, rest of the satellites of small islands and villages surrounding that small island had already accepted the domination of the Marathas. Everything seemed to be going all right and it was expected that in a short period Maratha flag would be flying high over Goa. Sambhaji's dream of bringing that territory under Maratha rule and bringing the culprits to the books for indulging into forced conversions and inquest did not seem to be far off.

But such was not the course of destiny. In the political field of Marathas a new factor appeared and it was in the shape of prince Shah Alam's invasion of South Konkan. This shook the very foundation of the Maratha Kingdom. The very existence of the state came into close danger. As a natural consequence of this campaign Sambhaji was forced to change his strategy of war and divert most of the forces now engaged against the Portuguese, to protect Konkan. As a result of this action of the Maratha King the Portuguese, who were almost beaten got a little breathing time. They took this opportunity and made peace with Sambhaji on the condition that Karanja was restored to them.

On account of being forced to fight at two different fronts, Sambhaji chose the wise course of making peace with the Portuguese, which eventually came to be known as treaty of Bhingadh. Bhingadh is jungle 27 miles east of Goa. After his invasion of Goain December 1683, here he retreated and made dash towards Rājgadh in order to make military arrangements to meet Shāh Ālam's army which was descending Rānghat in south Konkan. Behind him at Bhingadh he left prince Akbar and Kavi Kalash to negotiate the peace treaty. On 2nd January 1684, Manuel Sarava de Albuquerque set out as an envoy to conduct the peace treaty on behalf of the Portuguese. Shortly the terms of the treaty were drawn and fighting ceased between these two powers. The Portuguese prisoners of war captured at Salsette and Bardesh were released.<sup>61</sup> And at least temporarily peace prevailed among the Portuguese and the Maratha lines. Sambhaji expected that for some time to come he would be free to attend to other affairs of the state. He did not expect Portuguese to play any mischief, as contemporary records inform us. "There is now a cessation of arms and (we) hope there may be peace, the Portuguese having been soundly banged and all their aldeas (villages) and battee (foodgrains) ground burnt and ruined." By March the conditions had turned favourable to Sambhaji. Shāh Ālam who had invaded South Konkan with monstrous Mughal force received a crippling blow in the shape of famine and

pestilence. In the grip of devastation, he proposed to retreat. And Sambhaji was not the king to let go such fine opportunity without exploiting it to his advantage, and settle the old score with his Portuguese neighbour.

He issued orders for fresh attack on the Portuguese. On the 10th March his armada seized several rice boats which were brought into Karwar port by the Portuguese. He ordered his army to march towards Ponda and make a surprise attack on Goa.<sup>62</sup> In spite of those orders, nothing seems to have come forth. In June Portuguese Viceroy visited all his forts and important places. He had not paid the tribute as demanded by Sambhaji and he certainly was anticipating an attack by the Maratha army. In spite of such anticipations, when the Portuguese Viceroy saw that Marathas had not made dash on to his territory, he in turn played a mischief. On 19th September the Portuguese attacked and recovered high hill in Karanja island, that had been occupied by Sambhaji nine months back. The entire Maratha garrison was made prisoner. Even then there was no outbreak of hostilities between Portuguese and Marathas. Certain minor incidents did take place, but they can be discarded only as skirmishes. From now onwards till the end of Sambhaji's reign though no major battle took place between him and the Portuguese yet the languid hostilities continued till the end of his reign. The Portuguese war remained an open sore for years and continued to drain the blood of the Maratha State.<sup>63</sup>

C. MARATHAS AND THE ENGLISHRELATIONS BETWEEN SHIVAJI AND THE ENGLISH

In the beginning of 1670 Shivaji took possession of most of the forts in Maharashtra, which were earlier either under Adil Shahi or the Mughal rule. Immediately the first reaction came from the English factors at Bombay, who wrote on 30th March, 1670 that "Shivaji has become our neighbour near Bombay. He has taken Kalian and Bhivandi. He will prove to be a better neighbour than Moors." The English, showed preference to Shivaji's rule than that of any one else. Again Surat factors wrote to Bombay on the 14th April, 1670 that they have given full consent to the correspondence opened by Bombay factors with the Subahdar of Bhivandi and they need not unnecessarily be worried about the threats from the Moors. But none the less they were advised not to involve themselves in quarrel with any power, but they should try and remain neutral. Their sole purpose should be to carry on trade in the country. Thus they were asked to maintain friends to all. Though openly the English pleaded for the friendship of all and particularly that of Shivaji, yet secretly, they supported the activities of the Sidis in Kalian Bhivandi region, who was a sworn enemy of Shivaji. They avoided open conflict with Shivaji on any issue. Shivaji on his part also acted in the spirit of

friendship and proper understanding. This is particularly evident, when he sacked Surat for the second time; he took particular precaution of doing no damage to the English goods there. The English factors though pretended friendship with Shivaji, yet did not actually help him, when he needed their help. In 1671 Shivaji asked for some guns and ammunition from the English. Far from supplying, they even postponed a reply to his urgent request. This attitude appears to be very much in keeping with their earlier policy of neutrality. Probably this act of being unhelpful to Shivaji was weighing upper most on their mind, and as they got an opportunity they did help Shivaji, though indirectly by not allowing the Sidis to rest in Bombay for passing the monsoons (1671). But they were forced to give way to the Mughal fleets. But Shivaji did not condone this act as is evident, from the records, that when Thomas Nicholes, the representative of the English went to Shivaji to negotiate some concessions in respect of Hubli, Shivaji turned them down promptly.

Still, as a result of these talks Shivaji permitted them to carry on their trade (December 1679) which had ceased for quite a long time. In addition to this, they sent Rām Shenvi for conducting talks with Annaji Netto the Subāhdār of Chaul. In the agreement reached at it was decided that, the English would not supply any ammunition

and guns to the Sidis, they would not allow any enemy of Shivaji to pass through Bombay harbour, the traders from Shivaji's territory would not be put to any inconvenience or harassment and finally Āu Khan, who had joined the service of the Sidis and ravaged the territory of Shivaji would be punished by them and driven out of the island. This agreement was a singular triumph of Shivaji's diplomacy and his most tactful handling of the problem of foreign power on Indian soil. Thus the relation existed between Shivaji and the English were quite cordial. From time to time, it is seen that the English were quite afraid of Shivaji's strength, particularly since their defeat at Khānderi. Since then they chose the role of being more friendly and thus achieve their object of trade.

But then that was not the end in itself as far as the English were concerned. They never lost sight of an opportunity if they were to be benefited by it and if they were to sacrifice the friendship. They always looked upon time, opportunity and the relative strength of the concerned power and unhesitatingly furthered their motives. This necessarily forced Shivaji not to rely upon the English as his allies or rely upon their word when occasion demanded so.



SAMBHAJI AND THE ENGLISH

After Sambhaji's accession to the throne in 1680, he appointed a new Subāhdār to the territory of Chaul. In May, 1680, the English wanted to wind up their trade in Rajapur. They requested Sambhaji to permit them to leave Rajapur. But during this period, Sambhaji was much occupied with the internal affairs and could not pay any attention to the request of the English. In October, English factors of Rajapur received the news about the movements of the Maratha troops and heard that a large number of them including armada was being positioned at Bombay. This was mainly to counteract the Sidis who were becoming powerful. Meanwhile, a representative of the English came to the court of Sambhaji and requested for an amount of money. He had to return in disappointment as he was told that the English had given shelter to the Sidis and also supplied them with guns and ammunitions. This was in contravention to the agreement concluded between them and Shivaji in 1679. And till the time the English did not drive out the Sidis from Bombay and stopped the supply of arms, the Maratha king would not care for the English. But if they did drive out the Sidis, they would certainly get large amounts as gifts and also compensation for losses. Thus in the early days of Sambhaji's reign, a friction started between the smooth relations of the Marathas and the English. In spite of such

strong note of protest from the Maratha king the English hardly did anything to improve them. As a consequence of it, on 14th November 1680, the Bombay factors informed Surat that Sambhaji was busy in the preparation of an armada at Rājāpur manned by 4 to 5 thousand fighting personnel. On 20th November 1680, Avaji Pandit arrived at Bombay and informed the English that if they did not honour the agreement between them and Shivaji, and drive away the Sidis, then Sambhaji would be forced to declare a war against them. The cost of getting rid of the Sidi menace to the Marathas was very high. Sambhaji had to raise a standing force of ten thousand men. The Sidis<sup>64</sup> ravaged the country from Apta to Kurla.

This visit of Sambhaji's envoy to the English had the desired effect. On 20th December, the English sent Garry and Robert Tharbin to the Sidis and got in writing from them that they would not ravage the territory of Sambhaji.<sup>65</sup> After this the Sidis left for Vengurla and were chased by Daulat Khan, the naval commander of Sambhaji. But that was not the end of the Sidi's menace. In the beginning of March 1681, the Sidis returned in the vicinity of Bombay and seized a boat and four persons of Sambhaji. Immediately, the Subāhdār of Chaul demanded the return of the same from the English. No doubt the English were put in a difficult position, still they

managed to overcome it. By 12th April, the English made arrangements of returning the men to the Subāhdār of Chaul.<sup>66</sup>

In June 1673, the English sent a certain Nārāyan Shenavi as their representative to Shivaji's court. But nothing seems to have come out of it as Nārāyan Shenavi returned along with a courtier of Shivaji. They however did not give up the hope about their mission and sent Narayan Shenavi again on 24th March 1674. On the occasion of Shivaji's coronation the English sent costly presents in order to earn the good-will of Shivaji. But the English had put their own limitations and when in 1674 he pressed for his demand for supply of guns, the English politely declined telling 'so far and no more'. Similar story was repeated in July 1675. But Shivaji never misconstrued policy of the English and always extended concessions and facilities to them to carry on trade and business in his territory. In 1678 Shivaji gathered his troops near Ranagar. This certainly caused alarm in the mind of the English. But Bombay factors advised Surat not to get worried over it. And reciprocated by driving the Sidis from Bombay during the monsoon of 1678. This brought a great deal of satisfaction to Shivaji. Immediately followed a more dreadful news about Shivaji's intended attack on the Sidis under his veteran naval captain Daulat Khan. As a result of this the English vacated Rajapur and

suffered a loss in the trade. Shivaji, realizing this opened talks with them and asked them to resettle at Rājapur.

In 1679, Shivaji occupied the island of Khānderi much against the desire of the English. In addition to it he equipped that island with guns and ammunition and built a fortress wall. He posted enough men for its protection against any attack. The English disputed having their claim over it. According to Shivaji the strategic importance of this place was great, as this was stepping stone towards wiping out the menace of the Sidis to his subject. With the control over this island he could forcefully stop naval movements of the Sidis or the Dutch. The English made an attempt to take over this island from Shivaji, but the same ended in a disastrous failure. Having faced the miserable failure, the English were quick enough to turn their stand and opened peace talks with Shivaji. This was done, again with more selfish end, so that their rivals like the Portuguese and the Sidis should not be benefited by their defeat. They also expected the Sidis to come down to Rānda Rājpurī during this period.

On 17th April the Sidis left for Surat with their ships. But meanwhile another blow was given to the relations of the Marathas and the English. On 12th February, Sambhaji sacked Dharangaon. The English factors sustained

some losses and demanded compensation from Avaji Pandit, the Maratha representative. Avaji Pandit had earned the good-will of the English. The matter did not go beyond control and in June he left for Raigadh in order to represent the case of the English to Sambhaji. The English company in London became aware of the situation and before the English at Charangaon could take any retaliative measure, they were instructed to refrain from any fighting with any of the powers. Thus a direct clash between the English and the Marathas was avoided. But the problem of the Sidis remained unabated and unsolved. The English had accepted the responsibility of doing away with this menace; as a result of this, whenever Sidis appeared near Bombay, or in the territory of Sambhaji, they were confronted with very peculiar situation. The English could neither afford to break the old agreement with the Marathas or accept open hostilities with the Sidis, who were quite powerful at the sea.

In December again, the Sidi ravaged and burnt the territory of Apte-Kurle. As a result of it the food supplies of the English were stopped and the Marathas forced a virtual blockade on the English factors. It was lifted only when the English gave an undertaking that they would do away with the menace of the Sidis. After that only they were permitted to carry on trade in Apte-Kurle.

territory. The English factors at Bombay always looked for advice from their head office at Surat. In January 1682, Sidi Qasim anchored at Bombay. Promptly they wrote to Surat as to the action to be taken. Sidi Qasim was very likely to ravage the territory of Sambhaji and hence their relations would not have remained harmonious. The Mughal general Hasan Ali Khan was also ravaging the territory of Kalyan. The English factors at Bombay were really on the horns of a dilemma. Surat factors advised them to help secretly Sambhaji against the Sidis. But they were also asked to supply arms and ammunition to the Mughal general. To this the Bombay factors expressed their helplessness as on an earlier occasion when Sambhaji visited Portuguese at Chaul and had got the information that if were the English who helped the enemy of Sambhaji. Then Sambhaji had sent his representative to Pan and requested them to prohibit the entry of the Sidis.

Surat factors could not properly judge the situation that the Bombay factors were confronted with. They coolly advised them to help the Sidis. On 25th April they also advised Bombay factors to maintain good relations with Sambhaji. It was a most delicate and equally explosive situation that the Bombay factors had to confront with. Finally, judging the situation for themselves the Bombay factors took the decision and did not allow Sidi Qasim

to anchor in Bombay harbour. They also lodged a protest that the Sidis were not keeping the verbal promises made to them and were indulging into ravages and loot of Sambhaji's territory. This decision of the Bombay factors of not giving shelter to the Sidis was much resented by Surat council. By October, Surat was informed about the likely mischief, the Sidis would play in Sambhaji's territory, which meant incurring wrath of Sambhaji. And as a consequence of this Sambhaji stopped all supplies of grain. They requested Surat to send them armada for their rescue. But this did not relieve the situation. Finally they wrote to Surat that unless the Sidis clear off from there, they had no hope of getting any supplies. Thus Sambhaji effectively controlled the English factors.

In November 1682, a rumour obtained currency that Daulat Khan, the chief of the Maratha Navy had received positive orders from Sambhaji to invade Bombay without fail and before the arrival of Sidis there. But it soon proved to be false. The Maratha ambassador who came to the English brought the news about the likely surprise attack from Aurangzeb on Bombay.<sup>67</sup> This attempt on Sambhaji's part points out his effort to win more allies to face the invasion of Aurangzeb. It is not known from the available records if the English acted favourably or not. But in all likelihood it seems that they did not.

Right from the early times, the English considered the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb as their enemy. Probably and more likely as a result of poor response to Sambhaji's call, he attacked the English ship 'President'. 11 people of the English were lost in killed and 35 in wounded. Sambhaji lost three ships out of six.

Next year passed without much of activity. By the end of April 1684, Keigwin/<sup>the</sup> chief of English factor sent captain Garry to Sambhaji for certain negotiations.<sup>68</sup> Pān Shenvi and Thomas Pitkins had accompanied him. Keigwin was informed by Sambhaji that the English should treat the enemy of the Marathas as their enemy and similarly a friend of theirs be treated as friend of the English.<sup>69</sup>

Many times Sambhaji had informed the English about driving out the Sidis, but nothing definite in that respect had happened. If only the English could destroy the Sidis the Marathas would give the necessary help. And almost within a month's time a settlement was reached between the English and the Marathas, which later on came to be known as a settlement of the 15th May 1684. By this the English were permitted to open godowns in Karnātaka in Sambhaji's territory. The Maratha Subahdār was made responsible for any theft of the English goods and to bring the offender to the books. 2 1/2% duty was to be charged on the goods imported by the English but



they were prohibited from buying any person for slave trade and indulge into forced conversions to Christianity. The English were given assurance of other facilities, which other Christians were enjoying. A special mention was made with regard to the relations of the Bombay factors and the Marathas. They were to remain friendly and were to forget the past quarrels. The permit for export and import of goods was granted. If perchance, Marathas captured any English goods during any loot of the Mughal territory or ships, the same would be returned to them after necessary verification. And finally if there was any misgiving about the settlement, the same would be settled mutually rather than overthrowing the agreement itself.<sup>70</sup>

Thus atleast, Sambhaji got some relief from one foreign power atleast. According to this agreement Sambhaji did pay compensation to the English wherever it was necessary and convincing. The English on their part also much desired peace with the Maratha king and the agreement seems to have worked well for some more years. At the end of 1687, the English complained to Sambhaji about non-payment of dues for driving away the Sidis and maintenance of their armada, and finally threatened to withdraw their armed help at sea, if in due course of time compensation demanded were not paid.<sup>71</sup> However, there are no documents avail-

able to show, how this complaint was disposed of by Sambhaji. But on the whole it seems that the English maintained harmonious relations with Sambhaji. And the same attitude was continued ever after 1690. The authorities of the company tried to be on good terms with their troublesome enemies - at one moment siding with one party at another helping a weaker party, whose ruin might contribute to the downfall of the English themselves.

This policy they followed in their dealings with the Sidis and the Angrey. They were not slow to realize that the Sidis power was waning nor did they fail to understand that Angrey was becoming as dangerous as, if not more dangerous than the Sidis. To crush the Angrey was absolutely impossible; therefore the only choice left to them was to consolidate their position and to multiply their resources, and in the meantime to give all possible support to the Sidis to use them as a foil to the Angrey.<sup>72</sup> Such was the real attitude of the English towards the Marathas. And the Marathas had grasped this policy in time and kept the English well under their control, some times by way of threats, and some times by giving many concessions and permits for trade. The Marathas unmistakably used the English, to all possible extent against the Sidis.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 BS, pp. 10-11
- 2 BS, p. 13
- 3 HF, pp. 56-57, BS, pp. 24-25
- 4 BS, p. 29
- 5 HF, pp. 87-88
- 6 Fryer, pp. 169-70
- 7 BS, p. 31
- 8 BS, p. 31
- 9 BS, p. 29. Shivaji had gathered 22 masted grats 40 gallivats
- 10 HA, Vol. IV, p. 265
- 11 HA, Vol. IV, pp. 265-66
- 12 BS, pp. 32-33
- 13 BISMQ, Vol. II, p. 15. The author has not given the source of his information
- 14 HS, p. 216
- 15 HA, Vol. IV, p. 266
- 16 BS, p. 33
- 17 HA, Vol. IV, p. 266
- 18 BISMQ, Vol. II, p. 18. The author has not given the source of his information.
- 19 HA, Vol. IV, p. 267
- 20 HA, Vol. IV, p. 267, BS, p. 223.
- 21 HS, p. 221.
- 22 HA, Vol. IV, p. 267.

23 HS, p. 223

24 HA, Vol. IV, p. 268. Appendix A No. 242. J. Sarkar mentions that the fight was given to Sidi Āsim, whereas Akhbārāt dated 4th November give the name of Sidi Sambal. It further informs us that 40-50 Marathas were captured. Those who converted to Islām got pardon, and those who refused were ordered to be killed. Accordingly 13 persons were killed.

25 BS, p. 38.

26 BS, p. 38.

27 BS, p. 38.

28 BS, p. 38

Fatahpur?

29 BS, p. 39.

30 BS Letter No. 18, p. 192

31 BS, pp. 43-45

32 BS, Letter No. 30, pp. 199-200.

33 BS, p. 52.

34 PEM, I Shivaaji, p. 19.

35 SBPM, p. 14.

36 SBPM, pp. 15-16.

37 A preliminary report on the Historical Records at Goa, p. 22.

38 SBPM, p. 15.

39 SBPM, p. 15.

40. Rajwade, Vol. XV, No. 365, p. 396. SCS, Vol. VIII, No. 46, p. 51  
SCS, Vol. II, No. 397, pp. 399-400, p. 51. Letter from  
Kavi Kalash to Dharmānji Rāgnāth, Sarsubahdar of Phonda  
dt. 2 Jan. 1684 speaks clearly about intention of  
Sambhāji.
- 41 HA, Vol. IV, p. 270.
- 42 HA, Vol. IV, p. 270.
- 43 SBPM, p. 17.
- 44 BISMQ, Vol. IX, p. 19. The author has not indicated  
the source of his information.
- 45 HA, Vol. IV, p. 270.
- 46 HA, Vol. IV, pp. 270-71.
- 47 HA, Vol. IV, p. 271.
- 48 HA, Vol. IV, p. 271.
- 49 HA, Vol. IV, pp. 271-72.
- 50 HA, Vol. IV, p. 272.
- 51 HA, Vol. IV, p. 273.
- 52 HA, Vol. IV, p. 273.
- 53 HA, Vol. IV, pp. 274-75.
- 54 Collections of MS in the Public Library, Vol. B-16-7 or  
Portuguese Records, Noticias do India, Vol. I, Pt. II,  
unpublished as quoted by Mr. Bendre in his book  
Sambhaji, pp. 304-5.
- 55 Collections of MS in the Public Library, Vol. B-16-7 or  
Portuguese Records, Noticias do India, Vol. I, Pt. II,  
unpublished as quoted by Bendre in his book Sambhaji,  
pp. 309-10.

- 56 HA, Vol. IV, p. 277. Karwar to Surat Factors dt. 28  
Nov. 1683 as quoted by J. Sarkar.
- 57 MS, pp. 223-24.
- 58 HA, Vol. IV, p. 278. Reports of Factory Records as  
quoted by J. Sarkar.
- 59 Collections of MS in the Public Library Vol. B-16-7 or  
60 Portuguese records Noticias do India, Vol. I, Pt. II-  
unpublished as quoted by Bendre in Sambhaji, p. 315.
- 61 Collections of MS in the Public Library, Vol. B-16-7  
or Portuguese Records, Noticias do India, Vol. I, pt.II  
- unpublished as quoted by Bendre in his 'Sambhaji' p.317.
- 62 HA, Vol. IV, p. 279. Reports of Factory Records from  
Karwar to Surat as quoted by J. Sarkar.
- 63 HA, Vol. IV, p. 280.
- 64 Factory Records as quoted by Bendre in 'Sambhaji', p.420.  
Bombay to Surat dated 27 Nov. 1680 and Bombay to  
London, dt. 1 Jan. 1681.
- 65 Bombay to Gary and Tharbin dt. 20-12-1680 and Orme  
Vol. 116-7 p. 233-9. FA as quoted by Bendre in  
'Sambhaji', p. 421.
- 66 Factory Records and Orme, Vol. 116-9, p. 303, Bombay to  
Surat dt. 16-3-1681 as quoted by Bendre in Sambhaji, p.422.
- 67 MS, p. 34.
- 68 Factory Records, Surat to London, dt. 26-4-1684 and Orme  
Vol. 126, pp. 99-105 as quoted by Bendre in Sambhaji, p.437.
- 69 Sambhaji to Bombay (Keigwin) April 1684 Surat Vol. 109,  
p. 55 and Orme as quoted by Bendre in Sambhaji, p. 438.

- 70 BISMQ, Vol. II, pp. 32-37.
- 71 SKPS No. 243, p.81.
- 72 Rise of Bombay by Edward, pp. 140-41.

CHAPTER VI : SIMILAR WARS IN OTHER COUNTRIES: A COMPARISON

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## CHAPTER VI

SIMILAR WARS IN OTHER COUNTRIES - A COMPARISON

The last quarter of 17th century saw the Maratna war of Independence. It was a war animated with certain principles, which the generation of 18th century has accepted, as part of the human rights, namely, no state, how so ever strong has any right to rule over another state which is different from it in points of race, culture, language and civilization. So also every individual is free to worship and practice the religion of his choice and there cannot be any compulsion what so ever, or imposition of one particular faith, by the use of force or other coercive methods, by any other religion, sect or power. In other words, if the sovereignty of the people of any state is challenged, the people have every right to resist and fight against such an unprovoked and unilateral aggression. So also the freedom of religion has become an inalienable right of man. Such was not the case with the world of the 17th century. In India there was a struggle between two forces, one trying to impose itself on the other, and the other trying to defend its existence. These two forces were, Muslim and Hindu religions, consisting each, a different philosophy of

life. The former was backed by the strength and the power of the ruling class, whereas the latter was the religion of the majority of the governed people, ill organised, ill prepared and hence in the stage of decay. The Hindu religion was a definitely far older one than the Muslim religion and had survived through the upheavals and turmoils of the ages. The Muslim religion was an imported force, and hence alien to the people of India, but was being spread by all possible means including royal patronage and many a time at the point of a bayonet.

Why did the struggle at all take place? Mainly because, the difference which Muslim religion reflected in respect of certain intrinsic and ever lasting human values and human rights, the philosophy of life, culture and the growth of humanity. In these two religions the fundamental approach to life was different. The Muslims always considered themselves at war with all other non-believers till the latter were subdued or converted to Islām. Whereas the Hindu religion, for ages showed tolerance and spirit of accommodation towards others. It believed in the eternal values, natural rights and the growth of humanity, without any external interference. Thus, the followers of both these religions representing certain strata of people, came into a clash as there was no possibility of any compromise. Added to it, was the political ambition of Muslim rulers to conquer more

territory and destroy all the states in the Deccan and thus make Deccani states merged into the empire and hence an additional source of revenue to the imperial treasury. The people of the Deccan were under the Muslim rule over three centuries before the rise of Shivaji. The Muslim rulers showed least respect towards the religion and culture and languages of the Hindus who were in a majority. In Shivaji the Deccani people found an epoch making personality. He woke up the people from slumber of degradation. The people were organised in arms in order to defend the liberty and the natural rights of man. All these things are truly reflected in Maharashtra Dharma. The principles of that Dharma stand for ever lasting values of the man-kind and not for narrow interests. ~~unabated~~. As an outcome of that Maharashtra Dharma an unabated feeling of patriotism and also high degree of courage was shown by them in defending the frontiers of their mother land.

Similar wars took place in later years in other countries of the world. What are the resemblances? These resemblances are mostly of pattern than substance, as on every occasion, it was the liberty and honour of the people belonging to one country that was endangered by another powerful country. These wars, whether fought by the people of America, Ireland or Italy, brought out radical change in the prevailing political concepts and immensely

contributed to the growth of freedom of the people and preservation of Human Rights. It would be more gratifying to the author of this thesis, if he has been successful in carrying home the point that the war which the Marathas fought, involved the same principles of liberty and honour, which was the central theme of American War of Independence, a century later, and also Irish people's struggle for independence for many years after. The Marathas progressive in mind believed in the intrinsic values and natural rights of man, through the philosophy of Maharashtra Dharma, and were, if not the first, at least one of the people to lay the foundation of such type of struggle which became world wide in subsequent years. It was a struggle which evinced patriotism of the highest degree in the 19th century in all the countries of the world.

#### AMERICAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

About the year 1688 the American people and their land were considered as British colonies. The British Government exercised their right on them. Nor was the situation different in 1762 when the New Castle Ministry decided to retain in colonies a garrison of ten thousand men and tax the colonists for its support. Though the reaction of the people was seen in some sort of resentment yet nothing eventually happened. Then the Act of Navigation

was passed which imposed restrictions on the trade activities of the colonies. One single Act of Parliament wrote James Otis has set people ~~at~~ thinking in six months more than they had done during the whole of their lives before. Thus the peoples minds were activated by this act which was certainly not in their interest. Then came the Stamp Act. The colonial opinion was more united against the Stamp Act than on any other issue before. The opposition to Stamp Act involved something more than the resistance to pay the same. The British Government could not properly estimate the bitterness of American feelings. "From the beginning the real issue in the eyes of Americans was not the tax granted that they disliked all taxes but the authority by which the tax was levied. "A Parliament of Great Britain," declared John Adams in 1765, "can have no more right to tax the colonies than a Parliament of Paris."<sup>1</sup> Resistance to the Stamp Act began in Virginia. A protest was lodged against the England. And shortly the revolutionary scenes burst out in Boston.

At the same time the Declaratory Act of 1766 was passed, declaring that king and Parliament of England have full power and authority to make laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity to bind the colonies. In all cases what so ever the Congress, called Stamp Act Congress met at New York. There were representatives from nine colonies. The Congress mainly attacked the

very authority of British Parliament in passing such an act. It appealed for the repeal of the Act. And shortly the men prepared themselves to plunge into action. The meetings of the people were organised and the opinion was mobilised. They asserted 'people had a right to set limits and when necessary to reassess their Natural Rights and the Authority, which the laws of Nature and of God have vested them with.'

Thus the people had an aim before them. A philosophy of a kind of life was being put into practice. As a result of agitation against the Stamp Act the same was repealed in March 1766. But a new phase of agitation began in 1767, with the passage of Townshend Acts. The Parliament once again returned to the policy of collecting revenue through customs duties. Once again people were made to pay more taxes. This was greatly opposed by the people. 'The people are paying the unrighteous tribute' wrote Samuel Adams in 1771 'in hopes that the nation will at length revert to justice. But before that time comes, it is to be feared they will be so accustomed to bondage, as to forget they were ever free.'

These words were a great warning to the people against the alien rule and their submission to it. The people were being made to realise the warning of the time if not properly responded would lead them eventually to lasting bondage.

At Boston, the men acted violently and dumped all the tea into the sea. The British Government considered it as an outrageous act. The reaction of the British Government can be well seen when the King wrote "All men seem now to feel that the fatal compliance in 1766 has encouraged the Americans annually to increase in their pretensions."<sup>3</sup> The Massachusetts had shown its preference for independence. The Boston Port Act closed the harbour of Boston until the town paid the damages. Thus seeing the political situation deteriorating fast in the colonies, 'The die is now cast' said the King, 'the colonies must now submit or triumph.'<sup>4</sup>

A few months later when General Gage from Boston wrote home that perhaps the 'Coercive Acts' be suspended, the King George III remarked "We must either master them or totally leave them to themselves and treat them as aliens."<sup>5</sup>

"The die was cast indeed. It was cast when the British Parliament attempted to alter the structure of government in Massachusetts. This attempt presented the issue of Parliamentary authority over the colonies in the plainest terms. The act unified Massachusetts behind the Boston insurgents, and it rallied the other colonies behind Massachusetts. It led directly to the first Continental Congress and the Revolution."<sup>6</sup>

The American War of Independence began on 19th April 1775. On 10th May Continental Congress assembled. The Congress created its militia and George Washington was appointed the first Commander-in-Chief of the army of liberation. Simultaneously it issued the declaration of causes of taking up arms, a charter which fully illustrates the depths of feelings of the people and the cause they were fighting for. Congress adopted, on the 4th July, the Declaration of Independence, of which the glorious paragraph was "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness ..... that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it. .... But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government and to provide new guards for their future security."<sup>7</sup>

And in addition to all this many states published similar Declarations, of which the Declaration of State of Pennsylvania is outstanding for incorporating the freedom of worship of any religion and no compulsion whatsoever in the matter. It states that "All men have a



natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God, according to the dictates of their own consciences and understanding; and that no man ought or of right can be compelled to attend any religious worship, ..against his own free will and consent, .... nor can he be justly deprived.... of any civil right as a citizen, on account of his religious sentiments or peculiar mode of religious worship; and that no authority can, or ought to be vested in..... that shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner control the right of conscience in the free exercise of religious worship."<sup>8</sup>

Thus the opinion of American people was fully mobilized. They were made aware that they were taking up arms in order to guard the liberty and the frontiers of their motherland. They wished to die as freemen rather than live as slaves. The British government was considered a tyrannical power, bent upon crushing the colonies. They established man's right to liberty and to worship the religion of the dictates of his own conscience. But these feelings of the Americans, were under estimated by Great Britain.

General Gage with his troops butchered the people and wantonly burnt towns. The supplies required to sustain day to day life were stopped. This only aggravated the feelings of the people. There seemed no way out for them

but to fight the aggressor, if they wished to live in peace and honour. The same has been reflected in the Declaration of causes of taking up Arms, "..... our cause is just ..... being with one mind resolve to die freemen rather than to live slaves.....In our own native land in defence of the freedom that is our birth right...we have taken up arms."<sup>9</sup> The end of this war is known to all of us. The Americans achieved their independence. But what emerged more powerfully from this war was the man's right to liberty and certain other natural and inalienable human rights. These rights are now established as man's legitimate rights and no power how so ever strong it might be has the right to subvert them. Rights were demanded as a human being. It was not necessary to belong to one particular sect, caste religion or country to possess them. It brought out the fact that people can not be suppressed by any tyrannical measures against their will. And in any such attempt the defeat was surely of the tyrant. They established the fact that they with the unity of purpose could overthrow domination and supremacy of the England.

#### IRISH WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

The first Irish effort to rebel against the domination of England took place in Ulster under O'Neill. Sir Robert, Earl of Essex marched with an army of 12000

foot and 13000 horse in April, 1599 to put down this rebellion. English forces were defeated at the pass of Plumes' near Mary borough. About this time another English force was defeated in Glenmalure and O'Donnell of the Irish people won a victory in Connacht. In September, 1599, Essex was replaced by Mountjoy. The Irish leader O'Neill was considered by Queen Elizabeth as ..... 'the arch-traitor, a monster of ingratitude to her and the root of misery to her people.' The rebels again collected around Muster, but their rising was savagely suppressed and the leaders of the movement were imprisoned. But O'Neill, in the North of Ireland still commanded a powerful position with his 4000 army. A price was declared for his head, but the name of O'Neill was so revered in that part that none could be induced to betray him. But alas! men could be bought over and even the noble cause of freedom could at least be temporarily defeated, was shown by the example of Niall Garoh O'Donnell and Donel O'Cahan the two leaders of the rising who were bought over. Therefore, hopes of O'Neill the sole fighter of freedom were completely centred on Spain, where a fleet was being prepared to assist him. <sup>when</sup> But/the Spanish fleet arrived, it was found disappointing, as it did not have enough soldiers to fight. Finally, in December, 1601, O'Neill and O'Donnell who again sided with his countrymen were defeated at a battle of Kinsale.

The spell created by the defeat lasted for the next 40 years. The second rebellion took place in October, 1641. Two new leaders, Lory O'Morea at home, and Father Luke Wadding, head of the Irish Franciscans at Rome organized the cause at home and abroad and sought the aid of the Pope; and of the cardinal Richalieu. A general rising took place in Ulster. Long Parliament voted money for the suppression of this rebellion. The general aim of the revolt was expressed in Brussels Declaration of 1642. It was to procure 'Liberty of conscience, government by officials who should be Catholics, restitution of lands confiscated 'for religion'. Liberty of the trade ..... and the Independence of the Irish Parliament by the repeal of Poyning's Law."<sup>10</sup>

This new war continued till 1650. England ordered Cromwell as its general to suppress it. He defeated the local armies. In 1650, Kilkenny the Irish leader surrendered and the Irish confederacy dissolved. Finally in 1652, the Irish force also submitted. Ireland had to pay heavily for this war. Thirty thousand soldiers were given leave to transport themselves to France or Spain while thousands of commoners were despatched to the West Indies as practical slaves. But the struggle brought a radical change as far as religion was concerned. Roman Catholics secured in full civil and religious rights,

by way of the repeal of the Oath of Supremacy.

Then after a few years, the Irish people again worked in unanimity to secure full liberty and equality of religion. They organised themselves and a war broke out in 1687 during the period of James of England. In the reign of Queen Anne a whole code was passed to bar the Roman Catholics from Ireland, the army, the electorate commerce and the Law. In 1704, a typical act against the growth of popery was enacted to the effect that the estates which belonged or might belong to Protestants should not come into Catholics hands. Then there were Laws which affected the middle classes who were generally Catholics and excluded them from the learned and lucrative professions of Law and Education and debarred them from trade and industry. The grievances of Roman Catholics were economic; payment of hearth tax to the state, tithes to the Established churches, heavy rents for their small potato plots, not to speak of forced labour on the roads and the rest. It was ironically said that "In England the landlords let farms, in Ireland land." Such was the condition of the Irish people in general and the Catholics in particular. The religion of the majority, their political and civil liberty and all their racial self-expression were severely being suppressed. According to Burke a wellknown historian, "The protestant ascendancy is nothing more or less than the resolution of one set of

people to consider themselves as the sole citizens of the common wealth and to keep a dominion over the rest by reducing them to slavery under a military power."<sup>11</sup> What Irish people did not accept was this slavery in all its aspects and therefore again waged the war of independence. They, in ascertaining their claim went a step further, when we read that 'Ireland was a sister kingdom of England entitled to the same rights from Magna carta down'.

In Irish people the predominant desire was for emancipation from the British Parliament. As years passed this desire grew stronger and stronger but the British Parliament was uprooting the cause by using military power.

Ireland in 1770 had population of about 4,500,000 people or over half as many as England. Out of them more than 3,000,000 were Catholics who were legally debarred from political life even from the right of voting. The remaining 150,0000 were Anglo Americans though concentrated in the East but were found all over the island.

The form of the Government was strange. The Anglo-Irish Parliament was scarcely representative even of the Anglo-Irish. It levied the taxes and passed laws for Ireland. Irish people were to maintain British army of 12000 soldiers -- something like the army of occupation.

There were certain revenues available for the British in Ireland to be enjoyed in England. The laws adopted in respect of trade certainly ran counter to the interests of the Irish people. The discontent was growing gradually. The new leaders appeared in the political area. Jonathan Swift lashed a sarcastic attack at the British Government. It was followed by George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne and two protestant leaders, Flood and Henry Grattan in 1775. The American War of Independence encouraged these people in intensifying their activities.

A new party called 'Patriot Party' was formed to carry out the objectives of the Irish people. As a result of these activities, in 1778 certain concessions were granted in favour of the Irish Trade. But this did not solve the problem. The other and more important problems were, equality of Irish Parliament with the British one and recognition of freedom for Catholic religion.

In order to achieve this by means of force, a volunteer force was raised. In February 1782, a volunteer convention took place. It was attended by Grattan and Flood the delegates of 143 cops and was presided over by Charlement, the Commander-in-Chief.

The preparedness of this force exerted a great influence on the political situation, and particularly on the Britain.

In subsequent years, the powers exercised by the Privy Councils of both the kingdoms under Poyning's Law were considered illegal by the Irish people. The same were withdrawn by the British Parliament. The Irish nation accepted the principle that "As Irishmen Christians and Protestants we rejoice at the relaxation of the penal laws against our Roman Catholic fellow subjects."<sup>12</sup>

The Britain publicly recognised the Irish Parliament in 1782. The triumph of Patriot Party was received by the Irish nation with universal acclamation.

#### ITALY'S WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

The French revolution and Napoleon's epoch making personality brought the awakening to the Europe's sleeping people. The epoch making events which took place between 1789 and 1815 were profoundly felt in Italy, where for centuries the people had languished under foreign domination. The European wars had opened the eyes of the general public and the principle that men are born alike was now inspiring the actions and desires of a new society, a society which emerged in Europe in 1815. The principles of liberty and equality had come to the forefront. The abolition of medieval system of taxation, and of the rights by birth, had given the individual the feeling that he was equal to any one else and could freely climb the



ladder of society. If differences still existed the normal principle had won the recognition. Yet the statesmen meeting at Vienna firmly believed that all this could be abolished.<sup>13</sup> They firmly believed that by ignoring what had taken place during the previous 25 years, history could begin again where it had left off in 1789.

The political set up in Italy after the Congress of Vienna (1815) reflected the ideas that authority should be enforced through monarchs, who were entitled to govern by divine grace. Such an autocratic concept of power was certainly inspired by Prince Metternich, Chancellor of the Hapsburg Empire and by Czar Alexander I of Russia.

The ideal of an Italian resurrection a 'Risorgimento' made headway during this period of reaction (1789-1815). The people began to feel the need of united Italy. A great need was felt of equality, of the rights of and franchises that go with them. Many believed that if political liberty was achieved, economic and social problems would gradually be solved. The foreign powers which were deeply entrenched in Italy and Austrian rule were to be uprooted. The difficulties were great and the Italians had to overcome them without arms money or organization against most powerful enemies.

But one idea was gradually taking a definite shape

in the minds of patriots of Italy. They now believed that the newly revived monarchies and the all powerful Austrian empire could be ousted by a revolt. "Men of action and of thought deemed that if dynasties could unite in the Holy Alliance to defend their privileges, the people should also unite for the purpose of challenging these privileges and of setting in their place the right of the citizens to govern themselves."<sup>14</sup>

The patriots began to organise secret societies for the purpose of stirring the feeling of rebellion and encouraging revolts. The most important one that spread over the whole country was termed 'Carboneria'.

If the monarchs were crushing such revolts, the people were again and again uniting in a most determined and far reaching alliance which was soon to blossom and bring forth fruit. There was a growing desire for amalgamation of the district units even though Metternich's Austria represented at the time a foreign and retrograde influence. Liberal ideas, and Pellico's book 'Le mie prigioni', well served the cause of liberation. The first revolt broke out in Sardinia and Naples. It was suppressed with Austrian intervention in 1820. Yet it compelled king Ferdinand to grant a constitution. The following year another rebellion broke out in Tunis against the King of Piedmont. The revolt though initially

successful, was subsequently put down. For the next ten years and till 1831 Italy remained quiet and then Central Italy revolted. The patriots thought of gaining support from either France or Duke of Modena. But they were shortly frustrated in their attempt. Then came to the forefront of the Italian political scene Giuseppe Mazzini who founded a secret society. Its aims were 'Popular sovereignty, direct action by the people, independence, unity, ... and the principle of nationality'. Mazzini's ideals were expressed in a letter he wrote to a German patriot. "I admire my fatherland, because I adore all fatherlands; our liberty because I believe in liberty; our rights because I believe in rights. Natural sentiment belongs to all for the progress of all. A nation must be to humanity what the family is, or should be, to the father land....."<sup>15</sup> He inspired the people to rise against the foreign domination and gave them the slogan 'God and the People'. (Dioe Popolo).

"To Mazzini belongs the glory of having imposed upon Italian public life an idea-force to which all others ..... have had to become subordinate and tributary."<sup>16</sup> Although unsuccessful in obtaining concrete results, he gave determination to his people, inspiration to his followers and cause grave concern to Austria and the Italian states. In 1848 Milan rose against Austrians. But the fever was of short duration. Austrians skillfully

overcame the situation. Piedmont negotiated an armistice in August, 1848. In March, 1849 Charles Albert resumed the hostilities, but was soon defeated at Novara. In 1849 again, Tuscany rebelled and a constitutional government came to power. Rome also revolted and the pope was compelled to find refuge in the Kingdom of two Sicilies. A republic headed by Mazzini was proclaimed on February 9, 1849.

The military defence of the new republic was entrusted to Garibaldi. But France invaded Mazzini's Republic and crushed it. In the North, Austria crushed the revolts of Brescia and Venice. Outwardly Austria was victorious. And the situation in Italy had worsened. The only hope was seen in Cavour of Piedmont. It became the centre of patriots activities. It gave Italy an example of good administration headed by Cavour. This statesman combined complete devotion to the national cause with experience and ability in public affairs. Cavour's view of human activities was simple and optimistic, one rooted in the belief in the human progress, progress that was dependent on freedom. The stage had been now reached of an inevitable open conflict between the ir-reconcilable principles of Authority and Liberty.

Since France and England were sympathetically inclined towards the Italian cause, he carefully cultivated their friendship. Within a period of ten years from the

collapse of 1849, he engineered a successful war with Austria. France came to the help of Piedmontese. But subsequently, for no apparent reasons, France signed an armistice with Austria and thus let down Piedmont. Nevertheless the final stage for Italian unification had reached, the people of Duchies of Parma, Modena, Tuscany and Northern papal states, rebelled against their governments and asked for annexation to Piedmont. In January, 1860, Cavour perceived that the moment had arrived to complete the programme begun in the previous years. On 5th May, 1860, with the knowledge and assistance of Cavour, Garibaldi and his thousand volunteers landed on Sicilian coast and crushed the forces of the king of Naples.

In a similar way Cavour, personally commanded the army in central Italy. On 14th March, 1861, the unity of the peninsula was sanctioned legally and constitutionally. On 20th September, 1870, Italian troops entered the city of Rome and in a plebiscite of 7th October, 1870, the people of Rome voted in favour of annexation to Italy. Thus the final goal of the 'Risorgimento' was realized.

### CONCLUSION

For comparison, I have chosen three different countries of the world, America, Ireland and Italy, who fought for

their independence, their struggle being based on certain rationale and the principles of humanity in conformity with the natural rights of man. The object of this comparison is whether in Maharashtra, during its war of independence any such recognised principles were in existence, and if so to what extent the conditions prevailing in this country <sup>8</sup> and those in other countries of the world contributed to the success of these principles. Ireland fought its war of independence over a period of 175 years, starting sometime at the close of the 16th century, as compared with it, the Italians fought for a period of sixty years or so, and the Americans took still a lesser number of years to achieve their independence. In Maharashtra the actual war period was of about 25 years, beginning with the arrival of Aurangzeb in the Deccan and ending with his death.

The length of period may have varied in respect of all these countries, but what is more outstanding is the vigour the perseverance and the determination with which these wars were fought by the people in each country. There were many points in common to these countries. Britain imposed various taxes on the American people, with a dual objective, firstly to get more revenue and secondly to keep effectively these colonies under the British control. In India, Aurangzeb, during his reign introduced many taxes against the Hindus, the most hated being Jizya or toll tax. It had also the dual objective,

firstly to enrich the state treasury and secondly, to coerce the Hindus to such an effective condition that they finally embraced Muslim religion of their own accord. The net result of such a policy of taxation, whether in America or in India, was a general resentment and disapproval of it by the people in general. Americans, when Stamp Act was imposed upon them, questioned the very authority of the British Parliament. "From the beginning the real issue in the eyes of the Americans was not the tax - granted that they disliked all the taxes - but the authority by which the tax was levied - .... A Parliament of Great Britain declared John Adams in 1765 can have no more right to tax the colonies than a Parliament of Paris." Similarly, Shivaji also questioned the <sup>alien</sup> authority of Aurangzeb and other/powers in imposing taxes on the free people. The American people not only questioned the tax levying authority, but stated in their Declaration of Independence that "..... whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these (Life, Liberty and pursuit of happiness) ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it. When long established governments became a long train of abuses and usurptions, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty to throw off such governments, and to provide new guards for their future security."

It was accepted that people have a right to set limits and when necessary to reassess their Natural Rights and their Authority. That Maratha nation wanted was the same life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. It was denied to them for about three and half centuries by their Muslim rulers. Shivaji in his times only tried to assert the same Natural Rights, which a century later, Americans put into practice. The only difference in the Western world and India was that their wars of independence and liberation, were preceded by the age of Enlightenment, whereas in India no such particular age existed, though the idea of enlightening were current. Therefore, Shivaji raised his nation in arms only to seek these human rights, and to overthrow the despotic government of the alien Muslim rulers.

The American people, while taking up to arms, fully justified the cause by a declaration that ".... our cause is just ..... being with one mind resolve to die freemen rather than to live slaves..... In our own native land, in defence of the freedom that is our birth right...We have taken up arms." So also Shivaji declared as early as 1656 the same right in a letter to one of Aurangzeb's officers in the Deccan. The Marathas also took up the arms in defence of their mother land. In Ireland it was the tyranny of religion, of Protestants over Catholics, of one set of principles opposed to another. The people



The people holding belief in Catholic religion, were being coerced and crushed. They were barred from the public life as well as government offices and trade and industry. They had no privileges, only because they belonged to a faith other than Protestants. They were always at the mercy of the ruling class. In India also the same was true. In India there was the tyranny of Muslim religion over the Hindu religion. Various laws were passed, mostly discriminatory and humiliating against the Hindus. It was a matter of pride for Aurangzeb to do so. They were coerced and crushed. It was against the very principles of Natural Rights of man. Enough tolerance was shown by the Hindus. But still day by day their condition was worsening. Therefore, Marathas organized themselves in order to protect their 'Dharma' and honour. In the multitude of correspondence of Sambhaji and Rajaram's time we find that the people were told that it was their sacred duty to protect the Maharashtra Rajya and Maharashtra Dharma. They were reminded that it was the Kingdom of the people, and once they were united Aurangzeb would be nowhere. There was a definite determination to fight the coercion. In the reign of Queen Anne's whole code was passed to bar the Roman Catholics (of Ireland) from the land, the army, the electorate, commerce and the law.' In Aurangzeb's time many such regulations were passed against the Hindus, which prohibited them

from undertaking any such lucrative jobs. In both the countries the object of the rulers was common i.e. to torture people who believed in a religion other than their own. In both the countries the result had been the same, i.e. timeless resistance of the people. In Ireland, it were only Catholics who were taxed heavily and were subjected to discriminatory laws. In Ireland, the religion of the majority, their political and civil liberty, and all their racial self-expression were proscribed. In India, the Hindus can be comfortably placed in the place of Catholics. Burke, in his vehement criticism of the protestant ascendancy said "..... (it) is nothing more or less than the resolution of one set of people to consider themselves as the sole citizens of the commonwealth and to keep a dominion over the rest by reducing them to slavery under a military power."

How truly it is also applicable to the Indian conditions, when Aurangzeb with all his military strength came down to the Deccan to subdue the Hindus in general and the Marathas in particular. They fought vehemently in order to guard their state and the religion, as did the Irish people against the British crown throughout the long period. Italian war showed that the people had the unquestioned right of self-determination. Once the political

independence was achieved social and economic problems could be gradually solved. It was a war against a foreign power which had dug its roots firmly in the soil of Italy. Every opportunity that the patriots could get was used for liberation of their land. Many a time they were subdued. But in the end they won. The Marathas also in similar way had to face the enemy, who had already grown stronger on the soil of India. The Mughal dynasty had seen, by the time Aurangzeb invaded Deccan more than hundred and fifty years of life. The Mughals being stronger were able to defeat the Marathas on many occasions. But in all these battles, like Italians at the hands of Austrians, Marathas were merely defeated and not crushed at the hands of Mughals.

They lost no time in organizing themselves and thus raised the head high above the dust of humiliation again and again. They persisted in their fights, in order to achieve the singular goal of independence. In Italy's war of Independence, Mazzini had a distinctive place for having imposed upon Italian public life an idea force to which all others .... have had to become subordinate and tributary. The entire public force was mobilized in that direction. So also in Maharashtra, every thing was subordinated to the protection of Maharashtra Rajya and Maharashtra dharma. This was the biggest moving force behind all the activities of the Marathas. In other words

it was an idea-force which brought so successful results.

In short, I have brought out some of the similarities that existed, among the four wars of the four countries of the world. But where similarities do not exist, it would be incorrect to insist for the same. What is essential is to find out if there were particular concepts dormant, or certain phenomena that were admittedly different even if the difference might be an outstanding one. Yet, it should be seen, if they could be related as a product of a common impulse. We should also appreciate their achievements under varied circumstances and different degrees of opposition, if they had been successful in achieving certain accepted common ideals.

FOOTNOTES

1. ADR, p. 159.
2. American Revolution, p. xxxiii.
3. ADR, p. 174.
4. ADR, p. 174.
5. ADR, p. 174.
6. ADR, p. 175.
7. American Revolution, the Declaration of Independence adopted on 4 July 1776, p. 157.
8. American Revolution, a Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth or State of Pennsylvania, pp. 163-64.
9. American Revolution, pp. 141-45.
10. A History of Ireland, p. 246.
11. A History of Ireland, p. 300.
12. A History of Ireland, p. 312.
13. Italy by G. Zampagline, p. 31.
14. Italy by G. Zampagline, p. 35.
15. Italy by G. Zampagline, p. 38.
16. Italy from Napoleon to Mussolini, p. 36.

## CHAPTER VII : CONCLUSION

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CONCLUSION

On 21st February 1707, mortal existence of Aurangzeb came to an end and so also the long war in the Deccan, which had commenced 25 years ago, came to an end. The guns in both the camps of war fell into uneasy silence. The Deccan plateau activated by the presence of the Mughal soldiers came to an abrupt stop. The iliad of woes was over. The fury of the war seemed to calm down. There was lull and silence. The silence was symbolic, that the storm was over. It was symbolic of a homage to the martyrs, of the recently ended war. It was something more than that. It was eloquent of the fact that those who fight for liberty and honour would always emerge victorious as has been shown by the recently ended war. It unmistakably brought home the lesson that the Maratha nation was prepared to sacrifice the last living soul in order to defend its liberty, honour and religion. The guns of the enemy were silenced only to prove this.

The struggle which came to an end ranking in the minds of some as a skirmish in the roster of the major wars of history, actually this collision between India's most powerful emperor and the people of a very small state

cost more than a few million lives, equally large was the number of horses and transport animals that perished, the destruction of property was unaccountable, the miseries suffered by the people were immeasurable and showed clearly the extent of the chasm beside which men walk.

"It is said that the period from 1681 till 1707 has been one of the most brilliant and memorable period in the history of India. In fact, "It is the history of the formation of a true Indian Nationality, raising its head high above the troubled waters of Mahomedan confusion."<sup>1</sup> The period of twenty seven years in the Peccan marks a new era in the life of the nation. It highlighted the struggle already begun by Shivaji; a few years earlier. The type of struggle was new in the history and was not seen at any time in the earlier periods. It was a mass struggle. The initiative of the movement had rested in the hands of common man.

It was a movement in which men were determined to defend their liberty, Honour and Religion. Any aggression against it was to be met firmly. No force, how so ever strong it might have been, could possibly have changed these people from their solemn promise. It was essentially meant to defend certain inalienable human rights, the rights which have been accepted by our own generation as Human Rights and incorporated in the declaration of charter



of the United Nations Organisation. These were the rights which have been traditionally accepted from times innumerable and which certainly do not violate the similar rights propagated by any other religion or faith. Similar struggles were followed in other countries in the next century, in order to establish the man's supremacy in having those human rights. The Maratha nation was opposed by a very powerful and turbulent ruler Aurangzeb. With all the resources of the country at his disposal, Aurangzeb decided to launch an aggressive attack against the Deccan Kingdoms and Marathas in particular. In man power this enemy of the Deccan was second to none. In brilliance and experience he was matchless. In fighting the wars and managing the state craft fifty years of his valuable life were utilized. He was an unchallenged master of every thing including men, material, equipment, army organization and administration. And equally well he surpassed all others in cunning and state craft, in diplomacy and religious bigotedness. He combined both religion and politics. Some times to achieve the political ends he took shelter of religion and in carrying out the spread of his religion, he made an unrestrained use of political machinery.

On 3rd April, 1680 Shivaji passed away. The newly founded state of Maharashtra, with its legacy of Swarājya passed into the hands of Sambhaji, a man young in age, fired with passion and vigour to rule. The news of

Shivaji's death was a most welcome news for Aurangzeb. He gave a sigh of relief. The nobles and prominent sardars in the Mughal army thought of relaxing for a while. With the death of Shivaji he presumed that with the grace of God, thorn in the body of Muslim state was removed. To destroy the newly crowned King of Marathas and subdue his kingdom was considered a matter of great ease. It was almost presumed that the new ruler was incompetent to fight against the experienced generals of the Mughal army and annexing the new state was only a matter of time.

Aurangzeb was busy day dreaming about a total Muslim state. The other two Deccani sultanates had already degenerated. Combined resistance from these Deccani states was not at all expected. One by one he wanted to destroy them and thus bring the entire Deccan under the Mughal banner. With this sole purpose and firm determination he along with his best generals of the army marched out of Delhi the capital of the Mughal Empire. In marching to the Deccan, the immediate objective of Aurangzeb was to punish prince Akbar, his own son, who had revolted against him and also punish Sambhaji, the Maratha king, who had given him the shelter. But ultimately he wished to conquer the three different kingdoms of the Deccan. After reaching Ahmadnagar, he realised that he should first subdue the two kingdoms of Bijapur and Golkondā. Though,

he ordered a large force under Shāh 'Ālam to undertake the conquest of south Konkan. The prince Shāh 'Ālam marched with his army into the Konkan territory, which was as unfamiliar to royal troops as difficult to traverse. Herein for the first time the Mughal armies came to know about strength, tenacity and tact of the Maratha soldiers. Herein they first came to know the difficulties peculiar to the terrain infested with dense jungles, deep valleys, no roads for transports or animals and also an unusually heavy rainfall.

Herein for the first time the Mughal generals got a close idea of what this warfare was going to cost them and their king. Herein they came to know that the Maratha resistance did not depend much upon the king or a particular leader, but every man took upon himself the duty of guarding every inch of his mother land. The Marathas were defending themselves in a corporate body and were aware of the aggression of the Musalmans. The teachings of Rāmdās, invoking respect for religion and man's natural rights were consciously felt by these people. The wars which were fought by Shivaji had not passed away in oblivion, but most of their fathers and forefathers who had fought them were still alive. The spirit that Shivaji had imbibed on their minds was not forgotten soon. And every village, which was a constituent part of Maharashtra, was full with many such men. Then

how could they sit idle and watch the destruction of their property and kingdom? A strong and determined opposition was a natural outcome. They had to come out in arms to resist the free march of the Mughal armies in Maharashtra. And that is precisely what we see, when we find that the Mughal armies resisted everywhere, by the local populace in addition to the armies of the Maratha king. It is those people, more than Maratha army which were greater barrier in the Mughal conquest of Maharashtra. Even after a particular territory was conquered or a particular fort was taken by the Mughals, their success was temporary, as no sooner, the Mughal armies marched out of that territory, the local populace would always raise their head high and oust the Mughal Quiladār or take charge of that particular territory. Thus the ultimate control was retained by the Marathas. Shāh 'Alam, when he had to withdraw disasterously from south Konkan knew for the first time the real preparedness of the people. But no lesson was learnt. It was thought appropriate by the Mughal generals that their defeats were mainly due to shortage of man-power and war materials. Thus the strength of the enemy was underestimated and it was always counselled that by numerical strength they would overcome the Marathas. The conclusion shortly belied their beliefs.

The victims who fell first to the sword of the Mughal aggression were the two Deccani states of Bijāpur and Golkondā. They did not meekly surrender the invading armies of the Mughals, both the kings of 'Adil Shāhi and Qutb Shāhi questioned Aurangzeb about his unprovoked attack, then they fought gallantly and went down in the history, true to the tradition of the Deccani rulers. Aurangzeb had no answer to the question as to why he was lifting a sword against the sister Muslim state, but to silence those who opposed him by extensive use of force. The Deccani rulers, realized the danger alike in approaching Mughal armies and came to an understanding of mutual help, forgetting their own factions and feuds of the past or the difference in religion, they well realized, the destruction of one of them was a potential threat to the existence of the other. And how true it proved to be!

Aurangzeb indeed finished them one by one. Had these rulers shown greater alertness and speediness of action, probably the disaster might have been averted. But such was not the course of history, the last king of 'Adil Shāhi dynasty was made captive on 15th September 1685 and on 21st September 1687, Abdullāh Fani, an Afghan soldier and trusted general of Qutb Shāh opened the gates of Golkondā fort and forced Qutb Shāh to surrender to Aurangzeb.

Thus came to an end the rule of last Shiyā king in Hindustān and partly the ambition of Aurangzeb of putting the Suni sect on highest citadel of Islāmic religion was fulfilled. Thus there remained only one obstacle in establishing the Mughal rule in the Deccan and that was Sambhaji, the young king of the Marathas, a lone fighter, who had received a setback of sinking of two of the oldest Deccani Saltanats. Aurangzeb was eager to march there. Although the climate of Hyderabad was very good for the health yet he (Aurangzeb) had the desire to stay at that place from where he could look after the kingdom and punish the infidel Sambha, who had friendship with Sikandar and Abul Hasan and who did not care for anything against his own false claims.<sup>2</sup> Sambhaji's preparations were a foot. By 1684, a number of Deshmukhs of various villages were asked to recruit more men in order to meet the Mughals. In the course of four years Aurangzeb launched four offensives in Ponkan under the able generals like Shihāb-ud-din Khan, Khān-i-Jahān Bahādur Mokalātāsh and Qāsim Khan Kirnāni. The only success Mughals got, was in taking the fort of Sālher by bribes. Aurangzeb was much perturbed due to these failures of the Mughal army. According to the English Factors at Tārwar, "He (Aurangzeb) is so..... against the Rājāh that he hath thrown off his pagri and sworn never to put it again till he hath either killed, taken or routed him (Sambhaji) out of his country."

As a result of this more prominent generals like Bakshani-ul-Bulk Muḥullāh Khan, Hamid-ud-din Khan and others appeared in the field. But they had to withdraw soon without any creditable achievements. The technique of the Maratha warfare was new to them. The Mughal armies had barely accustomed to the hilly tracks of the Deccan. The only thing the Mughals could do was to exhaust their equipment resources and men in getting the knowledge of their enemy and its terrain. And truly they did so. For the next four years from 1684 to 1688 Aurangzeb directed his attack on the two kingdoms of Bijāpur and Golkondā. Though the definite reasons in the change of Aurangzeb's policy of conquest at this stage are not known, yet from the comparative study of the trend of events it appears that the united opposition shown by the Marathas followed by their victories against the Mughal army at various places, might have forced him to adopt this policy. One conclusion which appears to be outstanding is that, Aurangzeb could well understand that the Maratha nation since the death of Shivaji had not become that weak as he presumed it to be.

In December 1688, after annexing the two Deccani Kingdoms, Aurangzeb returned to Maharashtra. During these periods of four years, when Aurangzeb was away from Maharashtra, Sambhaji made preparations to meet the eventual attack, though they proved to be not very effective. The

official correspondence between his ministers and sardārs and other people of repute, throws light, on Sambhaji's efforts in warning people about the danger looming large. Sambhaji was making the efforts to unite all the Deshmukhs, Desāis and Vatandārs, though some of them deserted him and joined Aurangzeb. There were prominent Maratha sardārs who did so. But Sambhaji did not give up hopes. He was constantly making efforts to bring them back. In 1685, Sarjārāo Jedhe had joined the Mughals. Sambhaji informed him that "if attacked, the Mughals will not last even for two days. And they could be destroyed along with you." In his appeal to the people, he laid emphasis on impending danger to the Twarājya. Those people who had joined the Mughal service, with certain material expectations were reminded that the Mughals were foreigners to this land. Acceptance of service under them showed consent to slavery. The self-respect of such people was aroused. They were constantly reminded about their own king, their own nation and their own religion.

Sambhaji had the singular misfortune and also unequalled courage of fighting more than one enemy at one and the same time. He had the enemies at the sea like the Portuguese, the Bidis and the English. Sambhaji devoted his untiring energies in subduing these danger spots, as they were a potential threat to the very existence of his kingdom. The Portuguese indulged in religious



expansion, resorted to forced conversions and occasionally treated Maratha subjects in torturous way. These actions of the enemies of Sambhaji, enraged and provoked him to take immediate steps to put them down. In many battles he personally led his men in the battle fields. The year, 1689 was a most fateful year in the life and history of the Marathas. In January of this year, by a sudden stroke of ill luck Sambhaji fell into the hands of the Mughals. On 11th March 1689, the king of the Marathas was publicly executed with utmost dishonour and humiliation. The execution of Sambhaji created a big vacuum in the Maharashtra. With his death, the Maratha nation was left without a king and a leader.

Aurangzeb expected, under the situation, that chaos, confusion and disorder would prevail in Maharashtra. This would simplify his task of liquidating the Maratha rule. Thus by March 1689, the kings of Bijāpur, Golkondā and Maharashtra, all were vanquished. All seemed to be working according to the desired plan of the Mughal Emperor. To him every thing seemed to be over. Every thing was over, but for one factor and that was the Maratha opposition, which was still being felt like live wire. Though their king was executed, yet the expected chaos did not take place. The army leaders, nobles and the people left behind did not give up the fight, though a few, out of selfishness did desert the Marathas and

joined the Mughals. On the contrary what appears from a close survey of the facts is, uppermost in their minds was love of their country's independence. They were determined to defend their Liberty, Honour and Religion. As a measure of their high spirit and high morale, a daring attack was made on Aurangzeb's camp at Koregāon barely two and half months had passed since the debacle of Tambhaji.

The current thinking and situation at home must have been something like when Sam Adams spoke to the people of America at the time of its war of Independence, "I would advise persisting 999 men were to perish, and only one of a thousand to survive and retain his liberty. One such freeman must possess more virtue and enjoy more happiness than a thousand slaves." So also the Maratha nation was determined to fight the aggression. The unifying force among the Marathas was the protection of Maharashtra Sharma and Maharashtra Rājya. Utmost sanctity was attached to it. It was made symbolic of nationalism and patriotism. The appeal was direct to the emotions and feelings of the people. They were made to feel that it was their kingdom, it was their religion, which was in danger of destruction. The contemporary official records of Maratha king Rājārām speak volumes about this danger, and the depths of feelings of the king as well as other worthy and notable men of the time. And no doubt

the Maratha people responded to the call of their country and religion whole heartedly and thus reciprocated the feelings of their leaders. Khāfi Khan the Muslim historian of Aurangzeb had to admit that "after the death of Sambhaji God willed that troubles started by the infidels (Marathas) were not to be uprooted from the Peccan". There can not be a truer confession of burning desire and fierce determination of the Marathas than this.

With the disappearance of Sambhaji from the political scene of Maharashtra, Rajaram came to the fore front. The Maratha nation accepted him as its king. The foremost problem of Rājārām was to sustain the Maratha kingdom against the heavy blows of the Mughals. The magnitude of the problem appeared to be greater when the Marathas were to hold it with the bare skeleton of an almost weaponless army, supported by little more than 'sticks and stones' of the inhabitants. Defence was vital and was to be pursued with all speed and every ingenuity and artifice. Rāmachandrapant, Shankarājipant, Trailbād Nirāji, Bhandoji Nāyak Pānsambal, Phanāji Jādhav, Santāji Chorpade, Mānāji More, Namāji Chinde, were but a few revolutionary personalities, who were entrusted by Rājārām the state administration and military preparedness. They relentless and stubborn, gauged with skill and insight the strength and subtleties of their opponent's mind. They hurried

themselves in working new strategy of war and additional resources to sustain that effort. Their point of interest while working so hard was the survival of Maharashtra against such an upheaval.

The new strategy of war was conceived and in order to create diversion in the Moghal army, Second Front was made operative from Jinji. This brought many advantages to the Marathas and primarily assured the safety of their King Rājārām. With the adoption of policy of forming Second Front at Jinji, Rājārām entrusted the burden of administration in Maharashtra, to the two most able persons, Rāmchandrapant and Shankarāji. These two loyal servants of the kingdom were brilliant in wit and speech, relentless in their efforts, ever worked for the unity of the people and defence of the country. Their task was gigantic and required herculean efforts to achieve any commendable results. The conditions of the people were alarming. Almost every face they saw were a look of despair, almost every mile they travelled was littered with the wreckage left by the invading army. Burning of and looting the villages had assumed undue proportions. What appeared in the place of habitation was only dogs and desolation. Farms were without cultivation. Men were in desolate condition the army was to be organised, the forts, a few of them now under their possessions were to be adequately provisioned.

Politically speaking, the entire Konkan was under the possession of Matabar Khan. He was unrivalled master of fifty forts in that territory. Except for the capture of Raigadh, which also was invested by Zulfigar Khan, the Mughals had claim over all the forts in Konkan. The Mughal armies were marching unhindered, in all parts of Maharashtra.

Such was the magnitude of the problem, but they worked hard for their king, kingdom and the religion. Their unquestioned goal was to drive out the invaders. For the accomplishment of that purpose they were ready to make any conceivable sacrifice. In that accomplishment was to consist all their glory. No fascination of an 'ināmland' or a 'royal mansab' in the Mughal army could divorce them from their singular aim. They worked in unanimity with others. They consecrated themselves to this great enterprise by day and by night and with an untiring energy which bewildered their contemporaries in the enemy camp. The great emphasis was laid on uniting the people, many of the sardars who had joined the Mughal service came back to Rājārām. In 1690, Rājārām appealed to Jijne Deshmukh that it was Maharashtra Rājya and he should strive hard to protect it. His coming back to Rājārām proved to be of immense value to the cause of freedom fighting. A general appeal was made to people to unite and once they were united the enemy would have

been no where. They were told not to be afraid of Aurangzeb. In 1691 Nāgoji Māne joined the Marathas while giving him an assurance Rājārām wrote that the kingdom of the Chatrapati was the kingdom of God and that efforts were to be made to preserve Maharashtra Dharma. Immediately two other prominent Maratha sardārs followed the suit. They were Hanumantrāo and Trishnāji Chorpade. Rājārām warmly greeted them by stating that their intentions of protecting the Maharashtra Dharma were aptly understood.

Similarly, as a token of appreciation of loyalty and integrity, the Teshnaks, Deankulkarnis, and Chaugule of Aithe Phore and Gunjannawal territory were granted the sanads. So also many others were favoured in various parts of Maharashtra. In addition to this a few more letters of Rājārām addressed to various people in Maharashtra and Karnātak, in which it is emphatically stated that the kingdom of Rājārām was the kingdom of Gods and Brāhmins, that it was their duty to protect both the kingdom and Maharashtra Dharma. The kingdom was considered as the kingdom of the people. There could not have been a better appeal, coming from the King and moving the very heart and sentiments of the people in a more rational way.<sup>3</sup> The people also well reciprocated and responded this sincere call of their King and other leaders. This fervent appeal succeeded in creating the

fusion of the people and their king in order to achieve their predetermined goal.

In 1692, Antūji Udhav an influential Maratha sardār was won over by Rājārām. These are but a few examples of the relentless efforts made by Rājārām in uniting the people for the cause of Maharashtra Rājya and Maharashtra Dharma. This is a sufficient pointer in bringing home the point about the strength of underlying current which brought out unity and unanimity of purpose and of the people of Maharashtra. Rājārām created a new class of nobility. He gave awards in the form of land and titles to the various people. This was an outcome of necessity. The historians and particularly G. S. Sardesai have criticised this policy of Rājārām very adversely. According to some, Rājārām in doing so only sown the seed of disunity and disorder in the society created by Shivaji. According to Sardesai, many undeserving persons were elevated to the high standard of nobility and therefore created confusion in the existing state of affairs. It is opined here that such criticism, apart from being harsh is totally unfounded on the facts. It would be worthwhile to go into the necessity of this institution and also compare it with the similar class in other countries during that and the following century.

This class of nobility was introduced by the govern-

ments as a means to rule and organising the people. The nobles were used for more practical purposes. They made good army commanders, since traditionally they were trained to fight the battles. The French intendants were nobles. In Prussia, it was in the reign of Frederick the Great that the crown for the first time favoured the nobility in high offices and this remained the general practice thereafter. During the eighteenth century, in Western countries kings could raise commoners to the nobility, or promote lower nobles to higher grades. The Hapsburgs after the reconquest of Bohemia in the 1620's had created a new nobility to help keep the country loyal. They did the same after the reconquest of Central Hungary in 1699, where such families as the Esterhazys received princely status in the eighteenth century. The Irish peerage had been created by the British crown for much the same purpose.

Therefore in the context of the events, the rise of Maratha nobility was inevitable. Without it there could have been no successful movement against Muslim aggression. There had to be small groups of people, who knew each other, who could trust each other in perilous undertakings, who had some power and influence of their own, who could have direct access to the people and rally followers, and who from an enlarged point of view felt a concern for the protection and welfare of the



state as a whole. On the whole, the achievements of this class during this period of mass struggle, do deserve mention and hence justification. The system had its positive impact. The people and the local leaders took up initiative in the matter. This brought a great deal of confidence among them. The leadership was completely decentralized. Through the efforts of this class, people in general became more alert and lent their active support in fighting the war.

#### THE MARATHA TECHNIQUE OF WARFARE

The Maratha technique of warfare, both in open fields and in the mountains had undergone considerable change since the days of Shivaji. No doubt Shivaji is acclaimed as the pioneer of guerrilla warfare, yet during his time, the technique was not put to extensive use. But with the progress of time, and with the presence of the Mughal armies in all parts of Maharashtra, the Maratha military leaders and generals were forced to resort to make frequent use of this technique. They improved it to such an efficient standard, that due to careful application of it, they achieved the best results, and with the most economical use of force. The credit of bringing this technique of warfare to such a high standard of efficiency indisputably goes to Santaji Chorpade and Phanaji Jadhav. These were the two leaders, who led the armies in person

to victory and thus established the high utility of the technique.

The technique was perfected by introducing an element of surprise and subduing the distance to the speedy and forced marches of the army. Every minute was counted upon when an attack was launched. By surprise attacks the Marathas caught their enemy unaware and unprepared. By crossing the long distances, in the shortest possible time, they were able to achieve the most successful results of surprise attack. The strategy was evolved to use the minimum force and maximum blows. This greatly saved the strain on the resources of Marathas both in man power and war materials. The Maratha columns moved with lightening speed from one place to another, almost in an unimaginable space of time. A similar technique was employed at the close of the eighteenth century by Napoleon in order to fight the wars against the Austrians and Italians. The victories in these wars made Napoleon, a military genius and hero in the eyes of the contemporary generation as well as the posterity.

The Marathas while using this technique of warfare, allowed no repose to themselves. Their weapons of attack were spears and swords and a few had the arc and bows. Thus, their war equipment was light which gave them the maximum mobility and hence helped in undertaking speedy

marches. They used to fall upon the enemy like whirlwind, attacking at the same moment in front flank and rear. The brave old veteran Mughal soldiers, were bewildered by tactics so strange and unheard of, they even found it difficult to accumulate their army at a rapid rate. The Mughal armies known in the past for their gallantry always took to flight against such a surprised and calculated attack. There were a many great names in the galaxy of stars of Maratha commanders of this period. But the name of Santaji stands above all in distinction for his memorable victories. In the true sense he was the hero of the Maratha War of Independence. The untiring energy of this youthful general, his unhesitating reliance upon his own mental resources, his perfect acquaintance with the theatre of war, commanded the reverence of his equals in the enemy camp. There was an indèscribable something in his command which immediately inspired respect and fear and which kept all familiarity at a distance.

On his orders, his divisions were instantly on the move. The others had learnt a high standard of discipline from this man of courage and strategy. During the campaign he was on a horse back day and night. He took no time to eat or sleep. And so also did his comrades in arms. He always planned his strategy with a master mind and perceived the enemy's reaction well in advance. He

believed in surprising the enemy and delivering a fatal blow. The battle of Todderi in Parāṭaka, is a glorious tribute to this master strategist. Enormous sacrifices were required to enable the soldiers to move from point to point with the celebrity which was essential in operations so hazardous. He made no allowance for impediments or obstacles. At a given hour, the different divisions of the army, by various roads were to be at a designated point. To accomplish this, every sacrifice was to be made of comfort and of life. The storm, rain, mountains or valleys, hungry, sleepless or wet, by night and day the army under his command always marched. He infused super natural energy in them. The unflinching relentlessness with which decisions of war strategy were executed, indicated the energetic action of no ordinary mould. He had always the confidence in the success of the men. They followed him with delirious energy.

His attacks were decisive. Similar technique was followed by the other Maratha generals and thus humbled the foe, many times stronger than them in all respects and achieved the unexpected. From October 1689 till October 1697 that is for a period of eight years the Marathas maintained their second Front at Jinji in a most successful way. Their main purpose was to keep away the Mughal forces, which were concentrating in Maharashtra. Secondly Jinji proved to be the best place for

shelter and safety for their king. In the period of eight years both these objectives were achieved effectively. The Marathas needed time to recover since the debacle of Sambhaji and thus use that period for military preparedness as well as awakening the people against the Muslim invasion.

By 1697, Rāchandrapant and Shankarāji were enough confident to give a sustained fight to the Mughals in Maharashtra itself. The necessity of continuing the Second Front had ceased. Between January-February 1698, Jinji was captured by the Mughals and Rājārām came to Maharashtra. By now the Maratha leadership well knew the incapacity of any major retaliation by the Mughal forces. The Mughal army had become weary and sick of wars in Maharashtra. During the past 17 years they hardly had any time to repose. The dissensions and personal rivalries among the Mughal generals were ever on increase. The commands given by Aurangzeb were hardly obeyed to its fullest extent. By now a huge number of men had been consumed in the flames of war. Much of the resources of Mughal Empire were nearing exhaustion. The villages had become desolate and local inhabitants hardly owed their loyalty to the invading army. The Maratha sardārs who had joined the Mughal service, remained with them as long as it suited their selfishness. They without any hesitation deserted the Mughals. By now the Mughals

exhausted and exasperated had grown quite thin. A large number of well known commanders was slain in these battles. And yet the Marathas were not subdued.

The Marathas, glancing rapidly at their past were convinced that they effectively withstood Mughal onslaught. Though their losses in man power and material were by no estimation low, yet the determination to fight the aggression had not withered away. They did not become weary and sick of war. They mustered more courage in order to fight more vehemently. By now they had gained sufficient confidence that no single large army of the Mughals could wipe them out. They were capable of facing the guns of the enemy with all the confidence of a soldier.

This brought in them a new vision. From now onwards their role was changed. From defensive role they chose offensive one and planned a new strategy of war. Rājārām's coming back to Maharashtra gave a great blow to the Mughal prestige. Aurangzeb noted this development with grief and decided on the policy of conquest of all the forts in Maratha possession, as in his opinion, the forts were the centre of the Maratha power. He decided to lead these campaigns in person inspite of the infirmity and old age. He organised his army once again. On 19th October 1699, the Mughal army marched out from Islāmpuri, where it had encamped for last four years. While on the other hand,

the Maratha generals like Phanāji Jādhav and Nemāji Shinde and Krishna Sāwant crossed the Narmada and invaded the territory of Sironj Mālwa and Burhānpur.

By 25th November 1699 Aurangzeb secured Vasantgad. From Vasantgad he marched to Sātāra fort. On 21st April 1700, Sātāra fort was surrendered and at the same time the Marathas received greatest set back in passing away of Rājārām. The unexpected blow of Rājārām's death was too severe for the Maratha people and leaders to bear silently. No doubt, by progressive years in the nation's life, the people and its popular leaders had experienced more severe, and more cruel blows in the past. After the death of Sambhaji people rushed to Rājārām as their legitimate leader and a 'sheet anchor' of the state. And unmistakably he proved worthy of it. With the death of Rājārām, the glorious chapter of the Maratha War of Independence remained incomplete. But the destiny willed that the fight should continue and in Tārābai, the dowager queen and her son Shivaji II the hand of providence worked. From 1700 till 1707, this gallant woman, who herself had witnessed the war of independence, took upon herself to arrange the matters of state craft and inspect the Maratha armies. It was due to an inexhaustible fountain of energy which she possessed, the Maratha nation drew its inspiration. Herself coming from a warrior clan, she had well grasped the military

situation and importance of continuing the struggle against the barbaric invasion. The most hostile historians like Khāfi Khan, had to pay the glorious tribute, though reluctantly to this queen of the Marathas, who so successfully arranged all the administration and kept the forts properly provisioned and equipped in order to fight the Mughals. Thus in a period of twenty years since the death of Shivaji, she was the third in that glorious hierarchy to lead successfully the destinies of four million people of Maharashtra. On 10th March 1704 Tornā fort fell to the Mughals and that completed the grand design of Aurangzeb of capturing all the forts under the Marathas. In a period of approximately six years he captured, Vasantgad, Sātārā, Parli, Chandan Vandan, Panhālā, Pāvangadh, Vishālgadh, Singhadh, Rājgad and Tornā. Except Tornā, which was an achievement of Mughal sword, rest of the forts, were taken over by Aurangzeb by singular use of bribe after a wasteful fight. His campaigns proved to be disasterous failures. It appears that the Marathas during this period, with regard to the forts under their possession, adopted a general policy of resistance first, and then without suffering much losses in man power, to surrender the same. This had its own advantage, firstly the Marathas, who had already lost many men in the war could easily avoid the same and secondly, as and when the Mughal armies marched out of



that territory, they would recapture the fort by a surprise attack or escalade. Never did they allow the Mughals to retain the supreme control of these forts for any considerable length of time. Thus the success of Aurangzeb appeared to be more elusive than the ever elusive Marathas. Now onwards, the Marathas became more active than ever. These disturbing pieces of news though agonised Aurangzeb, yet never for a moment made him think of giving up his design. The aim of the Marathas during this period was to cause a total breakdown of the Mughal administration. This would have resulted in creating chaotic conditions and thus disrupting the entire organization. Now onwards till 1707, Maratha activities were spread throughout the length and the breadth of the country. And they were successful in creating such chaotic conditions which ultimately helped them to gain the victory. By 1704 though Aurangzeb was able to capture all the hill forts of the Marathas, yet it was not possible for him to retain the control and supremacy over them. The Marathas immediately started retaking them one by one. They had regained considerable strength. They were active in the valleys of Sahyādrī, in Khāndesh, Berār, Gondvana, Ujjain, Gujarāt, Mālwā and in Bedar territory in the Karnātaka. Hardly there was any part of Maharashtra, Western India, as well as the Central and the Southern India, which was not attacked

by the warriors of the Maratha kingdom. Everywhere, they established their rule and exacted chauth from the subjects. The Mughal officers in these parts were either killed or held as hostages. They paid ransom and secured their release. A dreadful fear was created by the Maratha sword among these Mughal officers. They were made to accept the supremacy of the Marathas.

The condition of the Mughal army had become most precarious. There was long continued famine and nowhere grain was cheap. The pay of the Mughal soldiers was in arrears. The only source of Aurangzeb's income was the amounts sent annually by the Governor of Bengal. Many a time, when treasury was being conveyed from one place to another, the Marathas with their swiftness attacked it and confiscated. Thereafter many of these sardars goaded by poverty took to plundering in order to support themselves. Such was the condition of the Mughal army to which it had been reduced. In February 1705, Aurangzeb left Maharashtra, once again, in order to punish the Bedars in Karnātaka territory. During his campaign of Bedar, the Marathas helped the Bedars and thus prolonged the agony of Aurangzeb and misery of the Mughal army.

At home the Marathas took the forts one by one after the exit of Aurangzeb from Maharashtra. They had become very powerful, in the words of Manucci, "....they move

like conquerors and showing no fear of any Mughal troops." In April 1705, the Bedars surrendered to Aurangzeb and that campaign proved to be the last campaign of his life. Now his body had become worn out and there were apparent signs of decay. He was not able to stand erect or support himself properly. From now onwards he fell continuously sick, and at Devapur, the rumour of his death spread. But by his public appearance he cleared that rumour, but the people became certain in their mind that he was not going to survive any more, though he himself was a greatly optimistic about it. From Devapur he marched towards Bahādurgadh and ultimately arrived at Ahmadnagar, the last stop on his eternal journey.

On 20th January 1706 he arrived at Ahmadnagar. His sickness and old age compelled him to give up all the activities of subduing the Marathas, though he still ordered Zulfiqār Khan and Tarbiyat Khan to take Singadh from the Marathas.

For next one year or so the Marathas gained tremendous strength. They were active not only in Maharashtra, but Nandaji, Kesopant and others crossed the Narmada and created havoc in Malwa, Central India, Gujrat territories. The Mughal officers were terror stricken. They hardly offered any resistance to the Marathas. The Marathas freely collected chauth from all the region where they

could do so and appointed their own officers. The condition of the Mughal officers was precarious. Their pay was in arrears. There were neither regular supplies nor they received any timely help from the Mughal army. They had become desperate and some of them joined hands with the Marathas. The year 1706 is full with many such events. These reports often reached Aurangzeb. But alas! Everything appeared to be beyond his control. Weary and sick he was lying on the bed, hardly attending to the court. The age had worn him out. Now he was only awaiting the grim end of his life. His chief aim of marching the Mughal armies into the Deccan was not at all achieved. He did not leave a single stone unturned to achieve this. But his efforts were not destined to be crowned with success. There was gross disappointment and haunting frustration. Everything which seemed going well in the beginning went exactly opposite in the end. His ambition of subduing the Marathas remained unfulfilled. His jihād proved to be ineffective. He failed miserably in converting dār-al-harb into dār-al-Islām.

On 21st February 1707 Aurangzeb's mortal existence came to an end. The long and weary war also came to an end. And the Marathas successfully maintained their Liberty, Religion and Honour.

The long war lasting for about twenty five years showed that none but men of iron constitutions could with-

stood such trials. It was physically impossible to resist them, there are limits to human strength, the utmost of which had been exceeded.

Thus the Maratha War of Independence showed beyond doubt that "It was not the outcome of the successful enterprise of any individual adventurer. It was the upheaval of the whole population; strongly bound together by the common affinities of language, race, religion and literature and seeking further solidarity by a common independent political existence. This was the first experiment of the kind attempted in India... It was a national movement or upheaval in which all classes co-operated."<sup>4</sup> What the Marathas had was a distinctive character, a character of its own, resting on the collective consciousness or will of the people.

Lastly, if it be asked, what did the Maratha War of Independence contribute to the world's stock of ideas? The answer might go somewhat along these lines. It contributed primarily a social doctrine. It put forth effectively emancipation of religion and concepts of natural liberty. It was a political movement based on religious fervour and concerned with liberty and with power.

FOOTNOTES

1. RMP, p. 4.
2. MA, p. 308.
3. There are nearly 8 letters which speak about Maharashtra Rajya, and Maharashtra dharma. From these letters we can safely conclude the awareness of the people in fighting against the Mughals. I have already mentioned some of these letters in the Introduction.
4. RMP, pp. 3-4.

## APPENDICES

APPENDIX 'A'

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سیاه

اخبارات دربار معین

No. 1

ماه جمادی الثانی سنه ۱۲۳۰

یوم الخمیس

۲۰ منبر: محمد جمال و غیره دو نفر گرد پیران بنام خاننچیان بیادر و فرامین

بنام برج خان و غیره برین مننون برده بودند که خاننچیان بیادر را صوبه داری  
دکن مقررند باخان متدارالبه ملاقی شده برای کار باز شای بگویند بعمل آرند در  
بدولایه رسانیده در جواب عرصه ذات بر که ام آورده بنظر گذرانیده و از زمانه  
ایا امر خود رسیده که خاننچیان بیادر شهر و شهر گاه رفت و نشست خان  
و اما جمعیت چهار هزار سوار بزرگ محاصره بوقت کرده که سپه اسبق و متصرف  
شده بود فرستاده است برین موجب خدشانه یافته بود و حاضر بودند  
(No. 855)

No 2

ماه رجب المرجب سنه ۱۲۳۰

یوم السبت

۱۴ منبر: امر عرصه ذات دیب سنگ قلعه دار بولیر امر خود رسیده معاودله پنج  
گروه اقامت در قلعه بریت نموده آمده نه جمع کرده بودند و در وی جمعیت  
فرستاده بندگان را اخراج نموده قلعه سپه اسبق و متصرف  
محمود اوست  
(No. 897)

## تعارف العظم ۲۲

یوم الخمس ۱۴ منبر ار واقع در این اجری رسیده که خانجیان باده بیست پنج توپ  
 از قلعہ شہر را پر طلب نموده علی آبادی رجالت سگد باده و  
 راجہ حبوت بوندہ لیلہ بڑی توپها فرستاده بود چنانچہ بیست پنج توپ  
 مردم توپها از قلعہ فرود آورده ازین خبر غنیمت جمعیت فرستاد  
 توپ بجارت برده ازین خبر خان سارال خواسته بود که خود  
 سواری نماید چنانچہ چون در دست خان داد خان حاضر نمودند که  
 ملان بیکار خواهم آید خدا خواسته باشد اگر نوبتی دیگر بشود  
 مناسب نماید که صاحب فوج سوار شود اگر سوار ملان جنگ  
 جادیت شاکر ملک جوابی کرد باینکه حاضر دور رنیت خان  
 داد خان را جمعیت ده هزار سوار تعین ساخته در یوان این صوبہ  
 افندہ کہ انجہ قیوت توپهای باشد داخل مطالبہ علی آباد جنگ  
 سگد حبوت بوندہ لیلہ باینکہ مرجع امر بشود حکم شد کہ از پرست  
 بزرگ هزار توپ باز یافت نمایند (No. 948)

## ماہ دی حجه ۲۳

یوم الساب

۸ منبر خانجیان باده رضہ داشتہ ارال داشتہ بود ببنگر گشت  
 محمول داشتہ کہ بسیرا مقبورا ۱۰ جانب شہر را پر آورده بود رنیت  
 خان و غیرہ بوندہ لیلہ بڑی از جانب تعین نموده بود چنانچہ  
 جنگ واقع شدہ ار ارباب حضرت مقبوران را شکست داده

بسیاری حائس کشته شده از روی راقعه غسل اعرض داد  
خواهش رسید (No 1061)

No 5

ماه شعبان ۱۲۳۰

یوم ۱۱ است

۲۰ منتهی از راقعه سرانجام بر اعرض رسید که مردم بنیم مراد  
شده امده این مسرکار خان بابت حاجان بیاد کرد در انجا بود  
قلعه بنده شده خبردار سانه غفلت بر کمرن پوره دیره - -  
راجیونان بیرون بیاد دگر تمام شهرات است از ساره تاراج  
لوده (منت) (No 1145)

No. 6

۱۵ منتهی یوم العربیه ده هزار روپیه قیمت بمردم برانجهور کرد  
متاع انباری سیر سوا مقهور تاراج نمود و از خزانه صرف حاصل حواله  
کند اشرف و له بخت کمال نمودن فرود نه که افت قیمت نمایند -  
اشیوخان دیوان حاله موافق حکم محول سایر که در عید حضرت  
فرودس شیان فرود بود غسل بجزین رسانید حکم شده چیل در  
روپیه از مردم بنود میگرفت چیل یک روپیه از مردم سدان  
نیز گرفته باشد (No 1149)

No. 7

ماه رجب ۱۲۳۱

یوم ۱۱ است

۲۴ منتهی بموجب امری داشت قلعه دهان قلعه دار ندرک بجز  
رسید که سنیاجی سپهر سوا مقهور جمعیت خود برای تاخت

يوم الاحد

۱۸ منبه ار واقع دکن بعضی رسید که جمعیت سبایی بر  
سیرا مقهور بجانب زادگ آمده بود بابران خانجیان بیاد داشت  
خان و نیز برای تنبیه انبا مقینه نموده چنانچه خانزور از زادگ  
شکوه انطرف مقابل نموده جنگ افتخ شده از اقبال حضرت  
بسیار منان بقتل رسانیده و زخمی نموده شکست داده و مردم  
ین جانب هم بشار آمده و زخمی شده بابران خانجیان بیاد داشت  
خان و نیزه را انگاه بچوینز نموده بود منظور شد (No. 1217)

No. 9

ساره جمادی الاول

يوم الجمعة

۱۹ منبه رعد شده خانجیان بیاد برک چوکی آمده معرفت لطف  
الله خان بنظر ازشت حصوص ذات بود که نوح غنیمت را باخت  
نوازی اورنگ آباد آمده بود چنانچه مظفرخان خانه ذاد و نیست خان  
و دارد خان و نیزه بده بافت بادشای سیرا می نمودند و آجا رسیده  
جنگ واقع شده چنانچه قریب کینزار پانصد کس از قهوران  
به اقبال حضرت بقتل رسانیده و بسیاری زخمی نموده بفرست  
داده فتح بادشای شده و انچه طاع تاج سرب بود بر  
گرفته و مردان گریخته رفتند و مظفرخان بجه نوح عقب  
آیا نموده و آنچه بر بادشای نردم نموده و زخمی شده  
قتل از ... واقع بعضی اشرف حواله رسید (No. 1255)

No. 10, 11

ساره رجب المرجب

يوم الاثنين

۲۰ منبه عبده الرحیم خان مرص نموده که و نیست خان به نیزه

خطی نوشته که مردم سنجان بر سر سوار مقبور حبه تاراج  
 بگرفت اندر و نیزه امده بود بنا بران خانجیان بیاد مظفر خان  
 پسر خود و بنده درگاه و نیزه جمعیت بر او تحسین نموده مفسدان  
 از انجا ترغیبه بیت پنج کرده عقب نموده در کونل دهر پیور  
 مفسدان مقابله نموده جنگ واقع شده بسیار از مردم متردان  
 بقتل رسانیده و شکست داده بیت هزار بنده و مویشی انبار  
 تاخت نموده میبرد بندهای بیت آورده و نشان نثار و مسح  
 مفسدان را آورده امیدوار رعایت است حکم شده مجرای  
 او شد (۱۳۷۶/۷۷) (No. 12)

No. 12

ماه رمضان المبارک ۱۲۶۰

الحمد لله  
 ۱۰ منبه از واقعه سنگین بعضی اسید که دو صد سوار پانزده  
 پیاده مردم غنیمت یک کرده از غنیمت سونیر یکینزار پانزده مویشی  
 متصرف شده چنانچه از استماع این خبر نادره جانتان دارسوی  
 کرد بسبب جمعیت قلیل گرشته آموه و یک صد دویار  
 قلعه به سبب طغیانی یاران سمارتیه افتاد بر چه امر شد محمد علی  
 خان فرمودند که به بیداران فرستاده امداد نماید (No. 1275)

No. 13

الحمد لله  
 ۱۱ منبه به اخلاص خان و امیر سعید الدخان مرحوم فرمودند که  
 برای امداد نگرد و پدید گاه داشت از سنگین برای نبوه بجهت بیاورد

جمعیّت تباہ داران سدا خطه نموده هر جا که قلعه ای شکست رخت  
 باشد مرمت کرده برید و آنچه بنده ای با شاهی را لازم  
 دادن قلعه مطلوب باشد از برای خود گزارند و از تباہ داران  
 مذکور بچاک بگیرد اگر کس سوار پیاد غنیمت تحویل جوتائی بیاورد  
 تنبیه نماید و اودنه یں باز خواست به عده نمایان است و نیز  
 آتش خان دارونه تو پخانه دکن حکم شد یک کس را برائے دین  
 لشکر مردم دشنام قلعه ای آیین نماید - (No. 1976)

No. 14

ماه رمضان المبارک

یوم الحرب  
 ۱۳ منہ به دیار خان فرموده که به روح الدخان اقله بولمینه  
 که جمعیّت غنیمت میخواهد بر تباہ انتور بیاورد که عبد العزیز خان  
 قلعه دار جو نیر و شاه محمد تباہ دار اندک بنویسد که وقت کار  
 کو یک احمد تباہ دار انتور نماید که ج را یات عالیات بست  
 احمد انگر اجد سعید و خان مشور است (No. 1980)

No. 15

ماه شوال ۱۲۶

یوم الثلاثاء  
 ۱۴ منہ به عرض رسید که شاه محمد و نیز در جنگ مردم غنیمت  
 احمد خان تباہ دار انتور که تائی نمایند بنابران کم فرمودند  
 (No. 2034)

No. 16

ماه رمضان المبارک ۱۲۶۷

یوم الخمیس

۱۱ منہ حضرت سید یاقوت خان نامہ دار دندل و صاحبی  
بحرفت بہرہ مند خان بصری رسید کہ عرض داشتہ بود کہ سنیہ مقبور  
برای گاہ داشت جمعیت مردان جائے بجائے طلبیدہ کو کری نایہ  
و انجی جمعیت در تباہات بود نیز بیشتر خود طلبیدہ است کہ  
(No. 1994)

No. 16A

ماه ذی قعدہ ۱۲۶۷

یوم السبت

۳ منہ از نوشتہ میرزا دست گرد ہزار کہ برای گاہ داشت پیادہ مانے  
توم ماولیہ نگاہ دارد چنانچہ سنیہ مقبور در ہاے مدد نمودن پیار  
بات را کافر بچہ آمدن نمی دہد دیگر توم را حکم نیست کہ بدلم  
حکم شد کہ ہر اہ بابائی بخود بیاید  
(No. 2052)

No. 17

ماه رمضان المبارک ۱۲۶۷

یوم السبت

۱۳ منہ عنایت اللہ گرز ہزار مران بنام شاہزادہ محمد اشرف  
نامہ در خطاب اللہ بنام شمس الدین خان ہرودہ بود سنانیہ در داشت  
شاہزادہ جیوہ خط شمس الدین خان بدو اللہ خان آوردن بنظر  
گذرانیدہ زبانی بصری رسانید کہ تا حال شاہزادہ جیوہ ہر روز  
استقامت دارد نہ عبور نمیشدہ اند بیخلم جمعیت ختم ہست

بادشاهی آمده چند دیبای ناراح بودند درین اثنا سه شایزاد - جیو  
جمعیت جبهه تنبیه مقهوران اعراس نموده انسا آفرخته اند (No 17)

No 18

ماه شمال حدود ۱۷

یوم الخمس  
۱۷ مه باد و غبار و انعام دانه برده کل کن و غلب  
فروردین خان شایزاد با نعلت اسپا به دلیل (No 17)

No 19

ماه شمال

یوم الجمعة  
۱۸ مه دره داشت احمد آباد و انتر بنظر گذشت عروضا داشت  
بود که سابق جمیت عینم بهم چیزی درین صبح آمده بود فردی  
مقابله نموده شکست داده و الحال ده ده از ده هزار سوار بهاده  
آمده ی خواهند که تاخت نابیز اگر خبر بنده بگیرند بهتر و او نه تیار  
هنگام از دست خواهند رفت و بنده زان خواهد شد بعد معروض فرمودند  
که شاب اردین خان و میرزا بهادری ادا تای را حکم شده است که  
کوکن مشارالیه نمایندگیه باشند (No 20)

No 20

ماه شمال

یوم السبت  
۱۹ مه سید و خدود فرمودند که سید محکم به بهادری خان نوک  
مشارا از دقتن کوک آمده تیار دار انور عورت داشته باید که به



No. 21

ماه شوال

یوم الثانی  
۱۰ مه - خدیوگ محبت یسارل فریان به انظم شاه حسن ملی خان  
بیاد و قلیج خان برده بود رسانیده در خزانة باغ آورده بنظر گذرانیده  
زبان بجزر اسافه شاهزاده بهمنزل قری استقامت دارنده قلیج خان  
در از خان با فوج سیزده هزار سوار بجیت تنیه نفیم لکم از دریا  
بهمره عبور شده و مردم حاسوسان خبر آوردند که تا دراز دگر  
مردم نفیم نمایان باشند بشنیدند خاوش ماندند (No. 2023)

No 22

ماه شوال

یوم الخامس  
۱۳ مه - بیاد و قلیج خان برده را از خدمت داد و به تعیناتی فوج شاهزاده  
معزالدین اخلاص فرمودند  
به مرض رسیده که جمیع نفیم لکم جانب بگانه آمده است به روح الله خان  
فرمودند که حسب الحکم به محمود خان بدست که سعه فوج برای خود برای  
تنیه مقهوران به بگانه برود (No. 2028)

No. 22 A

شرفیاب ۱۹۱۰

روز شنبه

۱۸ مه - خبر است که دم شعبان به جانب دکن بجیت تنیه سلطان محمد اکبر متوجه  
شوند و چنان شنیده می شود که نینو فی دکن محمد علی خان بجیت هشت هزار

سوار در بگانه آمده نشسته است و سلطان محمد اکبر نیز از  
 بایان کون کوچ نموده بطرف بگانه آمده و جمعیت پسر سوار  
 بران است و خود پسر سوار بدست سواران ی آید و برده  
 در حق ترقی شده - - - - - (No. 2039)

No. 23

ماه سوال

یوم السبت

۲۲ مه از واقع گلشن آباد اینست که جمعیت نیمیم در دایره  
 چه دیات این بار [آ] نشر داده تاخت تاراج کرده برده (No. 2039)

No. 24

ماه سوال

یوم الارشاد

۲۳ مه فرامین به راجه نور داس گور قلعه دار مله به راجه باسنگ  
 تاناه دار گلشن آباد شاه محمد تاناه دار اکوای طار شده که از بندیت  
 لعلقه خود با خبر دایا شده (No. 2041)

No. 25

ماه سوال

یوم الاحد

۲۶ مه به موجب نوشته اللهیار خان آغا که کتبه منجه بعضی رسیده  
 جمعیت کتبه مقهور به قلعه کیده سرت محاصره نموده قلعه آورده بود چون این  
 خبر فوری شد جمعیت مرستاده آخرش دست اندر درده و سگتر نموده ارسال  
 داشته امیر دار افغانه هم کلمه داده اسباب حواله اتمام خان نمایند (No. 2044)

No. 26

ماه سوال شده

لوح الخامس

۲۴ منبه - حسب حکم به روح الدخان نام سیف الله که جبهه سترای  
بیاد خان رفته است حادثه مضمون آنکه حاجیان بیاد را سترای کرده  
از قلعه نام بیج بگریسات دره تل کوکن ببرد و بیاد خان را ببرد  
تل کوکن اسافند از دانه چاکه بجز رسیده که جای باز خان تالعه ایجا  
بیمار است و جمعیت بیستم در دانی آوره است تا بران مردمان خان  
عمر کرده دله شده اند میخواهند که از خان بزرگوارانه شوند بر چه امر شود  
به روح الدخان فرموده که به شهاب الدین خان بنویسد که خود را نزد  
به تالعه بزرگوارانه

(No. 2046)

No. 27

ماه ذی قعدة ۱۲۷

لوح السادس

۱۰ منبه - به روح الدخان فرموده که بخداست او شاه خاره اعظم شاه و  
شاهزاده معزالدین مرقد است و حسب حکم پادشاه کرم خان و شهاب الدین  
خان و بیروز خان و غیره سرداران فوج و پادشاهان آن قلاع و سوا  
اگر مردم بیستم برای تحویل چوئیای بیاورند آید از پادشاه تنبیه نموده دستگیر  
نمایند بجای خود رفته و اگر جمعیت بیستم را بداد باشد سرداران  
خبر کرده با تقاضا که بگریست به ساند و اگر اسلحه ای  
جواب کرده مردم بیستم را که ساند و اگر گزشت از طرف  
بر طرف نموده جواب ده

(No. 2051)

لوم الحریه  
 « منبه از واقعه فوج تیج خان بعض رسیده که شیخ بده نوکره ارخان  
 با جمعیت کثیره سوار خزان و جنس و باره و غیره نزد کمال ابن خان  
 ی آورده چهار روزه از اینجا فرود آمده بود بگام شب جمعیت غنیم آمده  
 بر آنجا افتاده جنگ واقعه شده آخرش جمعیت غنیم کثیر بود چند  
 نفر ملری شیخ مذکور جان کشته انچه از جنس و باره و غیره آورده  
 رسیده و اکثر مردم غریبه درین جا آورده کمال ابن خان و دلیران  
 پیاده مان این خبر شنیده صف غنیم شانه افروش غنیم را  
 نیابت برگشته آمده  
 (۲۵ ۲۵۶۱)

لوم الجمع  
 « منبه خوابه دانش نوکر تیج خان در نزد خان مذکور آورده  
 بنظر کد زانیه معروفه است بود که در باره سوار چل کرده در خاک غنیم  
 رسیده چنانچه بهر را و دینوچی بجه بیت بزر سوار و پیاده  
 سوار مقبور بزره مقابل آمده رسیده و روی سرانرا خان و بهر خان  
 و کمال ابن خان و کثیره سوار و غیره بیت بزر سوار را از  
 فوج مقرر کرده سوار می نموده با مردم غنیم جنگ واقعه شده از  
 اقبال حضرت سید و چهاره کسر عبودان و انجمن ساخته و بسیار  
 زخمی ساخته قتل بادشای شد و تا پنج کوزه تعاقب نموده غنیم

گرنجینه به اس کوه پنهان شده و از دست پندای پادشاهی نبرد بوانی  
شاه امیدوار نتیجه نیک اند اجده و الله عز و جل رحمت خود را بفرستد  
منشی نموده که انتخاب کرده اجرض رسان  
(No. 2063)

No 30  
ماه دی قمره سال ۱۲۸۰

یوم السبت

۱۴ منبه سید اولادون مرضی نموده که تیج خان بجوهر مرض داشت  
نموده و آئینه نوشته است که پیر او وزیر جمعیت غنیم بهم را تنبیه  
بوانی نموده از اقبال حرب خوب نتج کرده و بندای پادشاهی  
امیدوار رعایت اند فرمودند نشان سادات غنی شود چنانچه خاندان  
نوشته که این قدر مردم غنیم را بقفل رسانید شب بنود از او آتش بود  
و اگر مردم غنیم را یکنه که بندای پادشاهی سرکاری آید  
و سوی این برشته نزد شاهزاده محمد اعظم شاه چرا آمده مرض  
نمود که او همچو بنده نیست که خلاف معروض دارد فرمودند که  
انتخاب مرض داشت خان مذکور و خطی که از او پیکر بطلب  
السلطان نوشته نموده اجرض رساند -  
(No. 2067)

No 31  
ماه دی قمره

یوم الاحد  
۱۵ منبه سابق حکم شده بود که شاهزاده حزارین در احمد نگر باث  
درین ولایت حکم شده ببادر گده عرف پیدگانو بیاید و غنیم را انظر آفرین ندیند

نمبردار باشند - بدین موجب فوج از حضور مقرر کرده همراه

(No. 2065)

ساری شایزاده باشند

No. 32

ماه ذی قعدة ۱۲۶۰

لواء الخمیس

۱۹ مه به بنجار خان فرمودند از ابو محمد پسر فوجدار خان بلوچ که  
از سرزمین دکن واقف حال است مطابق دره باغ ملک غنیمت تحقیق  
نموده اجرض رساند چنانچه برسیده عرض نمود که مشارالیه التماس بنمایرد  
پدر آمر شدن ملک غنیمت به خدمت دره آنه منجمله نصرت و پنج  
دره چنان اند که قبیل و شتر و غیره بگذرند و باقی دره مانده راه  
تنگ دارند حکم شد حقیقت مفصل نوشت بنظر گزارید

(No. 2069)

No. 32 A

خبر دربار وادارین صورت است که بندگان حضرت خان جهان بیادر  
را حکم فرمودند که در دره گوئی پایان در آمد شده در تنبیه غنیمت  
به پردازد خان موی الهه عز و نمود این خدیو زمان دانست خان را  
به خطاب بیادر خان سرافراز پردازد خان موی الهه قبول نموده و احوال  
شکر طفران را بجا بعافیت خراب و پریشان است و خبرم بود که  
بندگان حضرت دارم در نموده -  
در خدمت کنول نین بتاریخ یفت دلم شهر ذی قعدة ۱۰۹۳ (سید)

(V. R. No. 40)

بسم الله  
 ۲۳ مه  
 بموجب زشت ياد خان اجمن رسيد که فدی تبارغ  
 ۱۴ شهر حال بمجه فوج در آورده و تل کون شده بالا گيات برسيد انشا الله  
 تمام موافق ارشاد مرضي مبارک بتقدم خواهم رسانيد و از حقيقت  
 انجا سفي الله خوب واقف است بعضي خوابه رساند و نه هزار پياده  
 نگاه داشت کانهو جي همراه بده تعجب شده از انجمله ده هزار پياده رسيد  
 اند و حقيقت دره بود است جمعي که جاگير دار همراه آغايات از وقتي که  
 بيرون دره بودند کثري را خريبي از جاگيري آورده بعضي از ساهوکار  
 قرض کنيد، ي خوردند و حاله همراه فوج ک ساهوکار نسبت که قرض  
 و ام گرفته تردد نمايد و با آن گيات نرخ خل في "ب پنج اشار  
 است و پايين گيات بمحضت روشن اگر انجا چيزي ساده مرحمت  
 شود بهتر است  
 (No. 2074)

۲۲ مه  
 ديوانه بيلک و فبره بفره منصبه داران در ضد داشت تباب ايريهان  
 آورده بتظر گذرانيد و زيات بعضي رسانيد که خاندن کور هر روز بمختب  
 ۱۵ شهر حال اسباب زياد است و مردم مير را در جونيگر گذشت تنها  
 بمجه فوج بيلک غنيم در آورده قريب ببيت موضع تعلق غنيم اخذت  
 و تاراج نموده آتش داده بسياري را قتل رسانيد و بيشي بيت آورده هر روز  
 جمعه در انجا مقام نموده و بيزه باي را بمجنور فرستاده قرار کرده بود که



بروز شنبه چند مواضع دیگر گرد و پیش را تاراج نموده بیرون  
دره خواهم برآید فرمودند که بکریا کی شد (No. 2075)

No. 34  
ماه دی قعدہ ۱۲۶۲

یوم السبت

۲۴ منب شیخ عبدالعزیز نمود احمد خان نیایه دار انتوره به بندہ نوشت که  
برگاه شهاب الدین خان آورده به بندہ حکومت برسیه که حاله چه بایه کرد  
دارین استانی عینی زمیندار کوکن ظاهر نمود که اگر بندہ را برادر نمایند  
شارا اندرون دره تل کوکن جانی که آبادانی مردم غنیم است بزم این  
جمیته شهاب الدین منارالبه را برادر خود نموده اندرون دره شتافته  
پانصد سوار جمعیت خود برای خائنه گردان دادن آخرش خان منارالبه  
اندرون دره چند مواضع را تاخت نموده و چهارصد نفر بقتل رسانیده  
یک هزار بندی و چهار هزار مویشی بربست آورده باز خان منار  
بیرون دره شده درین جا آورده و قرار جان کرده است که بمن  
طرد جرییده شده اسب قبیله ای که غنیم است تاخت و تاراج  
نموده برآید آهسته آهسته بعد معرکه فرموده که مرا  
شهاب الدین خان خلعت علوه نمایند (No. 2076)



یوم الجمع  
 ۸ منبه روح السخان مرض نمود که تیر انداز نایب دار لاسور نوشت که مظفر  
 و له خانجیان گاکر فوجدار کا نذا بود به فقیر نوشت که قریب یک ہزار ایتھ  
 سوار جمعیت غنیم بزرے تھیل چوتہائی آئندہ منجملہ پانچ سوار از دربانے  
 مان انگ عبور شدہ سرحد بندہ کبیرہ اند کو ملک فدوی نایب بنابران  
 سواری کردہ روانہ شدہ از اقبال حضرت مقہوران را تنبیہ خواہم کرد  
 فرود بند کہ خوب کردہ

(No. 2090)

یوم السبت  
 ۸ منبه از حضرت داشت خانجیان بہادر بعض رسید کہ نادر بی نایب دار گلگیر  
 نوشت کہ قریب شش ہفت ہزار سوار غنیم بزرے تھیل چوتہائی آئندہ اند  
 بنابران مظفر خان و راڈ حکم سنگ و نیز فوج بطرف او نذرہ پستہ تعین نودہ  
 بود کہ در آنجا راہ سد نہ نمایند بعد تعین نمودن آنجا نذرہ نیز سواری  
 نمودہ محاصرہ کردہ متصل موضع ہوجہ پورہ مقابلہ نمودہ جنگ واقع شد  
 از اقبال حضرت بسیارے مقہوران بقتل رسانیدہ و لکھو جی سردار  
 فوج غنیم را بجان کشتہ و باقی گرختہ رفتند و چیزی مردم  
 این جات بکار آئندہ و زخمی شدند سر لکھو جی ہریرہ ارسال  
 خواہم داشت مطالعہ خالص در آوردند

(No. 2096)

No. 38  
ماه ذی الحجه ۱۲۶

يوم السبت

۸ شب سید ارشد درین روز که شتاب این خان به بنده نوشته است  
که جاسوسان خبر آردند که اخراج کنیم از ملک خود بیرون آمده میخواهند  
که بلف تبانی را راه شوند ازین جهت بنده منع شده هرگاه خبر کنیم  
بیایم ساری کرد حکم شده بخان مژده بفرستد که ازین دره منع است  
کنیم بزد که از حرمت خبردار باشد و اگر مردم کنیم شرفی نمایند تنب  
رسانند

در این خان درین روز که مردم خان بنده نوشته مردم جاسوسان خبر آردند  
که در بنار ساری کنیم موضع بنده برای تاخت آمده اند بیایدان فدوی  
تاریخ سلخ ذی قعدت اسباب زیاد و مردم بیرون در قاعه بدو نه اند  
بجهت تنبیه شافیه آخرش مقهوران قتل موضع بیرون با نژاده کرده این طرف  
از موضع بنده مقابل نموده از اقبال حرمت بسیار کس را قتل رسانیده  
و پنجاه کس را زنده سنگسار نموده باقی گریخته اند و چندی مردم  
این جانب بکار آمده و زخمی شدند اجه ازین موضع بنده و دیگر مردم  
مقتل حقایق از مرصه دانست بعضی حوادر سید مرصود در مجرای عالمه دانسته  
(No. 2097)

No. 39

ماه ذی الحجه

يوم السبت

۱۵ شب روح ابرو خان درین روز که مانند بی تپانه دار شکار پور خطی  
نوشته که نار و نرمل سوار سینه بشور اجمعیست کثیر این و آن آورده فدوی  
ساری کرده مقابل نموده مفید مذکور را سکست داده بیاید کس

را بقض رسانیده و زنی مآخه و پنجاه اسپ و چهل شمشیر مقهوران  
بهست آورده فرمودند بجاری نشد  
(No. 2105)

No. 40  
ماه ذی الحجه ۱۲۶

بوم الا شنبه  
۲۱ شنبه نضایل خان درض نمود که هرگاه نوشته بهادر خان به بنده آورده زبانی  
غابری نماید که خان مذکور در آورده دره تل گوین شده تا به قلعه تهرنی رسید  
یک مقام نموده قلعه بیاری گمانند و در راه از چهارات کسب غله به سر  
ادبیه بنده آثار غله و یک آثار رخن آنرا سرخ و شکر بود و اکثر  
زمینداران آن ضلع نیز متفق شده اند بعد بیار نمودن قلعه موافق حکم  
عبدالقیاض خان میان را به جمعیت در آن جا گذاشته روانه پهنتر  
نوابه شد و چند مرتبه جمعیت غنیمت نمودار شده بود از اقبال حضرت  
شکست داده نوشتجات خاندان که نیز بنظر بنده رانده بهلا اید خالص در آورده  
(No. 2117)

No. 41  
ماه ذی الحجه

بوم السبت  
۲۶ شنبه از واقعه بدو بعضی رسید که مردم غنیمت بهم جنبه تحلل جوتبائی  
آفزع آمده بود چند دیات را تاخت نموده بند بوشی و نیزه سلاح متصرف  
شده جانب صوبه هزار رستمند و کسرم خان بغاظمی نموده برای تنبیه مقهوران  
سواری نه کرده چنانچه خاندان در هزاران خدمت یک هزار دهم سوار بود از  
ادبیه امتزائی بازدهی خدات و در حد سوار کم کرده  
(No. 2124)

لوم الانشاء

۲۸ منب خرمای بنام خانجیان بیاد داد نمود که جمعیت غنیمت جبهه تحال  
چو تباست بهست سوره پیر آمده بنابران خود را بجهه فوج جبهه تنبه مقهور  
آنجا رسیده حواله غنیمت بیک گرزدار نموده حکم شد که محده الملك را سزای  
کرده به پیر رسانده حسب الحکم به میرادح اسرار خان بنام ایچ خان هو به دار  
بزرگ حواله گرزدار مذکور فرمودند

خرمان بنام غل خان حاد شده معنون آگه سوار است به پیران  
و بانزده سوار و اسرار فوج مقر نموده خود را به پیران رسانده و مردم  
غنیمت اگر در آن فراموش نماید تنبیه رسانده حواله سپه میر گرزدار نموده بموجب  
ذیل از فوج شاهزاده معزز الدین پیرا خاندان را تعیین فرمودند (No. 2127)

No. 43

محرم الحرام ۱۲۶

لوم الانشاء

۱۲ منب حضرت داشت شاهزاده محمد اعظم شاه آمده بنظر گذشت حضرت داشت  
بود که پیران و غیره و گران سپاه مقهور با جمعیت بانزده سوار جبهه  
مقابل آمده بود در چنانچه بنده قلیچ خان و سر دینان بیاد و راز ادب  
سنگ باده و سرانرا از خان و غیره را سرارل و دست راست و دست چپ  
مقر نموده سپاهی کرده مقهوران بجهت گداز بپیش آمده از اقبال  
حضرت بسیار مقهوران قریب پنجاه نفر بچشم رسانیده و زخمی ساخته  
و نفیض نفر زنده دستگیر کرده و چتری و نشان و بند و قبا و غیره اسلحه  
آنها بدست آورده و اکثری بنده ایی یادشای بکار آورده و زخمی کردند

و زخم بدوق به قلیج خان رسیده فتح اخیلم شد و ترو بدزبان باد نای مشروحاً  
معروض داشته ام به برای بیایند بدگان حضرت بعد مطالعه به شاه عالم جیرو  
مطالعه نمایند به روح انداختن فرمودند که مطابق نرد و گردن نوشت بنظر  
بگذرانید و یک اک او به انعام جبهه شایزاده جیرو سلووه نمایند  
روح انداختن مرده است نخل خان بنظر اندازانیده اجیرن رسانید که به بنده  
نیز خطی نوشت که فردی سوانق کم از نرد شایزاده محض این به پودا هر  
رسیده به بیت دقت موقع غنیم را آتش داده بسیار را بقتل رسانیده  
و زخمی ساخته یک نفر زنده نگذاشته و یک نفر را زخمی بدست آورده  
باقی مرغیته انداختند بعد آن بسته گاه بخار و مالدی او را سبب از سر  
متفق شده آمده مقابل نموده آثار نیز شکست داده فرمودند که  
(No. 2152)

بجای گشته

No. 44

ماه ذی الحجه ۱۲۷۰

یوم النصار  
۲۸ مه خواب حسین بیگ و نیزه ده نفر زندیده در فرزندت نواب این مان  
آورده بنظر اندازانیده معروض داشته بود که بتاریخ ۱۳ شهریور در جاکنه تروی  
خبر رسید که مردم غنیم جانب ده که آمده اند با بران بنده سواری نموده در آنجا  
رسیده قریب نصف نفر بقتل رسانده و در این ضمن خبر رسیده که مردم غنیم  
سی پور آمده چو ساری تحیل ی نمایند بتاریخ ۱۴ شهریور در جاکنه  
در آنجا رسیده اکثری را بقتل رسانیده و زخمی ساخته شکست داده بود  
در بنوا خبر یافته که مردم غنیم در برگنه حضور آورده در آنجا رسیده  
با مردم غنیم مقابل نموده جنگ افتاده قریب یکصد پنجاه کس را مردم غنیم

لقتل رسانیده و بسیار کس را زخمی ساخته فلج باد نای شده و اکثر مردم این  
جانب بکار آمده و پشتاد مواضع غنیم را تاراج نموده بیست و هفت نفرند و پوپ  
و بنده و چهل سته بیاله و یک پائی و پنج نشان و دو جفت نقاره بر دست  
آورده بند و بستی مردم غنیم بسیار بر سران فردی متصرف شده و  
مطالع فرمودند که عجبی کجی شد  
(No. 2128)

No. 45  
ماه محرم الحرام ۱۲۶

لوح الفس  
فرمودند روح الله خان فرمودند که حسب حکم بنام سید محمد خان صوبه دار  
برای خبر و بهی مضمون بنویسد -  
چون فوج غنیم از جانب بگلانه آورده شده و بعد از آن اتحاد داد و یک  
بنیانه داران این نواحی تا کلبه برنگارد و خود نیز از بند بیست و دانی خبردار  
باش  
(No. 2133)

No. 46  
ماه محرم الحرام

لوح الفس  
فرمودند به نطف الله خان فرمودند که به خانجیان بباد بنویسد که از نرستان  
صوبه برای متصرف آورده باید که از بند بیست و هفت گشتن بباد و دانی خبردار باشد در آنجا  
روح الله خان را به فوج و تحت نموده جواب شد -  
(No. 2138)

No. 47  
ماه محرم الحرام

لوح الفس  
فرمودند از دانه فوج شاهزاده محمد اعظم شاه اجری رسید که گریه شایراده چو بنزد  
پیرناله شش کرده آن طرف رسیدند مردم جاسکان خبر آورده که پیرناله و غیره



فوج غنیم بیست هزار سوار منجمل فوج پنج هزار سوار اقرار نموده که بر دیر و عقب  
افتند بنا برین شاهزاده جیر فیروز خان و دادا و پسران و غیره فوج عقب  
دیر گردانیده و خود با فوج جبهه تنبه سواران نمود. آخرش مقهوران بمقابل  
پیش آورده جنگ واقع شد از اقبال حضرت بسیار بقتل رسانده و زخمی ساخته  
شکست داده و اکثر بزرگانی که آورده و زخمی شده و فیروز خان  
بعد پسران نرود نموده زخمی شده و تیغ خان و غیره بنده بای پادشاهی خلی  
نرود نموده شنیده خاموش ماندند.

(No. 2139)

No. 48

ماه اربعه ساله

لوم البت

۵ منب خبره داشت ابرج صوبه دار برار حضرت تلف الله خان بنظر از دست محروم شده  
بود که جمعیت غنیم جانب نگذاشته و آورده سواران نموده از در خود بدو کرده بعد  
از آن خبر رسیده که مقهوران جانب ابرج بود آورده از جبهه بزرگ تنبه مقهوران بار  
طرف سواران نموده بنده بیست و هفتی خواص گردیده مطالعه فرمودند که حسب  
الحکم به خاندان کار بوی که سابق در باب شاکم شده بود که بعد از آن جمعیت  
بر کام شاهزاده انظم شاه برود موقوف نموده نزد شاهزاده محزون در نظر

آباد برود

از مابقی خرج خانجیان بیاد بعضی رسید و خان مذکور تعاقب غنیم نموده تاب  
میل کنین مامورین پسرده حیدر آباد رسیده از راه بهانه حکم شده  
فلت خان و کمرنگ بزرگ مان ستار الیه و غلامات جبهه مظفر خان و نصرت  
خان خلعه نمایند

(No. 2273)

لوم الثالث  
 ۶ منب از درخت داشت نیکنام خان قلعه دارد بر پاره اجری و سید که مردم غنیمت از  
 قلعه نرفت کرده و اوله جهوله و غیره چهار قلعه جبهه تحویل جوئیای برآمده بودند و بزرگ  
 جمعیت تعیین نموده چنانچه مقابله شده قریب ده یا نوزده نفر بقتل رسانده و  
 بسیار زخمی نمود و یا نوزده نفر زنده دستگیر نموده بجنود فرستاده و اکثر مردم  
 این جانب بجا آمده و زخمی زده حکمت حال اقدام خان یازده که در تیرنگاه  
 دارد و بجزای جانده گذشت

(No. 2142)

لوم الخامس  
 ۲۲ منب مرضه داشت امیرج خان صوبه دار برآمده بنظر گذشت معروضه داشت بود که  
 جمعیت غنیمت زامی کوادور تاخت نموده بنده بوشی متصرف شده ی روز از استماع  
 این فردی قاسم خان بمعرفه ج ساری نموده مقبوران را تنبیه کرده بنده بوشی  
 واپس آورده حواله ماسکان نموده بکسر را بقتل رسانیده شکست  
 داده مقبوران را کربخیه رفتند و سپس مضمون مرضه داشت قاسم خان نیز بنظر  
 گذشت اجد مطالعه فرمودند بجزای جان ستار الکلی شده

(No. 2161)

لوم السادس  
 ۲۴ منب میرا با رفیر در نظر داشت زباب این خان آورده بنظر گذرانیده  
 معروضه داشته بود که مردم جاسوسان خبر آورده که افواج غنیمت در راج گره و برادر  
 و سیواپور جمعی شونده قصد چنان داده اند که در سنگ بادهای بلایند بنابران ندی



بمعه بدهای بادشاهی یلغرنوده در آنجا رسیده مقهوران مغالہ کرده از  
اقبال حضرت شکست داده بسیارے را بقتل رسانیده چل دیوب و  
شانزده شمر و یک راج نغاره و یک شزل یکی از مقهوران بدست آورده  
بمخور نرساده فرود در در باب مجری قران بخاند کورنویس (No. 2174)

No 52

ماه صفر ۱۲۶۰

۱۵ مه غریب بگ گرز بردار مرضه داشت قاسم خان آورده بنظر گذرانیده  
زبانی بعضی رسانیده بخان مذکور خبر رسیده که مانند بلال سرگردون جمعیت  
سپاه مقهور با پنج هزار سوار بچکوه انظر فلدوگ نو دارنده چنانچه خان  
مذکور از این استماع سوار شده با مردم غنیم مغالہ نموده چتری و نشان  
و غیر بدست آورده میرعابد حیدر خان فوج ششدهی ذات پناه سوار بود  
بمعه چند کس گرز بردار و غیر بکار آمده بعد معروض از درئے مهرانے خلعت  
و قرمان و عالم علم و طوغ مرحمت نموده حواله میر غریب و غیر نموده (No. 2201)

No. 53

ماه ربیع الاول ۱۲۶۰

یوم الخمس ۱۶ مه از مرضه داشت سید مرت خان سوجی (تہوجی) بمعه جمعیت چهار  
هزار سوار و پیاده مردم غنیم آمده راه سوار کرده بود فدوی بدیم سگ  
و بزرگ دیگر مردمان را جنہاں و غیر مقرر کرده بتارنج استر حال قتال  
کرده جنگ و انجوشد قریب چهار صده کس را بقتل رسانیده و زخمی  
ساخته و باقی رو فرار نموده و بدیم سگ و غیر بدهای بادشاهی تردد

نمود شش منزل شکر بیاد خان مسافت است و مردم فرنگی این توانی آمده  
علاقه ای شده اند بجهت مطالبه عرض داشت (نگاه داشتند)  
(No. 2258)

No. 54

ماه ربیع الاول ۱۲۶۲

الحمد لله  
غرض منبر حکم شده پنجمین بار بدهد و قبیله صلابت خان و اتش خان نگاه داشته اند  
برکات باد شاه داده همه اعظم شاه تعیین نمایند -  
فرمان بنام روح الله خان حاکم است مضمون کند با فضل شاد از طالبین حضور  
موقوف کرده در گلشن آباد باشد حال سید میرگز برادر فرمودند (No. 2221)

No. 55

ماه ربیع الاول

الحمد لله  
۶ منبر بعرض رسید که جمعیت غنیمت زانی اند اگر نمایان شده بنابران  
تیرانداز و غیره را انعام داده و خلعت فرمودند و کلمه دوزیر بیگ  
گزر برادر رسانیده بیاورید -  
(No. 2226)

۱۲ سید میرگز برادر فرمان بنام روح الله خان سرده رود عرض داشت آورده  
بنظر گذارید عرض داشت بود که در باب ناسم خان حکم شده بدو تل لگو  
گوشت بیاد خان برود چنانچه خالقه که از آن سرزمین چند روز و این نیست بعد  
مطالع به لطف الله خان فرمودند که حسب الحکم به روح الله خان بگویند که بعد  
خروج پلری خود و ناسم خان بگوشت بیاد خان در آورده شده آنچه بیاد خان  
کاری کرد با اتفاق شما خواهد نمود سید و پیه خد متعالی گزر برادر عرض نمود  
مسافت فرمودند  
(No. 2226)

No. 56

ماه ربيع الاول سنه ۱۲۶۰

يوم العربيه  
 ۱۱ من شهر رجب خانجيان پادشاه بجهت وكيل نظر گذشت معروضه داشته  
 بود كه فرمان بقدرى رسيد حكم شده بود كه جمعيت غنيم جانب نادر  
 و گلپايان آمده بايرك شاهزاده حجازين را در بدر گذارند بجهت فوج  
 ان طرف بباير خانچه موافق حكم عمل نموده داشته اند (No. 2231)

No. 57

ماه ربيع الاول

يوم الثالث  
 ۱۰ من شهر رجب پادشاه عرض رسيد كه نيت ترسيم جمعيت غنيم  
 نيت ثبت كرده نواحي جالسه انده شتران و نيزه متاع سافران تاراج  
 نموده تحصيل چوتك نمايند حسب الحكم بهر لطف الله خان ديباب آتبه  
 مردم غنيم ساد سرودند (No. 2230)

No. 58

ماه ربيع الاول

يوم الخميس  
 ۱۲ من شهر رجب پادشاه عرض رسيد كه مردم غنيم آمده نيلون سرکار شاه عالم  
 چيو كه از اينجا دازده كرده بودند شتران آتش مردم بگارت بودند  
 بعد معروض مرد و تابع نزد امانت خان رساده فرمودند كه اطلاع فوجدارى  
 پسر خازنه در است انچه متاع است خواب گويد و نيز حكمت كه فوجداران  
 و تملك داران آن نواحى بنويسند كه احاط كرده پسر سازند و يا از  
 خود جواب نمايند (No. 2232)

يوم السبت

۱۳ منہ ابو الفیض گرو بردار حسب الحکم بنجانبان یادہ ہونہ بود رسائیدہ  
جواب ان آدرہہ بنظر گذارائیدہ بعض رسائیدہ کہ مردم جاسوسان  
بنجاندہ کہ خبر رسائیدہ کہ مردم غنیم جانب برابر آدرہہ بنجانبان خاندہ کہ  
بخر جہت تنبیہ انبان دانہ شدہ  
(No. 2236)

يوم الساب

۲۳ منہ بموجب نوشتہ محمد حسین نوجوان بالا پور بعض اسیدہ کہ جمعیت غنیم  
برائے تحویل چوتہائی ان نواح آدرہہ بود فردی سرمایہ کردہ دہ اسب یادہ  
و پنج نفر آدرہہ دستگیر کردہ آدرہہ شدہ بنظر گذارائیدہ  
(No. 2252)

يوم العرب

۲۵ منہ اخزون بگ گرو بردار حسب الحکم نام بنجانبان یادہ ہونہ بود رسائیدہ  
جواب ان خط آدرہہ بنظر گذارائیدہ حضرت آقا محمد علی کہ جمعیت غنیم جانب  
برابر آدرہہ بود اسرج خان رزے تنبیہ سرمایہ کردہ اسلحہ ان خبر  
فردی ہر افق حکم بہر گرو بردار تابع ہا ہر حال باختر رسائیدہ با جمعیت  
غنیم متبادل شدہ ان اتقال حضرت سید اکبر را بنقل رسائیدہ و انخی ساختم  
شکت دارہہ نفع ہوسای شدہ شدہ ہا ہر حال  
(No. 2255)

No. 62

ماه ربيع الاول سنة ۱۲۶۰

يوم النصار

۱۳ منته خدیو الگیک وزیر میرزا است سیف در آورده بنظر اذرا نیر  
که یک (یک) دانسته وزیر چهار سوار و مافریجه بجه جمعیت کشیده  
موبش از ملک بادشاهی است کرده ی بردند رعایا موضع مکن گمان  
آمده ظاهر نموده بابران موی اله سببه بزرگسایان از هرگز اسم منزل  
مکر (مکر) بجهت تنب غنیم ساری نموده چنانچه مقابل کرده جنگ اتد  
شد از اقبال حضرت سید که بر قتل رسانیده و زخمی ساخته شکست  
داره چهار هزار برده موبش و پس آورده در بنیاد اسپ مادیه است  
آورده و اکثر بزرگای ادنای بکده آورده و زخمی شده و متداراله  
اعاقب مردم غنیم میرود و بعد عرض فرمودند که بجاری شده بینه  
متداراله ششتر طلوعه نمایند و مران در جواب در محاسن دلی نمایند و عید  
بگ بجهای و کسم بگ و بستی در در یک هم نم بستی ذات الحاقه آورده  
کلمه که متداراله بویست که انچه ببرد و بستی بستی است آرد و اگر که  
و است بیده است و بدو مانی بجهت و بفرستد

(No. 22 65)

No. 63

ماه ربيع الثاني سنة ۱۲۶۰

يوم الحرة

۲ منته لطف الله خان عرض نمود که خان جبار بهادر خطی نوشت که مردم  
غنیم منزل ن گمان و وزیر مقابل نموده شکست آورده براه چانه میرود

حیدرآباد است و فدی اعلیٰ نمودہ خیلان و شتران سواران عالم حیو  
و قبریہ مردم کہ حاجانے گداہتے بودند بزرگداشت حوالہ جاگیرداران نمودہ  
(No. 2268)

No. 64  
ماہ راج استانی ۱۶

یوم ۱۲ اشاد  
میں منہ درخشاںت محمود خان آمرہ بنظر گذشت معروضات بود کہ دروی  
موافق کم برکاب شازادہ محمد انعم شاہ روانہ شدہ چنانچہ دریں ضمن نشان  
شازادہ حیو رسیدہ کہ جمعیت غنیم جان پیدگانو آمرہ بزرگے تنبیہ آیا  
ددار خان را اخلافت نمودہ بایہ کہ تمام بلوک حائلہ را بیورد بہا بران  
بانتلف روانہ شدیم  
(No. 2276)

یوم ۱۳ الجمعہ  
۱۱ منہ حسب الحکم بہر تلف الذخایر بام محمود خان و دلدار خان سادات  
مظنون اند کہ مردم غنیم خوانی پیدگانو آمرہ بایہ کہ سواران بودہ تنبیہ رساند  
حوالہ خبر بہ بیگ گرو بردار نمودہ  
(No. 2284)

No. 65  
ماہ راج استانی

یوم ۱۳ العربہ  
۹ منہ درخشاںت قلعہ دار خان قلعہ دار فتح طرف دبار در بنظر گذشت معروضات  
درخشاںت بود کہ اردو جی سردار سببا مقبور جمعہ جمعیت در خوانی آمرہ بود  
فدی خبر یافتہ سواران سواران قلعہ دار قبال محترت سردار مقبور  
را بچہ یکصد کن مقبوران اقبال سانیہ سر بریدہ بسیار ساختہ و بیکدگر

را زخمی نموده شکست داده و سیزده نفر زنده دستگیر نموده و چتری  
واسطه ماده دیال و غیره سلاح بدست آورده و اکثر مردم این جانب  
نیز بکار آورده و زخمی شده اند فتح بادشاهی شد بطالع خاص در آورده  
فرود آمد که مجرای کلیه شد  
(No. 2281)

No. 66

ماه جمادی الاول ۱۲۹۶

۱۲۸۱ هجری قمری بادشاهان ساسانی بجهت مال جاده مسجد اعظم شاهزاده کرده  
و شرف از ملک بیجا پور تشریف دارند و قلعه داری که برابر قلعه  
احمد نگر است از طرف اولیای دولت در آورده و ملک بون قلعه را آنجا  
پیشتگ گذارند و خود بردات آتش ازاد جهان جهانیان تا جاکه گول  
توپ قلعه برسد تشریف برود بودند - تاریخ نیم شهر ربیع الثانی  
شده ارسال نموده در عدالت کتبه را به پسر ابی (No. ۷۰۲۰۷۹)

No. 67

ماه محرم الحرام ۱۲۹۷

لواء الخمر ۱۲۸۵ هجری قمری دی گیل و دیوار غرض است ساسانیان خان آورد و بستر  
گذرانیده معروض داشته بود که دیو را می آید و قریب تمام پور  
ملک سنیان شهر یافت است نموده و از دیو و دشمنان را در پیش  
آورد و به لواء سرسبز و به قلعه زرد رنگ و به باد خاکی باب  
ادین خان به لواء سرسبز را آورد و با کجی نیز بمریان را ارسال نمود  
حکم شد که ده خلعت علییه بماند

۱۲ حسب الحکم پسر نطف الدخان بنام سر بلبله خان مراد نوده هنوز اندک سجد  
 قوج از پیه گمان نزد شهاب الدین خان بیاد برود گرماه خان از کار برانے یافت  
 ملک غنیم برود از آنجا خبردار باشد - دارخان را از طلب خبر موقوف  
 نوده حکم شد در سیه گمان باشد آنچه مطالب داشته باشد نوشته دالر  
 پسرش نماید که بختور آوردن اجرت باشد  
 (No. 2305)

No. 68

ماه محرم الحرام ۱۲۸۵

یوم الجمع  
 ۲۱ منته بدو جب نوبت خان خیاب بیاد اجرت سید که نودی سجد قوج به  
 ابره رسیده مردم مردم بر کار با خبر آورده که جمیع غنیم بطرف اردگیر آورده  
 ی خواب که ناساد نماید بنابر منفردان خانه زاده تبه مقهوران به آنطرف  
 رخصت نوده از اقبال حضرت تبه داند کرد  
 (No. 2307)

No. 69

ماه محرم الحرام

یوم اشاد  
 ۲۶ منته در شهادت نخر این بنامه دار که عمره آورده بنظر گذشت معروض  
 دانسته بود که جمیع غنیم نواحی - گاهه آورده بود بنابران نودی سجدی آورده  
 مقابل کرده از اقبال حضرت بسیار کسر را بکل رسانیده شکست داده اسیان  
 عادی و شریع است آورده حکم شد که سجد شد  
 (No. 2312)

No. 70

ماه محرم الحرام

یوم السبت  
 ۲۳ منته حسن بیگ و نیره ده افزادری در نزد است منفردان پسر خان  
 خیاب بیاد آورده بنظر گذرانیده معروض دانسته بود که از نواحی سجدی سجدی آورده



خبر یافت که جمیت غنیمتی رده است پس پنهانی دوربرد به سارنگ پور رسید و مقابل  
 کرده انبند کس را بقتل رسانیده تعقب نموده و بگام شب بر بهر مشهور  
 افتاده سلاح آتش و جنس واسطه مادی و غیره اسلحه بیست آورده و تریب  
 سی و هفت نفر را بدو شای بکار آورده از اقبال حضرت فتح شد و بعد مطالعه به  
 سیداه خلعت فرمودند که نقل حرنه داشت برنت اصل را حواله خدمت خان  
 نمایند بعد مطالعه حکم شد که خلعت خانه بخاری جبهه مظفر خان طلعه نمایند  
 محمد خلیل و قمرال خان را چیزی داشت آورده بدو است انظم شاه از خدمت کرده  
 حکم شد که بخدمت بادشاه داده و چو عرض نموده از ایشو آباد به تپانه کوله و سوار  
 شده بمشور سار

(No. 2315)

No. 71

ماه صفر سنه ۱۲۰۰

یوم الحرب  
 غره منبه قاسم بیک و سیدالکبیر گرز بردار عرض داشت مظفر خان و از غاغبان  
 بیاد آورده و نیز از انبند که فرمودی از سیدان و تعاقب غنیمت نموده و بیست  
 کرده به یغری مرفوع پور رسید و مقابل کرده جنگ واقع شده از اقبال حضرت  
 بسیار بقتل رسانیده جادون و گاد جی سرداران مشهور را از غنیمت اسبان ماده  
 و غیره سلاح بیست آورده و پنج کرده تعقب کرده با اسناد سیر نموده و بعد مطالعه  
 اعراف ماند و در نود خلعت خانه و نقل قیمت نه هزار و هشتاد طلعه نموده کام شد  
 فرمان بخاری طلعه نمایند

(No. 2317)

No. 72

ماه صفر

یوم الحرب

غره منبه از واقع فوج انظم شاه جرض رسید که تیاهی سر اسبان مشهور با جمعیت



در رکاب با وجود این غنیمت هم پنج غش کردی از آوردن غفر... آمده  
 شوی و ب آنکه گدیده ی رود بنده کدام دستر نظر داشته باب طالع  
 و لازم نایب و چون از حکم دزد نه دارد اگر یک شاخه زاده در دکن باشد بنده  
 در خدمت شاخه زاده ی باشد و آن چه شتر طاسی و تردد است بجای آمد بهمان  
 حضرت این را شنیده بی شاخه زاده شاخه عالم پیغام فرمود که شما را در دکن بگذازم  
 و خانجیان بدار را در رکاب شما گذاشته در خدمت شاخه زاده و اب داد که سابقاً  
 من در دکن بودم و از سبب دلبر خان و غیره مارا مردم در بیگانه داشت  
 ... ساخته که شاخه زاده ... قسم خورده ام شما را در بیگانه از رکاب  
 در آن خود را خلع نمکن و همین حاضر خدمت باشم ...  
 عرض است که از این پنج نفر دهم شتر و حبش را از بیار منب در  
 جزد رسید

(No. 74A. 461. 20. 7. 20)

No. 74A

ماه ذی الحجه ۱۲۶۷

یوم الشنبه

۳۱ شعبه فضائل خان نرس نمود که بر کاره نوشت بهادر خان به بیده آورده  
 دانی خابری نماید که خانه کرده آورده و آن گون شده تا به خانه تمیزی رسیده  
 یک مقام نموده حاجی طیار کی خانه و در راه از جازات رسیده بیده سری  
 و بیده بیده انداخته و یک اتار و من آن را سرخ در شکر بود و اکثر بیداران  
 آن ضلع نیز تفریق شده اند و بعد طیار نمودن حاجی موافق حکم بهادر خان  
 میان را بعد جمعیت در آن جا گذاشته و آن بهتر جابرت و چند مرتبه جمعیت  
 غنیمت نمودار شده و در از اقبال حضرت شکست داده و از شنبات خانه کور نیز  
 بنظر گذرانید بمطالع خاص در آورده

(No. 2117)

## یوم السبت

۳ منب روح الله خان مرض نمود که بیاد خان به بنده نوشته که بفت براس سوار  
وشت هزار پیاده کنیم آمده بود بنده خیر یافته در کلبان بهیتری قلعچه احداث کرده  
تا به مستحکم نشانده بتاریخ ۸ ذی حجه با مردم کنیم مقابل نموده از اقبال حضرت  
بیکارسی را بقتل رسانده و بهر لبت داده اسبان سوار به و چپتری و محبوب و غیره  
به دست آورده درین ضمن خبر رسیده که جمعیت کنیم تریب ده براس سوار و ده اژده  
هزار پیاده آمده بتاریخ ۱۲ نیز مقابل کرده از اقبال حضرت انار شکست  
داده فتح یافته بعد از سوارى نموده نزدیک قلعه بستگان تعلقه کنیم رسیده  
باری قلعه را آتش داده سه هفته فرمودند که بجاری کنند (No. 2136)

## یوم السبت

۱۳ منب سرحدات بیاد خان آمده بنظر گذشت سرحداتی بود که سابق در مرتبه  
جمعیت کنیم را مقابل نموده شکست داده بود حال در مرتبه دیگر جمعیت کنیم  
بر لشکر پادشاهی شب خون آورده از اقبال حضرت بسیار مردم مقتولان  
بجینم رسانده در زمین ساخته و قلعچه کلبان بهیتری احداث نموده کلبان انگور  
ی نمایم موافق حکم ده هزار سوار نو نو رنگ بدارت چنانچه آن جماعت طابری  
باید که بهیتری کرده چپتری بهیتری یومیه رحمت شود که تردد نمایند بعد  
مطالع سرحدات حواله روح الله خان نمود که انتخاب کرده ابرقی رسانده  
(No. 2154)

ماه محرم ۱۲۶۵

لوم الشاد

۱۹ منبه مرضه است بهادران که نزد کار طالب خان مقصدی است فرساده بود  
چنانچه خانگذار بیک محکم بحضور فرساده جمعیت زغال خان بنظر گذشت  
معرضه داشت بود که کجی سردار سببا مقهور با جمعیت کثیر از قلعه کلیان بهیری  
چار کرده آن طرف آمده بود و رجال بهی نموده ستر شده از استماع این خبر  
فردی سیری یاقوت خان و روی خان سردار دیبازات که رسیده اند  
بودند و مردم که در کلیان بهیری گذاشته بود و داد خان و ابوالنیاض خان  
و سنجاب و نیره و ابراهیم و شایر است فوج مقرر نموده برای تنبیه سوار  
سوار می نمودند آخرش مقهور به جنگ تیر و تفنگ پشتر آمده اجدان کجی  
یزان مقابل نموده از انبال حضرت کجی سردار را بهجه بسیار کسر بجهنم رسانیده  
شکست داده فتح اعظم شده دیگر جمعیت غنیمت گرفته در کوه پنهان شده و  
بندهای باد شای تا پنج کرده تعاقب نموده آمده داخل قلعه کلیان بهیری شدند  
و از دست بندهای تیر و تیر شده نفل از قلعه اجتناب کردند (No. 2165)

No. 78

ماه ربيع الاول ۱۲۶۵

لوم السبت

۲۸ منبه از مرضه است بهادران جری رسید که بهیر را در کسر سببا مقهور بهجه  
جمعیت کثیر آمده چنانچه فردی تا پنج و انبال از کلیان بهیری سوار می نمودند  
بمردم غنیمت مقابل کرده جنگ واقع شد بسیار مردم غنیمت بقتل رسانیده و بهیر را  
از زخم بان داشت و خبر بهیر را با ستره تیر و تیر شده در غنیمت را بجان کشته شکست  
داده چند کرده تعاقب نموده و اکثر بندهای باد شای نیز بکار آورده و  
زخمی شدند و بهیر گمان حرکت بملاحه خاک در آوردند (No. 2265)

۳۸ منہ خسرو بگ بسا دل بڑے سزا کے پدم سنگ وادرا کرن و سید نزلت خان  
دفتہ بود آمدہ سرخداشت روح اللہ خان و سید نزلت خان آدرہ بنفکر زانید و زبان  
اجری رسائی کہ بھر را و سر دار سبنا حقور سجد جمعیت بیت بڑا سہار دہ  
بڑا سہارہ نوانی کلمیان پیری آمدہ بود چنانچہ پدم سنگ و فیروہ مردم چنار  
مقالہ کردہ از انتقال حضرت سید دار مقبور بادکہ سر و گیر بجیم رسائیہ و بھر را  
ذخمی سندہ ریخت و پدم سنگ بڑا بڑا زرات بڑا سہار شکی و بیخ زخم ہواست  
و بیگنوت سنگ وادرا مانگر جی دکنی باز دی دات چلا سہار بود بکار آمدن و رام  
سنگ وادرا مانگر بڑا باز دی بڑا سہار بکار بود بکار آمدن پدم سنگ  
ذوہ بکسر پد ریت ی داسٹ بڑاے تنبہ مقبوران سہار ی نایہ ضعیف سندہ  
بیب زرات سندہ و پری سنگ وادرا برون ل بڑا ذخمی سندہ در میدان افتادہ  
بود مردم فنیہ ہواست ہر دنہ و گہنا تہ سنگ وادرا پدم سنگ و کلبے سنگ و سہار  
بانگہ و سادہ و اس سہار ہا یہ و کدو جی و بڑا بڑاے با دنا بی زخمی سندہ اجہ معروض  
نرمودند کہ امری باد برنگ حلالی پدم سنگ حائے تروہ میں بود ماہر دات سلاط  
مہم بینان و فیروہ معلقان مقونی خوب رعایت خواہ فرمود و بہ اہتمام خان حکم سندہ  
اگر کوچ مانے مقونی ستی سندہ مرانہ سندہ اختیار دارند (۸۵۰۲۳۸۹)

۳۹ منہ بوجب رائدہ زوج روح اللہ خان اجری و سید کہ در جگ مردم فنیہ ہواست  
یادنا ہی بکار آمدہ و ذخمی سندہ و انکشی کہ بکار آمدہ

پدم سنگ! بیت پنج سوار      بگشت سنگ وادماند کوکبی  
 مادهورام سیدیه      مانگ بردار بگلوت سنگ  
 دلیرخان اکرام خان قاسم خان      نوازش خان عظمت الله خان سید عبداله ای  
 سید مرزئی و نیزه بند با  
 خان بیگ محمد یار ابراهیم بیگ      مقصم بیگ سید یار خواجه محمد صالح  
 سید یوسف شیخ مرید و له حمید خان      میر محمد دار علافت خان  
 سید عبدالشکر سید زکریا      سید سجاد سید ابراهیم سید ابی طالب سید ابی طالب و نیزه گردان  
 یارون علی نرادیگ  
 بگلوت سنگ وادماند سنگ      سیام سنگ      راجه دگ سنگ

مفتی داران زخمی شده  
 بسنت دار نواز سوار داکوچی      ستر سال و درن راجور  
 سید داس اده سنگ بسنت دار      کابی سنگ  
 بان راد بیگ سنگ      بیوج راج      گنده راد  
 دلیرخان اکرام خان      نوازش خان      راجه دگ سنگ  
 خواجه محمد عادل      عبدالشکر      سید نورالدین      سید الفادر  
 حاجی برهان حاجی      فیض بیگ و نیزه زوری قاسم خان      عبداله بیگ و نیزه زوری  
 راجه ابراهیم و میرخلون      سید نصر      خواجه یحیی و میرخلون

لحمی و سبک بر سنگ و له پوت فل      راجه سیدی و سوار  
 زخمی و بر دم بنیم      در بگ لهری روح الله خان      رفته بود از فوت شده



لام البت

۸۴ منہ از داتہ فرج روح الدخان یعنی رسید کہ بتاریخ بیت دشم ستر  
 وبع اول ستر بمطابق بہری رسیدہ حال فرج بہادر خان شدہ  
 خانزادہ بہ بختی الملک اہل کردہ کہ اندوہن لغہ ہرد آمد بختی الملک گفت  
 بہراہ بندہ جمعیت کثیر و قاعدہ خود است بہرہ دہن ہودہ سازہ دہ دوم  
 بہ بہادر خان گزشتہ شدہ ماندن یک جا مناسب است را کہ گفت سہاری  
 ی ہودہ باشند چنانچہ خانزادہ سہار شدہ ہودہ مردم غنیم ہودہ شدہ  
 اکثری را بہرہ اسانیدہ سکت دادہ چنانچہ فریان بہ بختی الملک  
 از حضور آمدہ ہر جعبہ استقبال فریان سہاری ہودہ ہ مردم غنیم مقابلہ شدہ  
 از مال ذرت بسیار کسر را بہرہ اسانیدہ سکت دادہ اکثر مردم را بہرہ  
 بکار آمدہ و ذخیرہ شدہ اجزاء ان ترا گزشتہ شدہ بجا آمدہ (No. 2286)

روز جمعہ

۸ چنانچہ یافتہ شد کہ بختی الملک روح الدخان جیو بہ بامان اگو سمت  
 دریاے شہور اشدہ ہودہ ... غنیم شہور پنج ہزار سہار  
 تعین نمودہ کہ راہ دورہ عمدہ ہودہ ہودہ سمت خان طرف بہادر خان کہ در  
 درہ ہودہ چنانچہ خود را ماندہ بہ بختی الملک نیز اشدہ اسانیدہ راہ دورہ ستر بہ  
 شدہ روح الدخان جیو بہ فرنگیان ساختہ خدمت و انعام دادہ بارہ رسیدہ را کہ  
 شکر باد تاجی از راہ دریاے ہر جہاز بہرہ اسانیدہ غنیم نیز در علاج عمدہ ہودہ نمودن  
 راہ دریا محفیہ شدہ



جانب گفتن آلوده شدم و جاسوسان خبردار شدند و در ایچی بوسل و سانای ملو  
 سرداران مقهور سابق در جنگ دشمنی شده بودند و همچنین اسیدند بنده مان حضرت  
 شنیده فرمودند که این مطابق داخل واقع نمایند  
 (No. 2300)

## No. 84

ماه ربیع الاول ۱۲۸۲

یوم الثناء

۱۷ مه صلابت خان دارنده نو پنجاه راکب نیل بیون اسپ خلعت خالصه انعام  
 داده و یک نیل سادیه داده و زحمت نموده و حکمت که به تبارک بیان بهی  
 داخل فرموده و شنیده خبردار باشد بعد از آن موافق حکم بعمل خوانده گردد و  
 براسیان را بموجب ذیل انعام داده و زحمت فرمودند  
 (No. 2240)

## No. 85

ماه ربیع الاول

یوم الثالث

۲۴ مه پنج غیداله فرمودند که از محمد از نعل برادر احمد خان ساکن وادی آل کک  
 بهر سبب که بیاد خان دخیل بنده ی یاد تابی به کلان بهی اسیده تاجیه ادرش  
 کرده ایام برسات در آنجا ماندن میتوانند موافق حکم بهر سبب درین نمود که  
 از اس میله و یک بسبب هوای در آنجا در برسات اسبان طایع بنشینند لیکن در  
 از ده کرده اینطرف یک جانی بنام موه [میره] واقع است اگر آنجا  
 مانند بهر است هرگز در راه کتل در میان نیست باز برین دهن کنبه  
 مقهور و جی یاد تابی و نت اخذ کرده باز جواب بود لیکن کس غله بران جازات  
 نخواهد رسید و بهر است کتل مذکور رسد بهر استواری در لشکر  
 خواهد رسید شنیده خاوش ماندند -  
 (No. 2250)

لام البت

۸۴ منتهی از واقع فرج روح الدخان یعنی اسیر که با پنج بیت و ششم شیر  
 پنج اسفند ۱۲۷۲ به کمان بهری رسیده شال حال روح بلاد خان شده  
 خانزاده به بختی الملک ادبار کرده که اندوهان تلخ مرد آید بختی الملک گفت  
 بهرزه ایته و حجت کثیر و قاضی خود است بهرزه دین نوده و نوده و نوده و نوده  
 به بهادر خان گفته نشسته ماندن یک جانب نیست از کلفت سماوی  
 ی نوده باشند چنانچه خانزاده سوار شده بود مردم غنیم نودار شده و  
 اکثری را به نعل رسانیده شکست داده چنانچه فرزان به بختی الملک  
 از حضور آمده و در حقیقت اسفند فرزان ساری بوده با مردم غنیم مقابل شده  
 از اسفند حضرت بسیار کسر را نعل رسانیده شکست داده و اکثر مردم را به نعل  
 بکار آورده و دهنی شده اند و از آن فرزان نعلات بجای آورده (۸۶. ۲. ۱۸۶)

روز جمعه

۸ چنانچه یارانه نند که بختی الملک روح الدخان بیو به بامان آگن است  
 دریا به شوره ایته بودند ..... غنیم شوی پنج هزار سوار  
 تعیین نموده که راه دره مرده بود و درون مست خان طرف بهادر خان که در  
 دره بود چنانچه خود را مانده به بختی الملک نمیتواند رسانید در راه و کشته شدند  
 نده و روح الدخان بیو به فرنگیان ساخته خلعت و انعام داده بار رسد و اگر  
 لشکر بادشاهی از راه دریا به هر جاز بهرسانند و غنیم شیر در صلاح مسدود نمودن  
 راه دریا مقید شده

لوم البشاء

۳۰ منبه سید ارغون عرض نموده که سیلاب اسیر خان خطی نوشته بدو  
 بادشاهی از سر چهار طرف قلعه دام سبج را محاصره نموده بنارنج بیت افتم در خان  
 یک برج قلعه بتوسط بادشاهی آورده  
 (No. 2511)

No. 88A

ماه رهنما سال ۱۲۷۰

لوم البشاء

لم منبه روح الیهان عرض نموده تا اسم خان خطی نوشته که چون از توپ دیوار برج  
 قلعه دام سبج سابق سوار شده بود بنابران ندوی مقرر کرده که مردم بهر یمنی  
 دخیل از این راه بالا که گفته می‌آید از خانه اسیران قلعه بردند چنانچه بنارنج  
 به اشعاب گام شب قریب بانقله شش کس مردم بولان بدو می‌آید  
 به ازاد افق اسیران قلعه سقعه نموده عرض کرده آخرش چند کس مردم را در  
 خنجر خان و بیده به در راه قلعه رسید به آواز بلانگفت که بلانواران بیاید  
 جابری از آواز اسیران خیم بیدار شده سنگ می‌افکند اسیران نموده اکثر  
 بیدار می‌آید بادشاهی دیگر آورده زخمی شدند و چینی ترود پیش رفتند حال این  
 کار از دست دشت و ک بیدار می‌آید بادشاهی گفته بیده قبول نمی‌کنند به  
 ... باب بیده موجب حکم شود به محل از حکم به خان از کور بیدار می‌آید  
 اسیران خود را نزد سیلاب اسیر خان گذاشتند بیدار می‌آید  
 (No. 1264)

No. 89

ماه رهنما سال ۱۲۷۰

لوم البشاء

۲۸ منبه عرض داشت خانجیان بیدار آورده بنظر گذشت حروف ضلالت کی

قدوی بموجب حکم آمده قلم را ام سیج را محامه کرده است و این را بر شایع نموده  
در دفتر یادداشتی ثبت گردید.

No 90

ماه ذی الحجه ۱۲۸۰

لام الخمس

حاجت به روح الامیدان مرده و در گذشت جان جهان داد و بجا که داد و در گذشت روح را ام سیج را  
به دفتر یادداشتی ام سیج بنامی بنام مرده چه قدر مبلغ سرکار داد و خرج نموده  
برخی رساله در حق خود که شش و هفت هزار ششصد و سی و دو پیه نقد و جنس خرج  
شده اند حکم شده و الی انصاف خان گزارش نمایند.

(No. 2110)

No 91

ماه دی قعدة ۱۲۸۰

لام السبت

۳۰ مه نفر از این پیشه داد و بجا که سبب خان در حرم را بنامه دای سر به از اخیر قبلا و کل  
خان مقرر نموده حکم شده که بکلیه از چهل سوار را فوج طلب نمایند.  
۱۰ حیدر از سواران را بنامه داری سوار بود یک صد و یک نفر از شایع آمده  
مقرر نموده حکم شده و اینان بنامه سوار به بزرگ ماندند که و این بنامه (No. 2383)

No. 92

ماه دی قعدة ۱۲۸۰

لام الخمس

۹ مه روح الامیدان مرده نمود که حیدر عزیز خان ناعذر چه غیر خفت نوشت که سوار  
و پیاده جمیع کتب مشهوره در حق از حق آمده بود چنانچه این اسلحه جمعی از اخیر  
خانه داد و ستاد شده است که در دست داده و در حق ناعذر ناعذر و گلد و گلد  
آورده و بنامه داری رعایت است فرموده از بحری شده

(No. 2390)

۱۶ مه حاجی خوجه دینرو در خنداب و خندانست غازی این خان باده  
آورده بنظر گذرانیده و عرض داشته بود که بعد از انزال حضرت نظام ار  
دینرو است و حای تعالی سببا مقهور جنگ بزر بر ساخته آتش داده و باده  
مویشت و دست آورده فتح نموده بعد از ان باری قحطه را بیری که در آن  
سببا مقهور بود و رسید تا تحت و تاج نود و آتش داده و مقهور و بعد  
اسلام راج یاد شای بعد از ان تا از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که  
آباد از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که  
آنزیر از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که  
در آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که

(2543)

۲۹ مه دینرو خوجه محمد صادق دینرو چار از منزه و خندانست غازی این  
خان باده آورده بنظر گذرانیده و عرض داشته بود که بعد از انزال  
مویشت و دست آورده فتح نموده بعد از ان باری قحطه را بیری که در آن  
سببا مقهور بود و رسید تا تحت و تاج نود و آتش داده و مقهور و بعد  
اسلام راج یاد شای بعد از ان تا از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که  
آباد از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که  
آنزیر از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که  
در آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که از آنجا که

و یک ماه را آذوقه بود خرج شده بباران کوچ نموده بسمت دره مفتاح  
الفتوح روانه شده بتاریخ ۱۶ شهر حال ماهی گسالت خوام آمده بعد مطالعه  
بجایگاه خود خطاب فیزیوت جنگ سر امر از نموده  
(No. 2551)

No. 95

ماه دی قعد ۲۸

یوم الله  
۱۲ شهریور حکم شد استر خان بقلعه داران صوبه دکن بویک که مردم بنده و بچیان  
از طرف سرکار دارالامانات اند سر کس که برادر او کوکر سنبها مقهور ظاهر شود  
ایستادند نمایند  
برای سرکار بجز رسید که در قلعه احمد نگر سزم بنده و بچیان که کوکر اند  
برادران آنها کوکر سنبها مقهور اند هر چه امر شود حکم شد قید نمایند -  
(No. 2395)

No. 96

ماه ذی الحجه ۲۸

۲۲ شهریور دستگیر و وزیر است نفر منتهی به درخته دانت غازی الدین خان  
بیاده آورده بنظر گذرانیده معروض داشته بود که بتاریخ ۱۵ شهر حال بنده  
خبر یافته که نازکی بهیله ناسرور سنبها مقهور با جمعیت ده هزار سوار  
بقلعه ستاره جمع شده نظر بر شوقی دارد بنده بتاریخ ۱۶ شهر حال از تنانه  
سردل بیت و چهار کرده اسب قهجه درین مقهور تاب مقابل نیاورده  
از اقبال حضرت در مد نفرا بقتل رسانده فتح بادشاهی شد و بقتله  
نفر اینجاب بکار آمده اکثر رخصی شده بعد مطالعه فرمودند که مجرای گلے شد  
بازون بیک وزیر را افغانه فرمودند  
(No. 2443)



ماه ذی الحجه ۱۲۸۰

یوم الثانی

۸ منبر سیدار فلان عرض نمود که خانان این خان بیادر خطی نوشته که با ایشان  
خبر آورده که جمعیت عظیم توابعی سرچشمه است بنابر آن بیده ساخته  
شاید نموده از اقبال حضرت بسیار کس بچشم رسانیده و زخمی ساخته  
شکست داده دافع بادشاهی شد و فیل از دقایع بعرض خواهد رسید

(No. 2424)

ماه ذی الحجه ۱۲۸۰

یوم العربی

۱۲ منبر تاجی حیدر عرض نمود که تاجی محمد برادر زاده غلام علی برادر  
عبدالقادر خویش نخلص خان مرحوم که از حضور جبهه تخیر العجبات سببا  
مفقور تعیین شده بودند به بیده خطی نوشته که (که) بنده به پیاده پانزده  
این سرزمین خود گرفتار داشته در خانه کدوس شکست گرفت و بارها تاجی  
ز سریند از توابعی قلع که قلع که سرحد دره تیریا گات و آنکه تل گوگی است اتفاق  
نموده با سرکه یامنه که مردم قلع در آنجا جبهه دخیل به بیات که مثل قلع اند  
ی آمینه بنابر آن بتاریخ (منبر حال قلع که قلع دانسته شد بتاریخ دلم بقلاع مذکور  
السیه پشاوره مانع جدمر دشمن و غیره سلاح نموده هر سرسید نفر بیدو قبی  
کرده تا به قلع که قلع دانسته شد و عبدالقادر از آنجا جمعیت سواران به سرحد  
بنیان کرده عقب گذاشته و سرحد را زه کمرگات آن قلع امنه آواز داده که  
در راه قلع را بکشانند و خیر آورده اند مردم خود دانسته در راه در گذارند

بنده مادر آمده اند و بستانه سلاح برآورده جنگ دافع شد چنانچه مردم عظیم  
زیاده بودند لیکن عبدالقادر هم آورده داخل قلع شد و قلع عظیم گردید و عبدالقادر  
تسلیه در کوهس و مانندی ماندند (پانزده) هر که که آمدند بودند اجزای

به املقه خود یافته و بتارخ یا دلم مردم مقهور آمده قلعه را محاصره کرده جنگ  
شروع گفتگ در پی است بعد عرض غل سحانی خوشه رفت شده زرمودند که  
ایلا رناب خوام کرد و تانی حیرت خلعت و کب فیل ماده انعام داده حکم نه  
بهره منده خان بابا به نامه داران اطلاع بوسیله که کرد ام از محافظت قلعه  
و در تنبیه ان ... سر ترا شد

(No. 2434)

No. 99

ماه ذی الحجه ۱۲۸۰

۱۲۸۰ هجری  
۱۸ منبره داشت عبدالقادر بابا فتح قلعه که قبله بجهه کلمه الله آورده بنظر  
گذشت بعد مطالعه کلمه بنار به سفارده افغانه فرمودند

(No. 2439)

No. 100

ماه ذی الحجه ۱۲۸۰

۱۲۸۰ هجری  
عرضه داشت عبدالعزیز خان قلعه دار جویر آورده بعزیزت بخنادر مکان بنظر  
گذشت معروضه داشت بود که بیده موافق حکم خانه داد و بجهه جمعیت برآید  
که یک عبدالقادر قلعه دار کو قبله فرستاده برگاه مدخل قلعه اسبیه دیره که ناره بی  
نا سردار مقهور آورده دره بزرگ مسعود نموده خانه داد پویش نموده جنگ گرفته بزرگ  
داند نه از اقبال حضرت بسیاری را بقتل رسانیده سردار مذکور را دستگیر کرده  
در این ضمن بموجب نوشته خسرو بیگ صحبت ببنادل که جمعه سزا به انبار داشت  
بعرض رسید که ناره بی و غیره سردار مقهور دره قلعه که قبله مسعود نموده چنانچه  
ابوالخیر به سردار عبدالعزیز خان و بعد از آن عبدالقادر تسانه دار کرده نموده رسید  
بسیاری بقتل رسانیده سردار مقهور را دستگیر نموده و قربان بیگ و غیره در نفر مذکور  
عرضه داشت عبدالقادر خان در باب فتح آورده بنظر گذرانیده مطالعه نموده

(No. 2444)



ماه ذی الحجه ۲۸

يوم الجمعة

۲۳ منہ سید اذون عرض نمود کہ سائرجی پاندرہ تیانہ دار شکار پور خطہ دشت  
کہ بموجب حکم بندہ و ابوالخیر دتیرہ بقلعہ کوتاہہ بالاقاق یکہ گردنہ بنانہ  
بانارہ جی تریک اسرار مقبور جنگ واقع شد از اقبال حضرت بسیار کمر  
لا بقتل رسانیدہ شکست دادہ و اسرار مقبور را بجان کشتہ گلد را بریدہ  
مصحوب اداجی مزیدار بزدی خود بچھور فرستادہ اسرار دانیات است بعد  
سروغن مرھودہ نامان کی راسری راہ در آویزد و استرغ خان مراتب  
لید العزیز خان دتیرہ بعرض رساند  
(No. 2445)

ماه صفر ۲۸

يوم الخميس

۵ منہ از واقعہ قلعہ مفتاح الفتوح بعرض رسید کہ مردم پیارہ جمعیت سنبام مقبور  
بشام شب مابین قلعہ آمدہ بودند بنانہ سید سید اکرم قلعہ دار اینجا خیردار  
شدہ و دشنامے نمودہ جنگ تیرہ تنگ در پی آمدہ آخرش دقتند و خلہ  
در اینجا تیرہ بنارن مردم قلعہ بسیار غایب اند حکم شد بہ ابوالخیر توجہ  
جو تیرہ بویہ کہ رسانیدن بہ قلعہ مذکور مردم خود دانستہ بسم  
نام رساند  
(No. 2511)

ماه محرم الحرام ۲۸

يوم السبت

۲۵ منہ حسب الحکم بنام مرحمت خان منمن از کار تیانہ زاکہ امرا بقلعہ  
مفتاح الفتوح ورود رساندہ محکم شانہ خیردار باشد دایک  
کمر بردار نمودہ  
(No. 2493)

۱۸ منبه در دلفر شتر به ار روضه داشت مرحمت خان که برده قلعه مفتاح الفتوح  
افته است آوردن بنظر گذرانیده معروض داشت بود که بفت بزار سوار جمعیت  
خلیم آورده بود خانه داد سواری نموده از انبال حضرت بسیاری را بچشم رسانیده  
و زخمی ساخته سکت داده فتح پادشاهی شد فرمودند که

(No. 2531)

۱۹ منبه در روضه داشت عبدالکریم قلعه دار مفتاح الفتوح آورده بنظر گذشت معروض داشت  
بود بنظر سوار و پلاده جمعیت کافر چه حمله کند با و غیره سلاح آورده بتاریخ ۲۲  
جمادی الاولی که در بزرگ قلعه انداخته ده کسر از راه که در بار قلعه آورده از  
طریق آواز نموده خانه داد خبردار شده همه همراه بیان اندرون قلعه مقابل نموده  
دنگ آتش برافروخته پیش آورده از انبال حضرت نمودن را بچشم رسانیده مگر بریده  
و سبب در نفر زنده دستگیر نموده باقی ترخمه آتش و پانزده مردم اینجانب بکار  
و انفی شده فتح پادشاهی شد

(No. 2731)

۲۳ منبه قاجانی حیدر خان عرض نمود عبدالقادر و غیره که قلعه کوتله بابت سبنا مقهور کرده  
لصرف پادشاهی آورده در باب آنها سابق حکم شده بود که بعد از صرف آوردن قلعه رعایتی خوب  
خواهند کرد بعد از آن حذور بهر و خدیب و اخافه سر از راه نموده بهر چه امر شود بعد معروض  
قلعه کوتله را اسم مفتاح الفتوح نموده و بفت بزار سوار و سبب انعام بقاجانی حیدر خان مرحمت نموده  
که آنچه بیاید بای ما ولیه که دلیری کرده اند درون قلعه اول مرتبه داخل نموده اند اگر  
طلا و نقره پیدا کرده ببرند

(No. 2491)

ماه محرم ۱۲۸۰

يوم الثالث

۴ منبه ببرم از خان را نسبت خیر فائده خوانند سببه البرسیان انعام داده با فوج  
 است هزار دهم بشاد سوار جبهه تنبیه کنیم بانب سیرول بجای غازی ابرین  
 خان باید داخل فرودند

(No. 2461)

ماه محرم ۱۲۸۰

يوم الرابع

۶ منبه به خانه داد خان فرودند که حسب احکم رده انداز خان نیانند اگر رده شوند  
 بویسه که خود را سببه البرسیان نزد ببرم از خان نیانند

(No. 2465)

ماه صفر ۱۲۸۰

يوم الخامس

۹ منبه فغابل خان مرضی بود که اگر ام خان نیانند دار گمشد آباد اوایل خود نوشت که  
 سحر خلیل نیانند دار سببه بر گویند و نیانند دار بیکار خطی نوشت که سببه بر  
 اسرار سببه بر با جمعیت بخیل سوار این واجب آمده چنانچه خط تحسین  
 فرستاده بنظر گذارد حکم شد لطف السنان جواب این به اگر ام خان بویسه

(No. 2517)

ماه صفر ۱۲۸۰

يوم السادس

۱۰ منبه حکم شد لطف السنان حسب احکم! اتفاق خان بویسه که از نوشت سببه  
 منور خان و اگر ام خان نیانند دار گمشد آباد بفرست رسید که جمعیت کنیم در این  
 ضلع آمده است باید که خود را مع فوج رسانیده تنبیه رسانند حواله شد  
 سوار نمود و بفرستند

(No. 2518)



ماه صفر سنه ۲۸

لوم الاشياء

۲۸ سنه از زبانی سرکاره ابرش رسید که جمعیت سنیای مقبور از قلعه بیک در ملک  
بادشاهی واقع اند مرود آمده زبانی تسان بیلد شریفی نموده افتند و در این  
خان داهدار جوئیر حه پسر سوا بیک کرده از ۱۰۰۰ سترانی منصب بیک از ۲۰۰۰  
(No. 2505)

ماه صفر سنه ۲۸

۸ سنه

دیرد ز شتر سوار مرغه داشت ببره مدخان آورده بنظر گذرانیده  
حرفه داشت بود که جاسوسان خبر آوردند که جمعیت سنیای مقبور جسته متوجه  
بیده جانب پادشیر آورده شده است حکایت اندر داهدار خان به میرزا خان و نیز  
داهدار بنظر داشتاد سوار جبهه تنبیه آن بکشتان مرود چنانچه یک پسر  
داه گویا مانده رانده شده  
(No. 2515)

ماه صفر سنه ۲۸

لوم الثالث

۱۰ سنه از زبانی سرکاره ابرش رسید که جمعیت سنیای مقبور زبانی سنگنیر و نیز بده و شی  
تاراج نموده برودند و تسانه داران آلتاح جبهه تنبیه آنها سوار می کردند با بزرگ منصب  
کم نموده به تلف الدخان فرمودند حسب احکام اینا هر کسی که بدائع خبردار افتند  
و جمعیت مقبور را آموختند  
(No. 2518)

ماه صفر سنه ۲۸

لوم الرابع

۱۱ سنه از زبانی داهدار خان تسانه دار سوار به ابرش رسید که از داهدار سوار  
جمعیت برای بیده است در اینجا آوردند و تنبیه است دیگر جمعیت ابرش نمود حکم شد

لطف الهان چهارده و بنیاد سوار از حضور دیگر تعیین نماید (No. 2520)

No. 116A

ماه صفر ۱۲۸۰

يوم الثالث

۱۴ من مرضه دانت فخر این پسر غازی ابدی خان بادر و خط رده انداز خان که در  
نمانده بودند آمده بنظر ازشت سر و دانت بود که جمعیت قاضی به تریب  
ده هزار سوار آمده سر بنیاد برداشت چنانچه بردها سواری نموده مقابل کرده  
جنگ و آتش شد و از اقبال حضرت بیکار کس را بقتل رسانید و بحال جنگ و پیر  
است و حقیقت کمی جمعیت بردها به عدم رسید و اگر کس از بنابران آتش خان  
را جمع یکبار چهار در پنجاه بجهت سوار کس نمیدانست انعام داد و هزار و پانصد  
داره الهیاریک و ده منل خان مرحوم را خدمت داده نیت خیر فائده خوانده  
دخست نموده

(No. 2529)

No. 117

ماه صفر ۱۲۸۰

يوم الاول

۱۴ من مرضه دانت فخر این خان بنیان دار بودند آمده بنظر ازشت سر و دانت  
بود که جمعیت قاضی به تریب ملع آمده بود برده سواری نموده مقابل کرده  
بسیاری را بجهنم رسانیده شکست داده فرمودند بجهت مراب از حضور رسانده

(No. 2528)

No. 118 & No. 119

ماه صفر ۱۲۸۰

يوم الثالث

۱۴ من بنیاد و خان مرضی نمود ابوالخیر و له عبد العزیز خان که در بنیان نو لکده امده  
است خطی نوشته که جمعیت غنیم اینواچیه آمده سر بنیاد برداشت است  
و جمعیت برای بنده روشن است از اقبال حضرت تبیه خواهم نمود حکم نش

آتش خان بتاکیه تمام به پوز داشت بعد از آن که یک مقدار آتش به نوک آتش خان رسید

(No. 2530)

No. 120

ماه صفر ۱۲۸۰

یوم الاربعاء

۱۸ منب استر خان میر غنی سرکارش به عالم بباد را دیروز خلعت داده معه پانصد سوار جمعیت تا نزد جیو رود و در آنجا سواران را بفرستاد به نزد آتش خان به نوک آتش خان خلعت نموده حکم شد یک اک آتش خان و پنج سوار آتش خان از سرکار و از جبهه طالب تنخواه ملازمان بآتش خان فرستاده جیو معه سواران تنخواه

(No. 2531)

No. 120A

ماه صفر ۱۲۸۰

یوم الاربعاء

۱۷ منب استر خان سرکارش خود توجه حاکم که در کره نمونه است خطی نوشته که در اینجا سرکارش غنی بسیار است و جمعیت برای بره معده هم و با باقی بآتش خان و سوار دیگر می باشد و سوار دخیل و بزرگی آمده اند فرموده شد سواران به نزدیک آتش خان معذور تا راسه بسیار روح سفاقتیت تنبیه جواب کرد و اگر معذور باشد تا در حاکم خود بآتش خان بسیار است و اگر در آن معذور باشد تنخواه داده و حاکم حضور بآتش خان

(No. 2528)

No. 121

ماه صفر ۱۲۸۰

یوم الاربعاء

۲۵ منب استر خان سرکارش خود توجه حاکم که در کره نمونه خطی نوشته که بتاریخ شهرالده و دیو و در برآمده مردم بر کاره خبر آورده اند که تریب بفرستاده جمعیت معذور موضع فل (ل) بیان که از اینجا فرستاده و اقامت آبل نموده با سربازان به نزد آتش خان به سواران و سواران بآتش خان فرستاده جبهه تنبیه و سواران است بهیچ دشت خبر رسیده که موضع سیرور شناخته اند و به با خبر را بآتش خان



مقبوران بزم مویشی و گداخته دو کسر از سما از خمی نموده در بقره بنادند در این  
اشنا حیوانی برادر ساکنان جی تیاندار شکار پرور با جمعیت آورده ملاقاتی شده و بنده  
بعلقه خود آورده جنبه محافظت بهیر جانے نسبت کم شد مدخل برمی احاطه نماید  
نمده بگام سوارید و با فغانه گشته میراسته باشد  
(No. 2541)

No. 122

ماه راج الاول ۲۸

لوم الثمن

۳۰ من از انبساط خوجه حایه ابرش رسید که را و گاد او که نمونه بنیت کرده  
بر دروازه بهیره و انداخت مردم فیم تریب پنجاه کسر بگام شب ترانده دی  
ی ایند اثر حکم شود بگام شب جنبه تنبیه نموده ان سوار می نموده اش  
کم نمده رطف الیجان به مرحمت جان بود که که نصیبدار از بگری خود !  
جمعیت به تیاندار و گاد او برسند  
(No. 2557)

No. 123

ماه راج الاول ۲۸

لوم الثالث

۱۵ من سحر شرف نصیبدار مرصه دانت خود حایه پستایه خان که به تیاندار  
(کرده) نمونه است آورده به نظر اندازانیده که که بهیرو جی ماسر دار بنیانده  
معه جمعیت آموه سرس کاند را محاصره نموده بودند چنانچه مردم بر کاره بارنج  
در از دم خبر آورده که خوج فیم برادرش سردانست است از این استماع حایه داد  
اسپ قهقی دریده در انجا اسبیه سنا کرده جنگ واقع شده اثرش مقبوران  
در بقره بناده فردی تاد در یاد بهیره تعاقب کرده از اتقال حرکت بسیار  
بچشم رسانیده و زخمی کرده بزم مویشی شتران که از مردم لشکری برودند  
و افسر گرفته و اسبان باره و فیم سرج تاج فیم بست آورده



داسپ سهای خانه دادگار آورده فتح انیم شده بعد مطالعه فرمودند مجرای  
از دست غایت خاوت یک اسب انعام داده فرمودند - (No. 2571)

No. 124

ماه صفر ۲۸

لوم السلت

۲۸ شهریور از زمان برگزیده ابد غرض رسید که جمعیت غنیم و اخی یار شیر آورده نمایان  
شده حکم شد غلظت فرخان چه هوج انصاف در اسب فیهی دشت سرد ۲۸ شهریور  
بجایمان رسانیده بیاید و لطف اله خان به عبد الکیم تان در یار شیر خود حامد که  
در تان کره نموده است بگوید که ما اتفاق شده گیر مردم غنیم را بده تبع کریم  
حواله حبیب الله تریز سردار نماید (No. 2540)

No. 125

ماه صفر ۲۸

لوم السلت

۲۸ شهریور فرمان و حسب حکم بهر محمد الملک بنام هر محمد خان که در تان شیر است  
و حسب حکم بنام یار خان که حبه تنیه خوران نفوذ هر منظران بیاید صادر  
شده حواله محمد عاتل رفیزه بخت تریز سردار برده حکم شد بدستانه داران سری  
راه بگوید که برده داده شدت رساند (No. 2529)

No. 126

ماه صفر ۲۸

لوم السلت

۲۸ شهریور از زمان تریز سردار بخت تریز سردار آورده بفرمان تریز سردار  
ارضی ساسد که خانه در چه هوج حبه تنیه مردم غنیم را تان سیرای  
نوده مابین تان کره نموده و تریز سردار است آدمیم محمد اسفل

نیز برادر دینار گاد رسد فلان حضور نزد پیر زندخان به تبارک سیرول برود  
چنانچه یکنیز از زندان گاد رسد و امردم غنیم اجازت برود و سیر گاد رسد به سه به  
اساتید آمده عرض رساید

(No. 2533)

No. 127

ماه صفر ۲۸

لا اله الا الله

۲۱ من حکم شد لطف اله خان به میره زندخان بوسه که به تبارک سیرول آمده  
خبردار باشد و همه ماعقل نزد برادر جانکه دلیل را به تبارک سیرول بیاورد

(No. 2536)

No. 128

ماه رجب الاول ۲۸

لا اله الا الله

به من از زمانه برادر عرض رسیده که جمعیت قافریه از قلع با به برود آمده  
میخواهد از ای قادیان استوی نماید سرودن سید احمدون به گور سرداران  
حده بتنییه مقهوران برود چنانچه منار الله اسب قبیله دیده برگاه دگرزه از  
قادیان ایستاد رسیده سرودن داشت که جمعیت مقهور ریاده است و همراه  
فره ی حدود حکم شد ملقب خان جنتی سرکار ساد عالم بدار مجده جمعیت برادر  
سه از باران داده حیو کدک منار الله است الفان کد بگر نیه رسیده

(No. 2559)

No. 129

ماه رجب الاول ۲۸

لا اله الا الله

۲۱ من لطف اله خان عرض نمود که شغلنفر خان خطی داشت که جمعیت غنیم بباران  
چهارده از قادیان آمده بود تر شسته است بده در یک اسب برود سرکار حکم  
شود حده بتنییه اسب برود حکم شد قادیان به بهر برود اگر جمعیت مقهور

این طرف در ایام مذکور باشد تنبیه رسانند و الا نه بویجا سازند معروفه دارد  
 بوجهی که حکم شده و از آن عمل نمایند -  
 (No. 2561)

No. 130

ماه اربع الاول ۷۸

لوحه ۱۲

۴ منته از بنیاد برادره عرض رسید که جمعیت مقهور جانب پیرنده آورده میخوان  
 که مشغول نمایند حکم شد که استغاثه خان است تنبیه نماید عرض رسید که خاندان  
 بیمار است حکم شد فوج خاندان را همراه غنایم قرمان مع فوج افغانه تنبیه رسانند  
 (No. 2559)

No. 131

ماه اربع الاول ۷۸

لوحه ۱۳

۵ منته مراد بیگ بیاض و غیره نسبت فقره دانت بهر مدد خان آورده  
 بنظر گذرانیده معروفه است بود جمعیت مقهور اسلک و رنای بیده  
 مراسمی پیرنده خانه داد ستواری نموده در خانه بولبر مقابل نموده جنگ  
 واقع شده از اسلک حضرت بیاض بکنیم و فوج نموده شکست داده  
 اسبان ماده و سال و غیره تاراج بدست آورده اکثر اینجانب کشته شدند  
 و غنایم از راقده عرض خواهر رسید  
 (No. 2563)

از دفع گلشن آباد عرض رسید جمعیت مقهور در اینجا آورده بهایز انش  
 حاد را که قبضه خیر انعام داده مع فوج جبهه تنبیه غنیم جانب گلشن آباد اخلاص  
 نموده فقره دانت به بیاض بیگ مشرب ترادان رفته اند از خان را از کره نموده و مع  
 طفل ترادان مرصحت حاد را از نوکاه امرا و معده خلیل را از سیمین سزای آورده  
 جبهه تنبیه مقهوران به گلشن آباد رسانیده - بیاید  
 (No. 2563)

No. 132

ماه ربیع الاول ۱۲۸۰

یوم الاربع

در منبر حضرت سید منور خان آمده بنظر گذشت معروض داشت بود که  
دردی اگر از خان بنام دار گلشن آباد حاکم حضرت شهر گزاشته بعد صحبت  
خود در مجلس از اعیان بیان نامه حبیبه تنبیه مقبولان که درین نواح  
آمده ساری نموده از انصار حضرت تنبیه خواهم کرد - (2565. ۱۲۸۰)

No. 133

ماه ربیع الاول ۱۲۸۰

یوم الخمس

امام در شایسته میرزا خان بنام دار گلشن آباد حضرت مطلق الله خان بنظر گذشت  
معروض داشت بود که جمیع مقبولان حاجی گلشن آباد آمدن در مجلس بنوام طالب  
آریک آباد رسیده شرفی بایند بایران و من موجب کلم شد - (2566. ۱۲۸۰)

یوم الجمعة

امام خوجه ایاز درین نمود وکیل اشرف خان درین بیدار درگاه معکول منزل گلشن آباد  
در بیدار حاکم بنام خیر الدین در درگاه جمیع مقبولان از حاجی کریمیه بهیست بگذارد  
رفته خانه دار مردم بهیرو اسباب زبانی در موضع مسجد بود گذشته است اسباب فحش و درین  
تغایب مقبولان نموده از انصار حضرت تنبیه خواهم کرد مرود در آسرب باد

وقال خان مرضی نمود بنام دار گلشن آباد خطی نوشته است جمیع مقبولان از  
انجا از بنزار بنامه باب سرار خادرس و مستند بایران سید منور خان در حله  
جمیع اعیان بیان نامه مذکور براه کریمیه آقاب مقبولان کرد است احد دروغ  
به بقی الله خان مرود در حسب احکم سید منور خان در سید انار سید انار خان

به ملتش آباد نازده بعد از آن به صوبه بریانپور رفته خبردار باشد  
 حسب الحکم به میر لطف اله خان به مرحمت خان و ملا انداز خان و سوب شترسوار  
 صادر نموده مضمون آنکه جمعیت به بهر بزرگ و خازیرین است است و با جبهه تنبیه  
 مقبوران رسانند  
 به لطف اله خان فرمودند به ملتفتان بختی سمرقند عالم بیاد برسد  
 که بهر سمرقند خان جبهه تنبیه مقبوران جانب برادر است باید که شایعه جمعیت  
 با ناه داده جیو در بیاد کرده باشد خبردار باشد  
 (No. 2568)

No. 134

ماه ربیع الاول ۱۲۸۰

یاد ۱۲۸۰  
 ۱۳۰۰ منبر محمد اسماعیل اگر بهر دار سرحد داشت عاری ازین خان بیاد آورده سرحد جنگ  
 بنظر گذرانیده سرحد داشت بود که بیده موافق حکم روز جمعه از پوره ساری  
 بوده بعد خروج منبر تنبیه فیم جانب ملتش آباد دایره تنبیه جای آورد (No. 2570)

No. 134A

ماه ربیع الاول ۱۲۸۰

لوا المحضر  
 ۱۰ منبر سرحد داشت بهر خان شایه دار تالیز آورده حضرت لطف اله خان بنظر  
 گذشت سرحد داشت بود که جمعیت مقبور بزرگ که آورده بود و روی  
 بسبب بهمان ساری کرده محمد اسماعیل طاه دادا جمعیت جبهه تنبیه مقبوران  
 تعیین نموده امرش خانه دادا است مقابل کرده جنگ واقع شده بیاد کورا  
 بقتل رسانیده شکت داده فتح یافت شد و آثاره و بیاد دینر با سرحد  
 بیت آورده بعد مطالعه حکم به لطف اله خان بخاندان بهر که کمر گلی شد (No. 2566)

No. 135

ماه ربیع الثانی ۱۲۸۰

لام الخمس

۲۸ شعبه دیرز دانه بزرگ. عرض رسید وانا جیسنگ ما سردار مقهور جمعیت  
حائب بریند آرد. امت باهرا سر جمع جان پسرنا مدار مان را یک نیل  
قیمت پنجبزار. «پایه العام داده. جبهه تنبیه مقهوران رخت نموده. کلمه شد  
پانده بزار. «پایه خزانه آغاسیان و ج منجلا ده بزار. «پایه درجه مساکت  
بخانمذکور بریند و فوج خانمذکور یکبزار یکله پانزده سوار بود دین دار  
نیمه چهار بیت سوار دیگر تعیین فرمودند

(No. 2643)

لام الجمع

۳۰ شعبه شریف منزله ار دره دانت با در حاکم آورده بفرزانه  
سرور داشت و کرا انا جیسنگ سردار سنبها مقهور و طرف بریند. آورده چنانچه  
خانه داد از تنانه با در فست. پنج کرده. «پایه ایندایو و داد گانو  
مقابل نموده از اقبال حضرت سردار مقهور را بچشم رسانیده. سوار بقتل و زخمی  
نموده. درجه مادیه و بیال و جبهه تی و غیره تاج غنیمت آورده. نفع اعظم شد اجد  
مطالبه فرمودند سحر کلا شد و مان دیک تبهه سفینه در باب سحر الحله. نموده  
در سحر شریف. «پایه سی و دین سی احاطه فرمودند

(No. 2645)

No. 136

ماه ربیع الثانی ۱۲۸۰

۱۰ شعبه چارلزگان سردار حضرت خضر خان آورده بفرزانه  
ما سوار خیر آورده جمعیت مقهور و طرف آورده است  
اول انگشت و انگشت سنگ ستاره پنج سوم اثر  
سنگت داده و فوج با در تنابی شده و اسب ماده  
کشته شده

انجانب بک آموره و زخمی شد بعد سلامه فرود مذکور بمرایه شد براتب

(No 2647)

امروزه مساند

No. 137

اولیای امانت

اولیای امانت

۹۹ در حیات امان که جان بفرگشت سرودن آن در جمعیت  
حیات چون مثل آموره و زخمی شد و فرود مذکور بمرایه شد  
حیات بماند را بجهنم رسانید خروج سینه شکست و در دست  
ماده و یکبار امان بفرگشت و در دست بماند و در دست  
تاج لایم و در دست آموره و فرود مذکور بمرایه شد  
(No. 2653)

No. 138

اولیای امانت

اولیای امانت

۱۳۱ سید مرتضایان بفرگشت سرودن امان بماند و در دست  
امان و در دست امان بفرگشت سرودن امان بماند و در دست  
براه حیات امان و در دست امان بفرگشت سرودن امان بماند  
ارمانت سید مرتضایان بفرگشت سرودن امان بماند و در دست  
در حیات امان بفرگشت سرودن امان بماند و در دست  
(No. 2658)

No. 139

اولیای امانت

۱۴۱ امانت امان بفرگشت سرودن امان بماند و در دست  
در دست امان بفرگشت سرودن امان بماند و در دست  
(No. 2709)



No. 140

ماه جمادی الثانی سنه ۲۸

لواء الفرس

۱۲ سنه [جمعیت نینم] به تعلقه شوالیه آمده بود بیده بیان خانه خود را  
فرستاده که انبار تنبیه نماید سوار السیه دشت بتاریخ ۱۲ جمادی الاول جنگ واقع  
شد اقبال حضرت بسیار کس را بقتل رسانیده و زخمی نموده شکست داده  
سی و یک اسب ماده به مال و نیزه تاراج نینم برست آورده . . . گرفته  
... تا سر در برف نذر بار شکست دارد این همه را دیده و . . .  
خامه داده . . . زده چنانچه ایاد سقیر کرده فرمودند حکم شد

(No. 2741)

No. 141

ماه ربیع الثانی

لواء السیاحه

غیره منج ذالفتح بیک و نیزه ده نفر از سردار غرضه دشت تاراج این جان باده و  
سجاده خان بسیار پیش آمده و نفرات را دیده حرد و فرات است بود که سردار آسمان  
خبر آوردند که خامه مقهور بقتل رسد (هزایب) که سران آورده اند و زور بسیار بود  
و شکست پرده و نیزه بیایند منتظر خامه داد سجاده خان را سحر فوج رخت  
بوده که آن سلطان را تنبیه نماید تا بباران خاند و اسب نهی دیده در انبار کشیده  
مقابل نموده جنگ واقع شد را اقبال حضرت غرضه را منتهی تیغ کرد بیده  
راش به دست آورده و هزایب که در ران او را انداخته داده تلخ باد شای شد  
فرمودند مجری شد

(No. 2801)

No. 141 A

ماه ربیع الثانی

لواء السیاحه

۱۲ سنه از دست لواء این جان باده و غرضه رسد که بخت را در [بونت] و نیزه  
سردار مقهور جانب کوه ساره آمده بود چنانچه سجاده و غرضه را بجهت تنبیه ایما  
لحق نمودیم بسیاری را بقتل رسانیده شکست داده و در انبار بیاوردیم



(No. 2803)

نزدیک بکری ش

No. 142

ماه رجب ۲۸

لوم الفهر

۱۱ منی از دقت نادیر به عرض رسیده و فوج فیم اب دانی آبرو حکم شده به

(No. 2774)

نزدیکان به توبه که (نیم) برسان

No. 143

ماه رجب ۲۸

لوم الفهر

۱۲ منی بهجت الماک نزد حب الکوم به کار طالب خان نوجوان از آباد بویه

که عرض کرده که غلامه از لعل احمد آباد به سبیا حضور رسیده باشد که از

از به نوجوانان و تنه داران در میدان و به پادشاه بجا که گیرنده احدی از ملک

(No. 2522)

بجا که محرم رسیده حضور ببرند -

No. 144

ماه محرم ۲۸

لوم الثالث

۸ منی حاجی حیدر رحمت بود که محمد حسین قاضی قبول حلی شده که در ملک فیم گزین

سیاه شده چنانچه از بهر سرت و نیزه بهر به احمد آباد رسیده که سرب و ماروت

محمود میرد از سید ملک اله گجراتی که به منصب و بهر بنجاه دات بنجاه سوار

در حضور است و آن حال این سرورین است آید شده و در نامه غلامه

(No. 2463)

نادر و در قریب حضور حاضر شده و حکم شده از دفتر گذرانید

No. 145

ماه سنوال ۲۹

لوم الفهر

۱۰ منی محمد شریف نوشی در احمد بهجا پوری در حوض دولت و کلید طلا بابت

فتح قلعہ دولہ اسالو داشتہ بود بنظر داشت محرومی داشته بود بندہ موجب  
حکم یکزار پیادہ سالہا اسالو کردہ گاہ داشتہ بنایج ۱۱۹۹ خان پیادہ  
نابینا بودہ کہ اسب بسبب اسرا یکی بیاد چاہد شد قلا است اسر سوری ناید  
حب است اسب بندہ بکام شب مع کیندہ از نیامہ قتل قلعہ رسیدہ ہارگری  
شب باقی ماندہ رینہ با سر قلعہ پیادہ یکہ بجاء نبرد قلعہ مذکور داشتہ نگاہا  
خان دروازہ کہ در حجاب بود از آسار قتل نمودہ قتل را شکستہ دروازہ  
دا نمودہ مردم بادناہی کرد قلعہ رسیدہ درین اثنا کتاجی ہزار تاجہ دار  
انجام دہ برادر داد خود دنیو برادری آوردہ مقابلہ نمودہ جنگ واقع شد از  
اقبال حضرت ادراسہ برادر داد دنیو بقتل رسانیدہ قلعہ بظرف بادناہی  
آوردہ امیدوار است نمود قلعہ دار آفرستود سر دہر بخیر شد (No. 2865)

No. 146

ماہ سنو ۲۹

یوم السبت

۲۴ شہ از زینتہ لیل العزیز خان قلعہ دار دنیو امیر رسید کہ مردم ہاسہان خبر  
آوردہ کہ کافر بیچہ میخواست کہ بپیر سے تر بپیر را طرف ملک بادناہی بپرسد  
حقیقت بر حیت این آمانہ بچہ حضرت آفرین است سر دہر حقیقت کیے جمعیت  
آفرینا عرض رساند (No. 2884)

No. 147

ماہ و دفعہ ۲۹

۱۲۱۲۱۱ شہ

۲۷ شہ اسراف خان را حہ روح الطام دادہ نیت خیر فاقہ چاہدہ جمہ تہنہ مردم  
سینا حقور جانب دانگہ زخمت نمودہ فرمودند سرحاک خبر نفیم بیایدانہ  
نیت ابود سازد (No. 2919)

No. 148

ماه ذی قعدة ۱۲۹

يوم السبت

۲۷ مه از فوت مہاجے نمایندگان کتاوون اعرض رسید بکار با بنده خبر آوردند که  
 آگوبل و غیره ماسر داران کینیا مقبور جمعیست پنج هزار سوار منزل قلعه  
 چیدن بدن دستاره آمده جمعیست فرام می نمایند که به بیجا پور کوک سروز  
 یا سزان خانه داد امیدوار است که چند رکله بان و غیره لوازمه تو سخانه  
 مرحمت شد که فدوی رفته راه آن سروز نموده تنبیه نماید حکم شد که  
 این مقامی سابق بم اعرض رسید است اگر نزد مقبور جمعیست زیاده باشد  
 از تلف خود خیر دار باشد

(۸۵۰۲۹۲۶)

No. 149

ماه شوال ۱۲۹

يوم السبت

۹ مه از فوت روح الله خان اعرض رسید که رام راجا برادر خود کینیا مقبور  
 با عید بیدگی می آید حکم شد که تنبیه نموده طلبیده بجهت بفرستد بمطلب  
 سرانزار فرمایم به اشرف خان حکم شد که مراتب کینیا مقبور اعرض رساند

(۸۵۰۲۸۶۱)

ماه ذی قعدة ۱۲۹

يوم السبت

۲۷ مه از فوت روح الله خان اعرض رسید که سابق ماسر حاکم قلعه دار سیرال  
 رفته بود که رام راجه برادر کینیا مقبور امید بیدگی می آید درین راه رام راجه  
 مذکور رفته حضور شده بود چنانچه کینیا مقبور جمعیست فرستاده  
 ادرا کسکیر نموده برادر

(۸۵۰۲۸۹۷)

ماه جمادی الثانی ۱۲۳۰

۲۰۰۰ نفران و خلعت بنام پسر سیدی اعنات تپانه گلشن آباد در باب

فتح قلعه سرک کرده دارد شد (No. 3020)

No. 151 & 152

ماه بشوال ۱۲۳۰

۲۱۰۰ سید نور محمد نور محمد رضات سید عبداله خان بچه کلبه الله  
ابت فتح قلعه سرک کرده در سرک کرده قلعه نافر بچه آورده بنظر گزشت

حرفش داشته بود که بیده جمعیت برای سن بچه سران ۱۰۰۰

برای تخمینه سرستاره بود جانیخه قلعه دار مذکور بجنگ پس آورده

تاب افتاد کرده قلعه را تصرف بادشای آورده فرمودند بجزان شد

در پیش بنجاب خان سناج نوده باز صدی یکده بنجاه سه [بود]

بنجاه سوار اخافه نوده از سه بیستی بود بیستی ازاده فرموده

(No. 3028)

No. 153

ماه بشوال ۱۲۳۰

۱۶۰۰۰ امر اسباب پسر مقیم خان مرحوم داد قلعه داری گریک و توف نوده

بتموین سید عبداله خان قلعه داری سرک کرده که حاله مفتوح شده مقرر

نوده چهار صدی در سر سوار بود صدی در سر سوار اخافه فرمودند

(No. 3030)

No. 154

ماه بشوال ۱۲۳۰

۱۶۰۰۰ ملایف خان دامعه زوج برای تخمینه ملک نافر بچه العام داره

(احصت فرمودند) (No. 3031)

۱۳ منبر عرض داشت طاقت خان آمده بنظر گذشت عرض داشت بود که ناگه  
 لغیبات فوج بنده ظاهر نموده که [ ] قلعه داران کینیا مقهور بنده پیغام  
 داده که اگر همه فوج در اینجا قلعه را را ببرد بادشاهی [ ] میدهد چنانچه  
 ندیدی همه فوج سواران نموده بنشیند که از کتار انحراف در ... مقهور  
 رسیده باین تاج تاج که ه تعلقه مقهور را سوخته قلعه داران به جنگ پیش  
 آورده از اقبال حضرت دودگر را بقتل رسانیده بنده پیشی است آورده  
 درین ضمن بزبان سربازان عرضی رسیده نگاه حاکم ذکر سواران نموده باین  
 تاج رسیده قلعه داران باطله کثیر جنگ پیش آمده حاکم ذکر طرح داده  
 آورده حکم شده بمنور حاکم بخاننده که بزرگ که همه مزه داران ثابت  
 بادشاهی همه عظیم حضور بیاید یک گرد داراجن بیاید بگویند که ناگه  
 دینار برساند حاکم ذکر را به فوج مشرب خان رسانیده بیاید (No. 3537)

از نوشته دربار قلعه دار کتار ( ) عرض رسیده که بنده بنای ۱۲  
 دی قعه ۳۲ به بنانه خود رسیده و زمینداران دکن آورده به بنده سلامتی شده  
 و تاج دار مامور تعلقه مقهور در باب دادن تاجه بنظر بادشاهی پیغام داده  
 انعام منهای که بنده را از طرف موافق مراتب همه بی تعلقه دار ساپهر  
 سرازار ستود و چل پیرا ایدیه نقد رده اسپ ده خلعت انعام در  
 وضع خوشتر بخت وطن رحمت نمایند سجنور آورده سلامت تمام منتقل نموده  
 به بمنور حاکم سرحد که به دربار قلعه رسیده که چه آمون خوشتر ملایم و

انعام سرحدت خوانده شد بخاطر جمع بیاید (No. 3537)

ساراج درج سرفی ساراج

حضرات خانه داد حقیقت اما کس کس

..... نقل حضرت سربل سابق از این ذات پس از این

از به ارج ضایع کارکنان قد بر سر مراد سید است که بهیت و جام سیراج است

حضرات است. داد و جیو جیو و جیو جیو و جیو جیو و جیو جیو و جیو جیو

دستگیران مشق ضربان سبب مقبول که به دانه به جنت و رسیدن ~~سبب~~ جیو

خبر و کس سزاکردار با یکبارش با معده و از تاد کتر که به قلعه حضرت سار

خانه و زخم و خبر و دیر دست آوردن بنظر حضرت حکم شد آثاره خانه را ترک

باید و است. یاد خدا دی را باید صراحت

( No. 151 )

No. 156 A

ماه ستمال

۲۸ مه از راه سربل ای بمرغی رسید که سبب مقبول در سربل که آید بود

از استماع این کافو جی و دماو جی و سبب به استادی در اینجا رسید جنگ

دانش شد از اقبال حضرت سیاری را بچشم رسانیده ماری قلعه را آتش

داد و مقبولان ترخت قلعه به شده و در سبب در قلعه مرگ و میر کجیوس شد

است و به استادی بحداده نموده نزد سارخان

( No. 3082 )



پاراج دهرج سری راج جو جو درنداشت نام داد حقیقت امامی کیر وای  
 بعد از ادای آداب تسکات موجب شرف یافتگی انجمن است و ایام و جزم جاه و اول  
 طایفه بدلهای ایران نمودن میرساند که نقل برودات سرسل پنجم شیر و خان ۳۲  
 از راه استیلا به امانت امانت نوده و دینور و اینست که چون در اوقات حضرت شاهنشاهی از  
 سخنبر ملک دلیج بیجاورد و حیدر آباد و تنبیه کردن نشان در آداب مقبول و آفتاب تاراج  
 مای و تختیج اکبرانی از این ملک تاراج شد و گویا سببا مقهور که از دست ترو و باد سیران  
 ای ملایک و در امرای اعظام در صورت خدمت مناسرتان محمد ادا ره به بهی و  
 آوردن در دهگاه و الی گئی در پی و گری ایت کد است باقی ماند و خبر و وصل مانی به  
 ایران زمین گورد . . . اندر اسیه به حکم جهان طالع عالم طبع شرف در دریاوت  
 که به امارت بهاد عالم حان نام دار التراف شاه جهان آباد به سبند که مامورات و  
 سعادت در راه آنان متوجه به درستان بستوم بحالات و امانت در لخانه و اروا  
 دیده و خانسان یکبار نفر شتر بزرگ بار از صوبه بهر انبوه و احمد آباد طلب  
 نماید و به سندان هو بجات بر گورد نگارد و یک که در راه آمان که نرفت موجب  
 ملک شای سست به سندان است شتران سلوبه به رکاب مولی حاضر شوند  
 و حیدان خدمت بر که که از خیر راه و تفریح جنگل رحمت گردد —

سوال ۱۵۸

۳۴ منہ ارادت عبدالمراقبان نو جہاں تل لکھن اعرض رسید کہ دو ہزار نفر پہلے  
بجیت ضبط نمودن ملک تل لکھن ہزارہ بیدہ تعین نمودہ رود نہ منجمل یک ہزار و سیصد  
مانی سرایت نہ افتند

(No. 3049)

سوال ۱۵۹

۳۵ منہ اربعہ زوج خانزمان فتح جنگ اعرض رسید کہ ہر سویم منزل گاہ ہر  
آمرہ ہزار خان پسر بیدہ رفتہ تہیہ نمودہ بیت راس اسب بیت آمدہ

(No. 3051)

سوال ۱۶۰

۳۶ منہ اربعہ زوج ساہزادہ محمد بیدہ بجیت اعرض رسید کہ ساہزادہ حیو ارج  
حکم کہ کدی سننے لقب دانیدہ بارت ہر نمودہ سرگاہ آتش دادند یک رج  
کدی مذکور ہر ہر ۲۲ ج استادہ چارہ کسر اینجاب گاہ آمدہ

(No. 3072)

سوال ۱۶۱

۳۷ منہ سرحدات اعتقاد خان سبچہ کلیدہ للہ بات فتح تلہ رسال کہ کہ قتل قلعہ  
راسبری واقعات آمدہ سترگشت مساندہ حامی دہ آوردہ فرمودند

(No. 3074)

محرری شد



No. 162

ماه کفر ۳۳

۲۰ منب از واقعه فوج میر محمد خان ارضی رسید که حاکمستان خاننار الله خیر  
آوردند که سرداران قاده است و نیزه در قیچی و شراب لغافل بودند این  
استماع یافته در دیده در آنجا رسید و جنگ واقعه شده اکثر مقبولان را بجهنم  
رسانیده و فخرایی بهیچ فوج و نیزه انجانب بجا آوردند انشاء الله تعالی  
مدت فوج قاده شد  
(No. 3087)

No. 163

ماه بادی ۱۱۱۱

۴۱ منب میر عالم آمد و سزا داشت که بکلیان الله خان برآورد و رسانیده برضدات  
خان سار الله آورد و بکلیان الله خان سزا داشت که حاکمستان خاننار الله خیر  
آوردند که سرداران قاده است و نیزه در قیچی و شراب لغافل بودند این  
استماع یافته در دیده در آنجا رسید و جنگ واقعه شده اکثر مقبولان را بجهنم  
رسانیده و فخرایی بهیچ فوج و نیزه انجانب بجا آوردند انشاء الله تعالی  
مدت فوج قاده شد  
(No. 3116)

No. 164

سفر سنبل ۳۴

۲۶ قاده آجاردن فیم بهم موقوف شد قاده دارانجا که با آنها ساخته از قاده سراز  
حکم شد او را که برادر الله خیر چهار دریا به شتر و سوار کردند و بیارند خبر است که  
نجم را بیری بنیم در محاصره است و بخت را بایات عالی مات در راه دی حجه

بسمت سوپا کت بشاد و آغا چهاره شده بود خبر است یکباره سوار هیونی  
 یازده سوار شاه داشت به قاسم خان اعانه مرحمت شد و تعدادی و تعدادی دیگر  
 با اعانه یازده سوار داشت به دامه از پ سنگد مقررنده بود . . .  
 (No. 372 ve 373)

No. 165

ماه ریح استایل ۲۵

۲۶ اردیبهشت و کتاب ادناه دارن محمد کامبخش برض رسید که ده افغان خان  
 یادر حمید خان و سران از خان و لشکر خان دکنی و از دست یاران داده بودند  
 و مادران را در بنجاند و در خلعت داده و دست به چپ رسانده برای نمودن به جنبی  
 و خلعت فرمودند و به حمید خان نیز خلعت داده . . .  
 (No. 3169)

No. 166

ماه دی حجه ۲۶

مره اردانه کرمانک برض رسید که قاسم خان و چهار پنجایا پنج مادی  
 نعه رداه شرف جنبی شد  
 (No. 3180)

No. 167

ماه ریح الاول ۲۶

۲۲ اردیبهشت و ج کتاب ادنا برادر محمد کامبخش برض رسید که مردم  
 غنیمت گام نب رداده جنبی سر و جل جمید جان و گوتم برای بده و تجار آبره  
 معاند بوده و در افغان خان یادر استماع یافته جمید جان و میر را که کرمانک

فرستاده بود و ایشان تپانه را تمام نگردنه چنانچه سان ببادر بر روی چهل آمده بنیم  
و آئینه برسانند، شکست داده و چهل را تمام نمود

لعرض رسید که فتح البهتان بر کوه نش باد شاه داده محمد کام بخش آورده  
بود بارش براده چو خاندن کرد و از نزد حمده الملک اسد خان فرستاده آنچ  
حمده الملک بگوید قبول کند خاندن در بره حمده الملک آورده حمده الملک محبوب  
خواب سرائی بخاندن گرفت فرستاده که خفب کرده را بگردد بخانه اسد خان  
بر رویه اسد خان را خدمت دیگر بر چهل نفری تمام خاندن کور قبول کرده بر خاست

(No. 3197)

در بره خود آورده

No. 168 & 169

سهریادی اسانے شے

۲۳ مبارک و براج خدمت

کیفیت در بار علی اسفند ذوالفقار خان تعلق جنی را شماره نموده یک سال در  
تردد گشت از جانب مذکور و جاساسی گریستن تعلق به خان متار ابه قدس  
تعالی میرید و بر بادت براده دادا بر محمد کام بخش و حمده الملک نرسان میرنت که  
توقف چینگ و دشمنی قلعه سلور بیلور می آید بهبود و کس نخواهد بود بادشاهزاده به  
حمده الملک ناگیر بهبود که به میر خود بگردد از در زمان میان بهاء و خدمت میگیرم  
این چیز ... در میان بود ستاجی و نیر متا برار و حاجی و بجا بود با جمعیت بهیت  
برار سوار بهیت جنی شفا به بنا به بهیت کرده آنجا آورد به علی مردان  
خان و حیدر کرناک تعلقه حیدر آباد جنگ و چهل نموده تمام نوج خان متار ابه

را سکت داده مال و متاع او غارت نموده او را دستگیر کرده برود نزدیک  
قلعه جنبی رسیده از یکطرف بود و حال اسماعیل خان بکارا جنگ نموده بر داشته  
دو الفکار خان جمع بردهای بادشاهی را از محاصره طلبیده .....  
..... و امروز که بتاریخ بیت و چهارم منرجادی استانی شده اند  
برخی اندر سر رسید که لشکر بادشاهی از ..... غل و گاه و میرا نیاید که مردم  
غنییم هم در محاصره خود گرفته است عاجز و تنگ شده به مال خرابی در آورده  
از جنبی از طرف رسیده و هنوز از محاصره خلاص نیست .....  
( ۱۷۲ No. 204 )

No. 170

ماه شعبان ۱۲۶۰

لوم ۱۲۶۰ هجری  
عمره سید بهمنی الملک بهر مندرخان عرض نمود که اسماعیل خان که برادر غنییم زخمی  
کردن از سرجیل جنبی بر داشته برده بود در اینجا از تنیه خلاصی کرد بهوج بادشاهی  
محمد اعظم شاه داخل شده حکم نموده مدد طلبه کرد و را بهنجزار ذات و بهنجزار سوار  
به سوار سابق بجاال شده در دوشه جاگیر عرض رسانیده و بهوب که حاضر کرد  
همی مطلب دانسته تمامه بخد مت ساراده و جمع مانده  
( No. 3209 )

No. 171

ماه ریحان ۱۲۶۰

لوم ۱۲۶۰ هجری  
به محمد غنییم نایب ملک شکر خان دارنده توپ خانه فرموده که  
جریه الملک اسه خان و ده الفکار خان بهادر توپخانه ای سوار دارد که در جنبی  
گذرانته آورده نسبت آسایشه قدر باشد عرض رساند چنانچه موافق البه موجب

اعرض رسایه فرمودند که سداک در پی در مطالبه جوده الملک اسد خان و یک  
اک و پنجاء بزر در پی در مطالبه رد الفقا خان بادر داخل نموده و مبلغ مذکور  
از خاندان رسایه وصول سازد  
(No. 3235)

No 172

ماه رجب ۱۲۶۶

۱۸ مه بر آئے بر کاره اعرض رسایه که رسایه مقبور خارج ۱۵ رجب ۱۲۶۶ رسایه  
جنی بر آئیده جانب قلع ترشلی که حایه قلب است بمقابل دوازده کرده از  
جنی دشت و قلع بیت کونه رادر دشت زمینداری آجا بدشت خود در آورده در  
آجا سکونت گرفته است  
(No. 3224)

No. 173 A

ماه رجب الاول ۱۲۶۶

يوم السبت

۳۰ مه بموجب دشت دارنده عمارت مسجد مرتبه اعرض رسایه که دارنده عمارت  
مواضع حکم در داره دیورستان ایستفان سدد نموده حال خاندان رسایه بطرف  
چیتور است مردم سرت برسی بنایند فرمود که گرانته خاندان مذکور در  
بنخانه سهار بنایند  
(No. 679)

No. 173 B

ماه جدی الاول ۱۲۶۶

يوم السبت

۱۶ مه بموجب دشت حسن علی خان بادر اعرض رسایه که حدودی بنایند

اسلام آباد سمار لودہ مقل ایک موضع سن پور آباد لودہ

امیدواریم نرمان رحمت شود حکم بند بدینند  
(۱۲۷۶-۱۵۰)

No. 173 C

ماه جاری اول ۲۳

یوم الاربع

۲۳ منہ به اب خان فرمودند کہ حسب احکم به امیرالامران صمدیہ دار بنگالہ دیند

کہ بتخانہ باسم جگنائیہ واقع اور یہ راسمار سار  
(۱۲۸۴-۱۵۰)

No 173 D

ماه صفر ۲۶

۱۳ منہ برصہ دانت مار تا نزارد صمدیہ المسم نایہ آمرد بنظر لذت معروضاتہ

بود حکم دار صادر شود کہ بتخانہ مبادیو کہ از رحمت پور پشتر در ملک

سینا مقور واقع است رفته سار نماید چنانچہ موافق حکم بانست روانہ

سندہ ام سار خواہم ساخت  
(۲۱۹۹-۱۵۰)

No. 174

اولی ۲۳

یوم السبت

۸ منہ اسد خان فرمود کہ امیر سید سیدک صمدیہ نزد امیرالامران رساند

کہ جائزہ نزد پادشاه رساند چنانچہ بنظر امیرالامران بدین مقرب لالہ لودہ



۳۰ ش فرودند در تمام ملک عمر سه خبر به مقررات خودی چارک ادویه

جزیه قبول نمود چار بحال دسبر کار و الا گرفته

(No. 175)

No. 175 A

ماه و جب ۲۳

لوح الثالث

۳۰ ش بدو ارمات حکم نده از بدی بابت موضع یا دل نزد قاضی شیخ السلام  
برستند که مطابق شرح نایند

۱۸ ش بدو ارمات حکم نده بدی بابت موضع یا دل منجمله آنچه غارت و کورگان  
از نزد خود نگاه دار کی دینج نزد مرد را حواله احتتام خان نماید که مسلمان کرده  
نار بیلورند چنانچه مطابق حکم کو توال مذکور بسیار مسلمان ساخت

(No. 873)

No. 175-B

ماه نظام المعظم ۲۳

لوح الثالث

۱۲ ش نزدیک داس و رانے سگ فرستاده مانند مسلمان ندهند برود

(No. 955)

وزیر ارادیه الشام سرحدت فرودند

No. 175 C

ماه جمادی الثانی ۲۳

لوح الرابع

۲۰ ش کلیات انور منیرا و احکامت سگ منوهر پوری مسلمان شد جمیل (حمید)

السادسینم خطاب ددو صد و پیم و نمانه سرانرا از فروردین (No. 1302)

No. 175 D

ماه دی الحجه ۲۶

یوم الخمیس

۲۲ به موجب انتخاب خط نامه طلب خان مندری نعمت مرضی رسید  
 اول آنکه در باب چهل و پنج کسر نوگران سبنا مقبور حکم شده بود که هر کس مسلمان  
 شود قید گاه دارد و اتی را بقتل رساند چنانچه بیده موجب حکم چاک که  
 مسلمان نماندند از مسلمان کرده سیزده نفر بقتل رسانیده و محبت ۱۲  
 سردار مقبور در قید است در باب خلاصی او بیدی یعقوب خان معروفه داشته  
 است حکم شده که چنان مژور برید که کسر مسلمان نماند بعد محبت مذکور  
 بخفیه بر سر شده

(No. 2121)

No. 175 E

ماه شعبان ۲۴

یوم الخمیس

۲۴ به نفایل خان مرضی نمود که بیده موافق حکم باری و نیره قوم بهری  
 را در حدالت رجوع نموده بودند چنانچه آریا مسلمان نماند حکم شد که  
 حواله اهتمام خان مایه

(No. 2363)

No. 175 F

ماه بناد الاول ۲۸

۲۸ به محمد الملک فرموده حسب حکم بفرجه ران و دیوانیان ممالک



عمده بزرگه که آنچه مردم بنود در اینجا مسلمان میشوند سری مردم  
چهاردهم و عورت در دهیم از هزاره اینجا بطریق انعام مقرر است  
چنانچه آنجا برای دین اسلام خود مسلمان میشوند از آینده مبلغیانی

(No. 2699)

موقوف نایند

No. 175 G

ماه دی قعه شانزده

یوم الثالث

از منبر شخصی در ویشی بعضی رسانید که مسلمانان از زکوة عاجز بودند  
فرمودند به مسلمانان سال دوم سیده الی که بعضی رسانید که حضرت موافق  
بعضی حکم فرموده اند فرمودند به مسلمانان سال از سیده بگزارند

(No. 205)

No. 175 H

ماه صفر شانزده

یوم الرابع

از منبر دستبختان دیوان حاله موافق حکم محصل سایر که در عید حضرت  
مردم اسباب مقرر بود منسل بعضی رسانید حکم شده چهل در دهیم از مردم  
فرمود میگردند چهل یک دهیم از مردم مسلمان نیز شکرته باشد

(No. 1149)

No. 176

ماه سنو شانزده

یوم الخامس

از منبر بر کارهای بعضی رسید که در اینجا مسلمانان از  
اسلام این کارهای و ماگویی و نیز به زبان یاد تباری در اینجا رسیده جنگ

واقع شد از اقبال هرت بسیاری را بجهنم رسانیده اری قلعه را آتش داده مقبوران  
تقریباً قلعه بنده و بنیاد قلعه مذکور نیز سبوس شده است و بعد از آن  
مخبره نموده

( ۳۰۸۲-۱۵۰ )

No. 177

... سبوت چنین است که رام راجه برادر بسیار اکابر و نیر بنده ای  
بادشاهی متعینه و جماعت خاندان در پرتاب که سبوس نموده اند اقبال در سال  
بادشاهی ذی قعدة ۱۲۸۰ در پرتاب ۲۸ سبوت سوال شده

( ۳۴۴-۱۵۰-۲۰۰ )

No. 177

ما بحر الحرام ۱۲۸

و ام الحمر  
... در حداثت اکبر ابراهیم مریم مغله به بعد محمد حسن وکیل مجبور آورده  
بخدمت زیب انشا بیگم گذرانیده بعد از آن حضرت از مغله به مطابق استراستفاد  
نموده فرمود که مغله به وکیل ابراهیم باعلی در حضور باشد و شیخ عبداله از  
خرج اسباب برداراند و کلاهی سبوس مقهور که مرضه دانت در باب علاج آورده  
بودند مغله به کرده فرمود که علاج ان مافریجه به شمشیر است دستک  
در پرتاب بسیار است که نزد شاهان خان یادر پرتاب در راه کس مزاحم  
نستود آ باقر در حضور سردار

( ۲۴۶۶-۱۵۰ )

No. 178

ماه دی الحجه ۲۳

۱۶ منب از زمانه گزاره بالعرض رسید که وکیل را انقسم نزد ده لفقار خان بهادر  
آمده بود و خان متار اب وکیل مزبور ترسبک را و متعینه خوج خود را نزد متعینه  
مزبور ترستاد که بیبودی متار این است که ساداتی سند (No. 3129)

No. 179

ماه رمضان ۲۹

A منب عرض داشت نواب ابی جیم حضرت خدمت گاهان بنکر گشت سرور است  
بود که سرکاری لکل فردا بود و آزاد نموده بکین به سبب جریه کس در اجبا آباد  
و آید نموده است در لقرار بهادرانند اسبب از آن جریه به اجبا سلف سند حکم بتدک  
جبره الیگ ... معانی تدبیر (No. 2816)

No. 180

ماه دی الحجه ۲۴

۱۶ منب سادات خان عرض نمود که ما و جی و غیر ترسب یک هزار سه هزار  
نمده موافقات جاگیر عار داندین خان بهادر را تحت کرده بسیاری متاع  
موقوف نمده حکم بتدک ... سید حسین علی خان نایب بهکاس  
نوب که متعینه ان را متعینه سائید (No. 3126)

الحمد لله رب العالمين

4. بوجب امری رسید که جمعیت خیم نواحی بیاد گله و احمد نگر آوردند و در نتیجه  
است محنتی الکلیه بر مردگان نرسد که خطای عباد برای آوردن خزانة خیمه  
بیاد نرسد و که تا زمان در نواحی احمد نگر باشد (3127. 50. 51)

No. 182 DELETED

No. 183

۱. سفر ۲۱۵

۱۱۵

[illegible]

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— 3 —

تکلیف بر من و همی ساخته رسد که خوب نرود و نموده (No. 3138)

7. 185

۳۵

— 21 —

از راه برکات العرش رسید که جمعیت غنیم در تاج شاه درگ آورده بود و کردی  
اینجا را است بهر سال را نورج و توانست کرد ششید خاموش ماندند

(No. 3140)

No. 186

ماه محرم ۲۵

یوم الستاد

۲۳ به راه برکات العرش رسید یاد شایرادی و علم شاه باب یاد کرده جبه  
تنبیه غنیم که جوده بود و بعد . . . چون خبر رسید که سننا اسرار باب ستاره  
گرفته افتد باین است ای و نه

(No. 3141)

No. 187

ماه محرم ۲۵

۲۲ به لمری و رسید که جمعیت غنیم باب گله و بیدری آورده است حکم نه

(No. 3148)

No. 188

ماه محرم ۲۵

یوم الستاد

۲۶ به لمری و برکات العرش و رسید که جمعیت غنیم آورده گری و کندی  
را حاضر بود و رسید محمد شاه دار آجا طالب بود و جمعیت غنیم کتیر بود  
سید محمد را دستگیر نموده اگندی مقرر شدند

(No. 3154)

No. 189

ماه کفر ۲۵

۲۷ لمری و مقدس رسید که جمعیت غنیم اندر رس گده را حاضر



پرنده آورده و در نزد وی سواری نموده مقابل نموده جنگ واقع شده بسیاری بنشینم

سید ... یار دینا ابی ادریس ... دولت آورده و بهر او ارسال شده

رسیده و در محضر نشسته (No. 3159)

No. 192

ماه اربع است ۲۵

لحم الخیر

۵ منب ... اربع ... جنگی ... روح الباطن ... سید ... حاکم ...

... در ... در ... در ... در ... در ...

... در ... در ... در ... در ... در ...

... در ... در ... در ... در ... در ...

... در ... در ... در ... در ... در ...

... در ... در ... در ... در ... در ...

... در ... در ... در ... در ... در ... (No. 3160)

No. 193

ماه اربع است ۲۵

لحم الخیر

... در ... در ... در ... در ... در ...

... در ... در ... در ... در ... در ...

... در ... در ... در ... در ... در ... (No. 3161)



No. 194

سردی قدہ ۳۶

۱۷۱۱ مہاراجہ اراج سوامی درگن حضرت نور قدس داریہ سب در  
 ۱۷۱۲ مہاراجہ مال دکن کرد خضد سب دارن ملک سب بکریہ الیاد  
 دولت تاج در آورده و بدماے او شای بجلت پرسانے تاب و طاقت درارند  
 و مایے لیت برای انجری حدات دارند پاریں برادران سبیزاد با سطور و موزونات  
 بر مہاراجہ گفت و گردش بکینند کہ کجا با درم نیرسد از ہر طرف حقیقت سلا  
 بسج مبارک مقدسی برسد تو میر پرسان کہوان است فی ایہ از آورہ مساد

مسادات سیدستان و شای مقدس سرگزشت است (No. ۷۰۴. ۴۴۲)

No. 195

ماہ شطمان ۳۶

۱۲۲۱ الیاد

۱۲۲۱ مہاراجہ با امری رسید و مردم بیت برادر عماد سردار آلہ رسانیدند  
 ہر الہ سہری برد و شایران سوزان سہ سکران ہی توج و ملی مراد کہ دورا  
 با حدیث نزع تنبیہ خندان افسوس نموده و می ایہ در ہر الہ مقابلہ بیت کردہ است  
 با خندان خاندان نموده سکتہ دادہ تا اہمات رای آورده و در خصی سہ زرا  
 سوار نیم ارک و مہاراجہ آورده با جنگ زندہ سہ سکران علی مراد و نیز مہاراجہ  
 باد شای شریفیہ افستہ ترب بانقد کو سزا باد شای کار آورہ سہم دلہ  
 ندر زندہ جابجہ سہ سکران و سہر و اسباب کم کم زندہ

(No. 3223)



No. 196

۱۵ رمضان ۱۲۸۲

شهره از نوشته حرف سنگخان دارنده توپخانه تعینات رکاب سواران محمد  
عزیز الدین در حق و سید که در دهی یک برج قلعه بر مال کرده زار توپ اندازی شکسته  
گمانه به و قتل کرده که شوق برب ... و شوق ... و شوق ... است

(No. 3228)

No. 197

22 dayol

۸. ملایک خان و درجه جوانان سران بود که آمل شاره محمد خزانین ناصر  
میاید که جمیع هم رسد نظری رسانید و داد بر مال کرده آرد و است و شاره میو  
را عهده داران را سوار اجیر نمود و است سوار کرد و فرود کرد که سبب انکسار بنام  
محمد اعلی خان بود که خود را در سواره بنام و بیکت که یک شاره و جو  
دایر که در رسانید و سر رسید و نیز پنج نفر از سواران این بود که محمد اعلی خان  
در ای روح سران بود و ادراک است و بود و باید

(No. 3237)

No. 198

البرهان

«منه وای که سر راه امری رسید که عیدادی خاک و کمال اسباب و یادی را در هیچ  
گذاشته بود و در هیچ رزق نیامده بود و در هیچ کس نیامده بود و در هیچ  
دگر نیامده بود و در هیچ نیامده بود و در هیچ نیامده بود و در هیچ نیامده بود»

و سه فلجیت تنیه فندان جانب گوارا در قبح نموده در این استاء خاندان  
در بخار سپرد و در گوارا در مدافعی شد و بحجبه تنیه فندان مستعد از اسباب  
عبدالرحمان برادر و نیز بخشی داند و یس و ح محمد ابرین خان را در راه سردا غنیمت حاج

(No. 3241)

No. 199

سپهر سوال ۳۴

۱۳ تنیه . . . . . بهمت قلعه پیراله ستاد میر مفسدان با جدیت کثیر  
از طرف جغی آید آگاه شده اند و شایسته است که از طرف البه خان حاضر قلعه  
بود تردد میکنند و قلیل است از حضور میرزا در خانه واد خان سپهر روح البه خان  
سرمه و آیین تردد و عاری از این خان هم به پیراله عوار و رفت به ناسم خان و جبار اراک  
حکم رند که خود را به پیراله رساند به خان جان یاد و سفر جنگ که نزدیک خجسته بناد

(No. 72. 822)

رسیده حکم رند که بیان راه خود را به قلعه پیراله رساند

شماره ۱۳ سپهر سوال ۳۴

No. 200

ماه نظامان ۳۶

فره منبه موجب نوشته میدی قلعه دار فوجدار سنه ۱۱۹۰ و امر من برسد که جمعیت فیم  
و ای مدد و پرامن آمده سر بساد در داشت اگر کم شده و مایب در آگاه است  
مفسدان و در راتبه رسانم حکم رند جسی الکک از طرف خان به صوبه دار صادر  
بر سه که حسن دلی بهر خود را به جمعیت از تنیه فندان بر سر شده

لواء الیه  
۵۸ منبر از دافقه زوج شاهزاده محمد عزالدین اعرجی رسید که قلعه دار  
دیوگره بخیر مت شاهزاده جوهره داشته که صحبت کنیم در توانی تمام آورد  
نت دارد در قلعه دخیل است حکم شد ماطل خان مان سلطان سرانجام در  
(No. 3209)

No. 201

ماه شعبان ۳۴

لواء الیه  
۲۲ منبر از نرسه مهرمت خان آجینات زوج شاهزاده محمد عزالدین اعرجی رسید که  
بردم نیم تمام نده را صحبت پرستی کرده مباد بود نشند میجواید که وقت برای  
سوار در ستاده گو مک قلعه پیراله باید حکم شد که حمید الدین خان طاهر شد  
و خلعت میفرام و بهر منده خان زوج پیرا ماند در دیار باید  
(No. 3217)

No. 202

ماه شعبان العظمی ۳۴

۲۸ منبر برای برکاره اعرجی رسید که جمعیت کنیم قریب بزرگ سواره پیاده از  
کو مباد بر سرانے تاخت ملک بار شای در توانی بهر آمده اند حکم نده که حسب  
الحکم به آتش خان قوجر را بنجا برسد که سفیدان زنب باید  
(No. 3225)

No. 203

ماه شعبان ۳۴

لواء الیه  
۲۵ منبر حمید الدین خان راجعت خاله انعام داده خان نیت خیر داده  
نیم سفیدان عاب مروج بعد در بزرگ باله سوار و خلعت فرمودند  
(No. 3221)

No. 204

ماه رمضان ۱۲۴۰

عزیز منیر را به بر کاره معرفی رسید که جمعیت نسیم در آل بنگی آمده سران  
و گمان است که علی که بجهت ترش گاه و قهیه دانسته و در این باره گرفته بود  
( No. 3228 )

No. 205

ماه دی الحجه ۱۲۴۰

۱۲۴۱

۱۲۴۱ بر آن بر کاره معرفی رسید که انور خان نمانه دار که در پور تعینات زوج  
شماره حرا این خبر یافته جمعیت نسیم را می گوید و آورده بایران حاکم کور  
از تعیناتی برواست به تعلقه خود رسید، چنانچه شماره ۱۲۴۱ جمیع در برادر سرد  
حاکم کور مرستاده که در تعینات اینجا بود و کار اداری داشته چنانچه

( No. 3257 )

No. 206

ماه دی الحجه ۱۲۴۰

۱۲۴۱ به او نامه عرض نمود که نسیم را به بر کاره ای طرف بیدای بادشاهی  
نام نسیم حکم نموده چنانچه برایت اله و از تربیت خان مرحوم و محمد ظاهر  
و از نظرات خان مرحوم و محمد حسین نامه دان تربیت خان مرحوم نسیم دستگیر نموده  
بروز نسیم حکم کرد و به بر کاره ای به بیدای بادشاهی طرف نموده اگر در نزد  
خدا می ماند چنانچه در بر کاره ای به بیدای بادشاهی طرف نسیم دستگیر نموده و سایر  
محمد حسین را در اینجا مرستاده

( No. 3261 )

No 207

۱۵۵۲۰۷  
۱۲۱۲۱۲۱۲۱۲۱۲

۲۲۔ ملت خان جادو پیر خان میان بیاد رانہ رحمت یک راسی اپ  
 طبری سہ ہر نزدیک تہہ شمشیر اعظم دارنیت خیرات حواریہ زکے  
 تہہ نبی ان جانب دارنہ رحمت نوادہ حواریہ کہ ارسا نے تاکاے  
 (No. 3275)

میرود بسبب برام راج مقدس که از مساجد مقدسات دکنی از سرور انجمن نادره بسج  
 باد و بر سر انجمن نادره و وحشی امداد شده و دست در حق جواب هر دو که  
 اندک ازت را به دهر و توبه میدهند در میان آمدن و اجر بر حاجت و آن لشکر با  
 ی آید که امروز خبر گذشت که با یک کاک که در ابادی به خزانه پادشاهی رسید  
 از نوع انعام و امداد در قمر نوشته جلی در اب و ابتر شده و اعداد  
 شده و شک کردن شاه بر سر امداد الشری نویسنده که در انجمن و خبر و آید  
 نسبت که یک رسد به کس خود میباید و اما بهی خبر برود و حق و امداد دست میرود  
 اگر امداد داشته شود خبر داده اعداد از چهار ضرب بسیار است (No. 466)

No 210 DELETED

No. 211

۱۵۱ به اسامی ۲۸

۲۸ به لغوی رسید که جمعیت ختم بهیم طرف ملوک آزاره شده حکم شد که  
 محمود خان ... خجسته بیاد و موهی خان و حیدر خان و حیدر خان و حیدر خان و حیدر خان  
 بوی که به اتفاق بدیدر فدان را تپه بایه  
 به سیادت خان حکم شد که به سیادت خان بایه که بهیم بهیم طرف  
 ملوک آزاره شده است تپه بایه  
 (No. 3168)



No. 212

ماه دی حجه ۳۶

يوم السبت

۲۷ منبه در خانه است بپیش نشاندن آن آینه بپیش از آنکه سر و قد آنست بود که ز روی  
استماع یافته که محمد بن علی خان حیدر ج. مایلر پاید بیده بیده بر سره طریقه ای  
نزدن ساند و در آینه شده بود و انشاء را به مردم نیم آورده مقابل کرده است و است  
مطلبه برای ساند و دیگر آورده یک زخم باله روی سزانه مفسد آن گرفته است  
(No. 3187)

No. 213

ماه ربیع الاول ۳۶

يوم الثلاثاء

۲۸ منبه به سیادت خان رسیده که مر حشام ایی گرز در آنکه مرصه است فاسم خان  
در جواب در آن آورده بود و حقایق غنیمت را در اسفند ماه به فاسم خان تعارف غنیم  
کی رسیده خانه که بوجب کم اگر سردار شوقی بوده و آخری رسانیده که فاسم خان  
تعارف غنیمت موع سلیقه رسیده و دستا مقبول و دنیا میلان و غیره مردم غنیمت  
نوامی قادی کوی که ساند الم ساند دکنه است و در سینه آن وامی گدگ و غیره  
سجانه که در سالی نند نه  
(No. 3196)

No. 214

ماه ربیع الاول ۳۶

يوم الاربعاء

۲۹ منبه ا. دانه روح عاری از من خان چادر لغز رسیده که خان فیروز جنگ غنیم  
را تنبیه کرده و که بخیر کرده و داد و ترس دارد و آورده حکم کند که سجانه دور  
سویب که قاضی دار حشر نماید  
(No. 3198)





~ 1152

جان سار و دستم دل جان در دست ناله نمودن سا سراده قمریانه بی طاعت را جانت

دادن و کتاب رساندن و در خدمت بود و دستم را خطاب از خدمت داد و به حیدر آباد

خط ۱۲۰

(No. 3341)

No 218

۱۷۷۵ دی محمد شمس

— 17 —

۸ عند ۱۰۰۰ جود د القادخان باد بر سر کسکه سنه ۱۰۰۰ جاب چنماور

مرکز و جان پادشاهی استماع شتافته خانه جنگ دادند بسیاری از معدن

دینور پانندہ سکت دادہ

No. 219

انسان و المکر و نیر

و بعد از آن که در این ایام به جهت کار آمدن بعضی مردم مرصع است

طریق را در سال دوازدهم و در شهر اصفهان در روز شنبه

کرامت و کرم از حد و بند گذر به جنبه خالص در خارج میگذرد تا به عالم غایب و راجع حکم

و این است که در نزد خداوند است و این است که در نزد خداوند است

بوده و چون در آن سال که این امر کراوات صادر شد دادند

۱۔ انصارِ حضرت بیداری نقل رسالہ و جمعی را مسجد کے دروازے پر لگا دینا اور

منتخب کتابت سرنگه انفاراسریه مجبورستانه (No. 3421)

No 220

لا اله الا الله

١٥١

24

فہرست

[illegible]

70 221

۱۵۰ سال

بهر دستب، راسه بزرگ، امرضی رسیده که درین ایام تناسله دارگشتن آاد  
 از جنور، دخت تنده متعلق خدمت میرت گزیده است کرده، ای طرف تناسله بزرگ  
 رسیده، تریب چهاربرایسه از دودان درین نواح آورده شده، حایله کور و مقابل آورده  
 جنگ کشته برای واقعه نه حایله کور، گردیده ضرب گشته، عیدوق در محل کاکامای  
 نری حایله کور رسیده، اکثر تا بیان حایله کور، گاه آورده و بسیاری با سحران  
 جیم، اصل ساحت عیدان شکست خورده و در سراسر بلاد (3633)

No. 222.

ماہنامہ

[illegible][illegible]

جنگ برافروخته دود خم شمشیر و بال برافروخته قاتل را سید است نه لب مادی گراننده  
افشاید مال السحان فراسه را را برادر خود دروغ سبب گماز گشته است سنا و سینه  
ویرانه برادر سوار دندان را که ستر مادی را تاخته سینه گدی را سوار نموده  
دندان خوب نشسته نموده بجایه نفر را آتش دهنده نفر را خمی گزده کجده را سینه پ  
مادی و نفر را گزده است هم تو که دل و پنهان در جیل برادر را سوار نموده

(No. 3645)

70223

طه رمان ۱۵۱

۱۲۰

الامير اعز من الله وسموكم كثر من انحاء مامت صومداران عاده يانافذ در الامات  
لا و بسبب بنوش دندان پيتر ايش لي تو از كم رزاق احوال قافل و اب نجو به  
بياد سائيد نايه و با حلقه و چار و دي بسا رعه قار و داد خان و بجه سنگ  
پيتر سال و كور و سالان تران حيره او معاه كيه سوار و ران امرالتر و بجا  
سوار كور و سر و ران امير و امير

No. 224

151 151

2112

درم الاضحه  
 ۱۰ این امری است که جمیع درون تریب در برابر سوار جانب نیاید که اندر  
 آورده شود ششم نیز حال ابلت بعد از آنکه در برابر ابلت و اندر سوار  
 درون را بچشم رسانیده و نمی تواند اندر درون تریب سوار و بالنت مرور  
 جمیع دلیل بود تریب شست سوار سوار سوار سوار سوار سوار  
 (No. 364)

اه دستان ششم

۱۲۱۰ هـ

دانشه بموجب نوشته برادره شعیبه برانپور و عرض رسید که سیاح بیک جویش  
 از اسباب جان مردم از سرگشته نیست جاگیر خود را برانپوری دارد استغفار که  
 دانی برانپور مینداند و نوی البه را که از روی دات و کارد سوار طلب است و سقیر  
 کرده اسبان و شتران و غیره متاع او را تاج کرده براند  
 (No. 3656)

۱۲۱۱ هـ

دانشه بموجب نوشته برادره شعیبه برانپور و عرض رسید که سیاح بیک جویش  
 از اسباب جان مردم که از روی بیک سوار شعیبه است از سرگشته نیست و حال جاگیر خود  
 برانپوری دارد و حال برین مالیه عظیم سقیر کرده برده بود و برین مالیه البه  
 از قریه عظیم طاق شده برانپور را آور  
 (No. 3684)

No. 226

اه دستان ششم

۱۲۱۲ هـ

دانشه بموجب نوشته برادره دارالظفر بیجاپور و عرض رسید که درگاه شاهی  
 بنایه را از منور اشیخ سوار داده بیاده به سوخ و انپوری دست دراز و درگاه سوار  
 در درخت سوار بیاده رکت و اسبان و اسلحه و کفنرا باکی براند  
 (No. 3658)

No. 227

اه دستان ششم

۱۲۱۳ هـ

دانشه بموجب نوشته برادره شعیبه شعیبه بیاد امری رسید که بده به منور و خان  
 حادسی انجا خبر رسانیده که بر سر پوسله و غیره پنج هزار سوار اسراران

داد مثال این را حاضر کرده تا اگر یک سال تا دو سال دیگر  
 سال مندراب حجت بر او حق حاضر و تنبیه و زندان و ایدون خزان که از بدست  
 و آید و به ماری این خان و محمد شفق و حافظ سعد خان بیج خان را  
 نزد محاکمات بزرگداشت (No. 3646)

No 228.

ماه رمضان ۱۲۸۵

یوم النحر

۱۲۸۵ درانی بزرگوار حجت سیاد امری رسید که تا از انبار انشور  
 ندر و در محل وضع را بنجین رسید و در آنجا در تاریخ بوده بود (No. 3653)

No 229

ماه رمضان ۱۲۸۵

یوم النحر

۱۲۸۵ یوم النحر است بزرگوار و بران بود امری رسید که بر سر سوله و نیز در آن  
 بزرگوار است و حجت سیاد امری در آنجا بر سر سوله و نیز در آنجا  
 فراموش بود بگاله را در آنجا است حجت سیاد امری در آنجا است محاکمات  
 در آنجا است و در آنجا است که امری در آنجا است و در آنجا است  
 تنبیه و زندان بود و در آنجا است حجت سیاد امری در آنجا است  
 در آنجا است (No. 3655)

No. 230

ماه سنوار ۱۲۸۵

۱۲۸۵ در آنجا است حجت سیاد امری در آنجا است و در آنجا است

اراد انانی سمیت پند و سورت دارند خائز و در حال انزاف می اندازد

(No. 3708)

خلاصہ نمودن جامعہ آملہ

No. 231

ماہ ستمبر ۱۵۸۵ء

۱۲۱

[illegible]

باز در میان مردم نزدیک بود. حجت باید آوارا شده بود نه خواهم قل خان

وہو اسم سعید خان دہر محمد پشترہ دادہ کے قیامت نادر دہرہ پشترہ

دود گویا، چشم کبیر، فرستاده، محرر، سافه، استاد اسپ، اسلحه و الله

مقامی و ذہنی سکھ اسرار و اکریت گراں تہ دربار آمدن و دارالاسان خان

مستار السهم بالسرور و فرحگاه آورند و خنده اثر افکند و در غنای مملو و انباشته

شماره ۳۶۶۹ (۳۶۶۹)

No. 232

۱۰۰ هزار ۱۵۰

مجلس

۲۶۔ ادارے سوانح دار (اسرار ہرانیہ) حضرت علیؓ کے سنا اربعہ (الربیع)

دردان دست از محاصره قلعه را برپا داشته بجانب موضع جاک دری

دارنده بودند بهجات خان اعظم سنانه سیار را از مقبوران داخل حرم

دو حی زده سراسر بار ای که در دین سخن مرا که هر چه بپوشد و نبرد

سے برادر دادک اک شفاء، ترار ہے چوتھ مرغ نگاری بل پرگ



المیتر گزیده در بزرگ بنار (سوال) آداب بده (آداب ستی بر آداب یابد  
باز آن بجای حاکم است بده سرور دانه ستی آداب بده بر آداب

(No. 3696)

No. 233

ماه سوال

یوم الفجر

۲۳ مه یوب بخت بر آداب (سوال) آداب بده (آداب ستی بر آداب یابد  
بخت بر آداب بده در آداب آداب بده (آداب ستی بر آداب یابد  
خود را شناخت در آن گزیده آداب بده (آداب ستی بر آداب یابد  
باز آن بخت بر آداب بده (آداب ستی بر آداب یابد

(No. 3698)

No. 234

ماه سوال

یوم الثالث

۲۴ مه یوب بخت بر آداب (سوال) آداب بده (آداب ستی بر آداب یابد  
سوار در آداب بخت بر آداب (آداب ستی بر آداب یابد  
بخت بر آداب بخت بر آداب (آداب ستی بر آداب یابد  
بخت بر آداب بخت بر آداب (آداب ستی بر آداب یابد  
بخت بر آداب بخت بر آداب (آداب ستی بر آداب یابد  
بخت بر آداب بخت بر آداب (آداب ستی بر آداب یابد  
بخت بر آداب بخت بر آداب (آداب ستی بر آداب یابد

(No. 3687)

بخت بر آداب بخت بر آداب (آداب ستی بر آداب یابد

No. 235

ماه رمضان ۱۵۸۵

يوم الخميس

۱۸۴۰ بهار و بهار است سر راه طایفه سنگل بیهو عرض رسید که دنیا مادی و دنیاوی  
برایا و خیر و دران در جنگل در طول و عرض که برده فرود آورده است و خان  
نصرت جنگ بزرگ تیره ایسا بقا داده کرده رسید و دران میخواهند که به  
خود را در آورده و هر یک ستون

(No. 3653)

No. 236

ماه سنوال ۱۵۸۵

يوم السبت

۱۸۴۰ بهار و بهار است دو لقا خان بهار نصرت جنگ عرض رسید که دنیا مادی و دنیاوی  
بگاه راد و قاده و انظر بجا بود که است تبعات دنیا مادی و اسرار بود  
بنا بجهت حکم خود که بگاه و برده در تاد بگیرد و منظور بود حکم خود بود  
(No. 3680)

No. 237

ماه سنوال ۱۵۸۵

۲۹ بهار و بهار است حاکم و حاکم که از قاده و سنگل خبر آوردند که ۲۹ سوال ۱۵۸۵

دینا مادی و بهار و بهار است دو لقا خان بهار نصرت جنگ است

کوک که در بود و بهار و بهار است حاکم و حاکم که از قاده و سنگل خبر آوردند که ۲۹ سوال ۱۵۸۵

(No. 3706)

No. 238

ماه سنوال ۱۵۸۵

يوم الاحد

۱۸۴۰ بهار و بهار است حاکم و حاکم که از قاده و سنگل خبر آوردند که ۲۹ سوال ۱۵۸۵



تربت خان بهادر رسانیده معاودت کرده بنسب سیر حال به پیرینده رسید به جعفر  
 بر روی ایبه و نسیب به برادر سوار داد که موضع گایا پور محل برگنه اوسه داک سحاره  
 دانت ادر رسیدن ساندو به سحاره موضع بود که گدانت گرنجیت استند  
 (No. 3682)

No. 239

ماه شوال ۱۲۵۸

یوم الاربعه

۱۲۵۸ حسب الحکم دار بهر طایف البهتان بنام تربت خان بهادر صادر نموده  
 حاله البه یار گرز سوار کرده ملوک وک در دان قاده میرک تعلقه صوبه دار الجباد  
 حیدر آباد را سحاره نموده رسته در دان را تنبیه بسانه  
 (No. 3686)

No. 240

ماه دی قعد ۱۲۵۸

یوم الاحد

۱۲۵۸ راسه حاکم سمان متعنه بنابه داگانه ارض رسید که تربت خان بهادر  
 درو برای بنام سوار از طرف بهادر گره آورده بر موضع پیل گانه دکر و بنام  
 که تعلقه بنامه داری امان البهتان و فوجداری اعتبار خان فوجدار جوئیر است  
 اداره رده چوتنه تحصیل سکینه در بنامه میر پور چهار سوار از امان البهتان و  
 یک سوار از طرف فوجدار جوئیر میباشد که بنامه منزل در ایجا باشد است محافظت  
 دیات ان منع میشود حکم شد امان البهتان بنامه را تمام نماید  
 (No. 3702)

۲۹ به زمانه جان که از قلم رنگینا خبر آورد که ۲۰ سنوال ۱۵۸۰

فرس مادی بر آن دیون بود خود که در قلم سه رنگ بیان داشت  
 دیون به قلم رنگینا آمد بهر را با چینی به بهرام دشتو گشت که در کوالا پور  
 تیاره خود را شانزده افتند بفعل خوب نسبت رفتی که به گمان حضرت ا. ا. ب. نگر  
 به فحشه سیار تشریف میفرمایند به قلم را به یکبار در حوام گشت  
 (No. 3706)

۱۲۰۰ حسب الحکم به کار طلب خان مقدس است برین مکتوب حاد و نه ده که سدی  
 سنبل سیر جاره یات خان سدی مری که کر سببا عتور لجه چله پنج نفر  
 دستگیر نمودن سدی مری رخمی است بر آن سرست شود حضور بفرست  
 وار بر بیان او که سلطان بهشت بجان بکشد و کر سر پندوان اگر سلطان  
 شود در قیدگاه دارند و آنرا را نیز بکشد بجان آقاری که با عید بزرگی  
 از دیار دهم آمده است محکوم جمعیت خود را آن حضور نمایند  
 (No. 2064)

برائے جاسوسان داندہ ۲۱ رمضان ۱۲۶۷

بنجاء نذر بیلداران مرستاده محمد ابن خان و سبب نذر ذکر رانہ جسنگ  
از سنگ و چوب و کل بیابہ سافہ چو کے راجپوت بیابہ تاہم شدہ از آنجا یک  
مورچال بزرگ کے دروازہ کہ چشم اب و مال است و یک مورچال بجانب برج  
در دروازہ کہ کرکی بندہ است و چل پیارہ انقیاد بچو کے انجای باشند بہ پیش  
ی نذر

راجہ جس سنگ قاری مابعد کہ نزد من سرانجام سرب و بادست قابل است  
از دی و در انقیاد است از گردن بند و قیاز داشتہ متعل سفلی و برج  
لحد سنگ جمع کی کنند و سر چو کے راجپوت بیابہ سنگی اندازند

بیابہ باغ غنیم از کہ کے دروازہ بفاصلہ یک تیر از بنجر ازین واقع شدہ  
ان طاف کو چہ سدرت کی کنند باہتمال این کہ تاید کے از راجپوت بیابہ  
بطرف دروازہ کے بیابہ بیابہ نہ تواند از

از مورچال محمد ابن خان بموجب ذیل نوشتہ اند  
از مورچال بوج معلومہ دیوار احاطہ کرتا کہینا دہ دیوار دہ دیوار  
شیدی نذر فرستادہ یاقوت خان ایک نذر پیارہ از بوج محمد ابن خان

لفات یک بان مرد آفرہ

No. 244

۲۴

نعل بری دگداز از سر کرده بخموش از دس فرستاده اند

دہ از دم ۱۲ سوال سیکھ راجہ جے سنگھ رے دیوں مورچال خود  
آکر بہہ سنگھ ہر دیاں راجہ با خود گزرتے تارن مایے مورچال دفن ہو درین  
ضلع ک گئے بہہ وی اور راجہ بہہ تفاوت سرزمین استادہ بخیر گدمنت  
وراجہ مرید راجہ ملاحظہ پیش است

بوده سنگ بردار راجه جسے سنگ پورس بودہ سنگ جو کہ پیادہ یا  
غنیم را از بیرون فادادہ بر داشتند نفس افز را جیو تیا ضرب کوئے زخمی  
شدند بدلی یک جو کہ پیادہ یا غنیم بیرون کو کہنے در دہارہ است  
بودہ سنگ کی گوشت کہ بیگام نرود و حال افتائے است و سرب و مارت  
و نیز سالہ جنگی تا سال نہ رسیدہ

۱۳۱ اثر مذکور شد  
دودہ سنگ ہر دین را بچے سنگ از جاسے گیر  
بیادہ غیم را زودہ برداشتہ دودہ در انجا بیت و پنج کنگہ بیادہ چوکی دودہ  
نام دودہ و بہتی سنگ نام را با پنجہ سوار و بیت و پنج سنگ بیادہ در  
درہ کہ کہ پیشا بکتس بنادہ دودہ ک شاہد کہ از بیادہ ما غیم بدر آورد  
سنگ تبارت

۱۳. چو که بیمار، غنیم منزل کوکت در راه و پای قلعه نشسته برق اندازی  
یکنزد و راجپوتیا به نیز بر آید برق اندازی می نماید چنانچه بیگم قائم نمودن لشکر  
و ده سوار بادشاهی پشت نیز بسیاره راجپوتیا به و ضرب سنگ مجروح زند

از آن جلالت نظر و فهمی بر ببرد دارد

۱۱۰ سیمه این خان بجه جغتیه خان و سعاد خان و نیزه و جغتیه و سعاد  
 کاتر کینا بودش نموده پیاده باغیم را از اینجا ... برانست دیوار قدیم و جبر  
 و ابدیت خود گرفتند و ... پیاده نیم ... پیاده نیم بجزیمیت  
 داشته شانه بسیاری را کت و زخمی نموده تاریری راه الله و پیاده باغیم  
 و فادگریمه زنده و خان سوی الله بهمان از اینجا سوادت کرده به فادگریمه و نیم  
 ایلر خندق چوک قائم نموده و کرده کاتر کینا لشکر و بار را خود آورده  
 از مردم و جغتیه و سعاد و جغتیه و سعاد و جغتیه و سعاد و جغتیه و سعاد  
 (۳۴۴۳ - ۸۵)

No. 245

نقل مری و گداز و سعاد و جغتیه و سعاد و جغتیه و سعاد و جغتیه و سعاد

۱۱۱ سیمه این خان بجه جغتیه خان و سعاد خان و نیزه و جغتیه و سعاد  
 کاتر کینا بودش نموده پیاده باغیم را از اینجا ... برانست دیوار قدیم و جبر  
 و ابدیت خود گرفتند و ... پیاده نیم ... پیاده نیم بجزیمیت  
 داشته شانه بسیاری را کت و زخمی نموده تاریری راه الله و پیاده باغیم  
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 ایلر خندق چوک قائم نموده و کرده کاتر کینا لشکر و بار را خود آورده  
 از مردم و جغتیه و سعاد و جغتیه و سعاد و جغتیه و سعاد و جغتیه و سعاد  
 (۳۴۴۳ - ۸۵)

بیلد مادی و ضرب و کس  
 بیلد مادی و ضرب و کس  
 بیلد مادی و ضرب و کس  
 بیلد مادی و ضرب و کس

۲۱. خط سنگ نام جمعیت دار وادجی سنگی بزرگ برقی برهنه بر جال جانے ہا  
ی کرد ضرب دے بندوق بکار آورده برآں روپ را ستایت بود و سرک سنگ

بسیار است  
در محلی نند  
از دگران راج  
بیلہ اراں از دگران راج  
نفر

یکہ سردار راجپوت از دگران راج از وطن آموزد در راجہ را دیدند

۲۲ سنوار ۴۹ شکر (سنگ)

معرفی رسید جواب نند  
سراج رکاب ستا برادہ محمد بیدار سمیت یار رسید افتاد خان اشترال سنگ  
توب نفیری کری کردی رسید تبغ سنگ جمالتہ دار دگران راج بے سنگ  
د. م. جال سکاد احمد

۲۳ سنوار ۴۹ شکر بہ یار علی بیگ حکم الہ رسید بہ سیدی منبر مرستادہ  
یا قوت خان کہ اس طرف قلعہ کلبا سراد اسیر کردن جمعہ در لہ سرگرم است  
بنویسد از قرار واقع شب در روز خبردار باشد کہ بر شقی از قلعہ کلبا بہر  
نہ تواند رفت بعد شکست  
(No. 3444)

No. 246

لوتہ سرکارہ بگا ۲۳ سنوار ۴۶ شکر جاسر سان خادی اندین خات بیادہ نرود جنگ  
خبر آید در کہ با سہ یوسا کہ چہن گیر با ازہ مقبور ملحق نندہ گفت پیدا  
نقی دیات اخلاق مرا بقدری متصرف شدہ و مدھی ستانیدہ چنانچہ دانو موضع سیتی  
گرا لعل پیدا نقی را محاصره داشت جبک تیر فشک در میان بود ستانیدہ الحال



دار بستر سید (سنتا) جنبی به تیر تندر داخل جہنم رفت  
را کے مرض رفت

سراج نگار شہزادہ دارالامتیاز بیدار سجت بہادر ۲۸ سترال شکستہ  
کسان بردی مان در قلعہ آنتہ بود روز درینوار حسب الطلب بہر ساقی بخت  
زخیرہ بقلعہ رفت  
(Regis. No. 553)

No. 247

بزبانے جاسوسان بتابع ۲۷ ستر سترال شکستہ  
یک نفر جاسوسان از روح رانہ جسے سنگ آتہ ظاہر بود کہ موت شب  
دیسر کسان از ہر دہانہ کوہ حواجز آتہ چنانچہ تمام شب جاسوسان مذکور در روح  
ماندہ بھی باز نہ قلعہ رفت و ادوی از قلعہ سائر  
یک نفر و بیکار و دیو کہ و سنگیر بایک کس دیگر مرستادہ سردار خان کہ  
بقلعہ فرستند چون بیگم شب بطرف درہارہ و ہر چار راہ شانتند بھی  
بقلعہ رفتند

سراج نگار شہزادہ محمد بیدار سجت بہادر ۲۶ سترال شکستہ امروز  
دیسر نفر مرستادہ سردار خان بقلعہ رفتند  
(No. 3428)

No. 248

نقل مرض سراج ۲۸ سترال شکستہ  
مقالہ خاص در آتہ  
زمانے بہر با جاسوس تابع و کلت ہر کار کار پانزدہ روزہ از قلعہ آتہ  
مرستادہ بود ہوی الیہ ظاہری مایہ کہ بہ کنوان رعد داران بایک نفر و سیدار  
قوم رعد دار قلعہ کسین رفت تا پانزدہ روزہ مانده ۲۷ مہار قلعہ ہر آتہ

یاد می آید و سبب حقیقت قلعه شرح دلیل است -

برای نقد ادوات و مهر بر  
مردم قلعه نام گذر نگذشت که تا حال از  
از قلعه دور است خبر نرسیده  
چنین شده و تریب بکند پناه افروخته و دیده  
بر سبب سببه انداز بر این  
دیر می شود تراشیده

در قلعه دخیل و از سرب و ارب  
قرب کپزار پیاده جنگی و تریب بر پا دارد پیاده سوار  
مسی که بر پیاده های جنگی بر حرف که در صفتی  
داشتند و گفته شده و وفات سپاهیان و بر سبب  
خود نیز خبر داری باشد و از ایامی ده

تاریخ  
تاریخ  
تاریخ  
تاریخ  
تاریخ

بر سبب فنی و دوری که در این مرتبه بندگان حضرت  
ترا دادند که بواسطت رکس و حاشیه فنی منقول  
شده قول داده بر آید تا به پشت که همین پیاده  
نظر بر حال فتح اربعان پیاده  
در سبب قلعه و گفته جنگی مانده از این خبر اسام  
یکی بر سر سبب و گفته از  
چ قلعه تا حال و اف نده اند  
بر آورده منجمله خود هم بر آوردن مایان بر سبب فنی  
در آید از راه اسن حواش کرد حواش گفت

دقت داشته پس از آنجا جایی به پسران سبب که در پیان جاده و در سبب



دنیو با بزرگ کوک ی ایله دراف پسرنا جینی بیاره بازارا می ی ایله تمام استقلیل  
 و اردست نوده جنگ از قرار واقع بکیر جانچه سیدی یاقوت خان نیز سا  
 دشت بود که این قلعه را اردست بیاره داد  
 (No. 3429)

No. 249

دایه جو اسس مازم سرکار دافعه ۶ دی قده شکره  
 از مازجال راجه جے سنگد خبر آوردند دی شب مازجال راجه جے سنگد  
 ده درجه کو جے سلامت پشتر دشت تہ فزیر برقی دفری برب وے زخمی تہ  
 دشت شب قریب بنجا بیاده دزدان از قلعه برآوردہ برای دے  
 استاد بودند ان جلد کسر نزدیک مازجال راجه جے سنگد نہ برودی آورد  
 مردم راجه آبارا گرفتہ لمونوت کتہ دزدین دشت زدند  
 بنارنج تہ بیارہ دے دزدان بگام تبست خریطہ بارت از ہم سالہ  
 تہ آوردہ اریان مازجال راجه جے سنگد گشتہ تہ تہ رفتند چہ کسر  
 راجه آبارا ناندک دربارہ رسانیدہ بار آوردند دفریطہ بارت از بیارہ دے  
 دزدان پشتر مازجال راجه استاد بودند بنارنج ہم بھی مردم مازجال خریطہ بے  
 برآشتہ آوردند  
 مردمان راجه جے سنگد خط مستار اہ نزدیک پشتر تقی اندرون قلعه میراند  
 پشتر تقی مردمان راجه را بنجا دے ہیم العام دادہ حاسوسان پشتر تقی نزدیک راجه  
 ی ایله دشت روزی بایشہ راجه کو آبارا بزرگ خوردن مردہ ہما ہوں

(No. 3430)

امیر دوست دارنده

No. 250

سراج رباب شاهزاده محمد بیار بخت بیار بطالعه حاکم در آید  
 ۸ دی قعه ۲۶ بماتت سر دیموگ منظر آباد و نیز در قاهره است  
 بمطالعه حاکم در آید

در دست دکت سرکاره نور جمال فتح الله خان بیار ۸ دی قعه ۲۶  
 فتح الله خان بیار بگرام ب  
 تربیت خان توب تیروان رارساییده  
 کن پیرنگ گذارسته به دیره امیر الدمرارفته  
 از انجا به دیره خود رفته

(No. Registe. No. 557)

بخت نذر در نور جمال رخمی شده

No. 251

مطالعه حاکم در آید  
 سراج رباب شاهزاده محمد بیار بخت بیار سرسله اعتماد خان  
 ۸ دی قعه ۲۶ (۲۶) بماتت  
 (۸) سر اسرار خان رادر خلوت  
 طالبیه بودند سراج نذر که حسب الامر  
 مایع بماتت بماتت از دیموگ که در  
 یاز به قعله کلین ترشاد  
 دفته بودند بار آید

عرض سیر جواب نش

بمطالعه حاکم در آید

فمنه ذلت كراوه مورچال فتح الله خان بباد ۱۰ دی قعد ۱۲۶۷

دیروز یک دایه طیار شده

خزینت دایه و دیوانه متحان کار با کتایل شرح قلعه ی

کجا د و خوال گردنه سازنه سوجل سانه

۳. فردوس جال و فی سده

(No. Registe. No. 559)

N. 252

A

حاجی خان کو بہادر چھوڑا اور چال راہ جے سندھ پر آو دیندہ ہم دی قعدہ ۶۷

لودہ سنگ ہر دیاں راب جے سنگ دوارہ درہ سر چال رابیں پردہ پنج

۶۱-۱۰۰

تختہ مائے چرے را از مو، چال را ب سردان سازد، باد را در مو، چال

جہاں سے

سماں بیلہ ران بادشاہی بھڑبھڑے سنگ زدنہ ایں

جلد کی نظر مرقہ است

(No. 3431)

No. 253

۱۰ دی نعدہ (۲۹) بمطالعہ حاکمی در ایہ

رائے حاکمان اداۃ قدرہ (۴۹) (۴۶)

ماد بوسه سلام تقی ۹ دی قمره ۱۴۰۵ بهجاء پاره بره

(دیریا) در قلعه دشت

یک نفر، نادر دوده، نفر جاسوس بنونت، ریزدار، یک نفر چوبدار، سرانرا، خان  
براه، مورچال، راجه، بنه سنگ (م) شب، د. قلعه، کلبه، افته، بود، ز. شب، ۹ شب  
۱۱. قلعه، برآمره، بار، سر، مورچال، راجه، سر، برآمره، به، برده، سنگ، پینکار، راجه، قاسم  
کرد، که، پیر، سنی، میر، بنی، مذهب، خود، سنگ، لک، اد، پیه، نقد، و، ضرب، برای، پسر، خود  
میخواه، بر، سنگ، سر، خود، مردم، خود، مره، داده، نزد، سرانرا، خان، مرستاد  
۱۱. دی، قلعه، سنگ، (۴۶) (۴۶) بمطالع، حال، د. ای،

سراج، رکاب، شایر، ده، محمد، بید، محبت، بار، زادی، قلعه، سنگ،

سرانرا، خان، راد، خلوت، دلیر،  
۱۱. دی، قلعه، سنگ، (۴۶) (۴۶) بمطالع، حال، د. ای،  
۱۱. دی، قلعه، سنگ، (۴۶) (۴۶) بمطالع، حال، د. ای،

(۳۶۰۳۴۳۲)

دشت، عبدالحسن، برکاره

No. 254

۱۱. دی، قلعه، سنگ، (۴۶) (۴۶) بمطالع، حال، د. ای،

بنونت، و، نکت، برکاره، مورچال، فتح، ابن، خان، سجاد، ۱۱. دی، قلعه، سنگ، (۴۶) (۴۶)  
بیگم، ب. سنو، کجاده، و، بوار، د. پیر، مهر، د. ز. افته، ۳. د. به، دیوار، بیگم، کرد  
کستوری، برای، و، پسر، و، نکت، نزد، فتح، ابن، خان، بیاد، آمره، سر، زنی، کرد

خان ببادر انبارا امیرا غنیم خان نزد امیرا امرا فرستاد بعد از آن غنیم خان انبارا  
 گرفت نزد امیرا امرا برده سرخوشی با امیرا امرا میگروه انبارا اخصت نموده به  
 مور جال آمد  
 نقل خط انور از نوشته استاد خان ظاہر نمند  
 زمانے جاسوسان ۱۴۵۱ قعدہ ۳۶۹ (۳۶۹) قریب کیکہ و پنجاب پیاده  
 سیدی عنبر بابت یاقوت خان شافعی به بهیت کہہ تعلقہ مظاہر دشتہ بودند  
 بهنام شب برانچی قلہ فرورد رفتند دایں ضمن دزدان قلہ خبردار شدہ  
 و قریب کیکہ و چل کس بهجنگ بہت آمدند یک نفر از دزدان مقتول شدہ  
 یک نفر از پیادہ های سیدی عنبر قتل گردید پیادہ های سیدی عنبر کیکہ و چل  
 و بہت ہواہی از قلہ فروردہ گرفتہ آوردہ بموضع ہر پیادہ رسیدہ سیدی عنبر  
 براے دیون ہواہی و پیادہ های خود انجا رفت بود (۳۴۳۳. ۳۴۳۳)

No. 255

سرکنت با ۳۰ زماردار و دو جوڑے جاسوس نوکر امیرا امرا و نوکر  
 فتح اللہ خان ببادر جای دشتہ بودند در یوٹا فونستجات از آنجا آوردند  
 معلوم بہیت کہ کجا آتہ بودند و از کجا آتہ نہ  
 یک نفر بکار آتہ و دہ نفر در مور جال زخمی شدہ نہ  
 ۱۴۵۱ قعدہ ۳۶۹ در مطالعہ حاجی د. آریہ  
 زمانے جاسوسان ۱۴۵۱ قعدہ ۳۶۹ مور جال راجہ جے سنگ بہسبب  
 ہر آئین سنگ سیاہ در بہت بہری مور جال بہتندہ بہرا راجہ جے سنگ

به سنگ ترشان ده در پیه انفا آ داده ناکیه کرد که ذود سنگ را برتر نشید  
نارمور چال بهیتر برود

۱۴ دی قعه ۴۶ شنه به مطالعه حاصل در آید  
سمونج رکاب نا براده محمد بیدار بخت بیاد بر سله استاد خان ۱۳ دی قعه ۴۶ شنه  
نا براده محمد بیدار بخت بیاد چپا گبری دوز سمیع شد که زانافرناده بخت  
برآمده بود چال تشریف برده مور چال را سلاطه و بیدار باز به قادی که یلنار است  
لموده وقت ۳ گبری داخل خیمه مایه شدند

۱۴ دی قعه ۴۷ شنه بمطالعہ حاصل در آید  
نوشت رنگت بر کاه مور چال فتح الله خان بیاد ۱۳ دی قعه ۴۷ شنه  
بهنگام انقیار بارای قلعه سنگ اناری بر خندای سیه کرده حقه ایادوت  
و غیره انداختند حاج بیاد آب فرد شانه  
۳ نفر در مور چال زخمی شدند

۱۵ دی قعه ۴۶ شنه به مطالعه حاصل در آید  
نوشت بر کاه مور چال فتح الله خان بیاد ۱۵ دی قعه ۴۶ شنه  
یائی دیوار قلعه برج بران نشستن  
مردم در شب می نمایند  
شش نفر در مور چال زخمی شدند  
بدر یک دیواره دیگر جا طیارنده  
و چند سنگی گذاشتند

۱۶ دی قعه ۴۶ شنه به مطالعه حاصل در آید

نوشته و نکت شماره مورچال فتح البه خان بادر ۱۶ دی قعه ۱۲۷  
استغیا از باره قله پستای که را آتش داده از اجنه سنگ اندازی  
و گفت اندازی بسیار کردند دیشی بالشی سوخت و دیکه نغمه دایه نکت  
(No. 2085)

No. 256.

مادی قعه ۱۲۷ بمطالع خاصه د آید  
مین درج رکاب شازده بخت بادر هرکه اعتماد خان ۱۶ دی قعه ۱۲۷  
رانا اخرب از قاده آمده یک برادر بر آید سرانرا خان بزی مرغی طالب  
در خوت افته بود استماع یافت که بر شاقوی بزی مرغی طالب دلیل بفرستد  
و براد دیشی کفر کردن قله نیز دانی گردید سرانرا خان را در اخرا دزد  
حکومت طلبیده بودید  
(No. 3434)

No 257

مطالع خاصه د آید جواب نسته  
سراج رکاب شازده محمد بادر ۱۸ دی قعه ۱۲۷  
سرانرا خان را در خوت طلبیده بودید مسیح نده که بنجامه کور تاکه فرمود  
که در روز بزرگ نزدیک میرسد بگفت را به قله بفرستاد که دیکه که برسا  
سختی را بیاید  
بزرگ مرغی افته

نوشته و نکت شماره مورچال فتح البه خان بادر ۱۶ دی قعه ۱۲۷  
سعی بختی الماک روح البه خان و حمید الدین خان بادر در مورچال آمده مورچال



پیش از آنکه کرده نقش چوے را مایل کرده بفتح البخان بلاد سرگوشی  
نموده بچند و پیرودا و قند استغیا از بارانی قلد توها بسردا و پودند و گام  
دش کب و له آره نزدیک خان موسی البه استاد و ایلین بچیر گذشت  
بنایخ نزدیک سردی قعد و شش موجب رفته گوید و راه برکاده بعضی رسید  
امروز دی از بیه سنگ پشکار راجه جے سنگ به تردد بعضی رسیده  
موجال پتیز بزرده و بیت دایه طیار نموده

بنایخ در بعضی رسید که رانا (دانا) و بونت و کب چوید و سر از خان  
دور برکاده راجه جے سنگ و قلد رفته پیش پشکاری رفته

(No. 3425)

No. 258

۱۵۴۵ هجری بمطالع حاکم دایه

سوان مگرت راجه و اعتبار محمد پیر بیت از سر ستاده و تمام خان اادی قعد

بختی الملک از خان اادی محمد و سر از خان و دایه البخان و اادی کورت

امروز نیز دینجا استند و طایفه از خان راجه از سر لگری

و سر از خان راجه از چار لگری از خان اادی

و سر خان اذیت رسیده

بمطالع حاکم دایه

رمانی حاکم خان اادی قعد و شش

ساراده و الدنبار محمد پیر بیت اادی و سر در حال او کلا به پشکاری



مختی الملک روح الدخان را حضور داشت  
نموده سزا درین روز حال ملک کاشتر  
کدام تشریف فرمودند

را چندی شقی از قلعه کوذانه به قلعه راج کرده  
آمده یازده سوار مرده بزرگبارده براه  
دارد درین ضمن نوشته مکرانترین از  
قلعه پراپ کرده به را چندی رسید که پسران راجا  
جینی در قلعه پراپ کرده اند و در نیان جیمپون  
که از قلعه مرده نزدیکی واقع است بده ای  
پادشاهی نیان را تمام نمودند و پسر (حسن)  
خان نیز نیان را تمام کرده به را چندی  
و ابدا سلطان راجا جینی را از اجا برادر

را چندی شقی به نیان جادان نوشته  
بود که از نوود و انجا بیا بده ای  
پادشاهی قلعه کلدان را مرده فرود  
چاره گرفت پسران راجا جینی  
را از قلعه پراپ کرده ابدا برادر  
دینا جوب نوشته که خود را در  
پیرام

فرستاده استاد خان بنام رخ صدم

تا براده دانه بار بر - دیرن مورچال شریف نرودن جمنه خان و منظران  
و حاجی کمال و نیزه در راه روزت نمودن تا براده دانه اگر حاجی کمال پرسیدند  
در جبهه روز آفتاب را پامی دیوار بر روی ساسیت دیوار را خوانید بر ایندی روی  
الیه فری فرد دگ کتف دیوار بر روی رای برام بعد از این تا براده حیمه جاد  
و دیوار کماثر کفنا استاد شده داخل حیمه نایب شده

سرانجامان اسکرتگاه بجا بمانی است

(No. 3437)

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بر

مطالعہ حاضر در این

روشنه دکت بر کرده مورچال فلیق البان ساد ۲۶ دی قعدہ ۱۲۹۶  
دی روز یک دایه طیار شد از روز ده کجاده ۱۰۰۰ رج قلعه نگاه دانست  
تاه ساختند

در نزد دیوار حال نمی شدند را - فری حیمه نایب

رایا حاسر سات ۱۶ میندی روز باو پرت جیشل کمال و نیزه شرب بیت  
ترا کمر بر روی نسل دایا - سهر روزتند

سالمه حاجی در این

روشنه دکت بر کرده بنام رخ صدم  
استاد انارایه قلعه اشتر سنگ  
سید برود حال از آفتند ان بار  
اشتر را از اب و شاز سید نر  
در مورچال و جمنه خان

(No. 3435)



دست دکت بر کاره مورچال فتح اله خان بادر تاج ۱۱ دی قعدہ ۱۲۸۶

چند کنگه کجاده سزدک برج تالعه حمید الدین خان بادر در مورچال سزدک فتح اله

گاه دانه براه ساختمند خان بادر آوره

سیدی فیر مات باقوت ملک سته نفر در مورچال زخمی نندند

در مورچال آوره

تاج ۳ سبه

بنج کجاده ای برج گاه دانه ده نفر در مورچال زخمی نندند

براه ساختمند

( No.  $\frac{3437}{2}$  )

۲ دی حجه ۱۲۸۶ مرضی رسید جواب ننده

دست بر کاره مورچال فتح اله خان بادر ۲ دی حجه ۱۲۸۶

نفت کجاده پیش مورچال نگاه داشتند

سیدی فیر داخل در مورچال پیش نده

۲ دی حجه ۱۲۸۶

امروز برای مرضی رفت

خان عالم به بار عالمی دست که مادر گرو بره دیره دزدان با حجه کنسیر چهار

کرو ی نبی ماه درگ بر مال آواره شده اراده دشمن بگالو

داشتند خانه داد باقوت سده سرداران شامه رود گروه جنگ نموده

بیاری از مقهوران را داخل جبینم و زخمی ساخته مقهوران را به فرار برگزیدند و اسیران  
 و اطلاع بدست شاه جهان اسیران و تیر و خات و سرداران و دیگران و در راه رسیدند  
 نیز نوشته که تیر و خات نیز در جنگ جانساز  
 بود و یک مرد سوار را در آن کشت  
 رسیدند

(صد)

۱۲ دی حجه ۳۶۷ هجری رسید حکم شد  
 جواب شاه را سرالود و نزد خان عالم رساند که به اتفاق تنبیه افکار بوده بیاید  
 و خان عالم با نجات باشد  
 خان عالم بپای یک نوشته انقباض روحانی قلعه بنی شاه درگ طرف  
 آواره شده و حقیقت و خیال است و نشان شاهزاده به دیده رسیده که بمقت  
 منظور خان بیاید و جواب شاه تا فرود دی الحجه ۳۶۷ هجری بنی شاه درگ بیاورد  
 و فضل السلطان شاه خود منع از بنی شاه درگ روانه مرز نطق آباد شده  
 ۱۲ دی الحجه ۳۶۷ هجری رسید جواب شد

دست سرکاره قلعه بنی شاه درگ طرف پیراله سر دی الحجه ۳۶۷ هجری  
 تیر و خات و دیگران و سوار به موضع ماده در بهم کرد قلعه بنی شاه درگ  
 آواره شده بودند از این خبر خان عالم با بدبایه بادشاهی و انقباض  
 برادر را در آن قلعه در بنی شاه درگ نشاند و انقباض جنگ بود  
 تا یک پیراله بنی شاه درگ نشاند و انقباض جنگ بود  
 سرانجام بود

دادت مال قلعه دار جمعیت خود بزرگ محافل بنگاه سازاده محمد بیار بخت  
بیاد که در اینجا است مرستاده

نعل البه جان که به جوح رکاب باد سازاده محمد عظیم بیاد شاه هرود  
ماه خود انشاء کرده و طبع جان تمام از رات مال قلعه دار بر رکاب گرفته  
در آن زمان ناهل خبر رسیده که خان مذکور سلامت به مرآتقن آباد رسیده

(No. 3438)

No. 264

۶ دی الحجه ۱۲۶۷ عرض رسیده جواب نه شده  
زشت دکت بزواره مورچال فتح البه جان بیاد ۵ دی الحجه ۱۲۶۷  
چند کجاده پیش عمری نگاه داشته  
حالتی بدتر یک دایه دشب کرده

رست بزواره مورچال فتح البه جان بیاد ۵ دی الحجه ۱۲۶۷  
چار کجاده پیش عمری گذاشته بودند اسفیدار مارا لے قلعه سنگ  
اذاخته شکستند

نوبت دکت بزواره مورچال فتح البه جان بیاد ۶ دی حجه ۱۲۶۷ خان بیاد  
پیش عمری بزرگ تاکیه کاه داشته بودند اسفیدار مارا لے قلعه سنگ ای  
مکان متواتری اداخته که ضرب سنگ بر سرش رسیده خوبار جاری شده  
و صف تمام عارض گردید مردم خان بیاد داشته اند و چند سنگ  
یکروانی هم رسیده تا چهار گری شب نصف تمام دارد

(No. 3439)



۷ ذی حجه ۱۱۶۶ بمطالعہ خاص دایہ رسید بتاریخ ہجری ۱۱۳۳

سراج رکاب شاہزادہ محمد بہار بہت پیادہ سرسلہ استوار خان

شاہزادہ، پادشہ مرتبہ از فیضہ مایہ سرآمد تہذیب و ادب اندازان و فیضہ

رہودند و جہنبد خان و غفر خان را طلبیدہ بود روز در پیش ہزنہ کو چہنگ

و دیار نمودن تختہ ہی و تیر و بان بڑی پوش ناگاہ نمودند

محمد دمان شرف برادر خان ازاد و بیانات و احوال را دیدہ بعد از ان

۱۱۳۳ دست نمود سرودند حمام را پایان سفیل استاد گمانیدہ سرود و جہنم طالب

خان ارشدہ کہ بہ سلطان نظر وکیل رسید کہ از پیشگاہ ظل و کرم حکم

حاصل نموده خلعت او را بر بند

سرار خان را در خلوت طلبیدہ بود روز

اسد اللہ دولت ستہ بیری از ابتدای گوچہ سلطنت بہتر رفتہ ہرج

ایوانی را دیدہ و دسات (ب) نموده و بہ جمعہ مردم ناگاہ نمود کہ ہوسم ہاں

نزدیک اسیرہ و تہو خان سری سرودن کتبیدہ حال و رفت ہوش است

ہم نزدیک سہا ہستم و صورت فلج قلمہ از دستگاہ ظل و کرم رخت

و انعام مامور خواہد یافت بعد از ان بڑی مجری شاہزادہ پادہ رفتہ بود

بودہ سگ سر را بہ جے سنگ برہ و چال بڑی مجری شاہزادہ پادہ

آئندہ بود

بیت و یک دایہ ضرب سنگ استادہ بود از ان ادو دایہ دیگر قائم نموده

به بیلوران و نزد ران که سرگرم کمال بودند در جاده و به نام نشد

بیت نزد ران و حال و غمی نشدند

محمودان توپ را بجانب دست راست آورده سری دین چنانچه  
بج گله سر بخورم مردم دهنه یکس بنمیر گذشت

۸ دی حجه ۱۲۷۷ لشکر افراسیبه حجاب نشد

زبان حاکم سان ۸ دی حجه ۱۲۷۷ دولت گری از نب مایه قریب  
بغاء شت پیاده ارتاده فرود آمدن بر مور جال شایران مایه رنجینه بود  
دین سخن بود و سنگ سرکار راجه جی سنگ اجمه از توکران راجه منور  
کوک رسیده بود و در کرد و توکران راجه دین و غمی نشدند

۸ دی حجه ۱۲۷۷ لشکر نری غنی مجبور برود است

سوار کاب شایران محمد بیدار است مایه هر صده اقدامات ۱۲ دی حجه ۱۲۷۷  
شایران مایه در سرتبه افراسیبه مایه به تردد توپ افراسیبه  
دین ملاحظه فرمودند و لفرنگ بیگ باقی را که سراسر ایقام نمود  
گفت محرف نشد اسد الد ایل روز نزد راجه جی سنگ دهنه گفت  
که وقت پیش شایر کاب مایه حاضر توید راجه گفت بن با جمعه توکران  
خود حاضر میوم بعد از آن تیر حان آورده افراسیبه مایه مایه رحلت  
نشد و ران حضور نشد

محمد مائل و داد بر هوا و توپ مایه و ران گردید محمد ماکام که سراسر  
پیش روی که چه سلامت مقر است ناکبه و میناب مور جال است بود قدری ضرب  
سنگ مایه آورده دستار در طان مایه و به بی گند



سواخ رکاب شازاده بهادر ذی حجه ۱۲۷۶  
 شرفیاسم سکر و خیر و تله بچان شازاده واره  
 تبار محمد بهادر بخت بهادر آمدند شازاده بهادر به سرانرا خان  
 مرود که مطالب را القاء کرده تعرض رسائیده

تاریخ ۹ ذی حجه ۱۲۷۶ رسیه

گدنبه راه برکاره طاسر مروده

شازاده جیو دیروز بهونت زمیندار را طلبیده فرمود که تالادی دیند بخریب  
 یادمانه گرتاد جالده تعرض نمود که عاجز و ضعیف ام روح مرا بردارم و ادبیا  
 در پیش سرانجام مطالب خود میدارند شازاده جیو فرمودند که خوب روی را  
 جودی گرم به را تفیلی رسام خوب فرود به بینم چه طور تالاد امندان

دی «ز بهرا برکاره بطریق مرصه دانسته پرسانقی مجبور است شازاده وادگر آوره  
 معروضات است بود که طاسر عام تعرضی فرمایند نقیب است اگر نقبل می رسائید  
 جز ما بجنگ ما بکار بایم و درون سرانجام مطالب انفریس آشی در کماله است  
 باری بجنگ بکار خواهم آمد و اگر توبه (توبه) فرموده مطالب سرانجام می  
 فرمایند تالاد حاضر است و اگر انرا حق بینند و سائید و خطاب (نه) می فرمایند  
 حال خود حتمی المقدر بجنگ در پیش ام بعد از این رجوعه سطرف امرا را در امرد

(3441 . 50)

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نقل انتخاب سواخ

۱۰ ذی حجه ۱۲۷۶ بمطالعده خاص در ایام

رائے حاسون تابع عبدالرحیم و سہیل بنیت اذی الحجہ ۱۲۷۶

دی روزہ وقت در پیر حفظان قلعہ بازار بلنگہ لغتہ کہ سارایا بادشاہی ام ہرا  
تہ پادار سر بہ بہ و قلعہ را حاجی مکیہ قلعہ را میہم چنانچہ دہنر حاسوس کوکر  
راجہ جے سنگ حسب استرانی دیوار قلعہ رشتہ ساد سنگ را یک نفر دیگر  
نزد جمشید خان و شاد کام و خیرہ اور دند نام برادر سرستہ نفر . . . شایرادہ  
وارانہان محمد بیدار بہت ہادر مرستادہ شایرادہ فرمودہ . . . سرامراخان  
بہرند و دہنرستان امانہ شایرادہ ہادر ہام ہراسنقی در قلعہ ہرند

( 3442 . 3440 )

No. 268

نقل مرض مرستادہ ۱۲۷۶ دی الحجہ ۱۲۷۶

شایرادہ وارنہ لوت جمع از خیمہ کار کلبہ ساد ہرقلہ کہ سرامے ملاحظہ صر و حال  
دست نمودہ اند تشریف آورہ و روح الہیہ خان را طلبیہ فرمودہ کہ ہر دم  
ناکبہ نمایند کہ امروز بہرقت کہ عابد و دہر یوش نمودہ دیوے قلعہ را مایہ گشت  
چنانچہ در عمل دہرور خان و جمشید خان و رغالہ خان و افتاد خان و خیرہ  
بہرہاے بادشاہی را طلبیہ ارشاد کردند حاجی سام و بہرہاے سرکار حاجی ام  
طلبیہ ناکبہ فرمود کہ کرہ ام ہیار شوند دیں ضمن راجہ جے سنگ را ام ہادر  
فرمودہ راجہ منار الہ باکران جو کلمہ ہیار شدہ آمدہ بعضی عابے ساسیہ کہ  
ارستود اول مایہ پیش نام شایرادہ ہادر دلیری راجہ سوی الہ بسیار نمودہ  
دخلت فرمودہ چنانچہ در عمل دہرور دگر دیوے مردم کلمہ راجہ ارشاد ہور حال  
ہرگز نہ دیوار دیوے کہ او بہا ارشتہ بود و دہرینہ دادہ ہیشہ اہلہ  
در دیوے در آمدہ ستان خود غایم نمودہ و جنگ کوتہ ہراق نمایان آمدہ

و پس از آن از بر طرف بنده های بادشاهی و سرکارهای دیوے در آورده  
 تا سبای خود برگزیده نام نموده تا پیاپی جنگ و تیر و تیر و تیر و تیر  
 در میان بود تیر و تیر و تیر و تیر و تیر و تیر و تیر و تیر و تیر و تیر  
 محروم است سبای دیوار قلعه آمده بسیار و چو بنیان از قبیله و کوران  
 محل را به جی سگ از خضر بنده و قیاسی و بیال و سنگ محروم  
 گردیده به جی سبای از بنده های دیگر و کوران سرکارهای دیوے بکار آورده  
 در غصه گردیده و محروم حال تحقیق و شمار قلم جواب آورده مردم را به و بنده های  
 لشکر حاجا اندرون قلعه ایوان و دیوار و دیوے قلم شده و سایر را به و بنده های  
 به به راجه بنیان و مردم دیگر نیز آفرین یافتند فتح اعظم شد از گرفتن  
 دیوے در فتح قلعه بیچ نه مانده و بهر سال مردم را به هزار بیاده جنگی در  
 در واره قلعه استقامت و زور است

(No. 3607)

No. 269

حاکمان کابلیت و تابعه علی الرحمن بیکاره گویند و وقت حقیقت یعنی سبای  
 بنام سبای ۲۲ سبای حجه لشکر بعد از او بهر سال به محمد بیکار بیکار  
 و بنی الملک اوج السخان در آن به جی سگ و خانعام و غیره از نشر و حال  
 سعادت کرده بیکار و کما تر کلبا آمده اند و بنده های زیاد و اندک و مقرر گرد که دار استاله  
 سه به یوش مقرر و جمعیت راجه جی سگ و استان سراسی و حال قلم  
 اند و مردم غنیمت در دیوے توقف دارند

در بگرام کما زار سبای سبای سبای سبای سبای سبای سبای سبای سبای سبای  
 بوجان و غیره مقرر از طرف سایر را به و اندک و مقرر گرد که دار استاله

دینا با۔ جوے ڈاڑھانہ ی بردار سنگ سرب گئے دہ قنات حیر

لندہ اسبا دینا گزشتہ اندر

دہ وقت تردد یوش مذهب دہل اسنگ وادہت ابراری وحقہ دہوے

دھمی تہ بند و بکار آندہ

ار دکران اہم جے سنگ

حوج دھمی تہ بند

تلاہ ار داکوت و دیکار آندہ دھمی تہ بند

دہ نفر

ار ان بکدہ

بک بک

دہم کاری دار

جمنہ حان دہنہ حان ملازمان ساہزادہ ہارہ ستر سابق دہم

سہ چال نام تہ

(No. 3445)

اسفیا اشراہت یک دایہ مسخ تہ

No. 270

۲۴ دی الحجہ ۱۲۶۷ یک ہزار ساہزادہ مطالعہ حامی دایہ  
 زائے جاسہ سان ۲۴ دی حجہ ۱۲۶۷ یوں سنگ پشکار راہ جے  
 سنگ نشان راہ را اہل برہج یوںے نام نمودہ دستان جہنی الملک  
 و نیز برہج انتہ ۱۲ دی حجہ ۱۲۶۷ مطالعہ حامی دایہ

۲۶ دی حجہ ۱۲۶۷ یک ہزار ساہزادہ مرتبہ درہم خیر آرد دہ ۲۴ دی حجہ ۱۲۶۷  
 نشان ساہزادہ ہارہ دہم جے سنگ و اسرار نظام ناا کے رچ ورنے  
 تہ قائم تہ و سار اسفیا را جہنم و اہل ساختہ

گماں اورت انعامان رح دیون گماں داشتہ و دین جوں انور رسید

سوت

بدره بادشاهی پیاده با اسفار را که راجع ایونے قلعه بودند دود دود در  
کردند و پیاده با اسفار رحمت مطرب دوداره قلعه انت پیرو دوداره  
نزدیک دیوار قلعه جنگی کنند و بدره بادشاهی با راجع ایونے قلعه  
و دیوے همی اندر پیاده با اسفار دود دود در کردند

۲۳ دی حجه ۱۲۶۱ کبری مبارک است بمطالع حاصل در این

[illegible]



دو سال میماند دی گوید که در دستخیز قلعه بر پرده آذین تا حال جنگ انجم در میان  
است در این جنگ که در نزد نمایان شده اند خود از دانه و بر  
برآمده یوش نموده بسیاری کشتن راکنه  
(No. 3446)

No. 271

۲۶ دی الحجه ۴۶۷ هجری بمطالعہ حاجی درایه  
زمانے جاسر سان ۲۵ دی الحجه ۴۶۷ هجری

دی روز تا حاکم که ان کے برج بیدہ بائے بادشاهی و ملازمان سرکار عالی  
فایم شدہ بودند اردو زمانہ بستمہ و در واره قلعه یک جریب مطالعہ دارد  
سارادہ بادر بجای الملک روح البه جان شہرت نمود کہ حالہ  
ترب داشت نموده بر در واره قلعه بادی زد چنانچہ ترب شست نموده پنج  
شش گولہ ترب بر در واره قلعه فوددہ قری دیوار اردو واره افتاد  
ترب بیت پنج لاش از جنیان قلعه کہ دی روز کشتہ بودند از بالای  
ج را راستند  
(No. 3447)

No. 272

۲۶ دی حجه ۴۶۷ هجری در سارادہ بمطالعہ حاجی درایه  
زمانے جاسر سان نایبہ سیادت ۱۶ دی حجه ۴۶۷ هجری  
دوت دہر حصان قلعه بہ آواز ملکہ افتند کہ نیما و میدان را جا پور در ایچی  
کلنی ساگرہ را نزد مالبرستہ ما امان بنوام چنانچہ نام بردار قلعه رفتہ  
جاسر سان نایبہ عبدالرحمان خبر آورده کہ محضران قلعه مالش دارند

در مراد تمام نکات کرد که را یاد نماید در قلد بهر سینه سالان میخوانیم امروز وقت  
در بهر دو دگر نام بردا موجب امر شایسته یاد برآید در بابت مطالب در

قلد آهسته

(No. 3448)

No. 273

نقل انتخاب سوانح ۱۲۷۱ هجری شمسی یک بهر در برآمده مطالعه عالی در آید  
سوانح رکاب شایسته و اگر محمد بیاد بخت بیاد و هر یک استاد جان ۱۲۷۱ هجری  
صحبی شایسته بیاد و بهر شریف و در دگر در سینه سادوت  
مدرسه داخل خیمه نای که پای کنگ استاده شده شده

بنونت که یاد و نزد دیگر بایر بیاد قلد سنینان حسب الطر از مرعایه در

قلد رفته بود امروز از قلد آمده بر بودی حاضر شد و مطالب را به

نگر خان طاکر برد خان سرور عرض رسانیده باشد

خان نام عرض رسانیده که اگر سرخ و دونه حواله بیده شود بدوش نموده دید  
در دانه قلد را دست ارم فرمود در جماعتی که تردد و حافاتی کرده اند به دل  
جوابد شد در بدوش بقیق که نشاء سبقت خوابیده کرد

شایسته بیاد فرمودند که تردد و حافاتی است البه و القش از فر  
کم در یاد که داخل سه پنج کردی بانه حانه دار عرض رسانیده که تردد است البه  
مقرر دال کردن ام فرمودند نشاء به داخل ابرار بانه که رعایت در کار یا استوار  
تمامانه دار دیگران حافاتی بانه

(No. 3449)

اقل مرد سماع ۲۱ دی حجہ شمس طالع حاجی دانیال

سماع دکان سارو محمد بیار بنت بیار برسلہ آباد خان ۲۸ دی حجہ شمس

شکوہ خان درہ سنگ پیکار راجہ جے سنگ درہ تہہ باہوت و راما

برہون سارو شدہ بودہ سماع کہ فردا در قلعہ خواہد رفت

تپ اپنی مات قلعہ دار اندکی دورا رہے تاد مردم راجہ پوتیا راتہ آوردن

لال یک دھرم دما تپ دکر

حاجی سادی جاندہار کہ دی دور دور حال زخمی نہ بود پائے انگ آئوہ و محمد بھل

جاندہار بجائے حاجی سادی بمور چال است

۲۶ دی حجہ شمس کبیر در زمانہ برے رفت

۱۱ بجے سان نایع سمیادہت ۲۱ دی حجہ شمس

شکوہ خان درہ سنگ پیکار راجہ جے سنگ ماینا در ایا گمانتہاے زبیران

رے شمسہ الحج و اماں جاستن منجھان تاد پنجاب باب دتہ مروت کردہ تار

بہر طلعت در میان بود چہاچہ حب الہیہ حایے علی بہر ساقی توتہ داکر روز

کہ اگر در یک روز دست سے تاد راجہ بہتر دلائے پوش کردہ بہر اقل

جام سانیہ یک نرہ رے نیواگم دانت نام سردا امروزہ تاد خواہد رفت

حاجی سان نایع در امر مان خراہ در کہ رے سنگ پیکار دانتہ سنگ



بجای مایه طایر کرده که مردم را که آتش زنده اند طلع نه بایر شده و پورتن نمود  
 به دقتل ی و سیم الخزانه بدار پسندیده فرمودند به مقابر بویستند که اگر مان  
 ی جای درک در دست بسته بیایند والد تنه مثل تو ام کرد چنانچه بنهاد  
 رانای در تاه سپهر سندن

حاشه سان تاج دکت خیراد درک شایراده بدارا بره سگد بیکار  
 راجه بی سگد بر سگد خبری مفرده طلع اسفون بنام بیت او است و هیچ سبت  
 مانال مانای کورتن نمود استغفار دقتل مرسان

ان بی سگد به بره سگد بیکار خودک و بجزیل داد با ساس  
 سرگ کرده ارور دقت سام حاشه سان تاج

خیرالرحمان خیراد درک شایراده بدارا بیکار تشریف برده و اگر  
 مقابر اهنب آورده دست بسته فرمودند بیایند والد بر دایا پس در اورد  
 نشو مایه و شایراده داد اگر امر فرمودند که تفت با تفتی یاد و سباب  
 محمود جالی برسانند که مردم سپاه داد استود  
 (3450 80)

No. 275

سواج دکان شایراده وادانان محمد بیدا محبت بدار سربله اعتماد خان ۲۹ دی ۱۲۰۲  
 شایراده بدار بهر حال حاشه انکس گناه که زری نشتن نمود مانه مور حال  
 مژد کرده تشریف برور

بیت را که به قلعه افشته بودند امروز آمد در شکر و جان و بده سنگ دمام بود  
به دیو دی حاضرند بود به سوع تن که بنام بر کایل برسانی از قلعه خواستد آمد  
از صرب با سه توپ یک صحرای قلعه و بخت و رخ منشر و همه دیوار استاد  
اگر اوست بقدر کار هر چقدر شد به نعل الهی در ده با نژده روز به در دارها  
قلعه بسیار است

(No. 3451)

۲۶  
۲۵ دی حیدر خان به حاکم در راه

No. 276

۱۳ دی حجہ شمسہ راے مرثیہ است  
سوال مرثیہ آباد مرثیہ ج ۱۶ دی حجہ شمسہ تباریک کو مرثیہ ایس خان  
بادر چتر چیتا کو مرثیہ حکم چتر مرثیہ آباد مرثیہ خانہ مرثیہ مرثیہ  
سبب آبادی مرثیہ مرثیہ مرثیہ مرثیہ مرثیہ مرثیہ مرثیہ مرثیہ  
مرثیہ آباد مرثیہ مرثیہ مرثیہ مرثیہ مرثیہ مرثیہ مرثیہ مرثیہ  
مرثیہ مرثیہ مرثیہ مرثیہ مرثیہ مرثیہ مرثیہ مرثیہ

(No. 3452)

Z. 277

نقل سوانح و معراج شریف بنیامہ حلیہ در آمد  
 در ہر دو جہاں سری اور گزشتہ سائر راہ ہمارہ میان اگر سوار زدہ باحتی  
 المکان روح الدخان و جان عالم و مملو حیات و غیرہ بہ جیسا کہ ذکر تشریف آرد در

راہ سے سگڑا اور گرد گاہ بہر حال انگ (نفل) کا ترکینا درست اند  
گو بڑا کی سرنگہ کینا انتہا بود و شہادت پر ساقی بہ تہا کمال آورد

(No. 3453)

No. 278

سوانح بالئے  
دانت و محرم شہزادہ کی ہدای نامی ہری دینا نزول بہ کچھ سوار و اسبی  
بگاہ شہزادہ سادہ و نیز بمقابلہ گئے کردہ کرسدے دریاے دانت ہری ہری  
دانتہ بودند کی کردہ ی ہری ہری اسامع ان خبر جوابہ خان منامہ سوانح را دلاں  
کامیابہ اس کردہ اناب غنیمت کردہ کفر سوار اور خود کردہ غنی بہت آوردہ  
بود در راوت شد و در اس اس و در سالہ ان ہنواران ہوم شکر بیان  
آوردند اس جوابہ خان بقیہت بود و ہمہ دریں ثابت صفا شد  
سواران خان ارکاد ہی شانہ دگ کوچ کردہ بموضع پرماندہ شدہ نزد آمد

(No. 3454)

No. 279

نفل سوانح بالئے  
و محرم شہزادہ کی ہدای نامی ہری دینا نزول بہ کچھ سوار و اسبی  
سوانح رکاب شہزادہ محمد بیدار بہت ہادر مرسلہ اتحاد خان دانتہ ۸ محرم  
شہزادہ ہادر بہسب عروسی کردہ بن مقدمہ ہری ساقی ارکاد کینا  
تحقیق موجود نہ طاربتہ کہ سق (تمام استادیات)

بنام اکل برسانقی از روز خدا بر سر شوق و طالع مرستاد و گویند و سنگداری است

کسر دیگر از یاد نزد بها آوردند (No. 3454)

No. 280

احمر سنگی بهی مطالبه حاصد آنکه حکم شده

بخشی الملك روح اله حان

سراج و کتاب سازان و محمد پیداست یاد بر سر له اعتقاد حان و سحر است

سنگداری حان و بزرگ سنگداری اکل برسانقی و سنگداری است

نام برده است از گذشته از پیش گمانه فصل و گرم حان بخشی برسانقی و مطالبه

او منظور شده و مقابل حان بری سلی و دلا سلی از امر و اندیشه

مقابل حان بزرگ و نگارند که مطالبه و ابیات بخشی الملك روح اله حان

احوج کرده و دم اگر از روز حان در یابید نزد امرانق حکم قرار داد نشان سازان

یاد را مادی قاده و گرم و اجازت مشکل نسبت که بیشتر مقابل حان بزرگ

از پیش مشکل معهود بود که مطالبه و ابیات بخشی الملك احوج نماید حان

طایفه قاده و ابیات حان معهود بزرگ احوج مطالبه و مقابل حان گرم

حان قبل یاد از نزد دیگر بزرگ بزرگ نشان نه قاده بزرگ مقابل حان آره

گفت . . . سبکی معلوم (سیت) (No. 3455)



No. 281

الحرم الشریف پکیر اور وزیر آردن سبطالہ خاص در آید  
سوانح و کتاب شاہزادہ محمد بیار بہت یاد میرسولہ امداد خان ۱۰ محرم ۱۲۶۷

مسموع کہ از آردن بختی الملک روح البہ خان عالم تیار و غیرہ و کلاہ پیرا  
نتقی جمع شدہ و اسبابا پیروردند کہ حالہ خانے نذر بیدہ یا مانندہ آردند گویند

بہ قلعہ میرود بعد از ان شان غایب بہ قلعہ میرود

بنیاد کسی را بہ قلعہ میرساد

(No. 3456)

No. 282

۱۲ محرم ۱۲۶۷ لوقت در بہر سبطالہ خاص در آید

سوانح و کتاب شاہزادہ محمد بیار بہت یاد میرسولہ امداد خان ۱۱ محرم ۱۲۶۷

حب (حبیب) البہ میراے شکر خان و بیدہ سگد و بنیاد گویند و بیوت  
وزیر جان بختی الملک روح البہ خان رفتند بختی الملک اقل نران و اردنان

خان بختی بخودہ سردیودی غایب ہرورہ سوزنک سایدہ جباچہ میر سبطالہ  
شرف دیوان خانہ مانتل نران و شان سگد گویند و بیوت بہ قلعہ رفت

گنہام دار کہ ہزار ہا زیدی با زعم سوار سرب دارد و پیر سانی رای

شامہ ہر سبطالہ بہ قلعہ رفت

(No. 3457)

کفیت سماع و اخبارات واقع ۱۶ محرم ۱۰۵۶

اعرض دارم که بدو سگد سبک را به جبهه سگد باد و نشان باد سبای  
بسته است سگد و برآه سگد را به به اندرون قلعه انداخته و  
آنرا برآه های کشته و فنی که برآه را بیرون قلعه بیاورد نشان بارگرمی  
بادی قلعه سرد

بدو حضرت عدالت فرموده بودند تا یک گری دیوان عدالت نمودند  
و بار اس اس است و کب راس در و حبه العام به باد تا بزرده  
محمد کا به خشر مرحمت فرمودند  
(3458 هـ)

نقل سماع ۱۸ محرم ۱۰۵۶ کپی بردار بر آورده بمطالعہ حاجی در...

سماع و کتاب شاهزاده محمد بیور سبت باد و بر سر کله التاد خان به ۱۸ محرم ۱۰۵۶  
ارو سگد خان و در سگد و اکملانی برآه و بونگ ملات و زمیندار مور حال  
رفته سماع نده که یک کس را نزد برآه رستاده ناکیه نمود که نشان را  
در قلعه بگرو حاکم بکشی برآه است فردا در پنجشنب نشان را به قلعه میگیرم  
و قلعه را حاکم میگیرم یعنی ملک اوج الب خان یا بر ناکیه جناب حاکم میفرستد  
چون را به مور حال رستاده و به اکملانی برآه ناکیه و محمد بیور نمود که امروز

نشان در قلد بگیرد و الله عزوجل بخشنی تو ابدت و بقول دایم رسید

برای عرض دانت  
(No. 3459)

No. 285

۱۸ عمر شکر دوت یک پاس شب گذشت عرض دایم رسید

دره سگ بردمان را به جی سگ حسب الامر عای نزدیک دروازه قلد  
با جمعه را به بیت سلخ نشسته نشان تا برادر بباد و بخش الکل و راج  
جی سگ را در قلد فرستاده نایم برده بار اقبال ابر اقبال شینای قلد  
به تصرف اولیه دالت قاهر در اید

۲۹ (۱۹) عمر شکر عرض رسید

دی روزمانتا ساعته برادر به سگ پیکار را به جی سگ مفصل دل  
در قلد ادمان را برده نشا با مرستاد و برساتی التماس کرد که مردمان به برای  
بیایند یا برپا یزق آفتند و نشا برادره کس مقهوران از قلد بیرو  
... پیش ... به سگ مدکور اندر بر سافله کرده است امروزه حاتم بر

نشاداد حیو بخش الکل نشاداد حیو  
نفر نفر نفر

(No. 3460)

No. 286

نقل انتخاب سوانح

۱۶ عمر شکر یک میر و چهار گری روزه برآمده بمقاله حاکم در اید

## جواب نشند

زبانے حاسوسان و محرم شکره اردی روز بیا برسات برساتی قلده  
 نشین تانزده کس راسه نشان بادشاه و شاهزاده و روح البه خان و راج  
 جے سنگ در قلده گرفت و شاهزاده کس که در قلده افتند بے صلاح بودند  
 بیانیہ در بے یقین سرکار وادہ صحیح ملازمان سرکار عالی و در نشان  
 روح البه خان و در نشان راسه جے سنگ داخل قلده گردید و برساتی کمره که  
 چوکه و نشان تانزاده مادر سلطان برج قلده در حال فتح البه خان بادگذاشته  
 خود از قلده برآید . ( 3461 و 3462 )

No. 287

نقل در سوانح محرم شکره یکم روز برآوردہ بمطالعہ عالی در آمد  
 سوانح دکان تانزاده محمد بیار بیت مرسله املاخان و محرم شکره  
 پنج امید اسلام یوزہ افغانی که نشان تانزاده اردی روز بارے قلده بهره است  
 یکی از برادران خود را پیش امام قلی بخشی اذل سرکار عالی سپنام داده رستاده که  
 برساتی سردار صبی سر بلبلده بلمستانه گفت که من با اسباب و جانت خود برای  
 مراکت از قلده طیار نذر ایم بیج کار درام نمایا معنی اسرار خود گفت بمرسته  
 که بخدمت عالی عرض نماید که بردا کدام راه او را نہ سرم سموع تہہ کہ بعد  
 عرض او معنی فرمودہ کہ بہ راہ دروازہ لوکے سمت بر بادے میرا ہی کہ خواست  
 باشد تردد . محرم شکره امر در بمطالعہ عالی در آمد



زبان حسان بهر مسمی شد

راه است در دانه کوک برای برآمدن مردم قلعه دست بنایند

در حال خبر آفواه کم بود که پرشانی صبی با چهل کسر از

راه دبیجه قلعه برآمده است هر بار در وقت

(3462. ۳۰۰۰)

APPENDIX 'A2'

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غیر [ادعایه در کد مورخ] یاد مان بدو [ادعایه در کد مورخ] ۱۰۱۳

از ترانه بنایج

سازمانده که یکم سازت

بنجیزای دات بنجیزا رسد

بویپ سازت

دو برای دات دو برای رسد

تان [تاک] داری دارم

دات

کیزا باروری دات

ابجی دار سرزده سائلی

کیزا باروری دات

ملی دار سرزده گنارگیه

کیزای دات

دام داری دارم داری

چار برای دات چهار برای رسد

باب سازت از رن سازت

دو برای دات دو برای رسد

کان سازت دارم سازت

کیزا باروری دات

دام داری دارم

کیزا دات

ملی [آبی] دارم را ابجی

کیزای دات

(No. SW 73)

No. 2

۱۴۹۱. حشر شمس

۱

ان سازت بوسد

سجرات محبت دستگاه و بیزا امثال و ادبها بواره بهجبت دایب

بودن حشرت باشند بعد از دنا خیریت بهر دوا اگر رت بود در

(SW No. 73)

که گاهی از صورت حال خود ایتم بناد بر آب به از طریق دست و اخلاص و  
 یگانگی ابعیده بوده و طریق اتحاد است که خبر خرسنگی خود را باطلی که  
 دانسته باشد به سجا بانه مرتوم نماید که موجب استقامت یار دوست است  
 ارفا آنکه شاگردان اتفاق سبابت و تهر دسگاه کیم سبابت بتخریب خراب  
 سنگ مشهور سعی در بداد است حای سکر و ساق استانی بکنند دای  
 ندرگاه خاک بارگاه معروض داشته که سبابت ابتباه کیم سبابت  
 سرد سبک بران کنزال و سببای بعضی نریران سببای و سببای سببای  
 رام دلی و ام دلی خود و دلو سبابت و مال [نان] سبابت و سببای  
 کمال شده بتخریب خرابه مشهور سعی بکنند از بیت کردن اراده بکنند  
 دگاه حای بانه دایر بحسب الامناس دای کم حای طاع عالم سطح شرف  
 حیدر یاسه که در سببای و اتفاق سرد سببای کنزال و رام دلی حیدر کی سببای  
 به دالان افاده برکار بارشای سر بران داشته و از نفل و سببای شنای  
 ابرو و بایر ان به حقیقت را بر سر دسبک و دایر حیدر سببای داشته و نادر  
 لم طلع ی سازه که حای خود را به اباب جمع داشته در سببای سببای  
 یک مقهور سببای آن سببای شود بر کار حضرت نفل الی بفتح بجاورد  
 انداخته الداعی عمر حضرت که روز حد بهیت سل گردد بعد از فتح بجاورد  
 قاهره باماده داده عالم و طریق دایر ان نامدار قاهره سببای سببای  
 و آری ابای دایر قاهره در آردن تعین حایر بود اگر پیش از آنکه اراج قاهره  
 مان محبت بر سر سببای سببای و نادر سببای سببای حیدر و کیم بهیود سببای است  
 و نادر و ابایر پیش از پیش نه از این سببای قاهره و دایر ان نامدار حیدر  
 حایر نه ابیجاب که در کار نادر سببای سببای حیدر و کیم بهیود سببای است  
 چه نه داشته شود



7. 3

حدادی است ۲۹

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

252

نبات و نور دستگاه ذی الامانی و الهی است به جهت رعایت بقا  
 بعد از مخفی ماندن نبل این تخت و انبساط سراسر معجزه جلال و تعالی  
 قاعده دنیا را چو بی و چهار است ایامی از انبیا که حقیقت الهی و حقیقت  
 آن نبات است و جمیع دیمکران در عهد آن که درگاه جلال پناه دارد و  
 بجز در آن که در تخریب یک نایم نبوده است و در بعد از آن که نیست  
 و انبیا پناه مذکور است آمده بواسطه نیران آرمات را با هر ساخته و  
 به جهت هر دو برگردد که آن نبات پناه - - - - - سرچاه حقیقت و ارادت  
 مستقیم رده انبیا را محبوب وکیل خود برگزیند که بر آن مطلع ندهد آنچه اید بحضور  
 برادر عزیز داشت شود و رعایت الهی مستمر تا جایی که رسید که احوال  
 یادنی سررازی ایند [مانند] باره باره است (۵۸۵-۶۸)

و سادده بقدر جمعیت اشخاص و مقورشون خدمت سردیسکوئی اگر کی  
 بعبده کیم ساروت و تنخواه موجب بیاد سارک بران بیارد و خواستاده شود  
 بران سرخوم میگردد که این نگاشته را به منزله قولنامه دانسته به آتفه  
 بجمعیت حاضر را میرداری تمام با جمعیت شایسته از سوار و پیاده نزد انجناب  
 بیاید که اجازت آید منسوب به بنجینزادی دات و بنجینزادی سوار مقرر نموده  
 دیگر رعایت موجب که اول آنها منفرده کرده خواهد شد و جمع و جوهر کامیاب  
 خواهد گردید و مصلحتات سرانجام خواهد یافت و اگر در آید خود  
 توقف ننماید و آخر سر نشسته جلوس مبارک تحریر یافت (S.W. No. 61)

No. 5

بسم الله الرحمن الرحیم

باسم انا

۱۴

شای

و بقیه الاقران خادما و شتاب کیم ساروت زمینداران و کن بقایات علی سنا  
 مستطیر و ساری رود و از سرعه دانت از مفضل بر رفته بقیت و رسوخ نمودن  
 بواسطه لایق الحاقه و الا حسن انفل بیک بر ترانده از انظار سارا و گردید  
 باید که بجمع و جوهر حاضر مصلحتین نموده سعادت از روز و روز مت سر سربلایت  
 گردد که مشمول عرافت نای ساری گشته بطالب خویش نایر خواهد شد  
 با احادی و ادریکه جلوس مصلحتی گشته (S.W. No. 55)

رفعت و نجات بنابه محبت و مودت و گنگاه کیم ساقی است سردیای  
 برگشتن کونزال و مایلای پیوسته بر برادر دات متکلی بوده شد کام باشند  
 بعد از اشتیاق ظاهر و باطن بر تیره یی ای که اسال بوجه احسن جانیونی  
 اینجانب با اینفلع قهر و زوریده و آن زبده انزان گهای از ده کدمه اخبار خیر  
 مال اعلی کست بداده بامت . . . چه خواب بود از نت آنی که نت  
 حاله ام رابط اخلاص راگی بجال دانسته از ارسال رسیل و سابل جاری دانسته  
 باشد که موجب تسلی خوابه انجایمید و با ارفاق جمیله ایشان از زبانه  
 رمانچی نایک و اکل رمانی احوال شنفیده بحایت خود سنده و بوده در حاش  
 بر بزرگ حادثان آنجانب و یاده نزان است باهران نگارنده سرد که یک  
 شیر اقسام اول و یک سانبر و چند جوده خرگوش و چند سنگان از فریره های و  
 سواي آن در هر جنس حاضران که این نگارنده بوده باشند البته  
 باشتیاق تمام می فرستاده باشند که اینجه . . . این جانب خوابه شد  
 و سواي رمانچی و اکل هر چه ار نام زوده یقین که نری آسود آورده به . . .  
 خوابه کوشید و چیزی که فرستاده آمد خوابه رسید البته . . . باینده  
 زیاده از این بجز سرفه چه نگارنده می است در پنج بدست شهرشوال ۱۰۹۹ هجری

No. 7

شتردی حجه ۱۰۹۹

۴

از بده امثال و الاقران کیم سالت سرد بسکه برگشته که حال بجا نیست باشد  
بعد برا مخفی نماید چون آن زبده امشابه را با نام دلی و دیگر زمینداران  
پایین گمانت برای فساد ملک نگارن فرستاده شد باید که از روی حدیث حقیقت  
مسای بود که سکه مذکور را بفرستد باری در آرد و بجای دلخواهی خود  
باید و از رگران تقی اگر بیاید طالع برگردان آرد شغل نموده بطلبید  
و حقیقت او را برزگار که در خود حالت ابرو داشت نموده جواب شد زیاده  
چه رگانت ایده بنایخ چهارم شتردی حجه ۱۰۹۹ (Sw No. 63)

No. 8

شتردی حجه ۱۰۹۹

۵

از بده پناه شجاعت دستگاه حله امشابه کیم سالت محفوظ باشد  
بعد برا مخفی نماید در پس و در مرغانت که شغل برآوردن آن خواهد امشابه  
ایتهای زمینداران پایین گمانت و تجویر صاحب پیوند سالت و نام دلی و دیگر  
و گمانت بر این قدر ممکن بجای زمینداران آن زبده امثال درگاه چهارم پناه  
از سالت او در بیشتر نیز اثر گذشت و طالب معرفت در چه بدستری بابت  
و حسب احکم اعلی در جواب آن پیروی و سول انگنده تجویر مطالب در ...  
حالت ایا کرده عرض داد که بموجب نوشت در روی درگاه مذکور گردیده



فرمان داشتن بحالی از بیداری دستم قدیم بپاسم آن عهد بده انستبام و  
 عطای صاحب شرف خود در خواب دیدانت ببا بزرگداشت بی شود که تمام  
 مطالب معروضه ایست در پیشگاه خدانت و جلالی منظور باشد باید که  
 عالم خود جمع است چنان آتش بگرزند که مقهوران ... و ...  
 آفریده تعلیف رسانیدن نتوانند و تسخیرات غنیمت زارده پوزند و فکر تسخیر  
 داده بایند انشاء الله منسوب بودند سادست و را آذاری و خیر و بخیر نموده  
 بر سر اذانت می شود و فرمان داشتن بحالی از بیداری آن عهد بده انستبام  
 بر سر مادر که با لایان عالمی تردد نمایند که بجزای در پیشگاه عظمی  
 باد گردد دیار و چنگالت آید بباغ بباردم دی حجه الشنبه قلی شد  
 (Sw No. 66)

No. 9

حرم شنبه

السم الله الرحمن الرحيم

۸

[لطفره بک در عالم گراول]

سبحان الله که بکبر است بپادشاهی امیدوار بود و بداند که چون  
 در پی راه با انعام و نجات شمار لایق از انسان بیاد خان معروض مقدس  
 حلی گفت که از هر سبزی طالع بخر خان سار آینه آفریده تعلیف نموده که در تسخیر  
 غلبه در تعداد سنبلای سرود و مقهور جبهه بلخ و تدریم رسانیدن نجات  
 در آن کجی عادیان ما بکند و امیدوار است که هر دو سبزی که بر آن گردان  
 بدست بپوشن جای گردد ببا بزرگ او را بدستور قدیم بسوزد و بکند بپوشد

هنگام سرافرازی فخریهیم باید که علاوه بر مراسم آن گماشتنی هر دو نفر  
در آن حواله بیکدیگر درگاه نازک استیفاء داشته باشد بهر حال در سال  
خود شناسند و مطابق تکرار داد خویش برای گرفتن تعلیمات و نشانند  
نیایات و بیاموزند به واسطه حاج لشکر لفر اثر و ضبط اساده عبارات  
... گوی در امده کمال سعی و کوشش بکار برد و در باب ناکیه

دانش ششم سال سی و دوم از حوس و ادب نوشته شد (SW No. 37)

No. 10

ارایع الدوله

دفعه پنجم حاجت کشاء گیم سادات بعبادت باشد در حدیثی که منقول  
برای قلم برداشته و اظهار محبت و ترویج خود دانست و در رسیده و سحرای حسن  
حدیثی آن تکرار شده و در باره که جمعیت خود را همراه نام دولی و پسر خود  
دارد نزد برادر دار سعادت نشان انتم جان گزافه می برده از بر خود دار  
برگردد و احلت زده حضور بیاید و قلمه پاک کرده در حدود نقطه نالاست گریه  
معنی نایب کرد و انجانبی را توجه احوال خود دانست با الهیایان حاضر باشد و یاده  
چهارم در تحریر فی اشباح و در ایام دولت و شکر بینه دیگر آنکه در بارگاه  
آمده کما قلمه زده حضور بیاید و نزد انجانب نایب پاک کرده را خوانند آورد

و سحر اکل شود شناسند بینه

(SW No. 55)

No. 11

ستراجه اول

19 مه

انقب سنجات رباب و تهور دستگاه کیم ساروت بجانیت  
 باشد بعد از آنکه فیل از این کیمز قلیه گشته درین  
 دار تهرنگشتی آید که آن سنجات پناه و آرام داری و  
 جانب ساروت و کمان ساروت و تهره بقاعه ادا کرده بودند  
 و در سنجاقه هرگز در پیرازند و سنجاقه اگر توج در کار جواب بود  
 از صور مرسانه جواب شد آید که حاضر خود جمع است در درون  
 و از سر انجام این کار سحری خود دانند تا مفتوح قلمه هر چه در  
 انهم مان در تهرنگشتی تمام جواب کرد در باب بخت و توفیق جائز  
 ندارد رباب چه نگارد بنایح و استرجاع بقیه (Sw No. 70)

No 12

ستراجه دوم

از زنده انداختن و از تهرنگشتی ساروت ساروت ساروت  
 مقدس و کیمز آن رباب و تهرنگشتی ساروت ساروت ساروت  
 دارد و تهرنگشتی که رباب و تهرنگشتی ساروت ساروت ساروت  
 بود در راه پناه و تهرنگشتی ساروت ساروت ساروت  
 این ساروت در پناه و تهرنگشتی ساروت ساروت ساروت

ماده بنده که حاضر خود بهمه جبهه جمع داشت و ایراد بر اقسام آن  
 بوده موافق قرار داد خود بعمل آورده و کمال خود را با نسیه است درگاه سلاطین  
 تبرسته که سرانجام طالب حسب المدعا صورت جاری است همچون محمد علی و غیره  
 از خود هرگز با اقسام سلاطین دستوری نیست مگر که ممکن است با نسیه خود  
 حقیقت را بمشهور ارم سرحد دارد سیت و کیم خبر بیاورن در میان نشسته

حوس و از قلم نشسته

(SW No. 43)



APPENDIX "A"

201

سردج = ۲۰

۱۱۸۱ [در سکه مورد] روح النعمان خانه داران عالمگیر ۱۲۵

دست باکم و بسکه در میدان بزرگ بوکری آگ چون درین راه خدمت حضرت  
نهاد پادشاه بود تا آنجا بعبه نمود و در وقت پناه سال دست نهاد نادری را و  
مقرر شده بایست که اگر . . . سال از بزرگسار پادشاهی حاضر نشوند و از خدمت  
گرای خود بری اند و طاعت دارند و از حال تعلق خود بپادشاه نیز سخنانی  
نماند بزرگوری پادشاه باشد حسن در وقت . . . بجزای خویش دانند درین  
باب تا که بلیغ دانسته تخلق نه و در نزد اشراف و اعیان نشسته و در تعلیم  
(Ms. No. 37. P. 10. Ms. No. 10)







[illegible]

70.6

۲۵۰۰۰۰

۸۰ [در گدود] نبات الله مرید نام گیر شد  
پیران بهر درات پناه و اسال مرتبت صبر الی انکسار دیوان صمدیه دارالکفر  
از قرار پنج و شتم هزاران ابرار شد چو در حلقه شریف شمعیت و  
رفت پناه نبات دسگاه شیخ نبات الله محفوظ باشد خلی که بر در  
قادر شده بود در کسبه بمطابق در آمد در درگاه دولت جبارانی  
حفظ و حرمت آن خلع تنبیه و تادیب غیبیان و سرانان و ... و ایام  
گذار بعد از کرامت مرتبت حان و اولان خان سپاهان شرف گردیده  
چنانچه حاکم و با جمعیت وانی منتزب این سمت می کنند باید که جمیع مراتب  
و ابیان مستار الله ابرار سازند که صورت سرانان و اولان و اولان هزاران و پس  
بر سر نامی الحباب در دجبه مراتب انعام قلعه پوست گده تنخواه داد ۵  
موانع خارج از اسال دارند و باید که تحریر شود

(Nov. 11, 1900 No. 50)

APPENDIX 'B'

APPENDIX BCHRONOLOGYYear 1680

<u>Month</u>	<u>Brief description of the event</u>
<u>January</u>	
13	Shivaji returned to Raigadh.
<u>March</u>	
7	Rajaram's thread ceremony.
15	Rajaram's marriage to Pratāprāo's daughter.
21	Construction work of the fort of Coloba begins.
<u>April</u>	
3	Death of Shivaji at Raigadh.
20	The English, the Dutch, and the Portuguese at Surat were troubled by the Mughals. The English had to pay 3 1/2 percent tax.
21	Rajaram declared king by Annaji Pant Burnis. Conspiracy to put Sambhaji under arrest.
22	Masūd Khan released Venkatādrī from the prison.
26	An order was issued by Pāoji Pandit to all the Subāhdārs to submit their account at Panhālā to Sambhaji.
27	Sambhaji declared himself king. Appointed new Subāhdār at Rājāpur.
28	Sambhaji was at Panhālā.
<u>May</u>	
3	Rajaram was at Raigadh.
7	The Portuguese opened talks of friendship with Sambhaji.

<u>Month</u>	<u>Brief description of the event</u>
<u>May</u>	
16	Many men were arrested at Raigadh on the orders of Sambhaji.
19	Between May 19, and June 16, Hambir rao arrested Moropant, Annaji Pant and Pralhād pant and carried them to Panhālā.
26	Khan-i-Jahān Bahādur Khan left for Sambhaji's territory by way of Burhānpūr.
<u>June</u>	
18	Sambhaji arrived at Raigadh and arrested Rajaram.
26	A representative of the English came to Sambhaji's court to put his grievances before the king.
27	Putlābāi, the fourth wife of Shivaji performed the Sati ordeal.
30	Earlier to this date sometime, Sambhaji gathered his army about 6000 men, paid them the salary of two months and appointed Subāhdārs.
30	The rumour of Annaji's killing reached Bombay.
<u>June-July</u>	
June-july	Khān-i-Zaman, son of AazamKhan appointed to Burhānpur in place of Iraj Khan.
July 7	Ranmast Khan marched to Hanumantgadh and Khān-i-Jahān Bahādur to Dhruggadh.
12	Sambhaji declared himself king and gathered army of twenty thousand men.
20	Sambhaji enthroned.
<u>July-Aug.</u>	The fort Ahiwant besieged by Bahādur Khan. Diler Khan went to Aurangzeb.
August 7	Prince Muḥammad Aazam was given the title of Shāh and was sent to the Deccan.

<u>Month</u>	<u>Brief description of the event</u>
August	Sidis attack on the Varathas at Khānderi. Marathas looted 25 guns of the Mughals at Sholapur.
Sept. 16	Aurangzeb started toward Burhānpur.
Sept.	On certain night Sambhaji with 200 men marched toward Underi.
Sept. 29	Moropant died at Rāigadh.
October 12	Milopant was released and was bestowed upon Peshwāi. Annaji Batto was also released and given his original assignment.
October 13-24	Sambhaji paid visit to Sāwā Yākūt at Kelsi and stayed for a week there.
October 25	Sambhaji arrived at Rāigadh.
October- November	Burhānpur plundered by Hambir rāo.
November 10	News was received at Chapade that a part of Sambhaji's army and cavalry had marched towards Surat and Burhanpur.
20	Sambhaji's representative went to Bombay with a complaint against the Sidis.
22	Muhammād Aazam reached Aurangābād.
24	Aurangzeb arrived at Burhānpur.
27	Sambhaji's Navy consisted of 60 galvats, 5000 armed men, and 5000 ordinary men.
December (Early)	Sambhaji was near Sholapur. Ranmast Khan gave a battle.
3	Abdum Nabi was given the title of Rozwihān Khan and was given the charge of artillery of the Deccan.
22	The Sidis sailed away for Vengurla from Māsgaon.
Dec. Jan.	Raghunāth Nārāyan was arrested in Jinji.

Year 1681

<u>Month</u>	<u>Brief description of the event</u>
January	
1	Prince Muḥammad Akbar crowned himself as the Emperor. He marched towards Ajmer in order to arrest Aurangzeb.
6	A petition from the English to obtain licence for trade from Sambhaji in the parts of Jinji, Cuddalore, Comminer and Porto Novo.
7	Prince Akbar declared rebel by Aurangzeb.
11	Gopāl Dadāji continued as Subāhdār at Porto Novo.
16	Coronation of Sambhaji at Rāigadh.  Fight between Aurangzeb and Akbar. Defeat of Akbar.  Sambhaji's attack on Janjira.
February	Iraj Khan appointed to Burhānpur in place of Khan-i-Jahān Bahādur.
March 11	Sambhaji sent Hārji Rāje Mahādik.
April 8	Shyāmji Māyak Pānde along with Jaitāji Kātkar and Bābāji Kākade with the army to Karnātaka.
March 26 (Earlier)	Aurangzeb imposed a tax of 2 1/2% on Muslims of Surat.
March-April	Kalandar Khan's fight with the Marathas near Naldurg.
April-May	Hannast Khan clashes with the Marathas near Aurangabad.
May 9	Akbar and Durgādās crossed the Narmadā river in order to go to Sambhaji.
May (Earlier)	Marathas burnt some of the Portuguese houses near Daman, as they killed some men of Sambhaji.
May-June	Akbar arrived at Trimbak.

<u>Month</u>	<u>Brief description of the event</u>
June 1	Akbar sought refuge with Sambhaji at Pali.
14	Aurangzeb concluded peace with Mahārānā of Udaipur.
16	Netāji Pālkar and Hiroji Farzand were sent by Sambhaji to meet Akbar.
July 31	<p>Azam Shāh was sent to chase Akbar along with the army.</p> <p>Netāji Pālkar appeared in Bāglāna</p>
August 2	Sidi Sambul's son came to Bombay with the intention of joining Sambhaji. Conspiracy was revealed.
August	<p>Marathas were active near Sanganner.</p> <p>Ikhlas Khan and Atish Khan were ordered to inspect Mughal forts and artillery respectively.</p>
August-Sept.	On the advice of Kavi Kalash Annāji Datto, Bal Prabhu Somāji Datto and Hiraaji Farzand were arrested by Sambhaji and put to death at Parli.
"	<p>Shyāmji Nāyak was arrested in Karnāṭaka.</p> <p>Rumour of Maratha force going to Antor.</p>
September	<p>Sambhaji visited Akbar at Pāli.</p> <p>Sambhaji issued orders to block all roads of Talkonkan to the Mughals.</p>
8	<p>Aurangzeb left Ajmer for Burhānpur.</p> <p>Sambhaji informs Akbar that his readiness with 30,000 men to attack Burhānpur.</p>
October 12	Sambhaji's preparation for attack on Burhanpur at Rāigadh.
24	Sidi Qāsim the naval commander of the Mughals arrived at Bombay.
27	Gulich Khan was sent on the expedition of the Deccan.

<u>Month</u>	<u>Brief description of the event</u>
October 27	Rajaram's mother Soyarābāi died.
October	Sambhaji's effort to release his wife and daughter from the custody of Diler Khan.
November 11	Hasan Shah arrived at Aurangābād.
13	Meeting between Sambhaji and Akbar at Pāteshāhpur (Pali?).  Aurangzeb arrived at Burhānpur.
December 17	The Sidis burnt Apta on the fātālgangā.
December	The Sidis ravaged Maratha territory from Panvel to Chaul.
Dec.-January	Hasan Ali Khan looted and burnt Kalyān Bhivandi and went back.
1681	Vithal Shankar was the Deshādīkari of Yāvali region.  Kāsi Ranganāth was the Subāhdār of Māwal territory.
<u>Year 1682</u>	
January 19	An attack by Sambhaji on Dandārājpurī.
22	Death of Jaldas Swami at Parli fort.  Ruhullāh Khan detached to invade Bijāpur territory.
February 24	Ranmast Khan arrived at Kalyān.  Sambhaji returned to Nālgadh from Janjira.
March 1	Aurangzeb set on march of Aurangābād from Burhānpur.



<u>Month</u>	<u>Brief description of the event</u>
March 23	Aurangzeb reached Aurangābād.
April 17	The Portuguese Governor captured Anjdiv.  Ināyat ullāh Khan was given the title of Ikhlas Khan.
25	The English warship 'Hunter' arrived at Bombay. Sambhaji's ultimatum to the English factors.
27	Chinnāji, the zamindar of Khadaggadh and a servant of Sambhaji joined Aurangzeb.
28	The Portuguese sent 4 galvats and 200 armed men to Anjdiv. Sambhaji sent his men to capture it.
April	Quarrel between Hārji Mahādik and Rājā of Sri Rangapattam. The Raja defeated Shihab-ud-din Khan laid siege to Rāmsej.
April-May	Rupāji Bhosale and Mānāji More gave a battle to Shihab-ud-din Khan near Ganesh Gaon and captured 500 horses.
May 8	Talks with the English factors, about the Sidis. Their ravages continue.
18	Son to Sambhaji, named Shivaji.
23	Ruḥullāh Khan sent to defend Ahmadnagar district.
24	Hayāt Khan was sent to attack the fort of Rāmsej.
May	Dom Francisco da Costa bombarded lower Chaul.
June 2	Marathas naval battle with the English near Khānderi. English had 40 galvats. Marathas reached Khānderi.

<u>Month</u>	<u>Brief description of the event</u>
June 10	Sambhaji rode to Rājāpur; besieged Revdandā.
15	Aazamshah left for Bijāpur.
18	ẖāfiz Muḥammad Amin Khan, Subahdar of Ahmadābād died.
27	Kānhoji Deccani was given the manzab of 5 hazari and 5 hazari sawār.
28	Janārdhanpant Nanmante died at Devrukh.
June	Aazamshah took the fort of Ihārur in Bijāpur territory.
August 5	A royal robe was given to Bahrāmshah Khan to be given to Yūsuf Khan and Khairiyat Khan, the faujdar of Dandārājpurī.
21	Night attack on Ramsej fort by Qāsim Khan.
September 19	Bahādur Khan joins Aurangzeb with 20000 force.
	Prince Muizuddin came to Aurangzeb.
28	Prince Muizuddin, Rannast Khan, Dāud Khan and Ghazhafar Khan left for Ahmadnagar to punish the Marathas.
September	The Marathas were active near the Bhima in Mughal territory. The Marathas appeared near Antor.
September-October	Siege of Rānsej was abandoned by the Mughals.
	Rannast Khan marched into Konkan through Mahje pass and occupied Kalyan.
October 5	Siddis Mieri's fight with the Marathas near Nāgothana. Sidi died of wounds.

- October 5 Māmūr Khan sent to Baglān to chastise the Marathas.
- 14 Marathas plundered a few villages near Nasik.
- 19 Khan-i-Jahān Bahādūr was asked to go to Varghat from Rāmsej and Bahādūr Khan to Talkonkan and Shihāb-ud-din Khan to Chakan to meet the Marathas.
- 20 Durgādās approaches Surat with 12,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry.
- October Sambhaji's ambassador was with the English factors at Bombay.
- November 1 Marathas attacked Mughal treasure and looted it.
- Bahādūr Khan and Rāmast Khan entered into Konkan.
- 24 Rāmast Khan camped at Kalyan. Marathas attacked Thālnēr.
- Sidis continue ravaging the Maratha territory.
- Naro Trimal appeared near Shikarpur.
- (after) the Sidis gallivats entered Pen and brought 200 Maratha prisoners to Māzgōn.
- 26 Marathas gave battle near Sanganner.
- Nov.-December Rupāji Bhosale, Keeopant, and Nilopant Peshwā marched against Rāmast Khan in Kalyan.
- The Marathas were active in Khandesh.
- December Rāmast Khan's army blockaded in Kalyan.
- 14 Shihāb-ud-din Khan went to Lohgadh.
- Sidis of Janjira gave fight to the Marathas.

<u>Month</u>	<u>Brief description of the event</u>
	Sidis of Janjira gave fight to the Marathas.
December	Hambir Rao planned an attack on Prince Aasam's camp.
	Marathas were active near Manumantgadh.
	Avlā Jivlā and 4 other forts collecting Chauth.
	Tukoji gave a battle to Janmast Khan near Kalyan Bhivandi. He was killed.
December January 1683	Raghunāth Nārāyan Hanumante returned from Kannāṭaka.

Year 1683

January	Marathas were active near Kolhapur. Qāsim Khan and Iraj Khan gave a fight.
January (early)	Shihāb-ud-din Khan attacked Maratha forces near Rājgadh, Purandhar and Shivāpur.
17	Akbar sent his envoy Abdur Rahim Khan to the Governor of Goa.
20	Ambassador of Aurangzeb Shaikh Muḥammad arrived in Goa.
January	Akbar along with Durgādās arrived at Bāndā.
	Manko Ballal attacked Maldurg.
Jan.-Feb.	Aasam Shah invaded Kolhāpur territory but was driven away by Hambir rāo beyond the Bhima.
February 13	The Governor of Goa issued orders to send gallivats to Akbar.
18	Vithoji Chavan closed the roads of Talkonkan. Izat Khan gave a battle.

<u>Month</u>	<u>Brief description of the event</u>
February 23	Marathas appeared near Ahmadnagar.
27	Hambir Rao's battle with Rannast Khan. Heavy losses suffered by the Mughals.
28	Khan-in-Jahān Bahādur ordered to go to Naldurg. Marathas were active near Jalnā.
March	Prince Azam's camp and family attacked by the Marathas at Dhārur.
	Sambhaji's blockage of Rannast Khan in Kalyan Ghivandi
3	Khan-i-Jahān Bahadur asked to go to Berar.
	Muhallish Khan sent reinforcements to Rannast Khan.
12	Marathas were in Bālāpur collecting chauth.
March	Khan-in-Jahan Bahadur & Iraj Khan gave fight to the Marathas near Talgāon.
	Marathas were chased by Iraj Khan near Elichpur.
March	A battle between Dilawar Khan and the Marathas near Pedgāon.
"	Raraji's battle with Giladar Khan of Dhārur.
" -	Muhallish Khan crossed Kolvan &
April	Rannast Khan went across the ghats.
April	
15	Sambhaji launched an attack on the Portuguese.
April	All the Mughal divisions operating against Akbar were recalled
"	The Mughals evacuated Kalyān.

May	4	Raghunath Hanmante died.
"		Prince Aazam recovered Dhārur from the Marathas.
"	8	Muhullah Khan returned to Aurangzeb.
June		Shihāb-ud-din Khan was recalled to Aurangzeb from Junnar.
August	5	Aazam Shah's artillery arrived at Aurangābād fort.
"	20	Aazam Shah was sent to invade Bijapur -
July	26	Shivaji's Munshi, Qāzi Haider joined Aurangzeb.
August	30	Sikandar 'Adil Shāh permitted Masūd Khan to go to Adeni.
September	15	Dilerkhan died after prolonged illness.
"		Shāh Ālam left Aurangabad for conquest of Konkan & Sāvant wādi.
September		At Nicholi, Akbar met the Portuguese Officers.
"		Aurangzeb ordered governor of Surat to buy 4 lakh maunds of grain.
Sept.Oct.		Aurangzeb arrived at Ahmadnagar.
"	"	Shihāb-ud-din Khan arrived at Poona.
October	12	Aurangzeb encamped at Karenpur.
		Aazam Shāh & Bahādur Bakht were sent to Gulshanābād (Nasik).
"	17	Governor of Goa attacks Fonda.
"	30	Samohaji went to Phonda. Yesāji & Krishnāji Kank showed bravery in the battle.
October-November		Shihāb-ud-din Khan encamps at Poona.
November	1	The Governor of Goa leaves Fonda.
"	8	Akbar purchased a small ship at Vengurla.

- " 13 Aurangzeb arrived at Ahmadnagar in order to direct Bijāpur operations.
- " " (after) Bahadur Khan left for Sāngola in order to punish the Marathas.
- " 19 Sarbaland Khan Khwājā Yaqut went to Bahādurgadh to punish the Marathas.
- " 20 Akbar embarks a ship, but Kavi Kulash persuades him to return.
- " " Masūd Khan left Bijapur and reached Adoni.
- " 24 Sambhaji took the Portuguese island of St. Estevan and defeated the Viceroy.
- " 26 Sambhaji left Goa.
- " 29 A representative of Kavi Kalash certain Kirti Shah arrived at Goa and had meeting with the Governor.
- November Khān-i-Jahān, advanced from Bidar to Akkalkot.
- December 12 Shah Ālam by way of Raighat descended into Kudāl & Bāndā.
- December 18 Muhallish Khan & Baharāzand Khan went at midnight towards Nira and Ashte against the Marathas.
- " 21 Sambhaji captured Kumbhārjuve & ravaged Sētī & Bārdesh.
- " " Sambhaji returned to Raighadh.
- " 22 Shah Ālam went back after burning Kudāl & Bāndā.
- " 24 Shihāb-ud-din Khan rewarded by Aurangzeb for the victories at Kalyan.
- " 27 Kelgwis arrested the President of the English Company and assumed the control of Bombay.
- " 28 Shāh-Ālam descends through Raighat and burns Kudāl & Bāndā.
- December Mā'mur Khan gained victory over Marathas in Poona district.
- 1683-84 Aurangzeb's & Sambhaji's fight near ALMAJ Sambhaji victorious. Many of Aurangzeb's men killed.

End of 1683, Aurangzeb arrived at Ahmadnagar.

1683-84

Hussain Ali Khan Fathan deserted Sharzā Khan and joined Aurangzeb.

Year 1684

January

- 3 Shihāb-ud-din Khan accompanied by Mankoji ravaged Nizampur.
- Sarbuland Khan ordered to join Shihāb-ud-din Khan
- 4 Marathe force appeared near Udgir Muzfar Khan resisted it.
- 7 Marathe force appeared near Longadh. Fakhar-ud-din resisted it.

Kavi Kalash went along with Prince Akbar to the forests of Bhingadh concluded peace with the Portuguese.

Manuel Saraiva de Albuquerque was the Portuguese representative attended the peace treaty.

" 15 Shāh Ālam arrived at Bicholim.

January - Baharāmānd Khan marched towards Mungi-Palthan to disperse the Marathes.

" Mughal army marched from Coe to Vengurla.

February 13 Prince Azam was sent to Bahādurgadh (Pedgaon). Timāji attacked his camp.

" 20 Shāh Ālam descended the ghats (S.Konkan).

March 3 The defence of Bijapur entrusted to Sayy-id Makhdum.

March 11 Handullah Khan died.

" 19 Āgā Khusrau made Prime Minister of Bijapur

" 30 Sikandar Ādil Shāh told by Aurangzeb not to keep any relations with Sambhaji by a farman.

" 31 Gasi-ud-din Khan Bahādur left for Poona & Karde - Hormona.



April	17	Ruhallah Khan joined Shāh Ālam with 500 camels, 100 horses and 25 mules.
"	"	Bahādur Khan returned from Kānk.
"	"	112 servants of Sambhaji who were in Mughal custody were killed.
May	18	A quarrel broke out between Sikandar Ādil Shāh & the Mughals.
"	"	Kavi Kalash returned to Raigadh.
"	24	Shāh Ālam returned from Konkan to Shānpur.
"	"	Aurangzeb reached Sholapur.
May	(end)	Khān-i-Jahān took possession of Mangalvedha, Sangola and the environs.
July	30	Sikandar Ādil Shāh sought help of King of Golkonda.
August	2	Two wives, one daughter and 3 maid servants of Sambhaji were taken by Abdur Rahmān, Qiledar of Bahādurgadh to Aurangzeb.
September	21	Gāzi-ud-din Khan was sent to capture the fort of Rāhiri (Raigadh).
October	8	Fakhrud-din was sent as thānadār of Supa, & Abdul Hādī Khan as faujdar of Chākan, & Marhamat Khan as thānadār of Karde Nemone.
"	26	Ruhallah Khan was sent to punish Marathas.
"	29	Mānāji More, Gangādhār Vāsudev and Rāhaji Somnāth were arrested by Sambhaji.
October		Mughals outposts held in Chākan, Karde Nimone and Supa in Poona district.
November	7	Kavi Kalash arrived at Raigadh.
"	10	Agā Khusrau expired.
"	16	Aurangzeb received gold key of Kothlagadh.
Dec.	1	Bahramand Khan ordered to go to Sirval.
December	4	Abdul Qadir son-in-law of Mukhlis Khan captured Kondānā fort and handed it over to Abdul Karim.

- December 12 Marathas gave fight to Akram Khan near Kānsej
- " 28 Shihād Khan left for Pārner and Senganner in order to punish the Marathas.
- " Bādeji Kākad gave a battle near Bithor in Karnataka to the Mughals.
- Dec. - Jan. 1685 Bāoji Nājā expired at Tanjore
- 1684 Keigwin sent his ambassador to Sambhaji. Lutufullah Khan ordered to chastise the Marathas near Bhagor.

Year 1685

- January (early) Marathas ransacked Burhānpur.
- " 2 Sambhaji marched into Pārner to fight Bahramand Khan.
- " 4 Shihāb-ud-din Khan came to Cēngoli from Poona. Kavi Kalash gave him fight and drove him above Bor ghat.
- " Gāzi-ud-din Khan destroyed and burnt Nizampur and three other villages. Hambir Rao and Bupaji Shossale ordered to drive away Gāzi-ud-din Khan.
- The Marathas were active near Karde Nimone. A battle between the Marathas and Khoja Hamid.
- The Marathas were active near Karād. Lutufullah Khan gave a fight.
- Jan. - Feb. Khem Szwant Dessai of Kudal deserted Sambhaji. The Portuguese gave him shelter.
- A fight between the Marathas and Muhammad Ismail near Manuvantgad.
- February 5 The Marathas led by Ranko Rao (Jankirao ?) and Kiloji Pandit raised Dharangāon.

February	8	A treaty between the Portuguese and the Sāvants.
"	12	The Sāvants attacked Sambhaji's territory and ravaged the creek of Vengurla.
"	21	A Maratha contingent under Niloo Pant reached Bijapur.
	25	Maratha commander's attack on Parenda Indāpur and Adgāon and Bhālawani.
March	(early)	Shāh Alam entered Hydrābād unopposed.
		Marathas were active near Chendan-Vandan.
		Muhullah Khan arrived at Mangalvedhā.
"	26	Shihāb-ud-din Khan awarded the title of Firus Jung by Aurangzeb.
"	28	Khawājā Abdur Rahim, a Mughal envoy was attacked by the Adil Shāhī troops.
April	1	The Mughals laid siege to Bijapur.
		Mughal gave fight to the Marathas near Supā.
"	25	Aurangzeb left Ahmadnagar
April		Arjunji, Sambhaji's uncle's son was made a 2 hazari & 1 hazari sawār.
May (Middle)		Mujāhid Khan's battle with Marathas near Pratapgadh.
May	25	Baharāmend Khan sent to watch the activities at Golkonda.
June	7	Marathas were active near Aurangabad.
June	10	Sidi Masūd's contingent arrived at Bijapur.
"	14	Asam Shāh arrived at Begum Haaz and assumed supreme command of the Mughal army besieging Bijapur.
June-July		Sambhaji sent Kavi Kalash to help Sikander Adil Shah. From Panhala he (Kavi Kalash) sent the Maratha army to Bijapur.
July	1	Abdur Kauf and Sharzā Khan assailed the trenches of Asam Shah.

August	14	A Golkonda force under Ambāji Pandit arrived at Bijāpur.
"	20	Rāwalā fort taken by the Mughals.
October	8	The Mughal army enters Hyderābād.
November	3	Sajāwar Khan died.
December	10	Hambir Rao with the army arrived at Bijāpur.
1685-86		Mahadji Raik Nimbalkar died in Gwalior Fort.
1685-88		During the reign of Sambhaji Angre's organised the Maratha naval ships and expanded the Navy. The following appointments were made. Rājkot : Subhānji Kharāde. Khānderi : Mānkoji Marathe Sāgar Gadh : Udāji Padwal Colobābā : Shiraji Gujar

#### Year 1686

January	31	Abdul Cādir Deccani was given a mansab of 2 hazari jat, 2 hazari Sawār.
Jan.- Feb.		Aurangzeb besieged Golkonda along with Cāsim Khan
March	(early)	Madannā, Akannā and Rustum Rao were murdered.
March - April		Mughals captured Miraj.
May	3	Abdul Aziz Khan Qiledār of Junnar died.
May		Baharāmānd Khan reached the thānā of Indī.
June	14	Aurangzeb left toward Bijāpur from Sholapur.
July	3	Aurangzeb reached Rasulpur (3 miles) from Bijāpur.
September	13	Aurangzeb captured Bijāpur.

September	14	Aurangzeb entered Bijapur. Formal meeting and arrest of Sikander Adil Shāh. Sons of Sharza Khan & Dahirol Khan made 3 hazari sardars.
"	22	Aurangzeb left Bijāpur for Sholapur.
"	30	Firuz Jang left Bijāpur in order to capture Ibrāhimgadh (in Hyderābād).
Oct - Nov.		Keso Trimel was sent to Karnātak.
November	6	Aurangzeb arrived at Sholapur.

Year 1687

Jan. - Feb.		Gutab Shah gave away Golkonda Basarpathan and other territory to Aurangzeb.
Feb.	11	Kesopant arrived in the Karnātaka.
"	21	Sālher captured by Aurangzeb's army.
Feb.- March		Akbar left for Iran by the sea.
March	2	Shāh Ālam put under arrest.
Mar - Apr.		Aurangzeb's army after taking Miraj took the road to capture Raibālā.
May	28	Shaikh Nizām joined Aurangzeb.
"	29	Mankōji, the Giledar of Sangola joined the Mughals after the capture of the fort.
"	"	Yesāji, Maratha Giledar of Sālher accepted Mughal service.
July	10	Qāsim Khan was captured at Bangalore by the Rājā of Mysore (but appears to have been set free).
Sept.	21	Golkondā taken by Aurangzeb through bribes. Abdul Hasan taken prisoner.
"	27	Qāsim Khan took the fort of Pilgude (Pennugondā) by treachery.
Dec.	24	The Marathas capture Arcot.
"	27	Pām Nāyak surrendered to Aurangzeb.

- 1687                      Hambir Rao died.
- "                      (end) Matabar Khan was placed in charge of Nāsik district.
- 1687 Dec.                Aurangzeb came to Bijāpur.
- 1688 Jan.                Shihāb-ud-din Khan sent to Adoni. He laid siege to Adoni.

Year 1688

- Jan.      10              The Marathas burst into Canjeeveram (Probably under Kesc Trimel).
- "          17              Matabar Khan captured Vishrāngadh.
- Jan.                      (Later) Azam Shāh was ordered to proceed against Sambhaji with the army of 40 thousand men.
- Feb.      25              Aurangzeb's encampment at Gulbergā.
- "          "                Ismā'il Khan      Magha      Yāchappā Māyak  
Rustum Khan and Muḥammad Sadiq arrived at Canjeeveram.
- Feb. - March            Azam Shāh captured Belgaum and many other forts.
- March    22              Hārji Mahādik went to Canjeeveram from Tiruvannamata;
- April                    Madangadh and Sarasgadḥ captured by the Mughals.
- August                  Holgadḥ captured by the Mughals.
- September              Sēmāngadh taken by the Mughals.
- Oct - Nov.              Quarrel broke out between Kavi Kalash and Shirke.
- Oct - Nov.              Sambhaji's fight with Shirke.  
Shirke defeated. Arrived at Khelnā.
- Nov - Dec.              On the instigation of Kavi Kalash Sambhaji arrested Prathād Pant and many others.
- Dec.                      Rānji Krishna looted the country adjacent to Pondicherry.

Nov. Dec. From Bijapur Aurangzeb arrived at Tulāpur on the banks of the Bhimā.

1688 Adoni and Kernal captured by Firbiz Jang.

Year 1689

Jan. Askar Ali appointed governor of Hyderabadī Karnātake

" 8 Fort of Trimbak captured through bribes by Mātabar Khan.

" 8 (after) Mātabar Khan got Kalyān, Bhivandi, Durgādi and Malanggadh etc. through bribes.

Feb. 1 Sambhaji & Kavi Kalash taken prisoners at Sangameshwar by Shaikh Nizām.

" 9 Rajaram was released from jail by the gilder of Rāigadh Katkar Changoji and Yesaji Kank. He was enthroned. Manaji More and other people were also released.

Yesaji and Sidoji Farzand were put to death.

" 14 Sidi Yācut captured the fort of Māhim. The English deserted it.

" 15 Aurangzeb arrived at Sanādurgadh.

March 3 to Dec. 18 Aurangzeb's stay at Koregaon.

March 9 Hārji Mahādik arrested by Keso Trimal at Tirunavelli.

" 11 Sambhaji and Kavi Kalash put to death at Tulāpur.

" " Mātabar Khan received orders to march against Mahuli.

March 25 Siege of Rāigadh begins, by Itigād Khan

April 2 Aurangzeb left Koregaon to visit Chākan.

April 3 Rajaram left for Pratapgadh.

June 10 Abdul Khair Khan appointed Subādar of Rāigadh.

June	30	Abul Khair Khan left Pannālē for Vellore.
June		Mubarak ullah appointed faujedar of Chākan.
June		Aurangzeb intended to return to the North.
July	10	Ruhullah Khan sent to capture the fort of Nāichur.
"	17	Fort of Prabal captured by Mētsbar Khan.
"	28	Fort of Mahuli gained by bribery by Mētsbar Khan.
Aug.	1	Asalgadh captured by the Mughals.
"	5	Zulfiqār Khan marched against Pratapgadh. Sambhaji gave fight.
"	28	Hātim Khan appointed qiledār of Chandargadh.
"	19	Hārji Mahādik released Kesopant.
Sept.	29	Hārji Mahādik died.
October	20	Itiqād Khan captured Raigadh. wives, sons & daughters of Sambhaji & Rajaram were taken as captives.
"	28	Rajaram arrived at Vellore and from there left for Jinji.
November	2	Rajaram entered Jinji.
"	4	Raigadh surrendered. Royal personages at the place arrested.
"	23	Itiqād Khan was awarded the title of Zulfiqār Khan Bahadur.
"	29	Ruhullah Khan captured the fort of Nāichur and named it Pirus Nagar.
November		Sambhaji's son Shivaji (Shahu) taken to Aurangzeb at Tulapur. Made a sardar 7 thousand Sawar and 7000 zāt.
"		Bahrāmānd Khan attacked fortress of Ausā.
December		Nāchappā Nayak, Ismail Khan Makh and other 4 thousand deserted Mughal service and joined Nilo Pant Peshwā at Chenāpattam (Madras).
"		Pannālē taken by the Mughals.



- 1689 Mātabar Khan took from Marathas Karnala, Mukutgad (Vikat), Chanderi, Khatuda, Mānik gadh, Sankia and Duggad.
- " Kānhoji and Shivāji fought with Shaikh Muhammad.
- " Kānhoji's battle with the Sidis at Sagar gadh and Rajkot. The Sidis defeated.

Year 1690

- Jan. 12 Aurangzeb arrived at Bijāpur.
- " 14 Rajaram went out of fort Jinji for bath in the sea.
- Feb. 10 Bahrāmānd Khan encamped on the banks of Krishna for ten months.
- Feb. Fight between Lutufullah Khan and the Marathas near Vāngi.
- May 6 (Before the date) Marathas captured Wāi, Pratāpgadh and other forts under Rāmchandrapant.
- " " (Before the date) Hireji Rao Darekar captured Pratāpgadh.
- " 21 Aurangzeb encamped at Galgota.
- " 25 Sharzā Khan (Rustum Khan) was defeated at hands of Rāmchandrapant and Shankarāji, Santāji and Dhanāji. He was captured with his family near Sātārā.
- " 25 (after the date) Pratāpgadh, Rohidā, Rājgad and Tornā recovered by Rāmchandrapant and Shankaraji Pant.
- " 30 Lutuf-ullah Khan was ordered to leave for Khatāv ghāts.
- July 6 Lutuf-ullah Khan arrived at Khatāv.
- August 27 Zulficār Khan arrived at Jinji and laid siege. Rajaram left Karnatak for further south.
- October 5 Prince Azam marched towards Bahādurgadh. Turned towards Sātārā to chase Santāji.

- October 12 Chokhandi besieged by the Marathas.
- " The Marathas were active near Gulbarga.
- " 15 Marathas gave fight to Hamid-ud-din Khan near Parenda.
- November 23 Nemaji Shinde, Mankoji Pandhare and Nagoji Mane and other 2 thousand deserted Mughal service and joined Rajaram at Jinji.
- Nov.-Dec. Sarja Rao Jedhe went to Tulapur and received royal orders from the Mughals for the Deshmukhi of Bhor in Maval territory.
- December 16 Khanasad Khan and Daud Khan attacked by the Marathas.
- Marathas were active near Khatav.
- " 22 Before the date Shankaraji Pant was made Sachiv by Rajaram.
- 1690 Matabar Khan returned to Kalyan.  
Kanhoji Angrey appointed as the second in command of the Maratha Navy.

### Year 1691

- Jan-Feb. Rajaram returned to Jinji from the further south.
- " Aurangzeb arrived at Calgala.
- Feb. 23 Aurangzeb left Calgala for Bijapur.
- March to May Aurangzeb's stay near about Bijapur.
- April 11 Nagoji Mane awarded Sardeshmukhi.
- May 28 Prince Kambakhsh sent to Jinji along with Baharamand Khan.
- May 1 Maratha force brought food grains into Panhala.
- " 7 Hamid-ud-din arrived at Kolhapur.

- June 4 Hanmantrao Ghorpade and his relation Krishnaji Ghorpade were assigned a special mission by Rajaram.
- June Maratha raids in Raibagh Hukeri region.
- October 4 Asad Khan joins Kambakhsh at Kadapa.
- December 16 Asad Khan and Kambakhsh reached Jinji.
- 1691 Pralhad pant appointed Pratinidhi by Rajaram.
- " Santaji appointed commander-in-chief of the Maratha army.
- " The treaty between the Sidis and Angrey. Dual control over Rajkot, Sagar gadh, Underi and Parbur.

#### Year 1692

- Jan. 16 Zulfiqar khan captured the fort of Narmal (Narbul.)
- Feb. (after) Ramchandrapant by sending men with Parshuram pant recaptured fort of Panhala from the Mughals.
- May 4 Aurangzeb left Bijapur and arrived at Qutbabad (Galgala)
- " 8 Prince Muiz-ud-din was sent to Akluj.
- " 9 Abdul Hasaq Khan Lari was given the faujdari of Rahiri and Konkan.
- June Pawan gadh (near Panhala) was recaptured by Parshurampant( ) (Source Rajaram by Sardesai, p.27).
- July 6 Ruhullah Khan died.
- Sept. 3 Kakkar Khan who accompanied Kambakhsh was appointed faujdar of Jinji.
- October 8 Dhanaji and Santaji reported to have seized some forts near Belgaum.

- October 24 Luṭuf-ullah Khan and Asalat Khan were sent to Ahmadnagar.
- " 27 Santāji and Dhanāji left Belgaum to attack Dhārwar.
- Hamid-ud-din Khan ordered to go to Dhārwar, Athni looted by the Marathas.
- November In the third week Kunjargadh captured by the Mughals.
- October Siege of Panhālā by Muizud-din begins.
- December 13 Dhanāji Jadhav was sent to Jinji for the help of Rajaram. On his arrival he captured Ismaile Khan Nakh, the Mughal officer. He also captured 500 horse and 2 elephants.
- " 14 On the orders of Ramchandrapant Santaji Ghorpade along with 15000 horse started for Jinji. After his arrival he captured Ali Mardān Khan near Jinji. He also captured 1500 horse and 6 elephants.
- " 16 Zulfiqār Khan abandoned the siege of Jinji and arrested Kāmbakhsh.

### Year 1693

- Jan. 5 Santāji in his raid at Desur looted the grain godowns of the Mughals.
- " 22 Zulfiqār Khan left Jinji for Wandiwash.
- (after the date) Asad Khan and Kam Baksh left for the court of Aurangzeb.
- Feb. 12 Amrit Rao Himbālkar awarded Deshmukhi of Sawade and Khanapur in appreciation of his services.
- Jan. Marathas appoint Keshav Rāmanā as Subahdar of Golkonda Karnatak.
- Feb-March Expedition of Trichnapalli by the Marathas. Rajaram was present. The siege was laid by Santāji.

Feb. March	Yāchappā Nāyak took Sat-gadh. Bahiraji Ghorpade and Yāchappā Nāyak left Rajaram.
March	Zulfiqār Khan retreated 24 miles from the fort of Jinji due to scarcity of grain.
"	Marathas active near Mandrup.
April 23	Peace talks between Rajaram and Raja of Trichnapalli.
"	(after) Meeting between Rajaram and Shahaji II at Tanjore.
"	The Marathas active near Miraj.
April-May	Santāji's quarrel with Rajaram and return to Maharashtra. Dhanāji appointed in his place.
"	Ismāil Khan Makha gave a fight to Santāji at Jinji and was injured.
May	Rajaram to Yāchappā Nāyak and Bahirji Ghorpade quarrelled with Rajaram who was at Vellore.
June 15	Kāmbakhsā arrived at the court of Aurangzeb.
Aug.-Sept.	Himmat Khan was sent to Bhahrani, Akulj and Katar.
Oct. 20	Sidhgadh captured by Katabar Khan.
" 22	Santāji attacked Himmat Khan near Mandgaon (Mandavgaon ).
Oct-Nov.	Ramchandrapant, Shankaraji Pandit and Dhanaji Jadhav helped Panhala with the result that the siege was lifted.
Oct. 27	Battle near Panhālā between Mughals and Dhanāji Jadhav and Ramchandrapant.
Oct.	Amrit Rao deserted Mughals and jointed Marathas.
Nov.9	Himat Khan gave a severe battle to Santāji for 3 days. Santāji was defeated.
" 21	Himat Khan and Sayyad Abdullah drove Santāji into the fort of Alur (14 m.s.w. of Malkhed).

November-  
December

Yachappa Nayak met Zulfiqar Khan and accepted the Mughal service.

"

Ali Mardan Khan who was captured by the Marathas secured his release by paying ransom.

Year 1694

Jan.-Feb.

Zulfiqar Khan attacked Tanjore from Wandiwash.

March 29

Muiz-ud-din was received by Aurangzeb at Calgala.

March

Bahirji Ghorpade reconciled, sent to Tanjore to defend it.

April 5

Bidar Bakht sent for Panhala.

April-May

Zulfiqar Khan arrived at Tanjore. Received 40 lakhs chakra and made peace with Shahaji II.

May 22

Shahaji II signed a letter of submission to the Mughals.

August 2

Santaji and Dhanaji were out near Waragadh (a fort 25 m.e. of Satara).

Sept. 10

Zulfiqar Khan took the territory close to Jinji.

" 15

Zulfiqar Khan captured the fort and territory of Jagdev. Blockaded Jinji.

" 16

Zulfiqar Khan laid siege to Jinji.

" 16

(after) Yachappa Nayak was murdered by Zulfiqar Khan.

October

Zulfiqar Khan marched out of Wandiwash and camped at north of Changaon ( ) fort and pass (42 m.w. of Jinji).

Oct.-Nov.

Santaji reprimanded by Shankaraji pant and sent to Karnataka along with Yesaji Walhar and Hanumantrao Nimbalkar.

"

Marathas regained fort of Kari (8 m.s. of Bhor and close to Rohida).

1694 Kānhoji received the title of Sarkhel of Vijay Durg.

" Death of Pralhad Nirāji.

#### Year 1695

(Early) Siege of Vellore by Zulfiqār Khan.

May 11 Aurangzeb left Nawaspuri and arrived at Brahmanpuri on 21st May.

May The powder magazine in Mahuli fort exploded. The destruction of stores of Mutabar Khan was worth Rs. 18000.

Santāji visited Parli to celebrate marriage of Bahirji's son.

October Kumari fort sieged by the Mughal quiledar of Junnar.

November The English supplied to the Sidis with ammunition.

Nov.-Dec. Dhanāji Jādhav went to Karnataka and lifted siege of Vellore.

#### Year 1696

January 5 Santāji Ghorpade defeated and captured Khazad Khan and Qasim Khan in the battle of Dodderi. Qasim Khan died. Khānasad Khan paid a ransom of Rs. one lakh.

" 20 Santāji attacked Himmat Khan at Basavpattan.

" 22 Hamid-ud-din Khan sent to the relief of Himmat Khan.

January Santāji killed Himmat Khan near Basavpattan.

" Prince Bidar Bakht ordered to march to Basavpattan.

February 26 Fight between Santāji and Hamid-ud-din Khan near Basavpattan.

" Prince Asam sent to Pedgaon from Islāmpuri.

March 26	Aurangzeb left Islāmpuri for Sholapur.
March-April	Tarbiyat Khan who had gone to Mahadev gadh to punish the Marathas, returned to Islāmpuri.
"	Aurangzeb sent Firuz Jang to Nāgingera against the Bedars.
"	Santāji went to Jinji to pay compliments to Rajaram.
April	Zulfiqār Khan repulsed Santāji at Arni.
May 16	Barmappā Nayak of Chital Durg granted pardon by Bidar Bakht.
May-June	Quarrel between Santāji and Dhanāji near Jinji. Dhanāji was defeated and returned to Maharashtra. Amrit rāo Nimbalkar was killed in the fight. The place of event Aiwarkutty 20
July	(after) Hamid-ud-din Khan returned from Dodderi to Islāmpuri.
August 2	Dundirao was given mansab of 1 1/2 hazari and was made thānādār of Mahadev hills.
"	Rāmachandra the thānādār of Khatāv promoted to 2 hazari sat and 11/2 hazari sawar.
1696	Sidi Qāsim took Anjanvel (near Chiplun) from Parshuram and Mahadāji Ballāl.
"	Kanhoji Angrey captured Sāgargadh from the Mughals.

#### Year 1697

February	Zulfiqār Khan returned to Arcot.
March	(after) Wasi-ud-din Khan and Matlab Khan were sent towards Indapur to punish the Marathas.
"	(after) Prince Bidar Bakht was sent to Bahādurgadh.
"	Santaji returned from east coast to Satara.



March-April	Santāji Arrived at Sātārā. Firuz Jang was sent against him by Aurangzeb.
"	Attack of Firus Jang on Santāji near Sātārā.
June	Death of Pralhād Nirāji at Jinji.
June-July	Santāji murdered near Mahadev hills by Nagoji Māne through treachery.
August 2	Rajaram sent Karna to Zulfiqār Khan. He was accompanied by Khando Ballāl.
November 8	The Mughal army renewed the siege of Jinji.
" 24	Khan-i-Jahān Bahādur Zafar Jang died.
Nov-December	Bidār Bakht sent against Dhanāji near Vellore.
December 25	Prince Kam bakhsh appointed Subāhdār of Berār.
" 26	Rajaram left Jinji fort for Vellore.
1697	Kānhoji Angrey made Colaba as his chief operating place.
"	Janārdhan pant Hanumante died.
"	Fath Khan appointed to Parendā.

#### Year 1698

January 8	The fort of Jinji was captured by Mughals. 3 sons, 2 daughters, 4 wives of Rajaram and families of other Maratha sardars were captured. Jinji was named as Nusrat-gadh.
February 22	Rajaram arrived at Khelnā.
May 23	Son to Rajaram (probably by Rajasbai) named Sambhaji.
Nov.-Dec.	Dhanāji went to Jinji by way of Khelnā. He was followed by Bidār Bakht.
1698	On the death of Sidji Gujar, Kanhoji Angrey became chief of the Maratha armada.

- 1698 The Maratha armada at Suvarna Durg and Cheria. Their chief operating place was Colaba.
- " Kānhoji recovered all the forts on Konkan side from the Mughals (under Mughals since 1694).
- " Sidi Yaqut Khan of Janjira advanced with his men and armada from Rājāpur and stayed at Colaba for 5, 6 months and destroyed 7,8 thousand coconut trees.
- Year 1699
- (Early) Rajaram set out on a tour of inspection of forts in Konkan.
- January-Feb. Firus Jang made peace with Bedars and attacked Beogadh.
- February 19 An ordinance issued by Rajaram cancelling the titles of Vatans/Inams except those granted in the days of Shivaji.
- " 22 After the death of Ātish Khan, Māmūr Khan was appointed faujadar of Karnataka.
- February-March Rajaram's encounter with Bidar Bakht near Gadag.
- July 20 Rajaram reached Vasantgadh.
- July (after) Satva Daffe deserted Mughal army. Tarbiyat Khan Sayyid Khan and Shukrullah were sent to chase him.
- Oct. 19 Aurangzeb left Islāmpuri to conquer the hills forts of the Marathas.
- " 31 Rajaram left Chandan Vandan for the Adraki pass.
- Oct.-Nov. Bidār Bakht and Zulfiqār Khan sent against Rajaram.
- Nov. 13/14 Bidār Bakht came upon the Marathas near fort of Parenda.
- " 17 Fight between Bidar Bakht and Rajaram on the banks of the Narnada.

Nov. 21	Aurangzeb reached Masur.
Nov. 22-25	Siege of Vasantgad by Aurangzeb.
" 22/23	Bidār Bakht reached Ausa.
" 25	Vasantgad captured by the Mughals.
December 1	Rānoji Ghorpade was sent near Karārābād (Karad) in Sāngolā thānā.
Dec. 8 to April 21 (1700)	Siege of Sātārā by Aurangzeb.
December 19	Chori Khan the faujadar of Karārābād was captured by Dhanāji.
Dec. 20 and 21	Hamid-ud-din Khan attacked Masur. He was opposed by Dhanāji and Rānoji.
Dec. 26	Bidār Bakht returned from Jinji to Aurangzeb at Sātārā.
" 27	Ikhlas Khan slain by Dhanāji near Sātārā siege camp.
Dec.-Jan.	Rajaram's return to Rajgad.
"	Attack on Aurangzeb's camp at Brahmapuri by Dhanāji.
1699	Kānhoji Angrey defeated the united army of the Mughals, the Sidis and the Portuguese. Collected large revenue.
"	Yāqut Khan besieged Colaba for a period of 4 months.
"	Vithal Gopal appointed Subāhadār of Jāvali.
"	Bālāji Vishvanāth appointed Sar Subāhdār to Aurangabad and Poona territory.

Year 1700

January 6	Rāmchand, thānedār of Khatāv was promoted to 2 hazari.
"	Ikhlas Khan gave a severe battle one mile away from the imperial camp at Sātārā and was killed. Son of Najābat Khan also died.

- January 9 Hamid-ud-din Khan fought Dhanāji, Rānoji Ghorpade and Hanumant Rao appeared beyond Masur.
- " 10 Nusrat Jang, Bahrāmānd Khan and Hamid-ud-din Khan attacked Dhanāji and Hanumant Nimbalkar and Rānoji Ghorpade beyond Rahmatpur.
- " 22 Dhanāji captured thānedār of Khānāpur.
- " 25 Nusrat Jang repulsed the Marathas near Undirgāon (14 m.s. of Parenda).
- March 3 Death of Rajaram at Sinhgadh.
- March Karna was crowned as king. He died three weeks later.
- Feb.-March Rajaram's son Shivaji sat on the throne. Tarabai became dowager and queen.
- April 3 Death of Sikandar Ādil Shāh at the foot of Sātārā fort.
- " 21 Subhānaji surrendered Sātārā to Aurangzeb.
- " 22 Fath ullah Khan sent to Parligadh to dig trenches for the siege.
- " 30 Aurangzeb encamped in front of Parli gadh. Ruhullah Khan and Chin Qulich Khan laid siege to the fort.
- June 4 Faqir ullah Khan, a grandson of Fath ullah Khan and 60-70 men killed during Parligadh operations.
- June 9 Fort of Parli captured through bribes by the Mughals. It was renamed Nauras-tārā.

Year 1701

- Jan. 1           Mughals reached city of Miraj.
- "    3           Mukhlis Khan imperial pay master died at Miraj.
- "    21          Dhanāji's encounter with the Mughals near Panhālā.
- January        Treaty between Kānhoji and the Portuguese.
- February 4     Fight between Dādo Malhar and the Sidi.
- March 2        Aurangzeb started for the conquest of Panhālā and Pāvangadh. Arrived there on March 9.
- "    6           The Sidi of Janjira laid siege to Khānderi and Colaba.
- "    9           Siege of Panhālā and Pāvangadh by Aurangzeb begins.
- "    13          Manual Moraes de Carvelo, a Portuguese artisan came to Angrey to help him in construction of ships.
- April 16       Ismāil Khan Makh become faujidar of Nabi shāh durg.
- May 28         Conquest of Panhālā and Pāvangadh completed by Aurangzeb. Panhālā renamed as Nabi Shah durg. It was taken over by Tarbiyat Khan through bribes.
- May 29 to Nov. 7   Aurangzeb's halt at Khatāv for the rainy season.
- June 6         Capture of Vardhangadh by Fatahullah Khan and renamed Sādiqqadh.
- "    23          Capture of the Fort Nāndgir by Fath-ullah Khan. Renamed Nāngir.
- "    24          Aurangzeb's camp at Budhpīnchgaon.
- August 28      Latufullah Khan was transferred to Aurangabād as Subahdār.

- Sept.-Oct. Bidār Bakht occupied Samān gadh Vardhan gadh and Kalausdhi fort.
- Oct. 6 Capture of Chandan and Vandan by Aurangzeb. Renamed Miftāh and Maftuh.
- Nov. 7 The march of the Mughal army from Sādiq gadh towards Malkāpur in order to capture Khelnā.
- Nov. Bidār Bakht ordered to come to Khelnā with his troops by way of Borgāon.
- Nov.-Dec. Firuz Jang sent to Brahmapuri to safeguard communication.
- Dec. 23 The siege of Khelnā by Mughals commenced.

#### Year 1702

- Jan. 19 Muhammad Amin Khan descended through the pass of Ambā Ghāt into Talkonkan and devastated the Maratha territory up to Khelnā.
- June 4 Rs. two lakh sent to Parshurāmpant Qiledār of Khelnā by Bidār Bakht. Parshurāmpant vacated the fort on 6th June. Renamed Sakhkharlanā.
- " 10 Zabī Khan made Qiledār of Khelnā. The Mughal army set out towards Bahādurgadh from Khelnā.
- " 11 Bidār Bakht rewarded and sent to Hukeri Bāibagh by Aurangzeb.
- July 17 Mughal army reached Panhālā.
- " 29 The Mughal army reached Vadgāon and after one month set out for Bahādurgadh.
- July Excessive rainfall in Maharashtra.
- September Mughal army crossed the Krishna river.
- November 13 Aurangzeb's encampment at Bahādurgadh.
- " 15 Bidār Bakht took over as viceroy of Aurangabad.

- December 3      The Mughal army set out for the conquest of Kondānā. Arrived there on 27th December.
- December 27      Siege of Kondānā begins by the Mughals.
- Dec.-Jan.1703      Nemāji Shinde and Keso pant attacked the territory beyond the Narmadā river.
- 1702      Angrey captured one of the British ships at Calicut and brought it in his port.
- "      The port of Khānderi taken over by Angrey from Mahādaji Chinnāji.
- "      Zeb-un-Nissa Begum died in prison at Delhi.

#### Year 1703

- Jan.      Amanat Khan get faujadāri of Sanganner in addition to Bijapur.
- "      Sometime after January Chin Gulich Khan was appointed faujadār of Talkonkan, Belgaum and thānādār of Sangāon vice Saif Khan.
- February      Bidār Bakht appointed Subāhadār of Khandesh.
- April 8      Kondānā taken over by Aurangzeb after paying Rs. 50,000 to the Maratha Qiledār.
- July 10      Rāi Bhānji Bhonsale gets mansab of six thousand from Aurangzeb.
- "      Vyankoji Bhosale got a mansab of six thousand in Aurangzeb's service.
- "      (After rainy season) Nemāji Shinde ravaged the territory of Berār crossed the Narmadā and entered into Malwa.
- Nov. 27      Shāhu was released from Gulālbār and sent to Kāmbakhsh.
- "      29      Two marriages of Shahu arranged - Rajasbaie and Ambikabaie respectively.
- Nov-Dec.      Fight of Nemāji Shinde and Kesopant with Sharsā Khan. Sharsā Khan captured.

Nov-Dec. Sharzā Khan released after paying a ransom of Rs. 3 lakhs.

1703 The Viceroy of Goa sent a friendly letter to Kānhoji Angrey.

### Year 1704

Jan. 27 Padaji, thānādār of Budhpanchgāon who had 2 1/2 thousand mansab, got an increment of 500 zat.

Jan. Nemāji and Kesopant crossed the Narmadā river and attacked Sironj.

Jan. and Feb. Firuz Jang sent to chase Nemāji Shinde and Kesopant beyond the Narmada.

" Nemāji Shinde, Kesopant and Parsoji Bhosale crossed the Narmada with 50,000 troops.

Feb. 16 Rajgadh was captured by Aurangzeb. Firangoji and Damaji handed over the fort. Renamed Nabi Shahgadh.

Feb. 23 The Mughal army pitched its tents in the vicinity of Tornā to capture it. The Mughal siege commences.

March 10 Tornā captured by Aman ullah Khan by escaled. Renamed Fath-ull-Ghaib.

March Matabar Khan died.

April 17 Aurangzeb fixed his camp at Khed for 7 1/2 months. Renamed Masnadabād.

May 9 Death of Ruḥullah Khan.

" Shahu urged to become Muslim through Hamid-ud-din Khan.

Oct. 22 Aurangzeb set out towards Wāgingerā.

Oct.-Nov. Draught in Khāndesh and Berār.

November Death of Prince Akbar in Irān.



- Nov. 10 The Mughal army marched out of Poona for the conquest of Rājgadh. Reached the foot of the fort on 28th November.
- Nov. 11 Siege of Rājgadh by Aurangzeb.
- Dec.-Jan.1705 Lohgadh taken by the Marathas by escaled.
- 1704 Dāud Khan Panhi, while he was going towards Adoni, was attacked by the Marathas.

#### Year 1705

- Feb. 8 Siege of Wāgingerā by Aurangzeb.
- March Jahānzeb Bānā, daughter in law of Aurangzeb died.
- May 1 Wāgingerā taken by Aurangzeb.
- May 1 to Oct. 23 Aurangzeb's stay at Devāpur.
- June-July Kondānā taken by the Marathas by escaled.
- " Aurangzeb fell sick due to fever.
- Oct. 23 Aurangzeb set out for Bahādurgadh from Devāpur after his illness.
- Dec. 6 Aurangzeb arrived at Pedgaon.

#### Year 1706

- Jan. 18 Shahu was sent along with Zulfiqār Khan by Aurangzeb in order to set him free.
- " 20 Aurangzeb returned to Ahmadnagar, after a lapse of twentytwo years.
- March 4 Marathas attack Patangpur.
- " 21 Zulfiqār Khan captured Kondānā.
- April 12 Prince Aazam arrived at Ahmadnagar from Junnar.
- May Mihar-un-Nisā, daughter of Aurangzeb and her husband Izid Bakash died in Delhi.

Buland Akhatar, son of Akbar died.

Tarbiyat Khan was sent to Bahman Baksh Khero to chastise Marathas.

Shiv Singh Qiledār and faujdār of Hairi became Qiledar and Faujdar of Nabi shah darg and Chakan in place of Lodhi Khan.

Mandhota, son of Rao Kanhu, officer under Zulfiqār Khan was appointed with Yāsīn Khan to conquer the forts Hanumant gadh and Prachit-gadh.

Mir Numān was attacked by the Marathas near Mārdi. Parsoji Bhosale laid siege to Salwādi near Aurangabad. Parsoji Bhosale moved into Burhānpur.

are active in Cāndāpur in Khandesh. were defeated by the Marathas. attacked and looted near Nevāsā.

Ali Khan, Masud Khan and Mir were defeated near Aurangābād.

captured three British ships. From them they recovered 12 guns, 26 men and also captured Portuguese and

the sister of Aurangzeb died.

#### Year 1707

Marathas active near

to Bijapur as Subāhdār.

Azam to Ujjain as Governor.

at Bhingār near Ahmadnagar.

turned to Ahmadnagar.

on the throne.

for Delhi.

the Mughals.